
The United Nations Security Council have delivered a letter and also two statements on the situation and the level of crisis in the Republic of South Sudan. This is happening as the UNSC are discussing the mandate of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The problem is continuation of the flaring skirmishes in July 2016.
The UNSC are now looking into crisis and fixing the lax mandate or the issues with the peacekeepers in the nation. This has to happen as the UNMISS has already come under scrutiny for their acts around the UN House in and around Juba. The proven skirmishes and the evidence of what went down and also what has gone on since. Also the interesting who has exported the arms to the Republic; which has given the fighting armies the needed ammunition and weapons to continue to fighting each other.
Mr. Mohamad of Sudan said this:
“The Cooperation Agreement laid a solid foundation for normalizing relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, enhancing cooperation in all areas between the two and achieving sustained peace. It covered the areas of oil resources, trade, borders, security arrangements, the status of citizens and other themes. However, our brothers in South Sudan have so far been enthusiastic only about the implementation of the oil agreement. They have overlooked the implementation of other agreements, particularly the Agreement on Security Arrangements between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, which includes provisions on ending the support for, and the harbouring of, rebel movements, the establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and the establishment of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM)” (…) “On the deployment of the oil police in the Diffra oil complex, my delegation reaffirms the need for such a step, as the joint Abyei police has not yet been established. Another reason is that there are Sudanese rebel movement groups in South Sudan that can target those vital installations. That force is limited both in number and equipment” (UNSC 7810, 2016).
Mr. Malok of South Sudan said this:
“Cooperation between the two countries is crucial to any constructive and productive efforts in Abyei. Indeed, even the progress made by UNISFA could not have been possible without a degree of functional cooperation by the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan. However, much more cooperation is needed if the efforts of UNISFA are to continue to bear tangible fruits that will benefit the two communities and help to facilitate continued improvement in the relations between the two countries” (…) “It is noteworthy that, as the report of the Secretary-General observes, the restrictions imposed by the Government of the Sudan on non-governmental organizations have limited the implementation capacity of humanitarian and development actors, especially in the northern parts of Abyei. As the Secretary-General also notes, in addition to a lack of adequate funds, other challenges include high implementation costs owing to security and logistical constraints, delays in the issuance of travel permits and restrictions on the movement of personnel and supplies by the Government of the Sudan.” (UNSC 7810, 2016).
Context:
“The armed opposition to Kiir’s regime is an increasingly multifaceted amalgam of forces encompassing dissident groups with diverse grievances, aims and approaches to the war. Many of these groups are either not under the direct control of SPLM/A in Opposition led by Machar, which was a party to the Agreement, or are only loosely affiliated with it. Nevertheless, Machar’s resilience, notwithstanding the government attempts to assassinate him in greater Equatoria, has seemingly provided more motivation for Equatorian armed elements to associate formally with SPLM/A in Opposition. The perception that the belligerence of Kiir’s Dinka-dominated regime is leading the country inexorably towards a devastating tribal war, coupled with a sense that the international community is failing to take the steps necessary to avoid a further escalation of the conflict, are providing impetus among non-Dinka opposition political and military forces towards greater coordination, if not complete organizational unity” (UNSC letter, P: 3, 2016).
“The SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, remains a central figure in the perpetuation and expansion of the war, including the conflict in greater Equatoria, described in detail below. After the fighting in Juba in July, he oversaw the operation to hunt down Machar and the SPLM/A in Opposition forces in Central Equatoria” (…) “The extension of the war continues to pose an increasingly grave threat to the countries that neighbour South Sudan. For example, after a long series of skirmishes between SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition in Central and Western Equatoria after Machar fled from Juba in July, Machar and some 750 soldiers and civilians entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has confirmed that, on 13 August, SPLA then launched an incursion into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An estimated 800 to 900 SPLA troops from Division VI crossed the border and engaged in a battle with SPLM/A in Opposition. On 17 August, two MI-24 helicopters also crossed the border, travelling nearly 6 km into Congolese territory and again attacking SPLM/A in Opposition positions” (UNSC letter, P: 6-7, 2016).

Arms dealings:
“In a meeting with the Panel on 28 September, the First Vice-President, Taban Deng Gai, refuted the presence of L-39 jets in South Sudan, which the Panel had documented with supporting evidence, including photographs and eyewitness accounts, in its report to the Security Council that month” (…) “The Panel has been provided with preliminary information on the weapons that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo took from the combatants who accompanied Machar into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 2016. The sources of the weapons are consistent with those previously documented by the Panel as having been procured in South Sudan, both before and after independence, including weapons and ammunition manufactured in the Sudan, China, the United States of America, Israel and various Eastern European countries” (…) “One weapon of note among the arms documented is a Micro Galil rifle manufactured by Israel Weapon Industries, bearing serial number 36100549. This is the third weapon of its type identified by the Panel, with two others (serial numbers 36100566 and 36100588) having been documented in Upper Nile in 2015. Each of the weapons was, according to interviews with SPLM/A in Opposition members, taken from South Sudanese government stocks either through battlefield capture or by defectors. According to information provided to the Panel by the manufacturer, as noted in the Panel’s report of January 2016 (S/2016/70), the three weapons are from a batch sold to the Ministry of Defence of Uganda in 2007. There is no provision in the end user certificate for their transfer to South Sudan” (…) “In September, the Panel received information from Spain regarding weapon trafficking to South Sudan that the Spanish police had obtained as part of a continuing investigation into money-laundering and racketeering. The information details communications between an arms trafficking network based in Europe and the leadership of SPLM/A in Opposition in 2014, in which the latter had requested the delivery, through an intermediary in Senegal, of an extensive list of small arms, munitions and light weapons. Further investigations by the Panel suggest that this shipment was at least partially delivered” (…) “Also in September, the Panel received information and documentation from a confidential high-level South Sudanese source that, in July 2014, a shipment of small arms ammunition and 4,000 assault rifles had been delivered by Bulgarian Industrial Engineering and Management to the Ministry of Defence of Uganda. According to the documentation, Bosasy Logistics, a company registered in Kampala and described in previous reports by the Panel, including its report of January 2016 (S/2016/70), acted as an intermediary in the transaction. The weapons and munitions were subsequently transferred to South Sudan. While the Panel is further investigating this transaction, it notes that recent arms transfers from Uganda to South Sudan, as described in its report of September 2016 (S/2016/793), are likely to be using the same modality as the earlier transfers from 2014, with Bosasy Logistics and its Chairman, Valerii Copeichin, facilitating the sales” (…) “The Panel has received multiple reports from various sources of arms shipments entering South Sudan by road through Uganda and by airlift to Juba and Wau since May. The content, according to two high-level sources with knowledge of the operations, was small arms and light weapons, ammunition and armoured vehicles. The Panel is in possession of a contract signed by SPLA in May 2015 for the provision of Panthera armoured vehicles valued at $7,187,500.50 The company contracted to provide the vehicles, Egypt and Middle East for Development, was represented by an Egyptian national, Mohamed Atta Jad. The company is registeredin Cairo.51 The Panel is investigating the possible connection between this contract and the recent airlifts to South Sudan” (UNSC letter, P: 18-20, 2016)
Budget:
“The Panel obtained data indicating that projected State budget expenditure for the 2016/17 fiscal year would exceed revenue by 149 per cent.62 Consequently, the government has laid out a proposal for financial austerity and external borrowings, which incorporates recommendations made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after its mission of May. The Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, in his address to the Commission on 19 October, said the following: “We commend the TGNU for the work that has gone into creating an ambitious budget, which has been commended by many analysts. Strong constraints on expenditures are central to the budget and a condition for stabilization.” Progress towards the implementation of this strategy will indicate the government’s seriousness in addressing the macroeconomic crisis” (…) “The draft budget for the fiscal year 2016/17 is estimated to be 22.3 billion South Sudanese pounds, half of which is allocated to the security sector” (…) “Revenue for the 2016/17 budget was calculated on the basis of oil production of 120,000 barrels per day, which is the lowest rate of extraction since December 2013. There is no indication that Deng Gai’s efforts in August to renegotiate the pipeline and transfer fees with Khartoum were successful, meaning that South Sudan will continue to pay $24.1 per barrel in fees to the Sudan, undercutting the revenue of the budget owing to volatile oil prices. The oil industry also shows no signs of recovery to the pre-war levels; the Unity fields were disabled in the early months of the war, and the continuing conflict will make it difficult to launch the long and technologically complicated process of restarting oil production” (UNSC letter, P: 23, 2016).
This here is lots of interesting collected information that usually would be left behind and not for-told to the media and the press, as even the press is suppressed in the South Sudan. As the Eye Radio and others has gotten harassed by the TGoNU. They don’t want the news of conflict spread and the initial reports from the nation. Peace.
Reference:
United Nation Security Council 7810th Meeting (15.11.2016)
UNSC – ‘S/2016/963: Letter dated 15 November 2016 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (15.11.2016)














