Burundian UN Security Council Resolution 2279; a good deed, but will it make a difference?

As the unrest and crisis in Burundi continues even if they have Peacekeepers in Central African Republic and Somalia. The Opposition and the Government still keeps on with killings and oppressive behavior from the Government Armed Forces from the Police and the Army. The Opposition even tries to do plots to take down people of higher rankings as they have even attacked and gone after ministers and army generals. That is why the United Nation Security Council on the 1^st of April 2016 finally have come to resolution on the conflict as the Inclusive Inter-Burundian Dialogue that have been stalled after the Ugandan President Museveni was out of the picture. There since been little or no-talks between the powerful actors in the country.

Even with stories of counter-insurgencies from Rwanda and trained militias to topple the President Nkurunziza shows the viability and how the positions are played at the moment. But here are the most specific and most important parts of the UN resolution 2279 (2016) of the Security Council:

“Stressing the primary responsibility of the Government of Burundi for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its population with respect for the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law, as applicable” (…)”Urges the Government of Burundi and all parties to reject any kind of violence and condemn any public statement inciting violence or hatred and demands that all sides in Burundi refrain from any action that would threaten peace and stability in the country” (…)”Urges the Government of Burundi to respect, protect and guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, in line with the country’s international obligations, to adhere to the rule of law, to bring to justice and hold accountable all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights, as applicable, including sexual violence and violations against children” (…)”Welcomes the steps made by the Government of Burundi to withdraw some media bans, cancel some arrest warrants and release a significant number of detainees, and urges the Government of Burundi to urgently fulfil the remaining commitments announced by the Government of Burundi on 23 February 2016 and to extend such measures to other media outlets and political detainees” (…)”Welcomes the consent of the Burundian authorities to increase to 200 the number of human rights observers (100) and military experts (100) of the AU, calls for their full and speedy deployment in Burundi, notes that 30 human rights observers and 15 military observers have been deployed so far, and urges the Government of Burundi and other concerned stakeholders to provide them with full cooperation in order to facilitate the implementation of their mandate” (…)”Calls on States in the region to contribute to a solution to the crisis in Burundi, and to refrain from supporting the activities of armed movements in any way, and recalls in this regard commitments of the States in the region under the Framework Agreement on the Peace, Security and Cooperation for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region and the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees” (UN Resolution 2279, 2016).

Most of this is expected from the United Nation Security Council and their values and the wishes of security of the people of Burundi; which is the reason for why the resolution occurs. The issue I have with it, is not that the Resolution finally get Blue-Helmets on the ground and they are supposed to help to gain peace. But when you see the amount of people, experts and military men from the Peacekeepers it is very little. As little as it seems to be a gimmick and then the world society “we did something” but initially that something was very little.

And the Burundian Government will sure make sure their mandate is minor or small so they can conduct their affairs as much as they please only to formally do the implementation that are into the standards of the signed statues and the agreements done to international laws. So they don’t have grievances with anybody or anyone from the United Nation or the International donors to the Burundian Regime.

That the UN Peacekeepers will have the total of 100 Military Experts as Peacekeepers, that is a tiny base; they will not have the mandate or structure to do much in Burundi. It is more than the 15 Military Experts that are there now, so it is as adjustment. The Human Rights Monitoring will not be able to force anything, but to report to the UN and AU on the matters and issues on the ground. For me what is important is to remember the dire state that was in Rwanda before 1994. As this is similar and also had a Peacekeeping mission. But looking at the similarities when coming to the mission; the Burundian Peacekeepers can’t do much about nothing.

Important dates and issues with Rwandan Peacekeeping Mission:

“On 22 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 846 (1993), authorized the establishment of UNOMUR on the Uganda side of the common border, for an initial period of six months, subject to review every six months. The Council decided that the verification would focus primarily on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use” (…)”As requested by resolution 846 (1993), the United Nations undertook consultations with the Government of Uganda with a view to concluding a status of mission agreement for UNOMUR. The agreement was finalized and entered into force on 16 August 1993. This opened the way to deployment of an advance party which arrived in the mission area on 18 August. UNOMUR established its headquarters in Kabale, Uganda, about 20 kilometres north of the border with Rwanda. By the end of September 1993, the Mission had reached its authorized strength of 81 military observers and was fully operational” (…)”. Reporting to the Security Council on 15 December 1993 on the activities of the Mission, the Secretary-General noted that UNOMUR was “a factor of stability in the area and that it was playing a useful role as a confidence-building mechanism”. Upon his recommendation, the Council, by its resolution 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993, extended UNOMUR’s mandate by six months. The Council expressed its appreciation to the Government of Uganda for its cooperation and support for UNOMUR and also underlined the importance of a cooperative attitude on the part of the civilian and military authorities in the mission area” (UNOMOR Background).

We all who followed the Situation in the Rwandan Genocide knew what happened after this and that the mission of United Nations Peacekeepers was not incapable of doing anything with the dire situation in Rwanda that was already in 1993 and what escalated in 1994. Those 81 Military Observers did not have the manpower or the mandate to sufficiently do anything in the country.

As we are today in April 2016, 12 years after 1994, in the neighbor country of Burundi who also have history of civil war and violence, that ended in the Arusha Peace Accord of 2000 and gave way to over a decade of peace. Still, it was not sufficient or enough. 

So the 15 Military Experts or Observers cannot deal with anything especially since their mandate is not yet there; as the negotiations with the Burundian government are under way, the Burundian government wants as little or no meddling in their internal affairs; and with that in mind they have stifled the ability to have international peacekeepers in the country. Even if the UN Mission in Burundi with their 100 Peacekeepers, how much more power will they compared to the counterparts in Rwanda in 1993-1994? I doubt the Burundian Government will give up sovereignty and let them play national Police and Army over them. As they have Army Forces in Peacekeeping mission themselves in Somalia and Central African Republic.

Burundian President Nkurunziza said this in late December 2015: “Everybody should respect the borders of Burundi. If the troops are in violation of this decision, they will have attacked Burundi, and each Burundian must stand up to fight them” (…)”The country will have been attacked, and we will fight them” (…)”You cannot send troops to a country if the United Nations Security Council has not accepted it… the UN resolution says the international community should respect the independence of Burundi” (Daily Monitor, 2015).

Now yesterday the new Resolution said they would extend the Military Experts (Observers) which counters the words and arguments used by the President in December 2015. That an Resolution from the United Nation would change the matter, even the resolution is so vague and non-descriptive as it even in dialogue with the Burundian Government:

“…urges the Government of Burundi and other concerned stakeholders to provide them with full cooperation in order to facilitate the implementation of their mandate” (UN Resolution 2279, 2016).

This gives way to Burundian Government to do as they see fit in their sovereign territory while the Peacekeeping mission of United Nations will have little power or mandate to address, because we already knows that President Nkurunziza have little interest in having a powerful mandate to the United Nations Peacekeeping mission as he already wanted to attack the African Union planned Peacekeeping mission in the Country.

The 100 people of the UN Peacekeeping mission will in this state, and with this sort of arrangement and resolution gives lots of responsibility towards the Burundian Government, and will certainly not made in way that is adjusted to the concerns of the United Nation Security Council.

This resolution gives little or no direct mandate to the United Nations Mission and gives way for negotiations for the Burundian Government. Therefore the start of it is flawed and leaves possibilities of being a minor sting of pride for President Nkurunziza; as much as it was for President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda in 1993; to have a peacekeeping mission in his country. But if it has limited power or even reach, and with little manpower as it have, the worry for the Burundian government not necessary have to be there. Because the United Nation Mission can’t or doesn’t have the ability to stop anything; just peeping and monitoring at best; as much as the Human Rights workers that are parts of the Mission. The Military experts will be lame ducks, while waiting for a secure mandate. A mandate that the Government of Burundi not wanting to give them, as that will take away their sovereignity as a state and nation. Peace.  

Reference:

Daily Monitor – ‘Nkurunziza warns he would fight AU peacekeepers’ (30.12.2015) link: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/World/Nkurunziza-warns-fight-AU-peacekeepers-/-/688340/3015170/-/k7p15vz/-/index.html

United Nation  – ‘Uganda-Rwanda-UNOMOR Background’

Sanctions on South Sudan Renewed, Panel of Experts Extended, as Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2271 (2016)

7639th Meeting (AM)

Security Council – Meeting Coverage:

Determining that the situation in South Sudan remained a threat to regional peace and security, the Security Council today renewed until 15 April sanctions — including a travel ban and asset freeze — imposed by resolution 2206 (2015) and directed at those blocking peace in the country.

Unanimously adopting resolution 2271 (2016) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council also decided to extend until 15 May the mandate of the Panel of Experts overseeing the sanctions, with the intention of reviewing the mandate and deciding, no later than 15 April, on its further renewal.

Speaking after adoption of the resolution, Petr V. Iliichev (Russian Federation) said its technical character was a reflection of the lack of unity on the Council regarding the sanctions regime.  At the same time, the text emphasized the importance of resolving the armed conflict in South Sudan.  Responsibility for normalizing the situation in the country rested mainly with the South Sudanese.  They needed time and support.  Excessive sanctions ran the risk of complicating the situation and hardening the positions of the parties to the conflict.  The 15-member body needed to be careful.

David Pressman (United States) said that, while the Council supported the people of South Sudan, the country still had a long way to go.  The Council, which had repeatedly shown a willingness to use targeted sanctions to put pressure on spoilers, needed to work together so as to send the correct signals to the leaders of South Sudan.  New proposals would be considered to stabilize the situation on the ground, stem the flow of arms and encourage compromise.  It was a delicate moment in the peace process, but also a critical moment.  Parties to the conflict had to show progress on implementing the peace agreement.  They were urged to demonstrate, in the coming weeks, a commitment to a peaceful and prosperous future through concrete actions.

The meeting began at 11:31 a.m. and ended at 11:40 a.m.

United Nations Security Risk Assessment of South Sudan by September 2015

Today is a day where I will discuss and show findings for certain UNMISS report that is from UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) its numbered: ST/SGB/2007/06. It is the United Nations Security Risk Assessment – South Sudan. It was approved 11^th September 2015! And here are some interesting findings. I think the quotes speak for themselves!

“Following the onset of the conflict in December 2013, UNMISS could not fully perform its mandate given it under Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) because of the security situation and the need to maintain impartiality. Subsequently, Security Council resolution 2155 (2014), 27 May 2014, fundamentally shifted the basis of UNMISS’ mandate from support of the Government in capacity-building in traditional UN peacebuilding areas to four key areas. In the line with the UN Security Council resolution 2223 (2015), UNMISS activities are:

• Protecting the Civilians
• Monitoring and investigating human rights
• The Creation of conditions conducive for humanitarian assistance
• Supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement” (UN SRA SS P: 2-3).

“Despite the attacks on the Akobo CSB and the BOR PoC in April 2014, that were more linked with the ethnic based targeting of South Sudanese sheltering within UN premises, generally speaking the UN is not a primary target for hostilities. Moreover, the UN is more often caught in crossfire during armed conflict and access is affected as a result of armed conflict. This will continue to be a risk”(…)“The fact that UNMISS hosts over 166,000 Internally Displaced People (IDP) increases the UN’s operational risk profile and reputation” (…)”PoC sites are volatile with the potential that the high level of tension amongst the IDPs may spill over in violent clashes. Staff members are therefore at a higher risk working within these sites” (UN SRA SS P: 3).

“The armed conflict, which is now in its second year, followed last year’s pattern where the dry season was fighting season enabling forces to take control of vast areas of the country. During the rainy seasons (July-Nov) the roads become impassable curbing direct clashes for the period. Even with the IGAD peace agreement signed in Juba on 26. August 2015, assessment is that the country security situation in 2015/16 will remain unsecure” (UN SRA SS P: 4).

“Currently there is no mainstreaming of Security within the UN activities/ programmes. Therefore, the policy that defines that security needs to be involved at all levels of management to ensure security is considered/ mainstreamed into all the activities or programmes is not applied, specifically in UNMISS” (…)”Maintaining security training would enhance the functional expertise of all international and national staff although programme managers would need to receive training in order to learn the identity inherent and associated risks in a timely manner” (UN SRA SS P: 5).

“Peace Operation: To help implement the mandated tasks, UNMISS will consist of a military component of up to 12,500 troops of all ranks and a police component, including appropriate Formed Police Units, up to 1,323 personell” (UN SRA SS P: 9).

“Humanitarian programme assessments have indicated that, as the violence deepens, the humanitarian needs and risk to aid workers increases. 27 aid workers are presumed to have been killed in South Sudan since December 2013 and over 150 NGO staff are unaccounted for” (…)”In Juba, there have been a growing number of armed attacks against humanitarian compounds” (UN SRA SS P: 10).

“At the height of the conflict large numbers of people split over the borders into neighboring countries seeking refuge in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Abyei; these numbers stand at approximately 510,000 individuals” (UN SRA SS P: 13).

“The increased risk specifically in Malakal and Bentiu would require an increase in the deployment of security staff and expansion of the collective security posture” (…)”As the rains of 2015 began to cut off supply lines, military offensives increasingly used riverine methods of transporting goods and fighters to the frontline. The method of delivery was also being used by humanitarian agencies to transfer large quantities of food to communities in need. In April 2015 a barge convoy hired by UNMISS to carry food and fuel supplies for the base in Malakal was attacked by RPGs and small arms fire , injured four persons. In July the government gave strict warnings that all river transportation should stop, further restricting aid delivery around the country. In September there have also been reported incidents of alleged attack on government owned barges and gunboats in Upper Nile State, the SPLA-io claimed responsibility ahead of verification” (UN SRA SS P: 14-15).

“Since the beginning of the conflict (December 2013) until June 2015, there were a total of 594 security incidents involving IDPs in UNMISS PoC sites. Cases include serious assaults, civil unrest, mob violence, robbery, death threats and harassment, and several locations have also recorded serious disruption to humanitarian operation” (…)”Continued accusations by the government actors or affiliates that the PoC sites are a sanctuary for supporters of the SPLA in Opposition also make the PoC sites a target; this point was actively demonstrated in the attack in the Bor in April 2014 resulting in the death of 55 IDPs within the UNMISS site. Similar incidents have occurred near PoC sites in Juba, Bentiu and Malakal” (…)”An outbreak of cholera started in South Sudan on 18 May 2015 reaching total of 1718 cases [dates 4 September 2015], this rapid spread is largely affecting areas of the state capital Juba and also a separate smaller spread in Bor. One death have been reported at the PoC site in Juba with a total of 76 cases of people who contracted cholera inside the site” (UN SRA SS P: 16).

“UNSMS will have to work much closer with the GoSS security agencies to ensure an improved  security response to UN security related incidences” (…)”In Juba a “blue zone” was implemented to manage the locations which were approved by UN security for International UN staff to reside in based on accessibility to the area, crime rates and distance to UN base in case of relocation and emergencies” (…)”Where the UN has a presence Operational Zones have been created where security clearances are not required in all main urban areas to allow for improved access. This approach is underscore by risk management as opposed to a risk adverse approach, this concept needs to be maintained and where possible further enhanced or monitored” (UN SRA SS P: 17).

“The disruption in oil revenues and devaluation of the currency as a result of the fighting has had a detrimental effect on the already weakened economy; government, civil servants, armed forces and police are having their salaries delayed. The breakdown in social infrastructure has reduced employment opportunities; creating desperation which has translated into crime” (…)”For example, the on-going cattle raiding and inter-clan revenge clashes that has been served in retaliation have devastated Lake States” (…)”Government officials have sometimes exacerbated tense situations with alienating remarks on their perception of the UN, often with accusations that the UN is favoring one side over the other within the conflict itself” (UN SRA SS P: 19).

“Animosity grew when the government made accusations that the UN was harboring rebels within its Protection of Civilian (POC) sites. Direct and veiled threats to attack POCs became widespread” (…)”The effect of this was in April 2014 when “armed youth” attacked the UNMISS base in Bor resulting in the deaths of 55 IDPs and injuring many others including UN peacekeepers” (…)”On 26 August 2014 under suspicious circumstances a UN contracted helicopter crashed near Bentiu in Unity State, killing three (3) aircrew and injuring one (1) other underlining the threats involved in working within South Sudan. Investigations into the cause of the crash were inconclusive” (…)”In the middle July 2015 there are approximately 166,142 people saying in seven (7) UNMISS bases (UN SRA SS P: 20).

“There is also notable internal political  friction between the Central Government and the Equatoria States who have been calling for the greater autonomy via a federal government system. This has lead to local Equatorian communities feeling threatened and evacuating their families from the area” (…)”In Jonglei state” (…)” During rainy season in 2014 there were major skirmishes between the SPLA and SPLA-io reported in Jonglei. The SPLA-io has continued to threaten to fire upon aircraft flying in the areas, which were seven of the eleven counties during this period; the last threat was on 17 July 2014” Upper Nile” (…)”Several major clashes between the SPLA and SPLA-io have occurred; during one heavy exchange some stray bullets entered the UNMISS camp killing and injuring IDPs and causing structural damage to UN resources. All UN personnel remain concentrated in UNMISS camp including several agencies who had to abandon their own compounds” (…)”Unity State” (…)”To the west of Bentiu, UN staff previously based in the former Mayom UNMISS County Support Base (CSB) regularly were “caught in cross fire” incidents when the parties to conflict attempted to take control of the strategically important town, which is principally inhabited by Bul Nuer. UN Mission and Agencies Funds and Programme (AFP) staffs have become the target with regular ambushes, the demand for their trucks, and/or fuel and the forceful attempt to board UN flight by military” (UN SRA SS P: 22). “Also in the Upper Nile UNICEF reports that 89 boys were forcibly recruited by an unnamed armed group in late February 2015. They were takin in an area currently under government control, which is defended by government-allied Shilluk militia commanded by Maj Gen Johnson Olony” (…)”There are reports of an LRA attack in Western Equatoria State in March 2015 when one person was killed, the village was looted and eleven people were abducted but four were later released. This resuming of LRA attacks has increased fear amongst the population as the last attack in the 2012” (UN SRA SS P: 23).

“The oil pipelines exit South Sudan in both Unity and Upper Nile State, oil is refined in Sudan before being exported. The potential loss of oil revenues affects both nations so good trade relations’ remains key to maintaining income” (UN SRA SS P: 23).

“Currently the flow of refugees is affecting both countries as fighting affects the communities and so they move on, in Sudan the fighting in South Kordofan has created an influx of refugees into South Sudan and the fighting in northern Unity State in South Sudan has meant many refugees travelled north to refugee sites within Sudan” (…)”Cross border grazing & migration rights also areas of dispute as they host well-armed Sudanese Misseriya cattle herders who move around South Sudan in search of feed for their animals” (UN SRA SS P: 24).

“South Sudan lacks an adequate air traffic control system, countrywide. The government took control of the country’s airspace from Sudan in 2011, but to date has not issued any “Notice to Airmen” (NOTAMs), There are areas, however, that the government has declared a “no fly zone” (i.e. over the Presidential Palace in Juba), suggesting that the government reserve the right to fire upon an aircraft that violates this airspace” (UN SRA SS P: 25).

“Use of the River Nile for transportation of UN supplies and fuel has proved difficult with the government threat against all river travel by humanitarian agencies. With military supply vessels regularly travelling the river to the frontline it is not a safe option for delivery of humanitarian provisions” (UN SRA SS P: 26).

“Communicable diseases in South Sudan constitute a major cause of morbidity and morality largely due to the limited access to clean water and sanitation being extremely poor with open defection rates, which reaches 60% in urban areas and 80% in rural areas” (UN SRA SS P: 29).

“In regards to infrastructure, the entire country remains underdeveloped. Road and air mobility is seriously jeopardized especially during the rainy season where whole regions are cut off. Electricity, food and clean water supplies are scarce and seriously impact UN operations in remote duty stations” (…)”Due to poor road conditions in both dry and rainy season and lack of infrastructure there is a heavy reliance on UNMISS and UNHAS air assets for the delivery of humanitarian aid” (UN SRA SS P: 30).

“The existing EU sanctions delivered in July 2014 had little impact on the de-escalating of the crisis, however further extensive UN sanctions were delivered in a tough UN Security Council Resolution on the 3 March 2015, the decision affects individuals through the freezing of their bank accounts and travel bans will affect all players who do not work towards peace and security. There is also an African Union (AU) report which has investigated human rights abuses last dry season which is completed but yet to be published” (UN SRA SS P: 41).

“There is an increase of visible signs of South Sudan being a failing state: there is no free media, intimidation, by government security is commonplace, economy close to collapse and lack of provision or accountability of the civilian population by the state with most funds diverted to fund the war effort. Law and order is collapsing too, in some states wages have been stolen or simply delayed for months on end, in urban area reports of police becoming active criminals, local courts do not function and reports that crimes are committed due to perpetrators acting with impunity” (…)”Large numbers of IDPs rely on the security of UNMISS peacekeeping forces for their protection, however crowd control measures can never maintain order if the IDPs turn on their protector if the tensions rise inside the confines of the POC sites, the numbers are simply overwhelming” (UN SRA SS P: 42).

Afterthought:
It is all worrying even with the Peace Agreement between the SPLA/M and SPLA-IO which signed a deal with amendments and tokens taken off. The worrying path is the records and analyses that the UN and UNMISS is delivering in this report. The numbers of people that are fleeing from South Kordofan in Sudan and the ones fleeing South Sudan to neighboring countries like Ethiopia, Uganda and DRC is massive! Should be worrying and the way the air-space is not secured. Also the reports on how the seasons are changing and making it difficult to spread necessities like food through air should be seen as a GIANT sign that something has to change. Infrastructure that is gone during rainy season and the air-drops has to happen for no open roads. River Nile isn’t safe and is in the front-line and dangerous travel with transportation of necessities though that path.

There are the issues with the skirmishes in different areas and also military assaults in the various states. Both between SPLA and SPLA-IO but they are not alone. There other military groups making it worse, also the report of even LRA has done damage in the country. Those also innocent children have been abducted and all the weakness of the security issues together with the fractions inside the SPLA making the reports and data on the ground more worrying.

On top of it all the sanctions that has been put on the Government of South Sudan and it hasn’t hit the ground running, but been useless and if it does anything it’s been just a certain individuals that has lost bank accounts, but it hasn’t stopped the fighting or stopped small-arms coming to the country!

There is so much more I could have put into ink and discussed because its powerful to see what the UNMISS is writing and discussing in the report. I have taken what I seen as main issues and fresh insights. I am sure somebody else would have taken more of the context and background into it, but that you can read somewhere else. Peace!

Reference:

United Nations Security Risk Assessment South Sudan – September 2015 – UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) & UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) – Approved 11. September 2015 – (Given out 15.09.2015)