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Archive for the tag “Kenyans”

ICC: Lessons learned from the Kenyatta Case of 2011

The Internal Investigation of the botched International Criminal Court (ICC) case of the ‘Kenyatta Case – The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta – FORMERLY – The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11’, which the investigation started in Kenya in October 2010 and failure to produce anything binding or to justify the charges against them. So the charges was dropped by 2013 and 2014. While the whole case was terminated by March 2015.

Now the ICC has suddenly dropped an statement into their internal investigation into why it ended like this. Even if they have the warning, of if any of the judges get new evidence on the case. They might re-open it. However, what this states is very serious and the acts done to interfere in the investigation. Says also a lot, also about the shortfall of the jurisdiction and help from the government of Kenya. Which isn’t weird, as the state was investigating the President and allies of him. They don’t want any issues with an foreign court. That is all natural in the scheme of things.

Just look here:

The prosecutorial process in the Kenya cases, the experts found, was hampered by deadlines set by the first Prosecutor that were based on considerations other than what they considered to be sound prosecutorial practice. In their view, the effectiveness of the investigations and prosecutions was significantly undermined by a “decision over assessment” tactic respecting cases and a target-based – as opposed to evidence-based – approach to investigation and charging. This, coupled with other problems, meant that the prosecutions were burdened with weak cases, relying on one or only a small number of insider witnesses – whose evidence could not be independently verified by the OTP – to establish essential elements of the case” (ICC, 26.11.2019).

The key point concerning the Government of Kenya was the OTP’s delay in seeking the assistance of the Trial Chamber to compel cooperation, resulting in part from the contradictory approaches advocated by JCCD and PD (that is, continue to try to persuade the authorities to cooperate versus applying to the Trial Chamber for a finding of non-cooperation against the Government, respectively). This lesson has been taken on board. The OTP also has a range of strategies to secure cooperation from States Parties and situation countries, and these are still evolving” (ICC, 26.11.2019).

The investigations were further undermined by the decision to delay in-country investigations, which did not take place until after the CoC hearings. Unfortunately, after those hearings, investigating in Kenya became much more difficult: support for the ICC among Kenyans had been eroded by a concerted campaign of negative propaganda; OTP personnel were followed, putting them and anyone they contacted at risk; the witness interference orchestrated by the suspects/accused became even more pervasive; and the Government of Kenya (GoK) became even less willing to co-operate, if not actively interfering with OTP operations and witness security” (ICC, 26.11.2019).

As noted above, the GoK did not support the OTP investigative activities, instead it either allowed interference with witnesses inside and outside of Kenya and with OTP activities in Kenya, including surveillance of OTP investigators, and/or may have been directly involved in such interference. It refused Requests for Assistance (RFAs) thereby hampering the OTP’s ability to access potential evidence, or imposed such conditions or access as to, in reality, make that access so cumbersome as to be unworkable” (ICC, 26.11.2019).

We can see the ICC started this out on the wrong premise and lost because of it. They couldn’t present well enough evidence, either because of the deadlines. Nor the way the small pockets of witnesses was silenced. This was done, as the ICC haven’t secured them or ensured their safety. This was a mismanaged approach by the ICC and the ones seeking justice on this case. The Kenyatta case was finally dropped, because the ICC and their partners hadn’t done their job, neitehr had the Government of Kenya done its either. Therefore, this one got stalled and the charges got dropped.

Like the charges against William Ruto, Joshua Arap Sang and Uhuru Kenyatta. This was done because out of the 10 witnesses supposed to be put forward, only 5 showed up. That means the prosecution and the material they could assess wasn’t substantial enough nor digging deep enough. The ICC didn’t do their work and the Kenyans was doing internal actions to ensure the ICC didn’t get a case to begin with. They silenced the witnesses and intimidated the ones who could have come forward to the ICC.

This should be a lesson for the ICC. That to quick deadlines, not enough work with the coordinated leadership of where they charging people and get the proper jurisdiction might be more important. As they couldn’t do their job, as the Kenyans was putting hampers in their way. Next time find out ways to secure the witnesses and the affidavits to collect evidence before they are afraid of testifying. Peace.

Kenya: Governor Kidero & Prof. Swazuri plans for ‘Housing Estates’ at the land of Uhuru Secondary School

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Advocacy Brief on Kenya: 15th Session of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 16-24 November, 2016 (21.11.2016)

kptj

Background

At the height of the violence that gripped Kenya after the disputed 2007 elections, the Party of the National Unity and the Orange Democratic Movement, who were parties to the conflict, wrote to the International Criminal Court (ICC) seeking its intervention to stop what they called genocide. A local investigatory commission with international participation found that some actions during the post-election violence likely met the threshold of crimes against humanity and recommended the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Kenya, or in the alternative, the handover of the sealed evidence to the Prosecutor at the ICC.

Efforts to establish the Tribunal were defeated by political forces aligned to suspected perpetrators, hence triggering the handover of evidence to the ICC and the subsequent investigation. Six Kenyans were named in connection with seven crimes against humanity charges; the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed charges against four suspects. Two suspects – Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were subsequently elected President and Deputy President, respectively, before their trials could begin at the ICC. Thereafter, the Prosecutor withdrew charges against two suspects – Francis Muthaura and Kenyatta – citing witness bribery and intimidation, as well as failure by the Kenya government to cooperate with the court. The remaining case against Ruto and journalist Joshua arap Sang was terminated citing “intolerable levels of witness interference and political meddling”.

Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) has followed closely the developments around accountability for the crimes committed during the 2007 post-election violence. Since the opening of the investigations in March 2010, we have observed certain shortcomings and challenges on the part of the Government of Kenya, the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and the African Union (AU). This brief seeks to focus on key issues emerging from the situation that the ICC and international justice finds itself in today, while drawing linkages from how the Kenya cases and other ICC cases were managed. KPTJ also makes recommendations on actions that require to be undertaken by the ASP, the ICC and African governments in order to address the emergent challenges.

  1. Engage and Withdraw Simultaneously?

A Contradiction in the Mandate of the AU Open Ended Committee

  1. The 27th ordinary session of the African Union’s assembly in July 2016 issued a decision on the ICC[1] pursuant to a similar one from the previous session[2]. Besides praising the court’s termination of the case against Kenya’s Deputy President William Ruto, the AU outlined a five-point agenda for the Open-Ended Committee of Foreign Ministers on the ICC, which included the following:
  • Engaging with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) before the January 2017 AU Summit and before the 15th Assembly of State Parties in November 2016.
  • Maintaining the earlier decision from January 2016, to develop a comprehensive strategy to inform the actions of AU member states that are party to the Rome Statute; a strategy that includes collective withdrawal from the ICC.
  • Concluding a review of the ICC’s interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute regarding the compulsion of unwilling witnesses to testify, with a view to inform debate at the 15th
  • Conveying the message that AU member states object to the inclusion of language requiring the UNSC to mandate UN peace-keeping missions to enforce arrest warrants in Africa.
  • Utilising the AU Mission in Brussels, Belgium, as the secretariat to the Open-ended Ministerial Committee and provision of institutional support to the African Group in The Hague, Netherlands, to ensure effective coordination of its activities.
  1. The AU has since held a meeting with the UNSC in September 2016 to present pre-formulated terms developed by the Open-ended Ministerial Committee as conditions to keep African States as parties to the Rome Statute. These conditions were as follows[3]:
  • Immunity under the ICC’s Rome Statute for sitting heads of state and government as well as senior officials;
  • Intervention of the ICC in cases involving African states only after those cases have been submitted to the AU or AU judicial institutions; and
  • Reduction in the powers of the ICC Prosecutor.
  1. Recent developments have seen South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia commence processes to withdraw from the ICC; seemingly as part of actualising the intention cited in the agenda of the Open-ended Ministerial Committee. These actions expose the agenda by the AU to be disingenuous and presupposes that the deliberations within the ASP would be futile.. The wave of withdrawals occurs against a counter-wave of support for the Court by countries including Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana[4]; an indication that the strategy for mass withdrawal does not enjoy the consensus suggested by the AU decision of July 2016. These countries have suggested that concerns expressed by African states are not insurmountable and can be addressed within the framework of the ASP. Their support for the ICC underscores the fact that the obligations under the Rome Statute are State obligations and not AU obligations; as such, decisions on withdrawal will be based on national interest that cannot be assumed by the AU.
  1. Furthermore, the strategy for AU member states to withdraw undermines the other outlined agenda items of engagement with the ASP, such as the review of the interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute and the enforcement of arrest warrants. Such contradictory actions raise the question of whether the AU is negotiating ICC reforms in good faith.
  1. In light of the foregoing, KPTJ recommends that:
  • African States abandon and disregard calls for mass withdrawal from the Court and instead consolidate the member bloc to advance their concerns within the bounds of the ASP in deliberations based on good faith.
  • African states should continue to publicly reaffirm their support for engaging with the ICC through the ASP and prevail on the AU to adjust its engagement strategy accordingly. We applaud the statements made by Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana.
  • An ICC Liaison Office should be established at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to facilitate more productive and sustained communication between African States and the ICC as part of restoring a relationship that has become plagued by mistrust and misunderstandings.
  1. Absence of Accountability?

Peace, Security and Stability

  1. The characterisation of the ICC as undermining the peace and security of states or threatening their stability has become a recurring theme by those advocating disengagement or withdrawal from the ICC. In its notice of withdrawal, South Africa claims that its aspirations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts were being hindered by its obligations under the Rome Statute[5] to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when he attended the June 2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg. Kenyan government officials have also previously described the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto as an existential threat to peace and stability.
  2. A closer scrutiny of this assertion in the face of ongoing conflict situations suggests the contrary. The absence of accountability processes does not necessarily facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts; the South Sudan and Burundi conflicts instead point to protagonists willing to escalate violence, even in the context of peace negotiations. Burundi and The Gambia have commenced processes to withdraw from the ICC at a time when their respective governments stand accused of acts of repression and mass human rights violations. Rather than advance the cause for peace, the clamour for withdrawal from the ICC is playing into the hands of those wary of the prospects of accountability in the aftermath of conflict. Even more concerning is an apparent trend of rising post-election violence, such as that witnessed in Kenya previously and in Gabon currently, or violence stemming from efforts to instal third-term incumbencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Such trends are bound to persist in the absence of mechanisms for accountability, of which the ICC is a critical component.
  3. The assertion that the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Court) and its proposed expanded criminal jurisdiction through the Malabo Protocol would fill in any void created by a mass withdrawal from the ICC is erroneous. The African Court is a distant prospect for addressing the impunity gap: it is far from being operational. Since 2013, only five states namely Benin, Kenya, Congo, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania have signed but not ratified the Malabo Protocol, which requires the ratification of 15 states to begin operations. Kenya is the only state thus far that has made a financial pledge of USD 1 million to operationalise the court — a far cry from the resources required for a court of broad jurisdiction consisting of a mandate on human rights as well as international law and interstate disputes. It has previously been estimated that a singular international criminal trial costs USD 20 million to undertake. In addition, the protocol contains contentious provisions that undermine its viability as an alternative platform for international crimes, the most notable being the clause of immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. As a testament to the inability of the African Court to be an immediate replacement of the ICC as desired by some, even South Africa through its Justice Minister has indicated that it will ask for a review of the Malabo Protocol to address contentious issues. Furthermore, limited progress has been made towards establishing national mechanisms that can sufficiently undertake the obligation of accountability for international crimes.
  4. KPTJ recognises the pursuit of justice in conflict and post-conflict settings as an essential pillar of rebuilding democracies and restoring rule of law. These are the pathways to lasting peace, security and stability. Rather than push to void international justice mechanisms after the conflict to facilitate mediation, we recommend that:
  • African states fully implement and consistently apply already established norms on democracy, peace and security as a preventative measure to conflict including: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and; the African Governance Architecture.
  • African states must critically reflect on and address the issues of the African Court’s capacity, accessibility, legal standards outlined for crimes under international law and expunge provisions conferring immunity on sitting Heads of State and senior government officials. This process must not be rushed or predicated on a manufactured crisis precipitated by a strategy of mass withdrawal from the ICC.
  • African states should establish robust and credible national mechanisms to address the accountability question at first instance and in complementarity with regional and international mechanisms. They must also broaden their policy considerations to include comprehensive reparation programmes for victims of international crimes.
  • Disparity between State Obligations and Reality?

A look at State Cooperation

  1. The Kenya and Sudan cases have exposed the frailties within the Rome Statute framework in as far as state cooperation is concerned. These cases have laid waste to the presumption that States will willingly engage with the court in the face of cases seeking to prosecute sitting heads of state, their deputies or powerful elites in close proximity to power. State cooperation has only demonstrably worked in instances where the target for prosecution is a vanquished foe of conflict as seen in the cases of Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire, that are fast advancing a notion of “victor’s justice”. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the final recourse for addressing the lack of state cooperation rests with the ASP. The ASP being a political organ of the Rome Statute is influenced by political rather than purely legal considerations in making its decisions, which makes the issue of resolving the non-cooperation of states problematic. A final challenge to state cooperation is the failure of the United States, China and Russia to ratify the Rome Statute while also being members of the UNSC with the power of referral of matters to the court. This has created the notion of double standards within the international justice system and emboldened other states to disregard cooperation with the court.
  2. KPTJ calls on the members of the UNSC who have not ratified the Rome Statute to display leadership on State cooperation with the court by first ratifying the Statute and utilising its discretion on referral and deferral in a manner that adheres to the objectives of the Statute. We further wish to reiterate that state cooperation must denote effective cooperation that facilitates the mandates of the respective organs of the court and not feigned cooperation which creates the perception of facilitating the court but in fact consists of using procedural and technical obstacles to undermine the court. We call on the ASP to adopt a consistent and objective legal standard in the assessment of state cooperation.
  3. Are there lessons to be learned?

Taking stock of the experience in the Kenya cases

  1. The Kenya cases and the manner of their termination carry critical lessons for consideration to inform future actions by the court and the content of reforms within the strategic plans of its respective organs. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) as well as the bench on various occasions decried the instances of witness tampering and intimidation as well as non-cooperation by the state in responding to the OTP requests for information and a failure to execute ICC warrants of arrest with respect to three Kenyans suspected of witness tampering. This in fact has led to a finding of non-compliance against Kenya and led to its referral to the ASP under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. In the midst of all this, was an unprecedented and disruptive diplomatic effort that deliberately exerted political pressure on the court with a view to influencing the outcome of the Kenya cases. It is arguable that these diplomacy efforts yielded the concession of excusing President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto from continuous presence at their trial and that the current wave of withdrawals from the ICC on the basis of an apparent bias by the court against Africans are a fallout from these diplomatic efforts. The capitulations of the cases have also pointed to significant flaws in the investigative and prosecutorial approaches that informed the development of the cases and must lead to some introspection from the relevant mechanisms. The fact that the Trust Fund for Victims is yet to commence operations in Kenya cannot go without mention.
  2. KPTJ urges all the organs of the court to reflect on these experiences and take due cognisance of the following lessons and recommendations:
  • The ICC, particularly the ASP, should do more to ensure that it does not allow political statements to interfere with the judicial independence of the Court.
  • The ICC should ensure that it takes steps to respond to messages of a political nature and correct inaccurate statements in a timely manner. In addition, it should ensure that such key messages reach the right audiences, including victims and affected communities.
  • The Court should continue to build its relationship with African States that openly support the mandate of the ICC; in addition, the ICC should do more to improve its relationship with, and image at, the AU.
  • The Trust Fund for Victims should commence operations in Kenya, as victims have received little to no assistance from the Kenyan government.
  • The Prosecutor should carefully consider when to request ‘summons to appear’ as opposed to ‘warrants of arrest’ and take into account the individual circumstances of each accused person in doing so, particularly their potential to intimidate witnesses and interfere with evidence.
  • Swift action should be taken by the Prosecutor and the Court in instances of non-cooperation by States Parties. Any instances of non-cooperation should be resolved as speedily as possible, in such a manner that the outcome of proceedings on non-cooperation can be applied to strengthen an ongoing case and not be delayed to the point that the outcome is only of academic significance.
  • The Prosecutor should continue to carry out a review of its investigative strategies and methods in order to improve its chances of success at trial.
  • The Prosecution should ensure that its staff are able to spend as much time as possible on better understanding the context and nuances of a given situation country.
  1. Pursuit of reform without prejudice?

UN Reform vs ICC Reform

  1. The unique role played by UNSC in referral and deferral of cases before the ICC means that the debates on reforming the court and reforming the UN and in particular the UNSC have inevitably intersected. We have witnessed both undertones and overt accusations of imperialism and undue influence directed at the court on account of cases on Africa referred to it by the UNSC (Libya and Sudan). Arguments made to amend the Rome Statute to confer immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials are laced with grievance against the UNSC permanent five members possessing a de facto immunity from prosecution under the ICC on account of their veto power. The end result is a misdirected effort to amend the Rome Statute or in the extreme withdraw from the ICC on the basis of perceived excesses that are better addressed by engaging the broader debate of UN reforms.
  1. While KPTJ acknowledges the slanted relationship of the UNSC with the court and supports a robust conversation on its reforms, we call on states not to misdirect the agenda of reforming the UNSC into discussions on improving the functions of the court and occasion amendments to the Rome statute that sacrifice the future of the court as part of a bargaining process on UNSC reforms. We call on African states in particular, to distinguish the broader question of UN reforms as enshrined in the “Ezulwini Consensus” from the question of reforming the Rome Statute and reflecting on the performance of the court. We call upon African member states to the Rome Statute not to sacrifice the promise of justice for victims of atrocity crimes at the altar of grievance against the unequal power relations represented by the UN Security Council.

end/kptj/16.06.2016

——–

About KPTJ:

This brief was prepared by Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ), a coalition of Kenyan citizens and over 30 organisations working in the human rights, governance and legal fields that came together during the crisis over the disputed results of the 2007 presidential election to seek truth and accountability for the elections and the widespread violence that followed; and who continue to work closely with the victims of that period. It is a brief update on the situation in Kenya as pertains to pursuing accountability for the crimes against humanity committed during the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence as well as its adherence to its obligations under the Rome Statute.

[1] Assembly/AU/Dec.616 (XXVII)

[2] Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI)

[3] Press Release: “UN/African Union: Reject ICC withdrawal”. Available here: http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/552-un-african-union-reject-icc-withdrawal.html

[4] Article: “Which African states slammed Burundi, South Africa and Gambia’s withdrawal from ICC?” Available here: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/which-african-states-slammed-burundi-south-africa-gambias-withdrawal-icc-1589711

[5] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/South-Africa-Instrument-of-Withdrawal-International-Criminal-Court.jpg

4 MPs from Mt. Kenya endorse CS Wamalwa to face Kidero in 2017 (Youtube-Clip)

“A move by four members of parliament from the Mount Kenya region led by Kabete legislator Ferdinand Waititu to endorse Water and Irrigation Cabinet Secretary Eugene Wamalwa as their preferred candidate for the post of Nairobi Governor, has already stirred the political waters in the jubilee alliance. A section of Nairobi mps allied to the ruling coalition have dismissed the declaration made in Kiambu, terming it as self-serving” (Kenya Citizen TV, 2016).

Mrs. Beti Kamya – “Where is Museveni’s Heart” (Daily Monitor Article of 28.01.2008)

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KNCHR’s Statement on the Right to Assembly (CoK, Article 37) – (30.05.2016)

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Jubilee and Government Officials plans to Block the Rallies or Celebrations of Madaraka Day in Uhuru Park and Nakuru; because the Government are the only allowed assembling on that day, apparently!

reason kenyan proverb

The Jubilee Alliance Party under President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto are running around worried about the opposition. Even their spokesperson Eric Kiraithe has today addressed the planned rally of the opposition Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) which is run by Hon. Raila Odinga, Hon. Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka and Hon. Moses Wetan’gula.

We can see that CS Joseph Nkaisserey have already yesterday warned the CORD of demonstrating against the Electoral Commission. While later today the government has both locally in Nairobi said their peace on the Uhuru Park rally on 1st June 2016 and also now with the Government spokesperson Kiraithe also shut down the planned rally in Nakuru. It seems like the ruling regime is struggling with the Opposition and whatever they do, they have to silence them.

Kiraithe CORD

What Kenyatta and Ruto wishes is the Opposition to be silent and just be there. While in 2006 the ousted leader of KANU Uhuru Kenyatta held a illegal rally in Uhuru Park which was suffocated with tear-gas, he himself described it like this: “What has happened today is a travesty of justice and we shall not relent until we, the bonafide officials of Kanu, are recognized” (BBC, 2006). So if the President has remembered that occasion and what the Police did to his supporters when he was opposition, he might have honoured the men and woman a little more. Instead he is just like the leaders before him, ruthless in power and acting vigilantly while being in opposition.

That the Ruling Regime and Ruling Party want to run the day and have the close-up with all people is understandable. But with time Uhuru Kenyatta is acting alike the ones he took over for, without showing any progress or openness, as himself wanted as a Opposition figure while Mwai Kibaki was the President. So now that it’s in the ending of his first term, he is acting so similar and using tear-gas against opposition; he have emulated the Kibaki way and also added the paranoid CS Nkaissery who fears all actions of Opposition and will use the Police Service every step of Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka or Wetan’gula thinks of showing up.

TV Kenyatta Odinga

With this in mind the Jubilee seems to be so worried, so scared and fearing the Opposition as they have to crash all demonstrations, have to stop their rallies and file Police Orders together with Public Notices to silence them. All kind of Civil Servants have to comply and work for Jubilee and their political agenda as the Opposition and their members are nearly not even citizens, they are unnecessary political opponents that Kenyatta really wants to silence and easily get into his second term as President.

There obstacles in the road ahead. There mountains, rivers and deserts before you enter paradise again Hon. Kenyatta. As you shouldn’t fear the Opposition, but be a real big-man and embrace it. The richness isn’t the embezzled funds from NYS or Eurobond, but rather honest policy towards all kind of citizens, even opposition. Just like President Obama tried By-Partisan in Congress in his first term… maybe, you should consider to negotiate and create a peaceful atmosphere, instead of using tear-gas, live-bullets and water-canons to disperse the fellow Kenyans who wants to listen to the WDM, ODM or FORD-K. They should be without issues, just like you felt hurt in 2006 in Uhuru Park. It is a decade ago and surely all the VIP treatment have been well spent on you since.

Kenyatta Road

Short term memory is not an simple thing, but when you get all the perks of being the VIP, the Executive and the Head-of-State; so he is now used to getting his will and his words are turned into legislature. With that in mind, the Power of Government and rule must have left the old him behind. The old being opposition having to get control of the government from somebody else; as that being said they are now acting as the old ones and even bad at times as they are not only into tear-gas, but also live-bullets at demonstrators.

Jubilee has lost sight of what it means to be government, it means to govern; not to control and intimidate fellow citizens. That is their main attraction nowadays. As the CORD is acted upon as they are common criminals and all their main activity is harassed and attacked, just as the rallies of Wenta’gula we’re earlier in the year. The same happens now that the CORD are besieged by Jubilee who doesn’t let them manoeuvre. They can only exist if they are silent… So silent that they can work without any questions or interference in Parliament, as they are just somebody without support; that is how it seems from afar and that is the wish from Jubilee.

Cord Madraka Day

Jubilee is the Government and the Ruling Party, therefore everybody should just apply and accept their rule. Well, that doesn’t happen in Kenya or anywhere else, as there is also other views on how Government should work. That should be viable for Kenyatta, as he was in the wilderness before and because of that act different with the Opposition. CORD have beaten, hurt, detained and the Police have even killed CORD supporters. So with this in mind with the new idea of only letting Jubilee have the ability to celebrate and rally supporters show the little care for anybody else than the Jubilee.

This here is freedom, liberty or national security, the way the Jubilee, and civil servants are blocking the CORD now is just personal between Kenyatta-Ruto Versus Odinga-Musyoka-Wetan’gula. That is visible and now manifested in the arrogance from the Government stopping the peaceful rallies and celebration of the Madaraka Day. Peace.

Kenya: Government Spokespersons Briefing on 30th May, 2016 – “Subject: Madaraka Day Celebration”

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Kenya: Police Foil Another ISIS Terror Plot (25.05.2016)

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My letter to the Minister of Interior Affairs of Kenya Hon. Joseph Nkaissery on the planned closing of Daadab Refugee Camp

Nkaissey 2016

Dear Sir Honorable Joseph Nkaissery!

I write to you again, I know it’s been a month or so, but the actions have to be questioned and the liability of the actions you do Honourable Minister or Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Coordination of National Government. You have an ability of making decisions that area allowed to be questioned.

I am not writing to you because I am not defending terrorism, because I am not, the Garissa University attack, the Lamu Attack and Westgate attack in Nairobi was sad and unfortunate as innocent Kenyans died while Islamist, went in and killed without impunity; that has to be answered and those actions should not control the agenda of the country, but give way to the liberties and freedoms that the citizens are rights to have. While the Government finds ways of charging and hunting down the men who are behind these hideous crimes.

Dadaab Refugee Camp

But, the use of Terrorism to close down Daadab Refugee Camp seems a bit premature.

As this was even stated by academics on the matter in 2014:

“The speaker said that the Dadaab Camp is not an engine for radicalization; rather, it is an engine of moderation. Poverty and displacement do not automatically lead to radicalization. There is a growing need for more anthropological research on the topic. An entire generation has grown up in peace; it is not scarred by war” (…)”More political and economic analysis is needed on this issue. The Kenyans claim to be in charge but al Shabaab remains everywhere. The Kenyans do not have the level of control that they claim. A lot of the radicalism that is currently being seen in Mombasa is very local. Al-Shabaab is also present in Nairobi. Many al-Shabaab suspects are Kenyan nationals. Terrorism is a wider, urban East African problem” (Rawlence, 2014).

So if the man behind Open Society have claims two years ago that can counter your arguments now for closing, can you bring evidence can show that Rawlence is totally wrong, please honourable Sir?

Hon. Joseph Nkaissery I hate to do this as this is your set of laws and the ones that set the guidelines for your government until you get the National Assembly or Parliament to change it with a general vote.

Kenya Parliament

So for now the law of Kenyan Refugee Act of 2006 says this:

“18. No Person shall be refused entry into Kenya, expelled, extradited from Kenya or returned to any other country or to subject any similar measure if, as result of such refusal, expulsion, return or other measure, such person is compelled to return or remain in the country where –

  • The person may be subject to prosecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or public opinion;
  • The person’s life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in part of whole of that country”.

The law is clear and doesn’t seem that it is too important for you, if these laws is still applied then the closure still gives them rights as Refugees or as legal persons in the territory where you are the Cabinet Ministry Nkaissery. I know that shouldn’t be too much to ask that the Kenyan Government are following the laws of the land? Of does this not apply to the refugees and the ones that have left Somalia, Ethiopia or South Sudan because of oppression and aggression there?

In 2015 John Kerry and the United States pledged $40m directly to the Refugee Camps, so they must have had a say in the planned closure you had of the camps last year, with the new idea of trying to do it again.

John Kerry ABC

Here is his latest statement to you Hon. Nkaissery:

“We strongly urge the Government of Kenya to maintain its longstanding leadership role in protecting and sheltering victims of violence and trauma, consistent with its international obligations. We call on Kenya to uphold these international obligations and not forcibly repatriate refugees” (…)”We call on Kenya to continue its support for refugees and voluntary return efforts, and to continue to work with UNHCR and partner nations to find durable solutions that respect humanitarian standards and uphold international law. We also urge the Government of Kenya to honor its responsibilities, including the 2013 Tripartite Agreement on the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya” (…)”We remain committed to working with Kenya to support voluntary returns that are safe, dignified and consistent with international law, as well as helping Kenya to address security concerns presented by al-Shabaab and other extremist groups” (Kerry, 2016).

So Honourable Minister CS. John Nkaissery, you have lots of responsibility and have to swallow lots of crap in your days in office, while Deputy President William Ruto and President Uhuru Kenyatta got to do the fun stuff and sign decrees and words into laws. You have to clean up behind the scenes and act upon the ideas these two men have. So I am sure the stress is coming to you and therefore is so seldom that the pundits and public see you charming smile.

John Nkaissery

We are not at the point that the Terrorism claim, I don’t feel you can validate that as a reason for the closure of the camp, unless you have evidence you send to me Hon. Nkaissery. I am an advisory, but until I am proven wrong, I will not change my mind. As you are playing your cards this way, is to try filtering the world away from assassination plot that we’re on Jacob Juma or is the something else you want the world to forget? The Pre-Election violence twice in Nairobi under Nairobi Metropolitan Police Commander Japhet Koome towards the Cord Demonstrations, is this right or am I wrong hon. Nkaissery?

But to get back to reality and not the conspiracies that might run as the Kenyan Government said they would close the Refugee Camps last year in 2015. When as I said United States Government pledged more money to run them and filter it through the United Nations programs.

Seems more like this is a way of scaring the international groups, multinational organizations and all to give direct funds to Kenyan Government instead of taking it direct to the Refugee Camp. If not I hope you get a Task Force that really looks into your allegations and also delivers the findings so they can be looked through and are more believable than the financials from Donald Trump.

There are questions that remains Hon. Nkaissery because the issues and the rights, even the laws that are still viable and official guidelines for the refugees and citizens in Kenya, make a brother like me question the rhetoric you have used and arguments. So please take care of the action you do. This here will be greater stain on the Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP), and you don’t want that as a Cabinet Secretary that creates tensions with the allies abroad that both gives your army funding and equipment together with direct budget aid. That would not be wise… Though I understand Hon. Nkaissery that you care about the refugees and their safety even if you close them; because for many of them have been living there for a long time and they could be by many means Kenyan citizens with Somali ethnicity for instance.

Kibera Golf

Would you clear the Kibera slum and the areas around as the Rawlence claimed that the terrorist and extremist was more likely in Urban areas, and Kibera is Urban and also uncontrolled in some ways. So why are you not focused on the development of Kibera that you have Dr. Evan Kidero, the loyal Governor can access the situation for you and find ways to monitor the extremist that might be trained there? Because, if a so-called expert Rawlence can be some people who becomes violent in urban areas, and that is not politely the Dadaab Refugee Camp. So it must be more political than actual be the reason for the closing as they either want to show character or independence over the Multi-National Organization and the International donors, as a sovereign state.

Hon. Nkaissery, we both know that Kenya is a Sovereign State and because of that have freedoms to do what they want on their territory, but they have international obligation. You and I know that Kenya has internal laws and also have to keep their international laws considering the rights of refugees. Still, you can act this way, but will you consider the implications and the ramifications of this. Even if the European states are considering and signing agreements to ship the Syrian Refugees from Greece, to Turkey; that does not send direct flight back to Palmyra, Syria, as much as you don’t want to be remembered for sending back Somali Refugees from Dadaaab Refugee Camp to hostels in Mogadishu, Somalia. Or will you?

Mogadishu 9th May

I am just worried for these innocent fleeing human beings who has fled their homeland for safety in Kenya, as much as I am worried for the Syrian who are fleeing to Greece and being transported to Turkey. I condemn that and would condemn if the Kenyan transport these men and woman to Mogadishu in the midst of fighting and continuation of AMISOM mission in Somalia.

I know I am nobody, but I had to address it and ask you why you want to, as I also question quickly the biggest argument for closing. As I don’t believe until there are serious report and evidence of the terrorism threat from Dadaab Refugee Camp, and why you don’t check more Kibera slums of Nairobi, but that would hurt your pride, right? Wouldn’t it Hon. Nkaissery, or am I wrong?

Peace. 

Best Regard

Write of Minbane.

Reference:

Rawlence, Ben – ‘Somali Refugees in Kenya: The Case of the Dadaab Camp’ (08.05.2014) link: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/2014Somali%20Refugees%20in%20Kenya.pdf

Kerry, John – ‘On Kenya’s Announcement to End Hosting of Refugees’ (11.05.2016) link: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/05/257113.htm

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