Kenya: EACC investigation into Gov. Hassan Joho and Tom Mboya Primary School verifying his education!

Answer from the School to EACC:

 

Opinion: Everybody hates Governor Joho!

The Presidency and Regime under Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto, must have some grand issues with Mombasa and Coast Region as they every week for the last month has attacked with all sorts of tricks against the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) Deputy and Governor Hassan Ali Joho. That the Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP) and their cooperative measures to marginalize the opposition figure isn’t really working.

They have detained the man for wanting to see the first relaunch of the ferries as the Jubilee held rallies in his back yard as far back as the 13^th March 2017. They have since then blamed his government for lacking accountability and transparency, like the Central Government haven’t had enough issues with corruption scandals.

So President Kenyatta should be cautious attacking fellow peers in midst of re-election rallies, but it isn’t like he cares. Since he feels like he is Teflon and cannot be touch. When they attack his educational background, as they have attacked him before his accountability as a Governor. Therefore, all we see is steady attacks on the character of Joho.

Also said he was meddling with drug-dealers and importers, as they we’re having drug cartels, like the sugar cartels supporting Jubilee and Kenyatta. But hey, not that anyone really looks into the donor funding to the Jubilee from the Sugar and Coffee Cartels to the Kenyatta government. Still, all problems of crime in Mombasa County is Joho’s fault. As the corruption of the Ports is Joho’s fault, not that this has been issue since the independence. That even Jomo Kenyatta was working against the corruption on the Ports of Mombasa, even President Daniel Arap Moi we’re complaining when needed about the graft at Mombasa.

So after decades upon end with independence and second generation Kenyatta, the problems are still there. If they seriously wanted it to change, than John Githongo would still have a job and not been kicked-out the door by former President Mwai Kibaki! But that is a story the ruling regime doesn’t want to eat, still they easily eats of state coffers and thinks side-stories of undressing leaders of opposition makes the world and Kenyan citizens forget that.

I am sure Cabinet Secretary for Interior Joseph Nkaissery is trying to find the next charge he can put on the ODM Governor, as he has tried to revoke his guns and take away his security guards. So, there aren’t that many tricks left in the basket of peddling nonsense into the public sphere. They have used all sorts of demagoguery and misused their place as key leadership. Instead of being noble and show character, they have gone straight for the heart and attacked the character instead of the polices.

So the Jubilee has misused their opportunity to gain and show that they are better than Governor Joho, they have lost on public display, they have used the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) looking into his tax-record, Kenya National Examination Council (KNEC) looking into his educational history and also the added accountability, where the leadership of Jubilee claimed his county got 40bn shillings instead of the 16 billions shillings Joho claims the Mombasa County received from the Central Government.

The Jubilee under Kenyatta and Ruto have used all tools and tried to destroy the legitimacy of the leadership of Joho. Just like they fear him more than Raila Odinga, Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka or Musalia Mudavadi. Since they are all walking around like kings, while all of business of Joho is on the front pages.

That the state and their top leadership continues to pound on Joho, shows how little character themselves have, that they have to go after a governor when themselves going into National Elections. That they are going after a local politician, when they should go against the faces who could be Presidential Candidates. Since they are not touching the NASA/CORD leadership, instead they pick Joho as prey, but instead of clearing the flesh of the bones. They are instead creating their own wounds. Peace.

Kenya Revenue Authority: “Re: Notice under Section 59(1) of the Tax Procedures Act, 2015” – A notice on Gov. Hassan Ali Joho (14.03.2017)

Gov. Joho we’re arrested and only show the weakness of Jubilee leadership, nothing else!

“We firmly stood by our rights & questioned the illegal and frivolous charges under which were placed under arrest” – Hassan Ali Joho (13.01.2017)

Again and again the Kenyan Authorities goes against the Orange Democratic Movement own Coast or Mombasa Governor Hassan Ali Joho. Like he is the terminator or the villain out of one of the superheroes films that he is going to shot wild and go on a rampage against civilians because he owns a few guns that he has licensed. That isn’t weird as the Police are following him and detaining him when they have the ability.

The Police chief of the Coast are a remarkable man, one of kind who has to follow order, smile and grin to media, still looking mad and angry because the citizens shouldn’t go for a ODM candidate or stand by their elected ODM Governor. That is what the Police Commander Nelson Marwa is saying, but not in words, in actions!

Others arrested with him and was listed by the Police because they have licensed firearms, we’re the Mombasa Senator Hassan Sarai, because why not right? Got to silence the Opposition, especially knowing that the election season is around the corner.

On that day as he was arrested and others Deputy Vice-President William Ruto at a Jubilee Rally sneezed this out: “Today we face a rudderless, clueless, disorganized and leaderless opposition”. Well, if you we’re arbitiary charged and taken to the Police Office at any sort of junction your organization skills and campaigning would lag behind honourable Ruto, right?

So the arbitrary arrest of Joho is evident that the Jubilee government doesn’t plan to have a fair race in the coming months. They plan to suffocate and give no breathing space for the opposition as their own misgivings and scandals are brining lots of eating receipts from government funds, as much as the giant promises of previous elections has by all means to get shuffled. Like the promises of fancy stadiums in bigger towns and other investments in infrastructure that hasn’t been brought to court.

So the Joho and the ODM, the other opposition might get under fire from the authorities, they get challenged as they cannot get time to focus or keep their parties in check. If they did they could have the time to undress the kings and queens in the Jubilee party that thinks this is sure WIN and without any questions they should have a second term.

There were only Sarai who parts of the group that the ruthless Police Commander detained at his Police Station today. Another lucky one was MCA Ali Azhar. So the Police had decided to be hampering with freedoms of their elected citizens. Since they could so and show the world that Jubilee can make anybody criminals. That is what this shows. They have no integrity to do it or any sustainable evidence of any criminal intent of the elected officials. Still, they all ended with spending the day in the Police Station.

IGP Boinnet will claim he wasn’t taken to the Police Station or even arrested, but did it seem like he was there for a cup of tea and biscuits, are you serious with the trying to deceive your citizens Mr Officer? That Hassan Ali Joho we’re all free, if he was so free? Why wasn’t the politicians who showed up at the Police Station leaving the premises and not themselves stuck there trying to get him out of the Police Custody?

Did you IGP Boinnet see what I did there? I questioned your motives and the reason why other people in the same position of Joho happen to be arrested in an arbitrary arrest at the station today. So I wonder what their reasoning will be, not like the pictures of his release and his time in the Police Station will be forgotten quickly.

The Jubilee has not played smart detaining a political leader on the same they are claiming the opposition are rudderless, as much the election is coming up the government and ruling regime better act more mature. This is petty crap that isn’t honouring the democratic values and neither the openness of the Kenyan political landscape. That they are closing the doors and making it hard for the opposition before the election will only give leverage to the Opposition. That is unwise of Jubilee, but they have worked for months and for years pending things on Joho. So they will continue to pound him for his popularity in the Mombasa County.

Certainly the arbitrary arrest of the Governor Hassan Ali Joho of Mombasa today is a supposed to frighten and show power of the current leadership. Instead it shows their weakness, since they don’t believe in their own policies and leaders to challenge him in fair fight. They have to criminalize a political opponent. Cheers and hurray for Jubilee! Peace.

Ruto asks Raila to come clean on graft (Youtube-Clip)

“But even as Odinga defended himself, deputy president William Ruto led Jubilee leaders in challenging the cord leader to be more open on whether he had personally benefited from corruption schemes in the country. The leaders especially want Odinga to explain whether or not, he abetted Mumias sugar company financial woes” (Kenya Citizen TV, 2016)

Kenya: Press Statement on the Status of the Recruitment of Chairperson, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (21.11.2016)

Advocacy Brief on Kenya: 15th Session of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 16-24 November, 2016 (21.11.2016)

Background

At the height of the violence that gripped Kenya after the disputed 2007 elections, the Party of the National Unity and the Orange Democratic Movement, who were parties to the conflict, wrote to the International Criminal Court (ICC) seeking its intervention to stop what they called genocide. A local investigatory commission with international participation found that some actions during the post-election violence likely met the threshold of crimes against humanity and recommended the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Kenya, or in the alternative, the handover of the sealed evidence to the Prosecutor at the ICC.

Efforts to establish the Tribunal were defeated by political forces aligned to suspected perpetrators, hence triggering the handover of evidence to the ICC and the subsequent investigation. Six Kenyans were named in connection with seven crimes against humanity charges; the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed charges against four suspects. Two suspects – Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were subsequently elected President and Deputy President, respectively, before their trials could begin at the ICC. Thereafter, the Prosecutor withdrew charges against two suspects – Francis Muthaura and Kenyatta – citing witness bribery and intimidation, as well as failure by the Kenya government to cooperate with the court. The remaining case against Ruto and journalist Joshua arap Sang was terminated citing “intolerable levels of witness interference and political meddling”.

Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) has followed closely the developments around accountability for the crimes committed during the 2007 post-election violence. Since the opening of the investigations in March 2010, we have observed certain shortcomings and challenges on the part of the Government of Kenya, the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and the African Union (AU). This brief seeks to focus on key issues emerging from the situation that the ICC and international justice finds itself in today, while drawing linkages from how the Kenya cases and other ICC cases were managed. KPTJ also makes recommendations on actions that require to be undertaken by the ASP, the ICC and African governments in order to address the emergent challenges.

1. Engage and Withdraw Simultaneously?

A Contradiction in the Mandate of the AU Open Ended Committee

1. The 27^th ordinary session of the African Union’s assembly in July 2016 issued a decision on the ICC[1] pursuant to a similar one from the previous session[2]. Besides praising the court’s termination of the case against Kenya’s Deputy President William Ruto, the AU outlined a five-point agenda for the Open-Ended Committee of Foreign Ministers on the ICC, which included the following:

• Engaging with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) before the January 2017 AU Summit and before the 15^th Assembly of State Parties in November 2016.
• Maintaining the earlier decision from January 2016, to develop a comprehensive strategy to inform the actions of AU member states that are party to the Rome Statute; a strategy that includes collective withdrawal from the ICC.
• Concluding a review of the ICC’s interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute regarding the compulsion of unwilling witnesses to testify, with a view to inform debate at the 15^th
• Conveying the message that AU member states object to the inclusion of language requiring the UNSC to mandate UN peace-keeping missions to enforce arrest warrants in Africa.
• Utilising the AU Mission in Brussels, Belgium, as the secretariat to the Open-ended Ministerial Committee and provision of institutional support to the African Group in The Hague, Netherlands, to ensure effective coordination of its activities.

2. The AU has since held a meeting with the UNSC in September 2016 to present pre-formulated terms developed by the Open-ended Ministerial Committee as conditions to keep African States as parties to the Rome Statute. These conditions were as follows[3]:

• Immunity under the ICC’s Rome Statute for sitting heads of state and government as well as senior officials;
• Intervention of the ICC in cases involving African states only after those cases have been submitted to the AU or AU judicial institutions; and
• Reduction in the powers of the ICC Prosecutor.

3. Recent developments have seen South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia commence processes to withdraw from the ICC; seemingly as part of actualising the intention cited in the agenda of the Open-ended Ministerial Committee. These actions expose the agenda by the AU to be disingenuous and presupposes that the deliberations within the ASP would be futile.. The wave of withdrawals occurs against a counter-wave of support for the Court by countries including Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana[4]; an indication that the strategy for mass withdrawal does not enjoy the consensus suggested by the AU decision of July 2016. These countries have suggested that concerns expressed by African states are not insurmountable and can be addressed within the framework of the ASP. Their support for the ICC underscores the fact that the obligations under the Rome Statute are State obligations and not AU obligations; as such, decisions on withdrawal will be based on national interest that cannot be assumed by the AU.

4. Furthermore, the strategy for AU member states to withdraw undermines the other outlined agenda items of engagement with the ASP, such as the review of the interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute and the enforcement of arrest warrants. Such contradictory actions raise the question of whether the AU is negotiating ICC reforms in good faith.

5. In light of the foregoing, KPTJ recommends that:

• African States abandon and disregard calls for mass withdrawal from the Court and instead consolidate the member bloc to advance their concerns within the bounds of the ASP in deliberations based on good faith.
• African states should continue to publicly reaffirm their support for engaging with the ICC through the ASP and prevail on the AU to adjust its engagement strategy accordingly. We applaud the statements made by Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana.
• An ICC Liaison Office should be established at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to facilitate more productive and sustained communication between African States and the ICC as part of restoring a relationship that has become plagued by mistrust and misunderstandings.

1. Absence of Accountability?

Peace, Security and Stability

6. The characterisation of the ICC as undermining the peace and security of states or threatening their stability has become a recurring theme by those advocating disengagement or withdrawal from the ICC. In its notice of withdrawal, South Africa claims that its aspirations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts were being hindered by its obligations under the Rome Statute[5] to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when he attended the June 2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg. Kenyan government officials have also previously described the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto as an existential threat to peace and stability.
7. A closer scrutiny of this assertion in the face of ongoing conflict situations suggests the contrary. The absence of accountability processes does not necessarily facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts; the South Sudan and Burundi conflicts instead point to protagonists willing to escalate violence, even in the context of peace negotiations. Burundi and The Gambia have commenced processes to withdraw from the ICC at a time when their respective governments stand accused of acts of repression and mass human rights violations. Rather than advance the cause for peace, the clamour for withdrawal from the ICC is playing into the hands of those wary of the prospects of accountability in the aftermath of conflict. Even more concerning is an apparent trend of rising post-election violence, such as that witnessed in Kenya previously and in Gabon currently, or violence stemming from efforts to instal third-term incumbencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Such trends are bound to persist in the absence of mechanisms for accountability, of which the ICC is a critical component.
8. The assertion that the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Court) and its proposed expanded criminal jurisdiction through the Malabo Protocol would fill in any void created by a mass withdrawal from the ICC is erroneous. The African Court is a distant prospect for addressing the impunity gap: it is far from being operational. Since 2013, only five states namely Benin, Kenya, Congo, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania have signed but not ratified the Malabo Protocol, which requires the ratification of 15 states to begin operations. Kenya is the only state thus far that has made a financial pledge of USD 1 million to operationalise the court — a far cry from the resources required for a court of broad jurisdiction consisting of a mandate on human rights as well as international law and interstate disputes. It has previously been estimated that a singular international criminal trial costs USD 20 million to undertake. In addition, the protocol contains contentious provisions that undermine its viability as an alternative platform for international crimes, the most notable being the clause of immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. As a testament to the inability of the African Court to be an immediate replacement of the ICC as desired by some, even South Africa through its Justice Minister has indicated that it will ask for a review of the Malabo Protocol to address contentious issues. Furthermore, limited progress has been made towards establishing national mechanisms that can sufficiently undertake the obligation of accountability for international crimes.
9. KPTJ recognises the pursuit of justice in conflict and post-conflict settings as an essential pillar of rebuilding democracies and restoring rule of law. These are the pathways to lasting peace, security and stability. Rather than push to void international justice mechanisms after the conflict to facilitate mediation, we recommend that:

• African states fully implement and consistently apply already established norms on democracy, peace and security as a preventative measure to conflict including: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and; the African Governance Architecture.
• African states must critically reflect on and address the issues of the African Court’s capacity, accessibility, legal standards outlined for crimes under international law and expunge provisions conferring immunity on sitting Heads of State and senior government officials. This process must not be rushed or predicated on a manufactured crisis precipitated by a strategy of mass withdrawal from the ICC.
• African states should establish robust and credible national mechanisms to address the accountability question at first instance and in complementarity with regional and international mechanisms. They must also broaden their policy considerations to include comprehensive reparation programmes for victims of international crimes.
• Disparity between State Obligations and Reality?

A look at State Cooperation

10. The Kenya and Sudan cases have exposed the frailties within the Rome Statute framework in as far as state cooperation is concerned. These cases have laid waste to the presumption that States will willingly engage with the court in the face of cases seeking to prosecute sitting heads of state, their deputies or powerful elites in close proximity to power. State cooperation has only demonstrably worked in instances where the target for prosecution is a vanquished foe of conflict as seen in the cases of Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire, that are fast advancing a notion of “victor’s justice”. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the final recourse for addressing the lack of state cooperation rests with the ASP. The ASP being a political organ of the Rome Statute is influenced by political rather than purely legal considerations in making its decisions, which makes the issue of resolving the non-cooperation of states problematic. A final challenge to state cooperation is the failure of the United States, China and Russia to ratify the Rome Statute while also being members of the UNSC with the power of referral of matters to the court. This has created the notion of double standards within the international justice system and emboldened other states to disregard cooperation with the court.
11. KPTJ calls on the members of the UNSC who have not ratified the Rome Statute to display leadership on State cooperation with the court by first ratifying the Statute and utilising its discretion on referral and deferral in a manner that adheres to the objectives of the Statute. We further wish to reiterate that state cooperation must denote effective cooperation that facilitates the mandates of the respective organs of the court and not feigned cooperation which creates the perception of facilitating the court but in fact consists of using procedural and technical obstacles to undermine the court. We call on the ASP to adopt a consistent and objective legal standard in the assessment of state cooperation.
12. Are there lessons to be learned?

Taking stock of the experience in the Kenya cases

12. The Kenya cases and the manner of their termination carry critical lessons for consideration to inform future actions by the court and the content of reforms within the strategic plans of its respective organs. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) as well as the bench on various occasions decried the instances of witness tampering and intimidation as well as non-cooperation by the state in responding to the OTP requests for information and a failure to execute ICC warrants of arrest with respect to three Kenyans suspected of witness tampering. This in fact has led to a finding of non-compliance against Kenya and led to its referral to the ASP under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. In the midst of all this, was an unprecedented and disruptive diplomatic effort that deliberately exerted political pressure on the court with a view to influencing the outcome of the Kenya cases. It is arguable that these diplomacy efforts yielded the concession of excusing President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto from continuous presence at their trial and that the current wave of withdrawals from the ICC on the basis of an apparent bias by the court against Africans are a fallout from these diplomatic efforts. The capitulations of the cases have also pointed to significant flaws in the investigative and prosecutorial approaches that informed the development of the cases and must lead to some introspection from the relevant mechanisms. The fact that the Trust Fund for Victims is yet to commence operations in Kenya cannot go without mention.
13. KPTJ urges all the organs of the court to reflect on these experiences and take due cognisance of the following lessons and recommendations:

• The ICC, particularly the ASP, should do more to ensure that it does not allow political statements to interfere with the judicial independence of the Court.
• The ICC should ensure that it takes steps to respond to messages of a political nature and correct inaccurate statements in a timely manner. In addition, it should ensure that such key messages reach the right audiences, including victims and affected communities.
• The Court should continue to build its relationship with African States that openly support the mandate of the ICC; in addition, the ICC should do more to improve its relationship with, and image at, the AU.
• The Trust Fund for Victims should commence operations in Kenya, as victims have received little to no assistance from the Kenyan government.
• The Prosecutor should carefully consider when to request ‘summons to appear’ as opposed to ‘warrants of arrest’ and take into account the individual circumstances of each accused person in doing so, particularly their potential to intimidate witnesses and interfere with evidence.
• Swift action should be taken by the Prosecutor and the Court in instances of non-cooperation by States Parties. Any instances of non-cooperation should be resolved as speedily as possible, in such a manner that the outcome of proceedings on non-cooperation can be applied to strengthen an ongoing case and not be delayed to the point that the outcome is only of academic significance.
• The Prosecutor should continue to carry out a review of its investigative strategies and methods in order to improve its chances of success at trial.
• The Prosecution should ensure that its staff are able to spend as much time as possible on better understanding the context and nuances of a given situation country.

1. Pursuit of reform without prejudice?

UN Reform vs ICC Reform

14. The unique role played by UNSC in referral and deferral of cases before the ICC means that the debates on reforming the court and reforming the UN and in particular the UNSC have inevitably intersected. We have witnessed both undertones and overt accusations of imperialism and undue influence directed at the court on account of cases on Africa referred to it by the UNSC (Libya and Sudan). Arguments made to amend the Rome Statute to confer immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials are laced with grievance against the UNSC permanent five members possessing a de facto immunity from prosecution under the ICC on account of their veto power. The end result is a misdirected effort to amend the Rome Statute or in the extreme withdraw from the ICC on the basis of perceived excesses that are better addressed by engaging the broader debate of UN reforms.

15. While KPTJ acknowledges the slanted relationship of the UNSC with the court and supports a robust conversation on its reforms, we call on states not to misdirect the agenda of reforming the UNSC into discussions on improving the functions of the court and occasion amendments to the Rome statute that sacrifice the future of the court as part of a bargaining process on UNSC reforms. We call on African states in particular, to distinguish the broader question of UN reforms as enshrined in the “Ezulwini Consensus” from the question of reforming the Rome Statute and reflecting on the performance of the court. We call upon African member states to the Rome Statute not to sacrifice the promise of justice for victims of atrocity crimes at the altar of grievance against the unequal power relations represented by the UN Security Council.

end/kptj/16.06.2016

——–

About KPTJ:

This brief was prepared by Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ), a coalition of Kenyan citizens and over 30 organisations working in the human rights, governance and legal fields that came together during the crisis over the disputed results of the 2007 presidential election to seek truth and accountability for the elections and the widespread violence that followed; and who continue to work closely with the victims of that period. It is a brief update on the situation in Kenya as pertains to pursuing accountability for the crimes against humanity committed during the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence as well as its adherence to its obligations under the Rome Statute.

[1] Assembly/AU/Dec.616 (XXVII)

[2] Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI)

[3] Press Release: “UN/African Union: Reject ICC withdrawal”. Available here: http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/552-un-african-union-reject-icc-withdrawal.html

[4] Article: “Which African states slammed Burundi, South Africa and Gambia’s withdrawal from ICC?” Available here: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/which-african-states-slammed-burundi-south-africa-gambias-withdrawal-icc-1589711

[5] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/South-Africa-Instrument-of-Withdrawal-International-Criminal-Court.jpg

UN Experts criticize Kenya Police for Excessive Use of Force against Peaceful Protesters (10.11.2016)

The demonstrators were protesting against alleged government corruption when police used teargas and batons to disperse them.

GENEVA, Switzerland, November 10, 2016 -A group of UN human rights experts* has condemned a violent clampdown on a peaceful protest in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, while urging the authorities to investigate claims of excessive use of force and arbitrary arrest – both against demonstrators and journalists – and to hold all perpetrators accountable.
The demonstrators were protesting against alleged government corruption when police used teargas and batons to disperse them. A number of people are reported to have been injured or detained during the incident on 3 November.

“Interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is inexcusable at any time, but it is especially repugnant when demonstrators are calling for government accountability,” the experts said. “Protesters may sometimes raise uncomfortable truths, but holding people in power to account is a central function of peaceful assemblies in a democracy.”

The experts also expressed alarm at the timing of the crackdown, less than a year before Kenyans elect a new president in August 2017. They said creating an environment where opinions could be expressed peacefully was key to avoiding a repeat of the wave of violence which followed the disputed presidential poll in 2007.

“Beating protesters does not make their grudges go away. Rather, it intensifies them, because it sends the message that the government does not care,” they stressed. “This approach does not foster a culture of dialogue; it fosters a culture of violence, which is exactly the opposite of what Kenya needs right now.”

The UN independent experts also expressed grave concern over reports that police had attacked journalists covering the protest, in some cases damaging their equipment.

“International law protects the right of everyone – including journalists and human rights defenders– to observe, monitor and report on such events,” the experts said. “It also imposes a duty on States to protect the rights of monitors to do their jobs, even if the gatherings turn violent. Attacking journalists who perform this important public duty is simply unfathomable.”

The UN Special Rapporteurs called on the Kenyan authorities to respect the demonstrators’ fundamental rights at future protests, and noted that they would be watching developments closely.

(*) The experts: Mr Maina Kiai, Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mr. David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and Mr. Michel Forst, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders.

Kenya: To the Public Accounts Committee (Parliament), Media Houses and All Interested Parties (08.11.2016)

Kenya: Police tear gas Journalists covering anti corruption protests (Footage)