Letter number two:
The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Gary Quinlan (Australia):
The members of the Security Council recall its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, which established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The members of the Security Council also note this year marks its twentieth anniversary.
The members of the Security Council recognize the contribution of the ICTR to the fight against impunity through fulfilling its mandate of prosecuting persons responsible for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi during which Hutu and others who opposed the genocide were also killed, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as set forth in resolution 955 (1994).
The members of the Security Council do also acknowledge the contribution of the ICTR to the process of national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace.
The members of the Security Council emphasize that the establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals pursuant to resolution 1966 (2010) was essential to ensure that the closure of the ICTR does not leave the door open to impunity for the remaining fugitives and for those whose appeals have not been completed.
The members of the Security Council call upon all States to cooperate with the ICTR, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals and the Government of Rwanda in the arrest and prosecution of the remaining nine ICTR-indicted fugitives, and further call upon States to investigate, arrest, prosecute or extradite, in accordance with applicable international obligations, all other fugitives accused of genocide residing on their territories.
The members of the Security Council reaffirm their strong commitment to justice and the fight against impunity.
5. November 2014:
The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Gary Quinlan (Australia):
The Security Council heard a briefing on 4 November 2014 by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, on the political crisis in Burkina Faso.
The members of the Security Council expressed their deep concern over the political and security crisis in Burkina Faso and over reports of the loss of life resulting from recent events surrounding the resignation of Blaise Compaoré from his post of President of Burkina Faso. They called for calm and urged all parties to refrain from violence. They called on the Burkina Faso authorities to respect the right of peaceful assembly and right to life and to protect citizen’s safety and property.
The members of the Security Council called on all actors involved in Burkina Faso to respect the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol on democracy and good governance and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, notably the rejection of unconstitutional changes of Government.
The members of the Security Council acknowledged the democratic aspiration of the people of Burkina Faso. They urged the security forces of Burkina Faso to hand over power to a civilian-led transition and to take immediate steps to restore constitutional order without delay.
The members of the Security Council called on all stakeholders in Burkina Faso to collaborate together to launch a peaceful, civilian-led and democratic transition process leading to the holding of free, fair, inclusive and credible elections as soon as possible, consistent with the Constitution of Burkina Faso.
The members of the Security Council took note of the Declaration of the Chairman of ECOWAS of 2 November 2014 and of the African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué of 4 November 2014 on Burkina Faso.
The members of the Security Council expressed their full support to the Special Representative for West Africa, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, and for the mission conducted jointly with the African Union and ECOWAS, and called on all parties in Burkina Faso to extend full cooperation to the joint mission. They commended the efforts of regional and international actors, in particular ECOWAS and the African Union, towards the restoration of constitutional order in Burkina Faso.
If you haven’t heard what has happen in Burkina Faso. If so, then these pieces will give you some notion on what has happen in Burkina Faso and also how it’s been and also what has happen in the last 48 hours.
Ban Ki-Moon statement:
“The Secretary-General is following with great concern the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso. He calls on all parties to end the use of violence, exercise calm and restraint and use dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues”(…)”The Secretary-General is saddened over the loss of life resulting from recent events. He has requested his Special Representative for West Africa, Mohammed ibn Chambas, to visit Burkina Faso tomorrow and welcomes that this mission will be undertaken jointly with the African Union and ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States]” (UN, 30.10.2014).
“Addis Ababa, 30 October 2014: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, has expressed deep concern about the unfolding situation in Burkina Faso and is following its evolution very closely. She has called for calm and utmost restraint from all the parties concerned” (…)”has urgently dispatched a High-Level Team that will form part of a Joint Delegation comprising the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN) to Burkina Faso to consult with all the Burkinabe stakeholders. In this regard, the Chairperson appeals to the Burkinabe authorities to facilitate the visit of the Joint Delegation” (…)”assures the people of Burkina Faso of the unflinching support of the AU, as they look for political solutions to the current difficulties facing their country” (AU, 30.10.2014)
“The United States welcomes President Compaore’s decision to withdraw a National Assembly bill which would have amended the constitution and allowed him to run for an additional term of office. We also welcome his decision to form a government of national unity to prepare for national elections and to transfer power to a democratically elected successor. We look forward to that transition taking place in 2015. We regret the violence and the loss of life today in Burkina Faso, and call on all parties to avoid further violence. We underscore our commitment to peaceful transitions of power through democratic elections and emphasize neither side should attempt to change the situation through extra-constitutional means” (Psaki, 30.10.2014).
“We are following very closely the ongoing events in Burkina Faso. The European Union is very concerned about the current situation, with reports on casualties following the violent demonstrations that took place today. Now that the law proposal on the revision of the
Constitution has been withdrawn, the European Union calls upon all parties to refrain from the use of violence and engage rapidly in a constructive dialogue. The European Union stands ready to step in to facilitate this process” (EU, 30.10.2014)
“Authorities in Burkina Faso must rein in security forces that have used excessive force to crack down on peaceful anti-government protests, Amnesty International said today” (…)”he use of excessive force to crack down on peaceful protesters is unacceptable and the transition authorities must act urgently to rein in security forces,” said Gaëtan Mootoo, Amnesty International’s Researcher for West Africa” (…)”It is crucial that those responsible for the killings and beatings of protesters, journalists and other civilians are identified and held accountable. Officials at the highest level should publicly make it clear that excessive use of force will not be tolerated,” said Gaëtan Mootoo” (…)”People took to the streets of Ouagadougou and other cities yesterday to protest against an attempt by President Blaise Compaore – who has since resigned – to amend the constitution to extend his long stay in power” (…)”They began beating them with cords, then they shot live bullets. I saw three protesters fall down in front of me. One protestor was shot dead. I was able to take a photo showing the bullets that killed him when he was shot in the chest,” he said” (…)”Protesters should not be detained and charged for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly, as guaranteed by the constitution and international and regional treaties ratified by Burkina Faso” (31.10.2014, Amnesty).
“The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) is closely monitoring the political and human rights situation in Burkina Faso, in particular since the first demonstration that took place on Tuesday, 28 October 2014 to protest against the bill to amend the Constitution” (…)”is concerned about the worsening political crisis and its disastrous consequences for the stability of the country” (…)”is deeply concerned about the acts of violence and vandalism which led to the burning of the National Assembly building and destruction of the property of the national television station leading to an end to its broadcasting activities”(…)”is concerned about the death of several people during clashes between the population and security forces”(…)”is concerned that the violence is inconsistent with the ideals of democracy which is the goal of the demonstrations”(…)”The African Commission strongly condemns the violence and urgently appeals for a return to calm and a restoration of order. The African Commission reiterates the need for all the parties concerned to work towards restoring peace and security, and calls on the political stakeholders to engage in dialogue towards maintaining stability in the country. The African Commission seizes this opportunity to urge all the parties to comply with the principles of international humanitarian law and to respect and protect the human rights of all persons in Burkina Faso” (ACHPR, 31.10.2014).
“Has followed with grave attention the events unfolding in Burkina Faso and the tension around the process leading to the consideration of the draft bill on constitutional amendment” (…)”takes note of the decision by the government to withdraw the passing of this draft bill” (…)”To this end, it reiterates the need for compliance with the principle of democracy and constitutional governance as stipulated in the ECOWAS protocol on democracy and good governance” (…)”ECOWAS calls on all the people to remain calm and law abiding, and the security forces to respect and act in accordance with the constitution of the Republic. It also calls on all the parties involved, notably the entire political class to embrace dialogue with a view to arriving at a political consensus that will lead to free, fair and credible election consistent with constitutional provisions. ECOWAS, in line with its principle, will not recognize any ascension to power through non-constitutional means” (…)”H.E. John Dramani Mahama, Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS” (31.10.2014, ECOWAS).
Tobias Ellwood the Minister for Africa said: “We are deeply concerned by the violence which has taken place in Ouagadougou, seemingly as a result of government plans to amend the Constitution of Burkina Faso so that the incumbent President can seek another term after 27 years in office” (…)”The UK reiterates its support for the African Union Charter and for peaceful and democratic transfers of power. We urge all parties to exercise restraint, to adhere to non-violence and to return to dialogue to resolve this issue” (31.10.2014, UK).
ACHPR – ‘Press Release on the Deterioration of the Political and Human Rights Situation in Burkina Faso’ (31.10.2014) Link: http://www.achpr.org/press/2014/10/d232/
Amnesty – ‘Burkina Faso must end excessive use of force against protesters’ (31.10.2014) Link: http://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/burkina-faso-must-end-excessive-use-force-against-protesters
AU – ‘AU deeply concerned by the unfolding situation in Burkina Faso’ (30.10.2014) Link: http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-deeply-concerned-by-the-unfolding-situation-in-burkina-faso#sthash.W4IGuW3n.Zo3a9RQY.dpuf
ECOWAS – ‘ECOWAS speaks on Burkina Faso’ (31.10.2014) Link: http://www.presidency.gov.gh/node/723
EU – ‘Statement by the Spokesperson on the situation in Burkina Faso’ (30.10.2014) Link: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/141030_01_en.pdf
UN – Secretary-General: SG/SM/16298-AFR/3002 -‘Saddened by Recent Deaths in Burkina Faso, Secretary-General Calls for Restraint, End of Violence’ (30.10.2014) Link: http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sgsm16298.doc.htm
UK – ‘UK concerned by violence in Burkina Faso’ (31.10.2014) Link: http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/news.nsf/articles/UK+concerned+by+violence+in+Burkina+Faso+31102014141530?open
U.S – Jon Psaki: ‘Welcoming President Compaore’s Commitment to a Democratic Transition’ (30.10.2014) Link: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/10/233567.htm
WANEP – ‘PRESS RELEASE ON POLITICAL SITUATION IN BURKINA FASO’ (30.10.2014) Link: http://www.wanep.org/wanep/files/2014/oct/pr_2014_oct30_burkina_faso.pdf
WARRING PARTIES IN SOUTH SUDAN MUST EMBARK ON PATH OF RECONCILIATION OR RISK
HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE, SENIOR OFFICIAL WARNS SECURITY COUNCIL:
Reiterating Government’s Commitment to Peace Process,
Permanent Representative Urges Armed Groups to Show ‘Seriousness and Faithfulness’
After three years of independence, South Sudan was on the “brink of a humanitarian catastrophe and a protracted internal conflict”, a senior United Nations peacekeeping official warned the Security Council this morning.
“This is a man-made crisis, and those responsible for it have been slow in resolving it,” said Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, as he briefed the 15-member body on the Secretary-General’s 25 July report on South Sudan (document S/2014/537) and recent developments in the strife-torn African country following the report’s publication.
With both sides — the South Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Opposition — believing they could achieve their aims through military means, the situation on the ground remained precarious, and the conflict risked spreading to other parts of the country, he stressed. The Security Council’s visit next week to South Sudan was particularly timely, and should serve to caution both sides about the negative consequences of impeding the peace process.
“The parties must reach an agreement, without a further delay, on how to end the conflict and embark on the path of reconciliation,” he emphasized. Those responsible for serious human rights violations must be held accountable and both sides must ensure unhindered, safe access by road, air and river for United Nations and humanitarian personnel.
He noted that talks had just resumed on 4 August between the South Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A in Opposition, and were being mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in an effort to sort out issues of security and humanitarian access; political transition and the creation of a Government of National Unity; justice, reconciliation and healing; and the parameters of a new Constitution, he said. IGAD member States would also need to decide on the terms of applying sanctions against those who undermined the peace process, should the need arise.
Giving an overview of recent developments, he said that the ceasefire agreements, signed by the parties on 23 January, 9 May and 10 June, had been violated. The first major incident occurred on 20 July when SPLM/A in Opposition forces attacked Government positions in Nassir, Upper Nile State. Fighting for Nassir ensued until 26 July, when the SPLM/A in Opposition retreated.
Skirmishes had also occurred in Rensk, also in Upper Nile State, and in Ayod, Jonglei State, he said. On 16 July, in Aweil, Northern Bahr El Ghazal State, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) received reports of clashes between Government security positions and approximately 200 Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) deserters that had abandoned their posts over lack of salary payments. On 2 August, clashes erupted between the Maban Defence Force, a local militia, and some 20 SPLA deserters of Nuer ethnicity.
Since the fighting began, United Nations personnel and aid workers had moved to the compounds of United Nations agencies and intergovernmental organizations for protection, and non-essential staff were been airlifted out, he said. Thousands of civilians had sought refuge in a refugee camp near the airstrip. A Quick Reaction Force with four armoured personnel carriers was en route to the area and another platoon size force was being deployed by air.
In addition, the deployment of more troops authorized under resolution 2155 (2014) was well under way, he said. As of 4 August, fully 3,525 of the 5,500 surge troops had been deployed. The remaining contingents — an infantry battalion, three military utility helicopters, three additional aircraft and a tactical helicopter unit — were expected to be sent by October. The United Nations had also identified police-contributing countries for the deployment of four Formed Police Units comprising of 660 personnel.
The humanitarian operation in South Sudan was the largest within a single country, he said, with the Mission hosting more than 95,000 internally displaced persons at its site, far more than its intended capacity. Heavy rains had severely flooded large areas of the UNMISS sites in Bentiu and Malakal, exacerbating already challenging health and sanitation conditions. With the slow pace of the peace process, displacement was likely to continue.
“The status quo, therefore, is not sustainable and alternative options must be explored,” he said, stressing that UNMISS’ capacity and funding fell far short of overwhelming needs. Aid had reached some 2.4 million people, but efforts had been hampered by insecurity, obstructed access, insufficient and delayed funding, and delayed logistic, human resources and political constraints.
The Mission had begun discussions with United Nations agencies and humanitarian partners to better delineate roles and responsibilities so that it could focus on its core mandate set forth in resolution 2155 (2014), he said. Meantime, UNMISS continued to encourage internally displaced persons to relocate to newly constructed sites in order to alleviate overcrowding at the existing ones.
Joseph Moum Malok ( South Sudan) reiterated his Government’s commitment to the peace process and its determination to reach a final settlement through negotiations. President Salva Kiir Mayardit had expressed willingness to form an interim or transitional Government in order to promote constitutional reform, national peace, and reconciliation and accountability mechanisms.
“We can’t afford to prolong the current situation,” he said, calling on the rebel groups to show “seriousness and faithfulness” in the negotiations and on the international community to remind them of the importance of adhering to the previous ceasefire agreements, which the rebels had violated repeatedly.
Furthermore, the international community must be mindful of the Government’s lack of technical capability needed to swiftly undertake forensic and legal proceedings, he said, expressing regret over UNMISS’ stalled efforts to build capacity of the organized forces and other rule of law institutions.
The meeting began at 10 a.m. and ended at 10:20 a.m.
We can all just see that the UN Security Council used ten minutes on a matter which themselves describes as a possible humanitarian catastrophe. Is that all the lives is worth for the UN? They fear that SPLM going back to the former days of SPLA. An they say the action comes from the opposition. The matter is how to solve the crisis and the effect of it. Endgame should matter, and isn’t that the mandate and honor of UNAMISS. They are supposed to have 5,500 surge troops, by 4. July, but they had gotten 3,525. So we can wonder if they will get the funding for the UNAMISS, when their missing nearly 2000 surge troops to their operation. If this isn’t sad piece of history, I don’t know history. Especially when it’s already filled with the sadness of the MONUC (2000-2010 in DRC) and UNAMIR (1993-1996). If you wonder why I add those into play? Well, then you should read some on them and see what I am saying without saying it. Hope that UNAMISS will have another fate then UNAMIR and MONUC.
Museveni start as President in 1986:
On the 29th of January 1986 Yoweri Museveni was inaugurated as president, who in the last week battled for the capitol city Kampala and overthrow of Tito Okello. Museveni himself on the matter: “Mere Change of Guards” (…)”Nobody is to think that what is happening today, what has been happening in the last few days is a mere change of guards” (…)”This is not a mere change of guards. I think this is a fundamental change in the politics of our government” (…)”Any individual, any group or person who threatens the security of our people must be smashed without mercy” (…)”The people of Uganda should only die from natural causes which are not under our control” (Rule, 1986). Museveni’s thoughts on democracy: “the right of the people of Africa” and about government: “the masters but the servers of the population”. He continued: “The solution is to have enough strength to ship the whole garbage and put it where it belongs, on the garbage heap of history” (Rule, 1986).
Libyan support for NRA/NRM:
“Idi Amin’s former Minister of Finance, Brig. Moses Ali, along with an economist, Dr. Suleiman Kiggundu, Ugandan Muslim clerics Shiekh Ali Kulumba and Shiekh Obeid Kamulegeya, and a businessman called Habib Hassan Kagimu are the men who introduced Yoweri Museveni, the leader of a news fighting group the National Resistance Army (NRA), to Gaddafi in 1981 and so started the Libyan sponsorship of the NRA guerrillas” (…)”Libya then started air dropping heavy field guns and rocket launchers into the NRA camps in Luwero Triangle in central Uganda in 1982, greatly boosting the NRA guerrillas and making possible their victory in Jan. 1986” (…)”Brig Ali was in jail in Kampala when Gaddafi first visited Uganda led by Museveni in 1987. Ali had to be taken out of jail after Gaddafi asked about his whereabouts” (…)”In the early days of the new NRM government, several officers and men of the new national army, the National Resistance Army (NRA) were sent to Libya for military training. Gaddafi also helped supply the Rwandan guerrillas, the RPF, with weapons in 1990 in the early stages of their invasion of Rwanda. The Libyan weapons were airlifted into Uganda and then the Museveni government passed them on to the RPF rebels” (…)”When Uganda failed to repay money she owed Libya, the debt was swapped for Libyan shares in the Uganda Telecom phone company, the Crested Towers and National Housing and Construction Corporation housing estates in Kampala and the Windsor Lake Victoria Hotel in Entebbe” (Dispatch, 2011).
In the 1986 – Creating an oil company:
Libyan has sent a trade delegation (both medical and financial teams). President Museveni has discussed to have a Joint Holding Company with Doctor Mukhtar. Both Government of Uganda and Government of Libya announced that their examining opportunities to set up an Oil Company. Since 1979 war against Amin the Libyan Peoples Bureau had 6 six employees, the staff has now a higher profile in Kampala. Ugandan government is naïve about it, but the largeness of Libyan interference in the oil company, Uganda can still control it through. Government of Uganda is in to secure oil supply and also setting up a company, because of NRMs distrust in the operations of the multinational capitalism. This company is to secure the supply of oil, in that they also would like to be a part of the Mombasa Refinery from the Government of Kenya (WikiLeaks, 1986).
Suits Museveni well:
The Libyan style of leadership where it’s all centered on the president. If Museveni need to be accommodated in any manner, he can just pick up a phone and call the Cornel Gaddaffi. The Americans describes the Libyans as radicals and calls Museveni’s action towards them as a risk, for him and also the interest of USA (WikiLeaks, 1986).
Relation between Uganda and Libya in 2007:
Libyan Africa Portfolio (LAP) bought shares of 51% of the Uganda Telecom Limited (UTL). The shares were bought from UCOM a German, Swiss and Egyptian consortium. LAP has also bought other assets in Uganda. They gotten 60 % of the textile company Tri-Star and also was awarded with the tender to build the oil-pipe that goes from Uganda to Kenya. Museveni has promised Coronel Gaddaffi that he will not sell the unrefined oil. He has also praised Gaddaffi for his collaborated effort to support Uganda (WikiLeaks, 2007).
Relation between Uganda and Libya in 2008:
President Museveni said Libyan president Gaddaffi: “is a problem” and for his wish of making the “United states of Africa”. He also commented on Gaddaffi’s “imitations” towards smaller and tinier African nations with bribes and pressure. This has led to that these nations haven’t participated as strongly or corporative in international forums, organizations like United Nation and international meetings. Because of the tension between Gaddaffi and Museveni, this has led to him having radar on his plane when he flies international airspace to get additional information of the airspace (WikiLeaks, 2008).
Relation between Uganda and Libya in 2009:
TamOil the Libyan owned company who is run by director Habib Kagimu. The company hopes that it gets the contract to build the pipeline between from El Doret, Kenya to Jinja, Uganda (WikiLeaks, 2009).
Museveni on Gaddaffi in 2011:
In his own words said Gaddaffi was wrong to support Idi Amin with weapons and arms. This he could use during the battles of the 70s (Museveni, 2011).
He knows that Gaddaffi supported him because he was seen as Muslim country oppressed by Christians. The second mistake Gaddaffi did after Museveni’s reckoning: he was not polite in AU and respected the regional collaborations in Africa. If he could he would ‘Overrule’ it. The third mistake by the Cornell was to interfere in internal matters of others. Like his actions towards the kings in Uganda. Fourth mistake is that he was like other Arab leaders and did not support the cause of South Sudan. Also not a direct mistake but he commented that as a radical Gaddaffi didn’t distant himself enough from terrorism (Museveni, 2011).
First is that Gaddaffi always has had an independent approach to foreign affairs. Not being an Western countries, where he also did an effort to get rid of British and American Military bases. Second positive was how we able to use and rig the oil-prices, from the meager 50 cents a barrel to 40 dollars a barrel. Fourth is the economic progress of Libya. With that was the current time Museveni wrote in the value of GDP of $89, 03 Billion, which is the same size of South Africa in 1994 and the same time Spain (Museveni, 2011).
Thanks for reading. Peace.
Dispatch.co.ug – ‘Uganda’s long complicated relationship with Gaddaffi’ (07.04.2011) Link: http://www.dispatch.ug/ugandas-long-complicated-relatioship-with-gaddafi/1745/
Wanock, Frank & Conway, Patrick – ‘Post-Conflict Recovery in Uganda’ (1999) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank
Rule, Sheila (NY Times) – ‘REBEL SWORN IN AS UGANDA PRESIDENT’ (30.01.1986) Link: http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/30/world/rebel-sworn-in-as-uganda-president.html
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni – ‘Article on the Libyan crisis’ (20.03.2011) Link: http://www.scribd.com/doc/51285348/Museveni-attacks-West-over-Libya
WikiLeaks – ‘MUSEVENI AND THE RADICAL MUSLIMS’ (16.07.1986) Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/86KAMPALA2314_a.html
WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: MARCH ECONOMIC REVIEW’ (14.03.2007) Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KAMPALA457_a.html
WikiLeaks –‘A/S FRAZER’S JUNE 13 MEETING WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI’ (18.06.2008) Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE65820_a.html
WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDAN PRESIDENT SEEKS OIL SECTOR SUPPORT IN IRAN’ (04.07.2009) Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA561_a.html
The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda):
The members of the Security Council welcomed the signing of a cessation of hostilities and violence agreement between armed groups in the Central African Republic during the Central African National Reconciliation Forum held in Brazzaville on 23 July 2014. They called on all parties to immediately and fully implement this agreement.
The members of the Security Council applauded the efforts led by the Mediator of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), President Denis Sassou Nguesso, and its Chairperson, with the support of the United Nations and the African Union, to broker this cessation of hostilities and violence agreement between the parties. The members of the Security Council commended Transitional Head of State Catherine Samba-Panza’s active involvement throughout this process to foster this agreement.
The members of the Security Council underlined that this agreement is a first step in a wider political process in the Central African Republic of ensuring durable peace, respect for human rights, protection of civilians and the rule of law. They stressed the need to address the underlying causes of the conflict through an inclusive and comprehensive political dialogue and national reconciliation process, efforts to fight impunity, formulation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation strategy, including children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, and the rebuilding of effective State institutions. The members of the Security Council underlined in this regard the paramount importance of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic.
The members of the Security Council further commended the commitment of the Transitional Head of State Catherine Samba-Panza to a political process that should ensure a successful transition. The members of the Security Council reiterated their call to the Transitional Authorities to accelerate, with the support of the United Nations and other partners, all necessary preparations in order to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections, with the full and effective participation of women at all levels and at an early stage as well as the participation of Central African Republic internally displaced persons and refugees.
The members of the Security Council reiterated their appreciation for the decisive actions, commitment and sacrifice of African Union, French and European Union troops in implementing their mandates to protect civilians in the Central African Republic. They further encouraged the United Nations Secretariat to take all necessary steps to ensure that the transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) on 15 September translates into a significantly enhanced international military presence in the Central African Republic in order to implement the priority tasks of its mandate as defined in Security Council resolution 2149 (2014)
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRESS RELEASE:
17. July 2014.
The United Nations Security Council must impose a comprehensive arms embargo on South Sudan, Amnesty International urged after receiving reports of Chinese small arms and ammunition proliferation amongst both sides in the conflict.
The organization also has confirmed that China supplied a further 1,000 tonnes of small arms and light weapons worth US$38 million to the country just over two weeks ago.
“China is playing a dangerous diplomatic game with the lives of millions of people in South Sudan. It has pledged to provide peacekeeping troops to protect civilians, and at the same time has sent over 1,000 tonnes of arms,” said Elizabeth Ashamu Deng, South Sudan Researcher at Amnesty International.
“Such arms are likely to fall into the hands of both parties to the conflict and be used to fuel the atrocities threatening civilian lives.”
The Security Council, of which China is a permanent member, has already condemned violations of international humanitarian law in South Sudan, including extrajudicial executions and ethnically targeted violence.
In May, the Security Council amended the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in South Sudan (UNMISS) to focus on protection of civilians, supporting the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement, investigating human rights abuses and violations and creating conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance. China has pledged a full battalion of some 850 troops to join this peacekeeping operation.
A UN arms embargo designed to help stop gross violations of human rights and war crimes would require every state to take all necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms to South Sudan. Pending such an embargo, states should immediately suspend international arms transfers to South Sudan.
The Chinese shipment
Chinese state-owned defence manufacturer NORINCO sent more than 1,000 tonnes of weapons and munitions worth millions of dollars to the South Sudanese government armed forces in a shipment that arrived last month. It included rocket systems, thousands of automatic rifles and grenade launchers, 20,000 grenades, hundreds of pistols and machine guns, and several million rounds of ammunition.
According to the shipping documents and related information, the massive arms shipment was loaded onto the Hong Kong-based vessel Feng Huang Song in two batches before leaving the Chinese ports of Dalian on 8 May and Zhanjiang on 15 May 2014. It reached Mombasa, Kenya on 7 June and the cargo was unloaded three days later, destined for the South Sudanese government in Juba in fulfilment of a contract signed on 3 April, 2013.
Amnesty International is aware of reliable reports that Chinese ammunition manufactured in 2013 for Chinese-made CQ assault rifles has recently been used by armed opposition fighters as well as government-aligned armed groups. CQ 5.56×45 assault rifles were first observed in South Sudan in 2013 with South Sudanese rebel groups, some of whom stated they had been armed by Sudan. In addition, Chinese heavy machine-gun ammunition manufactured in 2013 has been found in the hands of fighters of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfuri rebel group that has fought alongside South Sudanese government forces and committed grave human rights abuses.
“This additional flow and proliferation of deadly equipment from China into South Sudan’s raging war will set the country back decades and pave the way for increased criminality and violence among civilians – even long after the current armed conflict ends,” said Elizabeth Ashamu Deng.
“Given the ongoing pattern of atrocities in South Sudan, it is a no-brainer that these weapons and munitions will be used to commit and facilitate further serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The Security Council must roundly condemn any such flows of weapons and impose a comprehensive embargo on all arms transfers to South Sudan.”
Since the armed conflict erupted on 15 December 2013, the USA and European Union have already suspended military support to South Sudan. The decisions came amid ongoing crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by both South Sudanese government and opposition forces.
On two recent missions to South Sudan, including one this month, Amnesty International documented how both sides have targeted people, including women and children, based on their ethnicity. They have killed individuals seeking refuge in hospitals and places of worship. These atrocities have generally involved the use of small arms and light weapons.
“The rebels shot dead the four people in the beds next to mine,” a civilian patient named John told Amnesty International, referring to a raid on Malakal hospital by forces loyal to former Vice President Dr Riek Machar in mid-February 2014. Individuals have also been shot dead in hospitals in Bor and Bentiu.
In the South Sudanese capital Juba, too, civilians have repeatedly been targeted using small arms and light weapons. A resident of the city’s Jebel Kujur area described to Amnesty International how government soldiers attacked his home on 17 December 2013:
“My house was surrounded with heavy artillery and many soldiers as well. Gun shots were fired at me and my relatives in the house, and three of them were killed on the spot.”
Nyaliap witnessed the massacre of 11 men in Pariang County, Unity state by government forces in December 2013. A group of about 20 soldiers “stripped them naked and tied their hands behind their backs. They lined them up…and they [shot] them from behind.”
Amnesty International continues to call for accountability for all those responsible for such actions by government and opposition forces, which constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious human rights violations.
The Bloomberg news agency reported on the Chinese arms transfer on 9 July (“China Sells South Sudan Arms as Its Government Talks Peace” by Ilya Gridneff) and also released the shipping documents to Jane’s Defence Weekly (“South Sudan takes delivery of Chinese ATGWs” by Jeremy Binnie).
The Chinese company NORINCO combines manufacturing, research and trading of arms and related equipment.
Between 2007 and 2008 various large shipments of arms arrived in South Sudan from Ukraine via Mombasa. It is not clear if Ukraine was aware that South Sudan government forces were the intended end-user, and not Kenya, as stated in the documentation.
Wel, Paan Luel – ‘AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: South Sudan arms embargo crucial after massive Chinese weapons transfer” (17.07.2014)
Well, today is this blog in the name of WikiLeaks. For the simple reason the documents I found was to interesting to not be addressed and take the quotes which give an impact on how the Americans address the pre-election Kenya. This is the Election which Uhuru Kenyatta the chairman of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and William Ruto the leader of the United Republican Party (URP) their Jubilee Coalition won over Rail Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). But here are the quotes and transcripts that were interesting in hindsight of history and also seeing the view of the US into the matter.
Odinga’s Presidental Plans and how sees the opportunity to win the election:
“The Ambassador told Odinga the United States remains optimistic that there will be a credible, positive electoral process, and urged Odinga to continue speaking out against violence and exploitation of tribal politics. The Ambassador commended Odinga for having delayed a huge rally planned for Nairobi because it conflicted with a planned pro-Kibaki rally, rather than risk confrontation. (The rally was held in Nairobi,s Uhuru park October 6, with an estimated turnout of over 500,000.) The Ambassador emphasized the U.S. interest in moving quickly to coordinate post-election priorities should Odinga be elected” (…)”Odinga, who just days before the lunch suddenly emerged in polls as the front-runner, said he is anything butoverconfident. He commented that polls are not always accurate, and he said he recognizes the formidable governmental machine and the money behind Kibaki,s campaign. However, Odinga said that his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party is better-positioned overall to win than is Kibaki,s newly created coalition Party of National Unity (PNU)” (…)”Odinga said that ODM is doing its own weekly polling both on issues and specific races. The ODM polls track closely with the national polls showing him significantly ahead of Kibaki. Odinga,s comments reflected something we have heard from numerous other sources: that the ODM,s &war room8 and strategy are at this point far better organized than Kibaki,s effort, which is rent by internal divisions. Odinga described these divisions in some detail, noting that there are at least three competing groups seeking to dominate the campaign: the technocrats, the so-called Kikuyu elders, and several key financial backers. As a result, the Kibaki campaign has been disjointed and without a coherent message, Odinga said”(WikiLeaks, 09.10.2007).
”Odinga is working to achieve victory on the first ballot, but is simultaneously working on a strategy to deprive Kibaki of 25 percent of the vote in at least four provinces, which would force a run-off (…)”Odinga is working to achieve victory on the first ballot, but is simultaneously working on a strategy to deprive Kibaki of 25 percent of the vote in at least four provinces, which would force a run-off. (Note: The President must be elected by a plurality of total votes cast and by receiving at least 25 percent of the vote in five of the country,s eight provinces.) Odinga believes the ODM may be able to deny Kibaki 25 percent in Coast, Northeast, Western, and Nyanza provinces. Odinga believes that he will receive a plurality of all votes cast and at least 25 percent in Coast, Western, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Nairobi, and Northeast provinces. Odinga noted that his and Kibaki,s base votes are about 30 percent each, emanating from their respective tribal groups, the Luo in Nyanza province and Kikuyu in Central province” (09.10.2007).
Odinga feels (in an opinion that is widely shared) that former President Moi,s support for Kibaki in Rift Valley may prove counter-productive with Moi,s Kalenjin tribal group there, and Odinga claimed he will get 80 percent of that vote” (…)”dinga cited the danger of misuse of government resources and said local chiefs have been told by Minister of Security Michuki that they will lose their jobs and have to be elected (they are appointed now) if Odinga wins. Kibaki and his team are also warning that Odinga,s support for &majimboism8 (strong local autonomy) will create chaos and reinforce tribalism. (Note: “Majimboism” was first promoted, unsuccessfully, immediately after independence by those who wanted to deny land ownership and other rights to Kenyans deemed not indigenous to a region” (WikiLeaks, 09.10.2007).
“Odinga is part of the same traditional political class as Kibaki. His hands are not clean, though perhaps relatively cleaner than some. While he says he understands the need to reassure groups which feel threatened by his possible election, an Odinga victory would constitute a sea-change for Kenyan politics in several respects. It would be the first time a sitting President lost an election and handed over power to the opposition. It would represent a seismic shift in Kenyan tribal politics. Paradoxically, his election would in one sense be the result of the worst kind of tribal politics (playing up anti-Kikuyu resentments), but in another sense it might actually represent progress through Kenyans demonstrating their willingness to &try another tribe,8 a comment widely heard in different parts of the country. The responsibility would then be heavily on Odinga to prove his commitment to improve the welfare of all the people of Kenya. We should also reflect on our own rhetoric regarding the maturing of Kenyan democracy and our faith in the ability of the relatively well-educated Kenyan electorate to set the nation,s agenda for the next five years” (WikiLeaks, 09.10.2007).
“Annan remains intensively engaged by phone with the two leaders, and I am coordinating closely with him. We are supporting various efforts underway to bring about another meeting between Kibaki and Odinga to iron out a cabinet deal” (…)”Kibaki and Odinga have agreed on a cabinet size of 40, with each side getting 20 positions. Odinga insists that for the sake of real power-sharing he must receive at least a few of the highest profile ministries. Kibaki has not offered any of these, and insists that what he put forward is fair”(WikiLeaks, 09.04.2008).
Cabinet Question Part II:
“Uhuru Kenyatta, who currently holds Local Government and is a presidential aspirant, does not want to give up this powerful ministry. Kenyatta is important to the cohesion of Kibaki’s Party of National Unity. Martha Karua, who is also a presidential aspirant and who was Kibaki’s lead negotiator in the Annan-led talks, holds Justice and Constitutional Affairs and does not want to relinquish it. Kibaki sees Foreign Affairs as his personal domain. Odinga is under enormous pressure from William Ruto, who is key to the crucial support Odinga has in Rift Valley. Ruto feels threatened by the government’s allegations that he was involved in organizing and supporting the Rift Valley violence which followed the election dispute” (…)”Kibaki repeatedly insisted that he has offered all that he can. He said the problem is that Odinga keeps changing his conditions and demands for an agreement (moving the goal posts, though he did not use that expression). Kibaki sounded patient and exasperated at the same time. “His behavior has put me in an impossible position,” Kibaki said. “I do not want to create another crisis by being the one who makes this deal not succeed.” Kibaki went on to say that “I’ve reached a point where I cannot change, because if I do I will look useless to my people. I will lose all my credibility” (…)”Kibaki did, however, leave the door open. “I want to move this country forward,” he said, “and I know that I cannot do that without a deal with Odinga. For the sake of finalizing an agreement, I might be willing to make additional concessions on ministries,” he continued, “but there is no guarantee that Odinga would not simply take that and then put on yet more conditions” (WikiLeaks, 09.04.2008).
Kibaki thanks USA for setting up the talks:
“Kibaki expressed great appreciation for all the efforts the U.S. has been making to help Kenyans, and asked me to talk to Odinga to get him to accept what is on offer” (…)”Kibaki said that I could also tell Odinga that he (Kibaki) is willing to make additional ministerial changes within 2 months following installation of the cabinet” (…)”Kibaki claimed that there will be more Kalenjins (people from Rift Valley) in the government once Odinga is prime minister than there has ever been before. This, Kibaki maintained, would benefit Odinga and strengthen his credibility by showing results” (WikiLeaks, 09.04.2008).
Odinga talked with Ambasador over lunch:
“Odinga agreed with this assessment saying that, in some respects, it mirrored his own situation” (…)”Odinga said he is reluctant to meet with Kibaki again unless there is a strong prospect of reaching agreement. He proposed having two people from each side meet to work out a final agreement” (…)”I talked at length with Odinga about the advantage he will have once he becomes Prime Minister, almost regardless of the specific nature of the cabinet appointments. He agreed with this, but said that accepting a deal without the 2-3 ministries he wants would risk splitting his party and thus weakening his leverage within the government and within Parliament” (WikiLeaks, 09.04.2008).
Annan following up the Cabinet deal:
“Annan urged Kibaki and Odinga to meet again, and he urged Kibaki to yield at least a couple of the high profile ministries. I have been in frequent touch with Annan, and we are closely coordinating efforts. The evening of April 8, Annan told me it may become necessary for him to come to Kenya at some point to press Kibaki and Odinga to finalize a cabinet deal. He had planned to come for the planned April 12 swearing-in of the new cabinet and Prime Minister. Annan expressed great appreciation for the Secretary’s continued engagement, saying it is essential to SIPDIS moving Kibaki and Odinga forward” (WikiLeaks, 09.04.2008)
“After the unsuccessful Kibaki-Odinga meeting on April 6, both sides went public. That evening, Kibaki and Odinga made positive statements emphasizing their commitment to reach a cabinet deal and urging the Kenyan people to remain calm” (…)”The impasse over the cabinet has heightened tensions, and sporadic violence flared in several places on April 8. This did not become generalized violence, and the country is currently calm. A very positive corollary to these rumblings of unrest, however, is the mounting chorus of voices from supporters of both sides, and indeed from Kenyans everywhere, echoing our pressure and demanding that their leaders resolve this impasse immediately” (WikiLeaks, 09.04.2008).
Leaders & Signals:
“Both President Kibaki and Raila Odinga are demonstrating a strong commitment to implement the political accord signed on February 28th” (…)”Kibaki and his team have been referring to Odinga as the “prime minister-designate,” even though the implementing legislation had not yet been passed by Parliament” (…)”Parliament on March 18th passed legislation amending the constitution to create the positions of prime minister and two deputy prime ministers (see ref B). President Kibaki and Odinga, both MPs, participated in the friendly and constructive debate on the bill, and set a very positive tone” (…)”Odinga will be sworn in as prime minister next week, and that the composition of the cabinet will be announced at that time” (…)”Formation of the coalition government is one among a number of steps needed to implement the accord. The other two main areas of implementation include formation of three commissions (on election irregularities; on election violence; and on truth, justice, and reconciliation), and moving ahead with the institutional reform agenda (constitutional, electoral, land, and related issues)” (WikiLeaks, 20.04.2008).
Annan and the Nigerian Foreign Minister:
“Former Nigerian Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji, who Annan asked to work with the parties following his departure, has been ably chairing the continuing talks on the reform agenda. Annan is remaining in touch with Kibaki and Odinga, and has made clear that he has not abandoned the process. To continue this process, formation of a formal “Secretariat of Eminent Persons” with AU and UN personnel, as well as outside experts, will follow the implementation of the coalition accord. The U.S. and other donors are providing financial support for this mechanism” (WikiLeaks, 20.04.2009).
Odinga & Kibaki – Safricom and Aid:
“On March 14, Odinga dropped his earlier opposition and signaled his support for the March 28 launch of the Safaricom initial public offering, which will provide the GOK with $770 million in badly needed cash for the budget” (…)”Kibaki and Odinga jointly chaired a meeting with donors and international financial institutions on March 17. As reported septel, they appealed for approximately $480 million in support. At the meeting I circulated a paper laying out the humanitarian assistance that we are providing and making clear our commitment of $25 million in new assistance” (WikiLeaks, 20.04.2009).
U.S (are the same as we). more involvement:
“U.S. stock in Kenya has never been higher but, concomitantly, expectations for our continued engagement on recovery efforts are also high. Kenyans appreciate that the U.S. is already their largest bilateral partner, and look to our friendship as key in ensuring the accord stays on track” (…)”I have emphasized to Kibaki and Odinga the need to work closely with civil society and the private sector to carry out the reform agenda in an inclusive manner” (…)”With timely support from USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, we will expand our support for Parliament” (…)”The bolstering of USAID’s democracy and governance funds is enabling us to expand support for grassroots reconciliation efforts, particularly in hard hit Rift Valley Province” (…)”We are continuing to provide humanitarian assistance on an urgent basis, including upgrades to IDP camps in preparation for the impending rainy season” (…)”Once the coalition government is in place, we plan to brief PM Odinga and relevant ministers on the U.S.-Kenyan partnership, and to lay out key priorities for action (including legislative priorities like anti-money-laundering). We will provide similar briefings to Members of Parliament” (…)”We are working with relevant government ministries and the private sector (including the American Chamber of Commerce) to encourage the return of tourism and to intensify support for U.S. investment” (…)”We are working with Peace Corps to begin the return of volunteers during April and May” (…)”Other steps to demonstrate engagement with the new coalition government may include a U.S. naval ship visit to Mombasa in early May” (…)”This strong U.S. leadership will be further bolstered as we influence donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) to provide appropriate support for Kenya” (WikiLeaks, 20.04.2009).
Uhuru Kenyatta Presidental Ambition:
“Uhuru Kenyatta appears to be working towards a presidential run in 2012. While many have pointed out that replacing President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, by another Kikuyu, would be unlikely due to anti-Kikuyu sentiments prevalent across much of Kenyan society, Kenyatta may be encouraged to attempt a presidential run due to shifting political dynamics that make potential challengers seem weak” (…)”Kenyatta is taking steps that are clearly intended to bolster his political standing and mobilize support. His appointment as Finance Minister was seen by many as an implicit endorsement by Kibaki; it provides a powerful platform for Kenyatta to pursue presidential ambitions” (…)”Kenyatta also increases the support he is likely to receive in working behind the scenes to ensure that parliamentarians never approve an independent special tribunal to hold accountable those involved in post-election violence” (…)”Ex-President Moi,s son Gideon could compete for control, but at the end of the day an accommodation could be worked out.(Kenyatta was Moi,s designated successor and ran in 2002 on the KANU ticket.) Gideon Moi and other KANU stalwarts have been pressing Kenyatta to focus his energies on rebuilding KANU” (…)”Kikuyu political dynamics seem to be favoring Kenyatta” (…)”A number of sources report close contacts between Kibaki and Kenyatta, and between those two and William Ruto, a potential ally” (…)”Kenyatta and Ruto is focused on a deal whereby Ruto uses his influence among Kalenjins to facilitate the reintegration of the Kikuyu internally displaced persons in Rift Valley; in return, Ruto would get a significant share of important economic positions for his Kalenjin political allies” (…)”The reason that Kenyatta is assumed to be on the Waki Commission list of suspected perpetrators of post-election violence is his fund-raising to support Mungiki violent actions against Kalenjins during the post-election violence. Some reports indicate that Kenyatta has tried to distance himself from the Mungiki” (…)”Kenyatta may see shifting political dynamics as opening the way for a presidential run. Odinga is increasingly perceived as feckless, unable or unwilling to govern effectively and move forward the reform agenda” (…)” (WikiLeaks, 26.06.2009).
Thanks for reading and hope you got enlighten and new information.
WikiLeaks – ‘KENYA ELECTIONS: MAIN OPPOSITION CANDIDATE ODINGA LOOKING PRESIDENTIAL’ (09.10.2007), Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07NAIROBI3991_a.html
WikiLeaks – ‘RESOLVING KENYA’S CABINET IMBROGLIO’ (09.04.2008), Link:https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NAIROBI960_a.html
WikiLeaks – ‘CORRECTED COPY: KENYA’S POLITICAL PROCESS AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT’ (20.04.2008), Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NAIROBI798_a.html
WikiLeaks – ‘UHURU KENYATTA – PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS AND THE’ (26.06.2009), Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NAIROBI1296_a.html