South Sudan: PDM Press Statement on recent Massacres following the President’s Inflamatory Rhetoric against Equatorians (24.11.2016)

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Kenya – Worsening drought in Mandera and Samburu (23.11.2016)

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  • Drought conditions are deteriorating particularly in northern Kenya. Around 1.3 million people are reportedly food insecure.
  • Food security is expected to shift from stressed (phase 2 of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification/IPC) to crisis level (IPC phase 3) for pastoral areas in early 2017. Global acute malnutrition is expected to remain critical, with rates above emergency thresholds.
  • The government of Kenya announced an allocation of 5.4 billion Kenyan shillings (nearly EUR 50 million) to mitigate the effects of the drought.
  • DG ECHO partner organisation Acted launched an emergency appeal for USD 2.6 million for immediate life-saving support to drought-affected communities in the districts of Mandera and Samburu.

Kenya: Press Statement on the Status of the Recruitment of Chairperson, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (21.11.2016)

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MPs turn violent, exchange blows after meeting Interior CS (Youtube-Clip)

“Two members of parliament from Laikipia County engaged in a physical confrontation as they emerged from a peace meeting convened by interior affairs cabinet secretary joseph Nkaissery at harambee house. Laikipia north MP Mathew Lempurkel clashed with nominated MP Sarah Paulata Korere during which they are reported to have exchanged blows and kicks. Both MPs recorded statements with the police accusing each other of assault” (Kenya Citizen TV, 2016)

Advocacy Brief on Kenya: 15th Session of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 16-24 November, 2016 (21.11.2016)

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Background

At the height of the violence that gripped Kenya after the disputed 2007 elections, the Party of the National Unity and the Orange Democratic Movement, who were parties to the conflict, wrote to the International Criminal Court (ICC) seeking its intervention to stop what they called genocide. A local investigatory commission with international participation found that some actions during the post-election violence likely met the threshold of crimes against humanity and recommended the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Kenya, or in the alternative, the handover of the sealed evidence to the Prosecutor at the ICC.

Efforts to establish the Tribunal were defeated by political forces aligned to suspected perpetrators, hence triggering the handover of evidence to the ICC and the subsequent investigation. Six Kenyans were named in connection with seven crimes against humanity charges; the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed charges against four suspects. Two suspects – Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were subsequently elected President and Deputy President, respectively, before their trials could begin at the ICC. Thereafter, the Prosecutor withdrew charges against two suspects – Francis Muthaura and Kenyatta – citing witness bribery and intimidation, as well as failure by the Kenya government to cooperate with the court. The remaining case against Ruto and journalist Joshua arap Sang was terminated citing “intolerable levels of witness interference and political meddling”.

Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) has followed closely the developments around accountability for the crimes committed during the 2007 post-election violence. Since the opening of the investigations in March 2010, we have observed certain shortcomings and challenges on the part of the Government of Kenya, the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and the African Union (AU). This brief seeks to focus on key issues emerging from the situation that the ICC and international justice finds itself in today, while drawing linkages from how the Kenya cases and other ICC cases were managed. KPTJ also makes recommendations on actions that require to be undertaken by the ASP, the ICC and African governments in order to address the emergent challenges.

  1. Engage and Withdraw Simultaneously?

A Contradiction in the Mandate of the AU Open Ended Committee

  1. The 27th ordinary session of the African Union’s assembly in July 2016 issued a decision on the ICC[1] pursuant to a similar one from the previous session[2]. Besides praising the court’s termination of the case against Kenya’s Deputy President William Ruto, the AU outlined a five-point agenda for the Open-Ended Committee of Foreign Ministers on the ICC, which included the following:
  • Engaging with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) before the January 2017 AU Summit and before the 15th Assembly of State Parties in November 2016.
  • Maintaining the earlier decision from January 2016, to develop a comprehensive strategy to inform the actions of AU member states that are party to the Rome Statute; a strategy that includes collective withdrawal from the ICC.
  • Concluding a review of the ICC’s interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute regarding the compulsion of unwilling witnesses to testify, with a view to inform debate at the 15th
  • Conveying the message that AU member states object to the inclusion of language requiring the UNSC to mandate UN peace-keeping missions to enforce arrest warrants in Africa.
  • Utilising the AU Mission in Brussels, Belgium, as the secretariat to the Open-ended Ministerial Committee and provision of institutional support to the African Group in The Hague, Netherlands, to ensure effective coordination of its activities.
  1. The AU has since held a meeting with the UNSC in September 2016 to present pre-formulated terms developed by the Open-ended Ministerial Committee as conditions to keep African States as parties to the Rome Statute. These conditions were as follows[3]:
  • Immunity under the ICC’s Rome Statute for sitting heads of state and government as well as senior officials;
  • Intervention of the ICC in cases involving African states only after those cases have been submitted to the AU or AU judicial institutions; and
  • Reduction in the powers of the ICC Prosecutor.
  1. Recent developments have seen South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia commence processes to withdraw from the ICC; seemingly as part of actualising the intention cited in the agenda of the Open-ended Ministerial Committee. These actions expose the agenda by the AU to be disingenuous and presupposes that the deliberations within the ASP would be futile.. The wave of withdrawals occurs against a counter-wave of support for the Court by countries including Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana[4]; an indication that the strategy for mass withdrawal does not enjoy the consensus suggested by the AU decision of July 2016. These countries have suggested that concerns expressed by African states are not insurmountable and can be addressed within the framework of the ASP. Their support for the ICC underscores the fact that the obligations under the Rome Statute are State obligations and not AU obligations; as such, decisions on withdrawal will be based on national interest that cannot be assumed by the AU.
  1. Furthermore, the strategy for AU member states to withdraw undermines the other outlined agenda items of engagement with the ASP, such as the review of the interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute and the enforcement of arrest warrants. Such contradictory actions raise the question of whether the AU is negotiating ICC reforms in good faith.
  1. In light of the foregoing, KPTJ recommends that:
  • African States abandon and disregard calls for mass withdrawal from the Court and instead consolidate the member bloc to advance their concerns within the bounds of the ASP in deliberations based on good faith.
  • African states should continue to publicly reaffirm their support for engaging with the ICC through the ASP and prevail on the AU to adjust its engagement strategy accordingly. We applaud the statements made by Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana.
  • An ICC Liaison Office should be established at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to facilitate more productive and sustained communication between African States and the ICC as part of restoring a relationship that has become plagued by mistrust and misunderstandings.
  1. Absence of Accountability?

Peace, Security and Stability

  1. The characterisation of the ICC as undermining the peace and security of states or threatening their stability has become a recurring theme by those advocating disengagement or withdrawal from the ICC. In its notice of withdrawal, South Africa claims that its aspirations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts were being hindered by its obligations under the Rome Statute[5] to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when he attended the June 2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg. Kenyan government officials have also previously described the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto as an existential threat to peace and stability.
  2. A closer scrutiny of this assertion in the face of ongoing conflict situations suggests the contrary. The absence of accountability processes does not necessarily facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts; the South Sudan and Burundi conflicts instead point to protagonists willing to escalate violence, even in the context of peace negotiations. Burundi and The Gambia have commenced processes to withdraw from the ICC at a time when their respective governments stand accused of acts of repression and mass human rights violations. Rather than advance the cause for peace, the clamour for withdrawal from the ICC is playing into the hands of those wary of the prospects of accountability in the aftermath of conflict. Even more concerning is an apparent trend of rising post-election violence, such as that witnessed in Kenya previously and in Gabon currently, or violence stemming from efforts to instal third-term incumbencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Such trends are bound to persist in the absence of mechanisms for accountability, of which the ICC is a critical component.
  3. The assertion that the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Court) and its proposed expanded criminal jurisdiction through the Malabo Protocol would fill in any void created by a mass withdrawal from the ICC is erroneous. The African Court is a distant prospect for addressing the impunity gap: it is far from being operational. Since 2013, only five states namely Benin, Kenya, Congo, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania have signed but not ratified the Malabo Protocol, which requires the ratification of 15 states to begin operations. Kenya is the only state thus far that has made a financial pledge of USD 1 million to operationalise the court — a far cry from the resources required for a court of broad jurisdiction consisting of a mandate on human rights as well as international law and interstate disputes. It has previously been estimated that a singular international criminal trial costs USD 20 million to undertake. In addition, the protocol contains contentious provisions that undermine its viability as an alternative platform for international crimes, the most notable being the clause of immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. As a testament to the inability of the African Court to be an immediate replacement of the ICC as desired by some, even South Africa through its Justice Minister has indicated that it will ask for a review of the Malabo Protocol to address contentious issues. Furthermore, limited progress has been made towards establishing national mechanisms that can sufficiently undertake the obligation of accountability for international crimes.
  4. KPTJ recognises the pursuit of justice in conflict and post-conflict settings as an essential pillar of rebuilding democracies and restoring rule of law. These are the pathways to lasting peace, security and stability. Rather than push to void international justice mechanisms after the conflict to facilitate mediation, we recommend that:
  • African states fully implement and consistently apply already established norms on democracy, peace and security as a preventative measure to conflict including: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and; the African Governance Architecture.
  • African states must critically reflect on and address the issues of the African Court’s capacity, accessibility, legal standards outlined for crimes under international law and expunge provisions conferring immunity on sitting Heads of State and senior government officials. This process must not be rushed or predicated on a manufactured crisis precipitated by a strategy of mass withdrawal from the ICC.
  • African states should establish robust and credible national mechanisms to address the accountability question at first instance and in complementarity with regional and international mechanisms. They must also broaden their policy considerations to include comprehensive reparation programmes for victims of international crimes.
  • Disparity between State Obligations and Reality?

A look at State Cooperation

  1. The Kenya and Sudan cases have exposed the frailties within the Rome Statute framework in as far as state cooperation is concerned. These cases have laid waste to the presumption that States will willingly engage with the court in the face of cases seeking to prosecute sitting heads of state, their deputies or powerful elites in close proximity to power. State cooperation has only demonstrably worked in instances where the target for prosecution is a vanquished foe of conflict as seen in the cases of Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire, that are fast advancing a notion of “victor’s justice”. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the final recourse for addressing the lack of state cooperation rests with the ASP. The ASP being a political organ of the Rome Statute is influenced by political rather than purely legal considerations in making its decisions, which makes the issue of resolving the non-cooperation of states problematic. A final challenge to state cooperation is the failure of the United States, China and Russia to ratify the Rome Statute while also being members of the UNSC with the power of referral of matters to the court. This has created the notion of double standards within the international justice system and emboldened other states to disregard cooperation with the court.
  2. KPTJ calls on the members of the UNSC who have not ratified the Rome Statute to display leadership on State cooperation with the court by first ratifying the Statute and utilising its discretion on referral and deferral in a manner that adheres to the objectives of the Statute. We further wish to reiterate that state cooperation must denote effective cooperation that facilitates the mandates of the respective organs of the court and not feigned cooperation which creates the perception of facilitating the court but in fact consists of using procedural and technical obstacles to undermine the court. We call on the ASP to adopt a consistent and objective legal standard in the assessment of state cooperation.
  3. Are there lessons to be learned?

Taking stock of the experience in the Kenya cases

  1. The Kenya cases and the manner of their termination carry critical lessons for consideration to inform future actions by the court and the content of reforms within the strategic plans of its respective organs. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) as well as the bench on various occasions decried the instances of witness tampering and intimidation as well as non-cooperation by the state in responding to the OTP requests for information and a failure to execute ICC warrants of arrest with respect to three Kenyans suspected of witness tampering. This in fact has led to a finding of non-compliance against Kenya and led to its referral to the ASP under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. In the midst of all this, was an unprecedented and disruptive diplomatic effort that deliberately exerted political pressure on the court with a view to influencing the outcome of the Kenya cases. It is arguable that these diplomacy efforts yielded the concession of excusing President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto from continuous presence at their trial and that the current wave of withdrawals from the ICC on the basis of an apparent bias by the court against Africans are a fallout from these diplomatic efforts. The capitulations of the cases have also pointed to significant flaws in the investigative and prosecutorial approaches that informed the development of the cases and must lead to some introspection from the relevant mechanisms. The fact that the Trust Fund for Victims is yet to commence operations in Kenya cannot go without mention.
  2. KPTJ urges all the organs of the court to reflect on these experiences and take due cognisance of the following lessons and recommendations:
  • The ICC, particularly the ASP, should do more to ensure that it does not allow political statements to interfere with the judicial independence of the Court.
  • The ICC should ensure that it takes steps to respond to messages of a political nature and correct inaccurate statements in a timely manner. In addition, it should ensure that such key messages reach the right audiences, including victims and affected communities.
  • The Court should continue to build its relationship with African States that openly support the mandate of the ICC; in addition, the ICC should do more to improve its relationship with, and image at, the AU.
  • The Trust Fund for Victims should commence operations in Kenya, as victims have received little to no assistance from the Kenyan government.
  • The Prosecutor should carefully consider when to request ‘summons to appear’ as opposed to ‘warrants of arrest’ and take into account the individual circumstances of each accused person in doing so, particularly their potential to intimidate witnesses and interfere with evidence.
  • Swift action should be taken by the Prosecutor and the Court in instances of non-cooperation by States Parties. Any instances of non-cooperation should be resolved as speedily as possible, in such a manner that the outcome of proceedings on non-cooperation can be applied to strengthen an ongoing case and not be delayed to the point that the outcome is only of academic significance.
  • The Prosecutor should continue to carry out a review of its investigative strategies and methods in order to improve its chances of success at trial.
  • The Prosecution should ensure that its staff are able to spend as much time as possible on better understanding the context and nuances of a given situation country.
  1. Pursuit of reform without prejudice?

UN Reform vs ICC Reform

  1. The unique role played by UNSC in referral and deferral of cases before the ICC means that the debates on reforming the court and reforming the UN and in particular the UNSC have inevitably intersected. We have witnessed both undertones and overt accusations of imperialism and undue influence directed at the court on account of cases on Africa referred to it by the UNSC (Libya and Sudan). Arguments made to amend the Rome Statute to confer immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials are laced with grievance against the UNSC permanent five members possessing a de facto immunity from prosecution under the ICC on account of their veto power. The end result is a misdirected effort to amend the Rome Statute or in the extreme withdraw from the ICC on the basis of perceived excesses that are better addressed by engaging the broader debate of UN reforms.
  1. While KPTJ acknowledges the slanted relationship of the UNSC with the court and supports a robust conversation on its reforms, we call on states not to misdirect the agenda of reforming the UNSC into discussions on improving the functions of the court and occasion amendments to the Rome statute that sacrifice the future of the court as part of a bargaining process on UNSC reforms. We call on African states in particular, to distinguish the broader question of UN reforms as enshrined in the “Ezulwini Consensus” from the question of reforming the Rome Statute and reflecting on the performance of the court. We call upon African member states to the Rome Statute not to sacrifice the promise of justice for victims of atrocity crimes at the altar of grievance against the unequal power relations represented by the UN Security Council.

end/kptj/16.06.2016

——–

About KPTJ:

This brief was prepared by Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ), a coalition of Kenyan citizens and over 30 organisations working in the human rights, governance and legal fields that came together during the crisis over the disputed results of the 2007 presidential election to seek truth and accountability for the elections and the widespread violence that followed; and who continue to work closely with the victims of that period. It is a brief update on the situation in Kenya as pertains to pursuing accountability for the crimes against humanity committed during the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence as well as its adherence to its obligations under the Rome Statute.

[1] Assembly/AU/Dec.616 (XXVII)

[2] Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI)

[3] Press Release: “UN/African Union: Reject ICC withdrawal”. Available here: http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/552-un-african-union-reject-icc-withdrawal.html

[4] Article: “Which African states slammed Burundi, South Africa and Gambia’s withdrawal from ICC?” Available here: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/which-african-states-slammed-burundi-south-africa-gambias-withdrawal-icc-1589711

[5] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/South-Africa-Instrument-of-Withdrawal-International-Criminal-Court.jpg

South Sudan: Apparently “No Pardon” for Dr. Riek Machar; while Machar calls Kiirs Government a “Rogue Regime” the battles intensify as the UNSC Arms Embargo in the works!

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SPLA

Today is another day and on this blessed Sunday, the battles between the SPLM/A and SPLM/A-IO are continuing and are in many states like: Yei River State, Blue Nile, Upper Nile, Western Bahr El Ghazal and Unity State. With this in mind, the reports of today tell who the fragile situation is and what this can all mean for the near future. Because the SPLM-N are even in trouble in Sudan and in South Sudan, which makes the borders even worse; with this reality the world should act and give extend the mandate of UNMISS, the Arms Embargo would not work if there is still sold weapons without ending certificate; than the meaning of the trade will not be in the loop until their fetched by the International Community like MONUSCO this year. So here is the lot of the day!

No pardon for Dr. Riek Machar:

President Salva Kiir said on Sunday: “My brother Riek Machar thinks the only way for him to become the president of this country is violence, killing innocent people. I told him several times [that] there is no reason to fight. If you [Machar] wants to be the president, wait for elections, but he did not listen” (…) “They come asking me to pardon him. I tell them I have no problem with him. He is a citizen of this country and he can return anytime, but must denounce violence” (Sudan Tribune, 2016).

Offensive from SPLA:

Big government offensive on rebel Fatuyo’s base in Li-Rangu following the attack on Yambio, in which rebels showed off new RPG supply.

This is happening as fuel shortages are hitting the country, the issues with lacking of food-supply and the NGOs are under attack from SPLM/A-IO and also SPLM/A; this is happening with the full knowledge and with support from the Troika. That have set in force the process, but not considered the wish of power for the President and FVP Machar, who both of them has their agenda. This is happening as the sore and weak Kenyan Government cannot handle criticism of their commander, therefore they are leaving the UNMISS to show integrity, but instead losing their power and helpful assistance in the war-torn country.

As this is happening the Yei River State Officials are resigning because of the “Human Right Violations” in the state. There been reports of fierce battles between the State and the SPLM/A-IO in the Unity State.

Gen. Malik Agaar speaks out:
“Does Taban know how many lives we sacrificed for the independent of South Sudan?” Asked Malik Agaar” (…) “Does Taban know how the people of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile fought for the liberation of South Sudan?” He ask again?” (…) “Where was he when our bones littered the land of South Sudan?” And asked again. Taban looked between his legs as if he was peeing but he was just sweating” (…) “Taban we aren’t going anywhere, as SPLA-N we are here to stay whether you like it or not.” Malik Agaar concluded boldly looking in the face of Salva Kiir. At this point Taban was done” (…) “Until you become the President of South Sudan then you can do whatever you want to do to SPLA-N.” Malik Agaar warns” (…) “From today onwards I don’t want to hear from you, neither call me nor ask me.” Malik Agaar declared and that was by no mean a point of contention. It was the END of the meeting” (Alfa, 2016).

So another group who are in the borderland and creating problems in South Kordofan, Blue Nile State and in Darfur, the SPLM-N are now threatening the SPLM/A and the FVP Taban Deng Gai, who took over when Dr. Riek Machar fled Juba in July 2016. This has since inflamed the situation and now the fragile state has more trouble.

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SPLM-N

But the SPLM-N is already trouble also inside Sudan:

“On Sunday, the Khartoum North court judge Osama Ahmed Abdalla convicted the defendant of spying for violating article “53” of the Criminal Code, saying the prosecution presented coherent and strong evidence against the defendant” (…) “He pointed the prosecution witnesses proved that the defendant has conveyed military information about the Sudanese army in El Meiram area, South Kordofan to the ruling SPLA party in South Sudan” (…) “The judge added the defendant also, in collaboration with two others, handed over a government source to the SPLA, saying the source was assassinated by the latter” (Sudan Tribune, 2016).

So when the Gen. Malik Agaar attacks Gen. Taban Deng Gai for his actions, they are themselves into trouble elsewhere… the fragile border and frictions between Sudan and South Sudan. This has become better and there been visits from Juba to Khartoum as even Dr. Riek Machar came there after being in the woods of Democratic Republic of Congo and banished by the MUNSCO, the President Kiir has pardoned the 750 soldiers that we’re part of Machar’s group there, but is not willing to pardon him before he acts peaceful. Certainly the bloodshed between the SPLM/A and  the SPLM/A-IO is not over, as the SPLM-N are taking stand now and are under fire in Sudan as well.

There rumours that the SPLM/A-IO Dr. Riek Machar after leaving the safe shores of South Africa he is now taken by Army Operatives of the Ethiopian State on Ethiopian soil, while the U.S. is currently on working on blacklisting him for not being able to get arms on legal basis; though I am sure the blood money can pay for guns and ammunitions.

These rumours and reports are coming as Dr. Riek Machar has leached out this statement:

“We have been driven back to the bush,” James Gadet, a spokesman for Machar, told the AP on Saturday in a call from Nairobi, Kenya” (…) “(We) call on the international community to declare the regime in Juba a rogue government,” the document says, adding that international agencies monitoring the peace deal should “suspend their activities” until the agreement is “resuscitated.” (News Wires, 2016).

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They can declare as much as they like, can call the TGoNU who cooperates with the IGAD-Plus and the UNMISS, also with the Troika a “Rogue Regime”, that might help their cause and help their loyal commanders, but it doesn’t strengthen their cause after the skirmishes this year.

President Salva Kiir might be totally wrong about his actions and decrees, but the initial violence comes as a result, but also the power-hungry FVP Machar has created as much violence on his own and also tried to kill the president in vain. Therefore both men do what they can keep themselves in power. The people, the citizens of the South Sudan are the losers who torn between two Parties and too Big-Men. Peace.

Reference:

News Wires – ‘South Sudan rebel chief urges armed resistance against government’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.france24.com/en/20160924-south-sudan-rebel-chief-riek-machar-kiir-urges-armed-resistance-against-government?ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_source=twitter&ns_mchannel=social&ns_linkname=editorial&aef_campaign_ref=partage_user&aef_campaign_date=2016-09-24

Sudan Tribune – ‘No amnesty for South Sudan rebel leader, says President Kiir’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60893

Sudan Tribune – ‘Sudanese court convicts former SPLM-N officer of spying for South Sudan’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60895

Alfa, John – ‘GEN. MALIK AGAAR OF SPLA-N IN is in JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN’ (20.11.2016) link: https://africanspress.org/2016/11/20/gen-malik-agaar-of-spla-n-in-is-in-juba-south-sudan/

Statement by Ambassador Joseph Moum Majak N. Malok, Charge d’affairs A.I. and Deputy Representative the Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan to the United Nations, to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the UNMISS and South Sudan Sanctions (17.11.2016)

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UNSC Press Statement on the Ethnic Violence and the Situation in South Sudan (18.11.2016)

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South Sudan: Eye Radio is Back on Air (18.11.2016)

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UNSC November 2016 on the South Sudan and the continued crisis!

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The United Nations Security Council have delivered a letter and also two statements on the situation and the level of crisis in the Republic of South Sudan. This is happening as the UNSC are discussing the mandate of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The problem is continuation of the flaring skirmishes in July 2016.

The UNSC are now looking into crisis and fixing the lax mandate or the issues with the peacekeepers in the nation. This has to happen as the UNMISS has already come under scrutiny for their acts around the UN House in and around Juba. The proven skirmishes and the evidence of what went down and also what has gone on since. Also the interesting who has exported the arms to the Republic; which has given the fighting armies the needed ammunition and weapons to continue to fighting each other.

Mr. Mohamad of Sudan said this:

“The Cooperation Agreement laid a solid foundation for normalizing relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, enhancing cooperation in all areas between the two and achieving sustained peace. It covered the areas of oil resources, trade, borders, security arrangements, the status of citizens and other themes. However, our brothers in South Sudan have so far been enthusiastic only about the implementation of the oil agreement. They have overlooked the implementation of other agreements, particularly the Agreement on Security Arrangements between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, which includes provisions on ending the support for, and the harbouring of, rebel movements, the establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and the establishment of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM)” (…) “On the deployment of the oil police in the Diffra oil complex, my delegation reaffirms the need for such a step, as the joint Abyei police has not yet been established. Another reason is that there are Sudanese rebel movement groups in South Sudan that can target those vital installations. That force is limited both in number and equipment” (UNSC 7810, 2016).

Mr. Malok of South Sudan said this:

“Cooperation between the two countries is crucial to any constructive and productive efforts in Abyei. Indeed, even the progress made by UNISFA could not have been possible without a degree of functional cooperation by the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan. However, much more cooperation is needed if the efforts of UNISFA are to continue to bear tangible fruits that will benefit the two communities and help to facilitate continued improvement in the relations between the two countries” (…) “It is noteworthy that, as the report of the Secretary-General observes, the restrictions imposed by the Government of the Sudan on non-governmental organizations have limited the implementation capacity of humanitarian and development actors, especially in the northern parts of Abyei. As the Secretary-General also notes, in addition to a lack of adequate funds, other challenges include high implementation costs owing to security and logistical constraints, delays in the issuance of travel permits and restrictions on the movement of personnel and supplies by the Government of the Sudan.” (UNSC 7810, 2016).

Context:

“The armed opposition to Kiir’s regime is an increasingly multifaceted amalgam of forces encompassing dissident groups with diverse grievances, aims and approaches to the war. Many of these groups are either not under the direct control of SPLM/A in Opposition led by Machar, which was a party to the Agreement, or are only loosely affiliated with it. Nevertheless, Machar’s resilience, notwithstanding the government attempts to assassinate him in greater Equatoria, has seemingly provided more motivation for Equatorian armed elements to associate formally with SPLM/A in Opposition. The perception that the belligerence of Kiir’s Dinka-dominated regime is leading the country inexorably towards a devastating tribal war, coupled with a sense that the international community is failing to take the steps necessary to avoid a further escalation of the conflict, are providing impetus among non-Dinka opposition political and military forces towards greater coordination, if not complete organizational unity” (UNSC letter, P: 3, 2016).

“The SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, remains a central figure in the perpetuation and expansion of the war, including the conflict in greater Equatoria, described in detail below. After the fighting in Juba in July, he oversaw the operation to hunt down Machar and the SPLM/A in Opposition forces in Central Equatoria” (…) “The extension of the war continues to pose an increasingly grave threat to the countries that neighbour South Sudan. For example, after a long series of skirmishes between SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition in Central and Western Equatoria after Machar fled from Juba in July, Machar and some 750 soldiers and civilians entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has confirmed that, on 13 August, SPLA then launched an incursion into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An estimated 800 to 900 SPLA troops from Division VI crossed the border and engaged in a battle with SPLM/A in Opposition. On 17 August, two MI-24 helicopters also crossed the border, travelling nearly 6 km into Congolese territory and again attacking SPLM/A in Opposition positions” (UNSC letter, P: 6-7, 2016).

arms-ssudan

Arms dealings:

“In a meeting with the Panel on 28 September, the First Vice-President, Taban Deng Gai, refuted the presence of L-39 jets in South Sudan, which the Panel had documented with supporting evidence, including photographs and eyewitness accounts, in its report to the Security Council that month” (…) “The Panel has been provided with preliminary information on the weapons that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo took from the combatants who accompanied Machar into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 2016. The sources of the weapons are consistent with those previously documented by the Panel as having been procured in South Sudan, both before and after independence, including weapons and ammunition manufactured in the Sudan, China, the United States of America, Israel and various Eastern European countries” (…) “One weapon of note among the arms documented is a Micro Galil rifle manufactured by Israel Weapon Industries, bearing serial number 36100549. This is the third weapon of its type identified by the Panel, with two others (serial numbers 36100566 and 36100588) having been documented in Upper Nile in 2015. Each of the weapons was, according to interviews with SPLM/A in Opposition members, taken from South Sudanese government stocks either through battlefield capture or by defectors. According to information provided to the Panel by the manufacturer, as noted in the Panel’s report of January 2016 (S/2016/70), the three weapons are from a batch sold to the Ministry of Defence of Uganda in 2007. There is no provision in the end user certificate for their transfer to South Sudan” (…) “In September, the Panel received information from Spain regarding weapon trafficking to South Sudan that the Spanish police had obtained as part of a continuing investigation into money-laundering and racketeering. The information details communications between an arms trafficking network based in Europe and the leadership of SPLM/A in Opposition in 2014, in which the latter had requested the delivery, through an intermediary in Senegal, of an extensive list of small arms, munitions and light weapons. Further investigations by the Panel suggest that this shipment was at least partially delivered” (…) “Also in September, the Panel received information and documentation from a confidential high-level South Sudanese source that, in July 2014, a shipment of small arms ammunition and 4,000 assault rifles had been delivered by Bulgarian Industrial Engineering and Management to the Ministry of Defence of Uganda. According to the documentation, Bosasy Logistics, a company registered in Kampala and described in previous reports by the Panel, including its report of January 2016 (S/2016/70), acted as an intermediary in the transaction. The weapons and munitions were subsequently transferred to South Sudan. While the Panel is further investigating this transaction, it notes that recent arms transfers from Uganda to South Sudan, as described in its report of September 2016 (S/2016/793), are likely to be using the same modality as the earlier transfers from 2014, with Bosasy Logistics and its Chairman, Valerii Copeichin, facilitating the sales” (…) “The Panel has received multiple reports from various sources of arms shipments entering South Sudan by road through Uganda and by airlift to Juba and Wau since May. The content, according to two high-level sources with knowledge of the operations, was small arms and light weapons, ammunition and armoured vehicles. The Panel is in possession of a contract signed by SPLA in May 2015 for the provision of Panthera armoured vehicles valued at $7,187,500.50 The company contracted to provide the vehicles, Egypt and Middle East for Development, was represented by an Egyptian national, Mohamed Atta Jad. The company is registeredin Cairo.51 The Panel is investigating the possible connection between this contract and the recent airlifts to South Sudan” (UNSC letter, P: 18-20, 2016)

Budget:

“The Panel obtained data indicating that projected State budget expenditure for the 2016/17 fiscal year would exceed revenue by 149 per cent.62 Consequently, the government has laid out a proposal for financial austerity and external borrowings, which incorporates recommendations made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after its mission of May. The Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, in his address to the Commission on 19 October, said the following: “We commend the TGNU for the work that has gone into creating an ambitious budget, which has been commended by many analysts. Strong constraints on expenditures are central to the budget and a condition for stabilization.” Progress towards the implementation of this strategy will indicate the government’s seriousness in addressing the macroeconomic crisis” (…) “The draft budget for the fiscal year 2016/17 is estimated to be 22.3 billion South Sudanese pounds, half of which is allocated to the security sector” (…) “Revenue for the 2016/17 budget was calculated on the basis of oil production of 120,000 barrels per day, which is the lowest rate of extraction since December 2013. There is no indication that Deng Gai’s efforts in August to renegotiate the pipeline and transfer fees with Khartoum were successful, meaning that South Sudan will continue to pay $24.1 per barrel in fees to the Sudan, undercutting the revenue of the budget owing to volatile oil prices. The oil industry also shows no signs of recovery to the pre-war levels; the Unity fields were disabled in the early months of the war, and the continuing conflict will make it difficult to launch the long and technologically complicated process of restarting oil production” (UNSC letter, P: 23, 2016).

This here is lots of interesting collected information that usually would be left behind and not for-told to the media and the press, as even the press is suppressed in the South Sudan. As the Eye Radio and others has gotten harassed by the TGoNU. They don’t want the news of conflict spread and the initial reports from the nation. Peace.

Reference:

United Nation Security Council 7810th Meeting (15.11.2016)

UNSC – ‘S/2016/963: Letter dated 15 November 2016 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (15.11.2016)