Rwanda: Communique du Conseil des Ministres (19.04.2021)

Rwanda: The Duclert Report re-affirms what we knew about French involvement ahead of the 1994 Genocide

Yes. This is a long time coming. It had to be several of French Presidents before they took any responsibility and taking to account their role in the Genocide of 1994 in Rwanda. The French had invested and a close relationship with the current leadership at the time in Kigali. That jaded their will and their support for it. These folks did directly trade weapons and profit on the genocide.

The French have tried people who has been involved in the Genocide in Rwanda. France have acted as a big-brother, but not acted righteous towards its own ends. They have been the paternal nation and with the current Duclert Report. The current leadership in Paris should make reconciliation and redeem its stature in Kigali. That is only fair knowing what their actions did and did assist the atrocities in Rwanda.

First dropping one statement from France24 to show what they found and what has been written in 1999 about the same thing.

French Reports states known facts:

“The report tells of French decision-makers trapped in “post-colonial” thinking who supported the “racist, corrupt and violent” regime of Habyarimana as he faced a Tutsi rebellion which many considered was directed from English-speaking Uganda. Mitterrand “maintained a strong, personal and direct relationship with the Rwandan head of state”, it said” (France24 – ‘’Blind’ France bears responsibility on Rwanda genocide, historical commission reports’ 26.03.2021).

French Involvement before the Genocide:

“The leaders of France and Rwanda also had very close family ties Mitterand of France and Habyarimana were friends, but their sons, Jean Christophe Mitterand and Jean Pierre Habyarirnana, were not only closer friends, but that friendship was consolidated further by business dealings. The two camps used political power in their countries in order to boost and protect their respective economic interests. The Rwanda Re-view(2:3,1993) ran a letter from Mitterand to Habyarimana, a letter that was not only both personal and official, but also talked about the interests of France in Rwanda. There is also an indication that Jean C. Mitterand was one of the biggest arms dealer in Rwanda. It was there-fore in the interest of France that there should be use for the arms France was ready to supply to Rwanda, arms that eventually ended in the arms of the hands of the extremist killers” (Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama – ‘The Path of a Genocide – The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire’, P.83, 1999).

With these two pieces. You see they say the same thing. They are connected. The Kakwenzire and Kamukama is also showing the benefits of the relations between the Heads of State. That the sons also had a favourable relations. They wouldn’t have done what they did. If it wasn’t beneficial and had positive outcome. These folks wouldn’t have worked together like they did.

Both Kigali and Paris had close communication. They were even trading arms ahead of the genocide. Certainly knowing what was brewing and had some foresight into the violence that could erupt. Not like they were dumb or had no knowledge.

Just as they had already done this as well ahead of the genocide:

“1991; March 15: The French ambassador to Rwanda, Georges Martres, informed Juvénal Habyarimana that the French Presidency had decided to put a thirty-man DAMI (detachment of troops for military assistance and training) at the Rwandan authorities’ disposal *(Lanotte, 2007: 144). It was named DAMI-Panda and was originally intended to stay four months on location, but in fact it remained in Rwanda until December 1993 *(Lanotte, 2007: 145). This deployment was not publicized by the French political and military authorities, or by their Rwandan counterparts *(Lanotte, 2007: 148)” (Viret Emmanuel – ‘Rwanda – A Chronology (1867-1994)’ 01.03.2010, SciencePro.fr)

So with this all in mind. The Duclert Report only re-affirm what we already knew. They are only stating facts that been out there and they have finally “found” it out themselves. If they will take more accountability and actually reflect it. That is a whole different ball-game.

For some of us. We knew the French was directly involved and supported the regime who did their part in the genocide in 1994. Clearly, with that knowledge. The French could have acted differently and not participated in the exports of arms. However, they only saw money and friendship with the Heads of State. It was business and pleasure. Which in the end was helping the demise of so many innocent civilians.

Now is not the time for empty statements, but direct action of the French to act upon their own findings, which many of us already knew. Peace.

Muse Report shows how the French Government supported Habyiramana during the 1994 Genocide!

Just two days ago an American Law Firm studied the Rwandan Genocide as they say it themselves: “In light of that inquiry, the Government of Rwanda has retained the Washington, D.C. law firm of Cunningham Levy Muse LLP to review and report on the material available in the public record on the role and knowledge of French officials regarding the Genocide against the Tutsi” (Cunningham Levy Muse, P: 3, 2017). This here is will be quotes from that report that is on the role of the French Government in the Rwandan Genocide. Clearly, there has been allegations and has been some talk about that, concerning the arms and the knowledge of it. This report are putting light on some of that. I will take the quotes that is substantial for the French intervention in the civil war and genocide in Rwanda.

“The expansion of France’s military support and strategic advice began within days of the war’s commencement. On October 11, 1990, Defense Attaché Colonel René Galinié recommended sending French advisers into the field, northeast of the combat zone, to “educate, organize and motivate troops that had been ossified for thirty years and who had forgotten the basic rules of battle.” (…) “In addition to advice, French officials supplied the FAR with modern mortars, armored vehicles, and other vehicles, along with ammunition and rockets. French officials also provided and helped maintain helicopter-gunships, which fired upon RPF fighters. According to jokes at the time, the only thing Rwandan soldiers did was pull the trigger” (Cunningham Levy Muse, P: 12-13, 2017).

“Massacres of Tutsi continued throughout 1991, 1992, and up until the Genocide. French officials were aware of massacres at this time, as well as the role of the Habyarimana government and its military in them. Despite this knowledge, French officials maintained their support of the Rwandan military and funneled weapons into Rwanda” (Cunningham Levy Muse, P: 20, 2017).

“Thus, in February 1993, after the Noroît detachment had just been reinforced . . . , the Army Chief of Staff reminded the defense attaché that he was responsible for “ensuring that the Rwandan army does not find itself in a stock shortage of sensitive ammunition . . . and that deliveries to the FAR of military equipment be made in the utmost discretion.” In fact, in the timeline laid down in his end of mission report, Colonel Philippe Tracqui, commander of the Noroît detachment for the period from February 8, 1993 to March 21, 1993, noted “Friday, February 12, 1993: landing of a DC8 50 with a 12.7mm machine gun plus 100,000 cartridges for the FAR. Wednesday, February 17, 1993: landing of a Boeing 747 with discrete unloading by the FAR of 10 mm shells and 68 mm rockets (Alat).” (Cunningham Levy Muse, P: 23, 2017).

“The French Parliamentary Commission accordingly found: Faced with procrastination by Rwandan authorities and concerned about the stability of states and regional security, France never made the decision to suspend all cooperation, or even to decrease the level of its civil and military aid. Thus, President Juvénal Habyarimana was able to convince himself that “France . . . would be behind him regardless of the situation, and he could do anything militarily and politically.” (Cunningham Levy Muse, P: 27, 2017).

“Arms flows to the FAR were not suspended immediately by France after the imposition of the arms embargo on May 17, 1994. Rather, they were diverted to Goma airport in Zaire as an alternative to Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, where fighting between the FAR and the rebel RPF as well as an international presence made continued shipments extremely difficult. Some of the first arms shipments to arrive

in Goma after May 17 were supplied to the FAR by the French government. Human Rights Watch learned from airport personnel and local businessmen that five shipments arrived in May and June containing artillery, machine guns, assault rifles and ammunition provided by the French government. These weapons were taken across the border into Rwanda by members of the Zairian military and delivered to the FAR in Gisenyi. The French consul in Goma at the time, Jean-Claude Urbano, has justified the five shipments as a fulfillment of contracts negotiated with the government of Rwanda prior to the arms embargo” (Cunningham Levy Muse, P: 39, 2017).

“Information in the public record also shows that in the months that followed the Genocide against the Tutsi French officials continued to support génocidaires. On August 3, 1994, the UN Secretary General suggested that the international community should coordinate with UNAMIR to identify within the camps perpetrators of the Genocide against the Tutsi, with an eye to bringing them to justice. But instead, French soldiers escorted and released suspected génocidaires in Zaire. Between July and September 1994, French military helicopters evacuated Bagosora, along with Interahamwe leader Jean-Baptiste Gatete, and other ex-FAR troops and militia members, out of Goma” (…) “Finally, we urge the Government of Rwanda to seek France’s cooperation in this endeavor. To this end, France should make available its archives, documents, physical evidence and officials (current and former). Any investigation by the Government of Rwanda should evaluate what occurred in the 1990s, as well as what has happened since then, including France’s cooperation with this investigation into French complicity in the Genocide” (Cunningham Levy Muse, P: 48, 52, 2017).

This one collected lots of public information and put into account. This is damning evidence and not just random quotes from a mad-man, but from lawyers collected information as ordered by the Rwandan Government. The could have been done by the French, they might have given other insights and even transcripts we haven’t seen. Even as the Rwandan has and can get documentation on the actions during the genocide and before. Since the Rwandan Government wants closure and might want the French to answer for their crimes.

French President Francois Mitterrand at the time was loyal to President Juvenal Habyarimana, therefore wanted to stop the Rwandan Patriotic Front from overthrowing their man at any cost apperently. The French really showed it with the ammunition, training and also helping them flee with weapons to Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo. Clearly, the French knew what they did and did it with a reason, as of they wanted someone loyal to them and also a weapons brother at any cost.

So the continued trouble of the Great Lakes Region has been created by the French as well. Since they let the Interahamwe and Ex-FAR leave with weapons in the refugee camps in the DRC. That has been an initial reason for violence since the 1990s. The French should step up and take responsibility for what they did and who they gave power to. Which also created this genocide. The PRF and President Paul Kagame did his part, the RPF is not a holy and non-violent movement who just brought peace. They also killed and took control. However, the French did aid and abide help to the other partner in the crime. Therefore, they are responsible for their part in this genocide. That shouldn’t be left alone and the stones should be turned, the ones sanction this and ordering this on behalf of Habyarimana and his government.

This report was compelling and it shows how disgraceful the French was and how they really wanted the dictator Habyirmana to continue to rule in Rwanda. Peace.

Reference:

Cunningham Levy Muse LLP – ‘REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA ON THE ROLE OF FRENCH OFFICIALS IN THE GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI’ (11.12.2017)

Advocacy Brief on Kenya: 15th Session of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 16-24 November, 2016 (21.11.2016)

Background

At the height of the violence that gripped Kenya after the disputed 2007 elections, the Party of the National Unity and the Orange Democratic Movement, who were parties to the conflict, wrote to the International Criminal Court (ICC) seeking its intervention to stop what they called genocide. A local investigatory commission with international participation found that some actions during the post-election violence likely met the threshold of crimes against humanity and recommended the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Kenya, or in the alternative, the handover of the sealed evidence to the Prosecutor at the ICC.

Efforts to establish the Tribunal were defeated by political forces aligned to suspected perpetrators, hence triggering the handover of evidence to the ICC and the subsequent investigation. Six Kenyans were named in connection with seven crimes against humanity charges; the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed charges against four suspects. Two suspects – Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were subsequently elected President and Deputy President, respectively, before their trials could begin at the ICC. Thereafter, the Prosecutor withdrew charges against two suspects – Francis Muthaura and Kenyatta – citing witness bribery and intimidation, as well as failure by the Kenya government to cooperate with the court. The remaining case against Ruto and journalist Joshua arap Sang was terminated citing “intolerable levels of witness interference and political meddling”.

Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) has followed closely the developments around accountability for the crimes committed during the 2007 post-election violence. Since the opening of the investigations in March 2010, we have observed certain shortcomings and challenges on the part of the Government of Kenya, the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and the African Union (AU). This brief seeks to focus on key issues emerging from the situation that the ICC and international justice finds itself in today, while drawing linkages from how the Kenya cases and other ICC cases were managed. KPTJ also makes recommendations on actions that require to be undertaken by the ASP, the ICC and African governments in order to address the emergent challenges.

1. Engage and Withdraw Simultaneously?

A Contradiction in the Mandate of the AU Open Ended Committee

1. The 27^th ordinary session of the African Union’s assembly in July 2016 issued a decision on the ICC[1] pursuant to a similar one from the previous session[2]. Besides praising the court’s termination of the case against Kenya’s Deputy President William Ruto, the AU outlined a five-point agenda for the Open-Ended Committee of Foreign Ministers on the ICC, which included the following:

• Engaging with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) before the January 2017 AU Summit and before the 15^th Assembly of State Parties in November 2016.
• Maintaining the earlier decision from January 2016, to develop a comprehensive strategy to inform the actions of AU member states that are party to the Rome Statute; a strategy that includes collective withdrawal from the ICC.
• Concluding a review of the ICC’s interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute regarding the compulsion of unwilling witnesses to testify, with a view to inform debate at the 15^th
• Conveying the message that AU member states object to the inclusion of language requiring the UNSC to mandate UN peace-keeping missions to enforce arrest warrants in Africa.
• Utilising the AU Mission in Brussels, Belgium, as the secretariat to the Open-ended Ministerial Committee and provision of institutional support to the African Group in The Hague, Netherlands, to ensure effective coordination of its activities.

2. The AU has since held a meeting with the UNSC in September 2016 to present pre-formulated terms developed by the Open-ended Ministerial Committee as conditions to keep African States as parties to the Rome Statute. These conditions were as follows[3]:

• Immunity under the ICC’s Rome Statute for sitting heads of state and government as well as senior officials;
• Intervention of the ICC in cases involving African states only after those cases have been submitted to the AU or AU judicial institutions; and
• Reduction in the powers of the ICC Prosecutor.

3. Recent developments have seen South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia commence processes to withdraw from the ICC; seemingly as part of actualising the intention cited in the agenda of the Open-ended Ministerial Committee. These actions expose the agenda by the AU to be disingenuous and presupposes that the deliberations within the ASP would be futile.. The wave of withdrawals occurs against a counter-wave of support for the Court by countries including Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana[4]; an indication that the strategy for mass withdrawal does not enjoy the consensus suggested by the AU decision of July 2016. These countries have suggested that concerns expressed by African states are not insurmountable and can be addressed within the framework of the ASP. Their support for the ICC underscores the fact that the obligations under the Rome Statute are State obligations and not AU obligations; as such, decisions on withdrawal will be based on national interest that cannot be assumed by the AU.

4. Furthermore, the strategy for AU member states to withdraw undermines the other outlined agenda items of engagement with the ASP, such as the review of the interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute and the enforcement of arrest warrants. Such contradictory actions raise the question of whether the AU is negotiating ICC reforms in good faith.

5. In light of the foregoing, KPTJ recommends that:

• African States abandon and disregard calls for mass withdrawal from the Court and instead consolidate the member bloc to advance their concerns within the bounds of the ASP in deliberations based on good faith.
• African states should continue to publicly reaffirm their support for engaging with the ICC through the ASP and prevail on the AU to adjust its engagement strategy accordingly. We applaud the statements made by Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana.
• An ICC Liaison Office should be established at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to facilitate more productive and sustained communication between African States and the ICC as part of restoring a relationship that has become plagued by mistrust and misunderstandings.

1. Absence of Accountability?

Peace, Security and Stability

6. The characterisation of the ICC as undermining the peace and security of states or threatening their stability has become a recurring theme by those advocating disengagement or withdrawal from the ICC. In its notice of withdrawal, South Africa claims that its aspirations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts were being hindered by its obligations under the Rome Statute[5] to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when he attended the June 2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg. Kenyan government officials have also previously described the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto as an existential threat to peace and stability.
7. A closer scrutiny of this assertion in the face of ongoing conflict situations suggests the contrary. The absence of accountability processes does not necessarily facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts; the South Sudan and Burundi conflicts instead point to protagonists willing to escalate violence, even in the context of peace negotiations. Burundi and The Gambia have commenced processes to withdraw from the ICC at a time when their respective governments stand accused of acts of repression and mass human rights violations. Rather than advance the cause for peace, the clamour for withdrawal from the ICC is playing into the hands of those wary of the prospects of accountability in the aftermath of conflict. Even more concerning is an apparent trend of rising post-election violence, such as that witnessed in Kenya previously and in Gabon currently, or violence stemming from efforts to instal third-term incumbencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Such trends are bound to persist in the absence of mechanisms for accountability, of which the ICC is a critical component.
8. The assertion that the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Court) and its proposed expanded criminal jurisdiction through the Malabo Protocol would fill in any void created by a mass withdrawal from the ICC is erroneous. The African Court is a distant prospect for addressing the impunity gap: it is far from being operational. Since 2013, only five states namely Benin, Kenya, Congo, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania have signed but not ratified the Malabo Protocol, which requires the ratification of 15 states to begin operations. Kenya is the only state thus far that has made a financial pledge of USD 1 million to operationalise the court — a far cry from the resources required for a court of broad jurisdiction consisting of a mandate on human rights as well as international law and interstate disputes. It has previously been estimated that a singular international criminal trial costs USD 20 million to undertake. In addition, the protocol contains contentious provisions that undermine its viability as an alternative platform for international crimes, the most notable being the clause of immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. As a testament to the inability of the African Court to be an immediate replacement of the ICC as desired by some, even South Africa through its Justice Minister has indicated that it will ask for a review of the Malabo Protocol to address contentious issues. Furthermore, limited progress has been made towards establishing national mechanisms that can sufficiently undertake the obligation of accountability for international crimes.
9. KPTJ recognises the pursuit of justice in conflict and post-conflict settings as an essential pillar of rebuilding democracies and restoring rule of law. These are the pathways to lasting peace, security and stability. Rather than push to void international justice mechanisms after the conflict to facilitate mediation, we recommend that:

• African states fully implement and consistently apply already established norms on democracy, peace and security as a preventative measure to conflict including: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and; the African Governance Architecture.
• African states must critically reflect on and address the issues of the African Court’s capacity, accessibility, legal standards outlined for crimes under international law and expunge provisions conferring immunity on sitting Heads of State and senior government officials. This process must not be rushed or predicated on a manufactured crisis precipitated by a strategy of mass withdrawal from the ICC.
• African states should establish robust and credible national mechanisms to address the accountability question at first instance and in complementarity with regional and international mechanisms. They must also broaden their policy considerations to include comprehensive reparation programmes for victims of international crimes.
• Disparity between State Obligations and Reality?

A look at State Cooperation

10. The Kenya and Sudan cases have exposed the frailties within the Rome Statute framework in as far as state cooperation is concerned. These cases have laid waste to the presumption that States will willingly engage with the court in the face of cases seeking to prosecute sitting heads of state, their deputies or powerful elites in close proximity to power. State cooperation has only demonstrably worked in instances where the target for prosecution is a vanquished foe of conflict as seen in the cases of Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire, that are fast advancing a notion of “victor’s justice”. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the final recourse for addressing the lack of state cooperation rests with the ASP. The ASP being a political organ of the Rome Statute is influenced by political rather than purely legal considerations in making its decisions, which makes the issue of resolving the non-cooperation of states problematic. A final challenge to state cooperation is the failure of the United States, China and Russia to ratify the Rome Statute while also being members of the UNSC with the power of referral of matters to the court. This has created the notion of double standards within the international justice system and emboldened other states to disregard cooperation with the court.
11. KPTJ calls on the members of the UNSC who have not ratified the Rome Statute to display leadership on State cooperation with the court by first ratifying the Statute and utilising its discretion on referral and deferral in a manner that adheres to the objectives of the Statute. We further wish to reiterate that state cooperation must denote effective cooperation that facilitates the mandates of the respective organs of the court and not feigned cooperation which creates the perception of facilitating the court but in fact consists of using procedural and technical obstacles to undermine the court. We call on the ASP to adopt a consistent and objective legal standard in the assessment of state cooperation.
12. Are there lessons to be learned?

Taking stock of the experience in the Kenya cases

12. The Kenya cases and the manner of their termination carry critical lessons for consideration to inform future actions by the court and the content of reforms within the strategic plans of its respective organs. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) as well as the bench on various occasions decried the instances of witness tampering and intimidation as well as non-cooperation by the state in responding to the OTP requests for information and a failure to execute ICC warrants of arrest with respect to three Kenyans suspected of witness tampering. This in fact has led to a finding of non-compliance against Kenya and led to its referral to the ASP under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. In the midst of all this, was an unprecedented and disruptive diplomatic effort that deliberately exerted political pressure on the court with a view to influencing the outcome of the Kenya cases. It is arguable that these diplomacy efforts yielded the concession of excusing President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto from continuous presence at their trial and that the current wave of withdrawals from the ICC on the basis of an apparent bias by the court against Africans are a fallout from these diplomatic efforts. The capitulations of the cases have also pointed to significant flaws in the investigative and prosecutorial approaches that informed the development of the cases and must lead to some introspection from the relevant mechanisms. The fact that the Trust Fund for Victims is yet to commence operations in Kenya cannot go without mention.
13. KPTJ urges all the organs of the court to reflect on these experiences and take due cognisance of the following lessons and recommendations:

• The ICC, particularly the ASP, should do more to ensure that it does not allow political statements to interfere with the judicial independence of the Court.
• The ICC should ensure that it takes steps to respond to messages of a political nature and correct inaccurate statements in a timely manner. In addition, it should ensure that such key messages reach the right audiences, including victims and affected communities.
• The Court should continue to build its relationship with African States that openly support the mandate of the ICC; in addition, the ICC should do more to improve its relationship with, and image at, the AU.
• The Trust Fund for Victims should commence operations in Kenya, as victims have received little to no assistance from the Kenyan government.
• The Prosecutor should carefully consider when to request ‘summons to appear’ as opposed to ‘warrants of arrest’ and take into account the individual circumstances of each accused person in doing so, particularly their potential to intimidate witnesses and interfere with evidence.
• Swift action should be taken by the Prosecutor and the Court in instances of non-cooperation by States Parties. Any instances of non-cooperation should be resolved as speedily as possible, in such a manner that the outcome of proceedings on non-cooperation can be applied to strengthen an ongoing case and not be delayed to the point that the outcome is only of academic significance.
• The Prosecutor should continue to carry out a review of its investigative strategies and methods in order to improve its chances of success at trial.
• The Prosecution should ensure that its staff are able to spend as much time as possible on better understanding the context and nuances of a given situation country.

1. Pursuit of reform without prejudice?

UN Reform vs ICC Reform

14. The unique role played by UNSC in referral and deferral of cases before the ICC means that the debates on reforming the court and reforming the UN and in particular the UNSC have inevitably intersected. We have witnessed both undertones and overt accusations of imperialism and undue influence directed at the court on account of cases on Africa referred to it by the UNSC (Libya and Sudan). Arguments made to amend the Rome Statute to confer immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials are laced with grievance against the UNSC permanent five members possessing a de facto immunity from prosecution under the ICC on account of their veto power. The end result is a misdirected effort to amend the Rome Statute or in the extreme withdraw from the ICC on the basis of perceived excesses that are better addressed by engaging the broader debate of UN reforms.

15. While KPTJ acknowledges the slanted relationship of the UNSC with the court and supports a robust conversation on its reforms, we call on states not to misdirect the agenda of reforming the UNSC into discussions on improving the functions of the court and occasion amendments to the Rome statute that sacrifice the future of the court as part of a bargaining process on UNSC reforms. We call on African states in particular, to distinguish the broader question of UN reforms as enshrined in the “Ezulwini Consensus” from the question of reforming the Rome Statute and reflecting on the performance of the court. We call upon African member states to the Rome Statute not to sacrifice the promise of justice for victims of atrocity crimes at the altar of grievance against the unequal power relations represented by the UN Security Council.

end/kptj/16.06.2016

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About KPTJ:

This brief was prepared by Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ), a coalition of Kenyan citizens and over 30 organisations working in the human rights, governance and legal fields that came together during the crisis over the disputed results of the 2007 presidential election to seek truth and accountability for the elections and the widespread violence that followed; and who continue to work closely with the victims of that period. It is a brief update on the situation in Kenya as pertains to pursuing accountability for the crimes against humanity committed during the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence as well as its adherence to its obligations under the Rome Statute.

[1] Assembly/AU/Dec.616 (XXVII)

[2] Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI)

[3] Press Release: “UN/African Union: Reject ICC withdrawal”. Available here: http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/552-un-african-union-reject-icc-withdrawal.html

[4] Article: “Which African states slammed Burundi, South Africa and Gambia’s withdrawal from ICC?” Available here: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/which-african-states-slammed-burundi-south-africa-gambias-withdrawal-icc-1589711

[5] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/South-Africa-Instrument-of-Withdrawal-International-Criminal-Court.jpg

Statement by the Spokesperson on Uganda and the International Criminal Court (14.05.2016)

Committed to preventing crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, and to avoiding impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes, the EU confirms its continuing support for the ICC and its work.

Full cooperation with the ICC is a prerequisite for the Court’s effective functioning.

In accordance with established approach of the EU and its Member States, the EU regrets that Uganda, a State Party of the Court, did not fulfil this week its legal obligation, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1593, to execute the arrest warrant against any ICC indictee present in the country.

Discussion: Should the French get jurisdiction for trials of Rwandan Genocide? Since they now are breaching international boundaries and judging acts not happening on French soil, but in Rwanda.

It is not that I am for the Rwandan genocide or partial in any sense of the actions done in Paris today. I will just spill the beans and ask for questionable trial and courtship in Paris as that is France, not Kigali that is Rwanda. If it still we’re tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania then this would be understandable for court outside as it was an agreement between United Nation and the Rwandan Government for this Tribunal as Peaceful change after the civil war and the genocide in 1993-1994 in the country. There I will question the action of the French Authorities today.

In Paris today:

“On Tuesday, Octavien Ngenzi, 58, and Tito Barahira, 64, will go on trial for allegedly playing a direct role in the massacre of hundreds of Tutsi refugees in a church in the eastern town of Kabarondo on April 13, 1994” (News Wires, 2016).

Because it is an important question and with the implication of history between Rwanda and the France; France have been the colonial master on the African Continent and still have control over the Central African Franc (CAF) and with that has an economic stake in many African nations. Still, this should not be implicated into why they can take Citizens of another Nation and also order their trial, even if it is breaching with Human Rights and Roman Statute. Most Countries have ratified the Roman Statute and also parts of UN Charter for Human Rights and even the Geneva Convention on justice in War. Still, this does opens the door from who has the right to sanction and the right to create justice.

Some people might say the Rwandan Government is a totalitarian and a Police State under strict control from a central government under the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under President Paul Kagame who does not have the will to take certain Génocidaires to court as they might implicate certain close allies of the government. Still, that does not open the question that I will talk about. Because even if the courts and judges are premature and built for the Government in Rwanda, does not take away their jurisdiction and their own rights of rule of law in their own country. Even when it is the violations are a crime against humanity as Genocide.

Not that I want the men and woman behind an action of this size to get away is not my intention to discuss it. It is more the example of colonial law and the post-colonial acts that are not just or justified. We as people have to set standards and use our minds. I will not let the French or British control the Central Arguments, as much as I don’t want the Americans or Chinese doing it. What is important is this. We have Nations, which is a set territory, a territory where they keep citizens safe and have the monopoly for violence is for the state; in that sense that the nation have an Army to keep foreign forces away and the town a secure to raise families and work. Second part of that security is the internal security to make peace inside the country with a Police that takes criminals and courts of laws that with justification condemns and detain fellow citizens that have breached the national laws. All of this should be universal and understood, as ordinary understanding of what a state should do. And it with this matter I will take a step further.

Because this is important even when the States and Governments who controls their nations and does the wrong acts against fellow peers. Their citizens should then as long as the nation and state have ratified international laws and statutes get their crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court of Hauge. Even if the ICC and it’s attack on African Leaders, it still have the authority as given by the United Nation and the other bodies together with the ratified laws that the States and Government have signed at one point in time.

The problem I have and the reason for it is simple and it’s basic for any Republic/Kingdom/State/Nation their sovereign rights and their sovereign rule as a Sovereign Power in their own Territory as it is with the Army and the Police inside that nation. That is the main issue I have. Even when it comes to Crime Against Humanity.

Let’s say that the unlawful and unjust war from the United States of America under President George W. Bush who even address the world on 20^th March 2003, which started a war on false premise and lies to American public and the United Nations, without the international states accept for United Kingdom accepting the attack on the Sovereign Nation of Iraq under President Saddam Hussain. I am not saying President Hussain we’re a saint, as his acts with certain gas and weapons against Iran was not justified, still the matter at hand can question the jurisdiction of the ones implicated and breaches of justice from the American Government at the time and the United Kingdom Government who went in Iraq. They all certainly we’re behind acts against Humanity on some levels as they went to war and even did torture in certain chambers in Iraq. Can the Rwandan Government and their courts if they collect evidence and collect for instance affidavit of victims and of low-level civil servants of the time, could they take President Bush for trial at the High Court of Kigali?

I am just asking the question, because the case today is an act upon the same sovereign question as the former Mayors of two towns or villages are taken to court in Paris. They are in foreign land as they are not in the Jurisdiction and the Territory of where the crimes happen and in the State where the claimed Génocidaires are citizens.

If citizenship and if sovereign nations still means something, then we have to ask the question and ask the matter. Even when it grimes crimes and crimes against humanity as the laws should be the same for Western Nations as for the African Nations. This should open up the questions for French interaction with the Génocidaires of the official government at the time under President Habyarimana with the military training and equipment before Operation Turquoise turned into the UNAMIR mandate under Dallaire. In that sense, the black-box sage that never really been answered as the training and interference of the French, should give the Government under Rwandan Patriotic Front to be allowed to Court the French Men who served the Génocidaires, right? Since the French now is doing the same in Paris, just because they are French and European should not make them able to clean their hands of the blood, just as much as the RPA, now RPF should not be white-washed over time. The law should apply alike to either side. Something that should not be needed to explain or take on; as any crime on humanity and support of the attacks with weapons and structures should be taken to court as violation of these men and woman.

The case is not that the Génocidaires should be dealt with from authorities and the men behind killings should not be punished by the Government or any other piece international legal-body that has the jurisdiction on it. If so then the men and woman should go to international court or a national one that could offer a fair judgement on the causes behind the violations and assess the criminal activity.

But what bugs me is the easy way the French and Government of France overturn the Rwandan Government as a sovereign nation to turn their citizens and their eye-witnesses to Paris for the trial to concede the judgement of these two mayors. Not that I am defending the Mayors for their activity, it’s the actions of French I am still questioning.

That is why, why couldn’t the Rwandese if they could collect information on the French involvement and support of the late-President Habyarimana in the turns up-to the genocide. Since the French can now take Rwandese to court in Paris and collect the witnesses from Rwanda to serve these men and woman in the capital of France. There questions about it and if it is justified as the precedence this kind of cases set. As if the French Authorities still can grant them authority to get these people to be eye-witnesses in a court case of actions against humanity in Rwanda and not on the French shores or near Caen. Therefore since this court is not directly based on the Roman Statute or the other ratified laws where the crimes against humanity are involved and control the verdicts of the judgements. So the matter is that if it was so, since this a case that is about crimes done abroad in alien jurisdiction, it might should have been posted in the ICC and not the High Court or whatever name the Court have in Paris.

It is not that I want the two Mayors to free-men without a court judgement or get the Génocidaires of the Rwandan tragedy to not be tested in Court and get fair trials, so that the men and woman who has actually done their crimes get their punishment. But the way it is done and how it is conducted as long as it talks about Sovereign States and Territory; when coming to court and to be able to conduct justice to its citizens and the condemn the crimes, condone it and make sure that criminals get fair trials before serving time as felons. That shouldn’t be too much to ask. The question is if we twisted the Courts to Kigali instead of Paris, if the French we’re sent to be on trial in Kigali instead of Paris. That should be allowed to ask, as the Rwandan Government and the French Government are both Sovereign States. As Sovereign they have rights, over territory and their citizens and nations are bound to respect these in any sense and be responsible for justice, also over boundaries and borders. And also respecting the international conventions, laws and other ratified accords that set the standards for justice in the State as the Citizens need safety and security; something the state should provide and make sure they have, by the peaceful means and rule of law. Peace.

Reference:

New Wires – ‘Rwandan ex-mayors face trial in France over 1994 genocide’ (10.05.2016) link: http://www.france24.com/en/20160509-rwandan-ex-mayors-face-trial-france-1994-genocide-Ngenzi-Barahira