WikiLeaks: Government of Uganda issues from 2007 to 2009/10; ENI/Tullow Oil, PRA, Wakiso By-Election, Election Rigging, Payed Media and so on

Here I will back into the past, as I have done with Museveni directly connected to violence in the past. Here it is more general. Some of this is to refresh the memory of the matter. And when the Government; back in the called all of this rubbish, it must have been some facts that the government doesn’t want into the light. There is certainty that this will shed some lights on matter of Corruption, Oil-Money, Election-Rigging and other saucy tales of the recent past. Enjoy!

Mabira Forrest and sugarcane deal:

President Museveni has gotten tired of multi-party-ism after the dissidence to agreement between Asian business deals to make the Mabira Forrest into a sugarcane farms. Especially President Museveni is tired of FDC and Dr. Kizza Besigye and how he is addressing the matters of Mabira Forrest. Because the NRM is happy with their trade between Government of Uganda and the Metha Group that Besigye and the public who has a feeling that Indian business are getting sweet-deals, but the ordinary workers are getting anything. Certain sources are saying that the Cabinet has made an agreement with the World Bank on the Bujagali Dam, but a part of that deal is to secure the Mabira Forrest. Museveni’s argument for the sale is to get the country into a middleclass county and in that way you have to use all the countries minerals and resources (WikiLeaks, 2007).

The PRA Suspect on bail:

On the 1^st March of 2007 has re-arrested the main offenders from the Peoples’s Redemption Army (RPA). These offenders are suspected on both murder charges and treason charges. They we’re given bail, but the police didn’t treat them correctly. The Police beat them with batons and their defense lawyers were injured in the altercation. “Minister of Internal Affairs Ruhakana Rugunda said that the PRA had been released on bail for the treason charges against them, and that the Government respected this decision” (…) “Principal Judge James Ogoola said that he was: “concerned for the Court, for liberty in this country, and for the peace of this country” (WikiLeaks, 2007).

Besigye’s brother:

On the 13.06.2007 the High Court judge Caroline Okello granted the brother of Dr. Kizza Besigye bail. He is Joseph Musaizi Kifefe. He was charged at the time for being part of the uprising of the PRA (People’s Redemption Army). Further on he will stand trial for treason against the state. The lawyer for Kifefe has applied for bail on the grounds of medical condition of his client since he has blood cancer and need treatment at Mulago Hospital. On June 18 2007 he was discharged from Hospital after treatment that has lasted for over a month. The conditions for the bail was set for that he has to report to the Kampala Central Police Station, do this twice a month and register that cost $6,000, leaving behind his passport and not allowed to travel without permission. The issue for giving Kifefe bail was that the Government of Uganda feared the smear and loses appeal with the donor nations. Next date that is set for PRA suspects is set for July 16.2007 (WikiLeaks, 2007).

Corruption cases:

Immunization Corruption Case:

In January of 2006 the President Museveni requested that the Inspector General of Government (IGG) to investigate the former Minister of Health Jim Muhwezi. This was because of the alleged scheming money from the vaccine program of Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunization (GAVI). The funds for this program were instead spent on SIPIDIS – Constitutional Referendum and National Resistance Movement. President Museveni asked First Deputy Prime Minister Eriya Kategaya on how much of these funds we’re used for campaigning in 2005-2006. While the President pushed for IGG to investigate the Fund. Janet Museveni tried to stop this and support Jim Muhwezi. In April of 2007 the Justice Faith Mwondha that the former Health Ministery and other government officials had misused the GAVI funds. These persons were Jim Muhwezi, Mike Muluka, Alex Kamugisha and also the first lady niece Alice Kaboyo was part of the corruption case. The case was for the missing $900,000 from the $4,8M. 4^th May 2007 Jim Muhwezi filed a petition against the case to block President Museveni’s case against the Gavi Corruption case. The argument being that it’s an independent institution that shouldn’t follow orders by the President and should get its mandate from the Constitution. The answer from the President came on the 16^th May 2007 when he went to Constitutional Court to swear an affidavit that claims the corruption of Muhwezi and Kaboyo. At the same time the President claimed he hadn’t interfered in the investigation of the IGG. 18^th May 2007 the arrest warrants on the Muhezi and Kaboyo was sent out. That also Kaboyo was implicated was not something the Ugandan public expected since she had been a part of the household of Museveni. Kaboyo claimed that she did this on verbal agreement with the President. Muhwezi was away when the arrest order came, but he turned to the police in 28^th May 2007 from there he was sent to Luzira prison. Mukula and Kamugisha were granted bail on the 25^th May 2007. The issue with this case was that the party of people took more money than where authorized to do and didn’t prove what they used that money for. Muhewezi is now seen as “not political responsible”. The Cabinet wanted just to “clip his wings” because they could be implicated by the case. This is something the President Museveni accepted (WikiLeaks, 2009).

Wakiso By-Elections:

4^th November 2008 there was held by-election to fill the seat of the Kyaddondo North of the Wakiso District. “NRM candidate and son of Kibirige, Robert Kibirige Kasule, won the tightly contested race with 8,183 votes – just 60 more than DP candidate Regine Bakittee.  Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) candidate Pallyne Nakabuye finished a distant third with 1,900 votes” (…) “Allegations of electoral malpractice, including ballot stuffing, bribery, multiple voting, and violence were widespread. In one confirmed incident, a polling station’s presiding officer and other officials were found at the site before the polls opened with a number of pre-marked ballots already in the box.  The police and Electoral Commission Returning Officer were called in and the presiding officer was later arrested and the ballot box confiscated” (…) “DP Legal Advisor and Kampala District parliamentarian Erias Lukwago told the press that the election was not “free and fair” and vowed to seek legal redress” (…) “DP Secretary General Mathius Nsubuga contacted members of the diplomatic community to encourage missions to observe the election on December 4.  Nsubuga expressed concerns about increased Ugandan military deployments in the area in the days leading up to the election and reported increased incidents of intimidation.  He reported that Bakittee’s campaign manager had been knocked down in a hit-and-run car accident involving a government-marked vehicle” (WikiLeaks, 2008).

Media is bribed to write certain stories:

“De Temmerman expressed deep concern over the state of Ugandan journalism. “What is happening in the Ugandan press is pure exploitation and fabrication,” she commented. De Temmerman said that journalists are often paid to write stories aimed at destroying political rivals or advancing private economic agendas. She pointed to coverage of the recent National Social Security Fund’s questionable purchase of land belonging to Security Minister Amama Mbabazi and approved by Finance Minister Ezra Suruma (reftel). She said that a “considerable amount of money” exchanged hands as Parliament’s probe moved forward and that a number of her journalists had been offered bribes to “hit Mbabazi hard.” (…)”“The Red Pepper is 90 percent fabricated,” De Temmerman affirmed (Note: The Red Pepper is a salacious tabloid that is used by the government and private individuals to malign enemies. End note.). She expressed concern that the paper’s readership was rising and that some Ugandans might actually mistake it for factual journalism” (WikiLeaks, 2008).

Local Council elections in 2009:

On 21th May of 2009 was there held in 79 districts that will fill the new seats in local councils and sub-country level. Observation teams saw this: “Voter turnout was low and there were very few contentious contests.  However, there were a number of irregularities and concerns that in a larger, more controversial election could be cause for conflict or possibly a rejection of the results.  Observation teams reported that several polling stations opened late due to tardy polling officials, missing or delayed voting materials, and rain.  Observers also recorded problems with the voter identification process, including multiple voters without voter identification cards or other identity documents, missing names, un-alphabetized voter registries, and conflict between polling officials and party agents over the identity of undocumented voters (Note: There were allegations that the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party’s officials brought people to the polling stations without identification to vote in the place of deceased individuals still on the list. End note)” (…)”Monitors reported inconsistent ballot box sealing procedures, mostly believed to be the result of poor training rather than fraud.  In some instances, polling officials mistakenly used regular ink instead of the indelible ink to mark voters’ fingers. In at least two cases, individuals responsible for marking voters’ fingers were absent from their posts.  Many polling officials, party agents, and Uganda Police Force (UPF) constables appeared to lack a strong understanding of their roles and responsibilities in the voting process and thus failed at times to properly enforce electoral laws.  This, combined with limited voter education and information, often led to confusion and in some isolated instances verbal confrontation.  In one district, observers reported a more serious case of ballot stuffing.  Although observers reported these findings to the District Electoral Registrar, the results from the station were still considered valid and were included in the final count” (WikiLeaks, 2009).

Election Rigging:

“On October 22, Uganda’s main opposition newspaper published excerpts of an internal NRM report accusing core EC officials of conspiring with opposition parties to place “ghost” voters and “phantom” villages on Uganda’s voter rolls. Opposition parties have identified a new EC as a prerequisite for their participation in the 2011 elections because they view the current EC as pro-NRM (refs. A, B and C). Various iterations of the NRM report accuse the EC of placing 500,000 to one million pro-opposition “ghost” voters on the voter registry to force the NRM’s Presidential candidate into a second round election run off in 2011. The report singles out EC Secretary Sam Rwakoojo, Legal Council Alfred Okello Oryem, and a handful of mid-level officials for corruption, fraud and conflict of interest, and recommends firing Rwakoojo “forthwith as he as done the most to damage (the) NRM.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).

NRM-Membership program:

“The NRM membership campaign probably also serves to strengthen Museveni and Mbabazi’s power within the party. NRM leaders are likely looking to prevent an embarrassing repeat of the 2006 legislative election when 37 NRM members, frustrated by the lack of internal democracy within the party, defeated hand-picked NRM candidates by running for parliament as political independents. With the registration campaign, party members could be identified earlier and threatened with permanent alienation from the NRM if they bolted to seek election as independents. Mbabazi may also use his control of the registration campaign to boost his own embattled position within the party by withholding registration to those in the NRM who do not support him. Mbabazi’s position as Secretary General is up for re-election in late-2010, and he will likely face stiff competition for the NRM’s contested top spot” (WikiLeaks, 2009).

The day before riots:

“The government closed five radio stations on September 11^th two CBS stations plus Suubi FM, Radio Sapientia, and Radio Two Akaboozi Kubiri – for violating Uganda’s Electronic Media act.  At least two other stations – Radio Simba and WBS TV – have been warned to censor their reporting or risk closure” (…)“On September 11, well known Radio One talk show host Robert Kalundi Sserumaga was abducted by unidentified assailants riding in an unmarked sedan as he left the WBS studio.  He was later dumped in front of a police station and arrested” (WikiLeaks, 2009).

Riots in Kampala:

“Rioting in Kampala subsided on September 12 after the King of Buganda postponed his visit to the disputed district of Kayunga” (…) “There was sporadic gunfire during the morning of September 12 on the outskirts of Kampala, as well as road closures and checkpoints near the city center amidst a heavy police presence.  Several police posts and dozens of vehicles were burnt during the riots.  One reportedly Asian-owned paint factory was also torched” (…) “On September 12 Buganda Prime Minister John Baptist  Walusimbi asked the Inspector General of Police, Kale Kayihura to  “restrain his officers and men from indiscriminate shooting against unarmed civilians in order to cool the temperatures.” (…) “On September 14, state media reported 21 dead and over 100 injured (including 13 police officers) during two days of rioting.  Some of those brought to Kampala’s overflowing Mulago hospital, including a two year old child who was killed, were hit in their homes by stray bullets” (…) “An estimated 550 to 650 people were arrested during the  riots. Local media reports only 82 of these have been charged, meaning that the rest should either be charged today or released” (…) “Museveni also accused Libyan leader Muamar Qadhafi of trying to destabilize Uganda by funneling funds to the Baganda as payback for Museveni’s opposition to Qadhafi’s United States of Africa proposal” (WikiLeaks, 2009).

President Museveni on alleged torture:    

On 14^th October 2009 President Musveni told the press that those who are torturing Ugandans will be severely punished. The president does this because he want to squash the allegations that been made in UHRC that agencies of the state is violating the Human rights. Reuters also questioned the President on the arrest and beating of the journalist Robert Kalundi Sserumaga. Later on 18^th October 2009 NRM spokesman Ofwono Opondo he was ashamed of the actions of the UPDF, the Police, Prisons and intelligence agency. Opondo has claimed that he didn’t Understand why this was happening since the government agencies are more educated then before therefore it’s a shock that they torture the people they are arresting. IGP Gen Kale Kayihura on the 17^th October he had to change the Rapid Response Unit(RRU) in the Police after claims of torture of alleged corruption case against the Executive Director of UNFA (Uganda National Forestry Authority) and his wife where the RRU is suspected of detaining them for a week and threathen to torture them. The RRU director David Magara was because of this moved from his position into a leadership role in the CID (Criminal Investigation Directorat). In Hoima the mayor who is a part of the FDC Atugonza is in proceedings against the state for a torture case where he was attacked by JATT (Joint Anti-Terrorist Team) in April 2009. This was a closed session from the public. The Mayor of Hoima claimed in court that he was sent to a “safe house” and tortured there by the CMI (Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence). Because of this Dr. Kizza Besigye has said that he would make litigation against Minister of Security Amama Mbabazi for the treatment of Atugonza by security agencies he controls (WikiLeaks, 2009).

New Districts in 2009:

“On November 11, Minister of Lands Adolf Mwesige asked Parliament to approve the creation of seven new administrative districts on top of the 14 districts already slated for creation in 2009 and 2010. If approved, this will bring the total number of administrative districts to 101, or three times the 33 districts existing when Museveni took power in 1986” (…) “According to the Commissioner for Local Councils, Patrick Mutabwire, all of the 39 districts created between 2005 and 2009 depend on the central government to cover 90 percent of their expedenditures.  At the moment, government service provision in new districts remains poor or nonexistent” (…) “According to the Commisioner for Local Councils, new district start up costs range from USD 300,000 for smaller districts to USD 1 million for larger ones, and each new district employs between 250 to 500 local government employees/ new districts are attractive job creation mechanisms for the Ugandan government. These appointments provide a chance for the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) to reward specific constituencies and individuals, or entice opposition members back into the NRM camp” (WikiLeaks, 2009).

GoU and ENI deal – Mbabazi connection:

“The report claims that Mbabazi is using a front company belonging to the European owner of Asante Oil, and that ENI representatives distributed “fat envelopes” to a number of visitors – including Energy Ministry officials, representatives from the Office of the President, journalists, and Bunyoro Kingdom officers – while installed at a safari lodge in Murchison Falls National Park close to where drilling has occurred. NOTE: EconOff witnessed ENI’s presence at this lodge during a trip to Murchison in early December. END NOTE. Much of the report highlights ENI’s Libyan ties and accuses Qadhafi of funneling money to the Bunyoro and Buganda Kingdoms to destabilize the Museveni regime. The final two sections of the report purport to “show how ENI corrupts a country’s leadership and forces them to take unpopular selfish policies,” and the “dangers” of an ENI/Libya deal” (WikiLeaks, 2010).

Tullow oil corruption:

“On 14 December, Tim O’Hanlon, Tullow Oil’s Regional Vice President for Africa met with Ambassador Lanier to discuss recent developments in oil exploration in Uganda (see ref. A for background). O’Hanlon explained that the $10+ billion required to produce, refine, and export oil from Uganda far exceeds the financial capacity of Tullow and other mid-sized exploration companies currently working in Uganda. Tullow is therefore considering selling a portion of its Uganda holdings to a larger international oil partner, and has unofficially “short listed” three major companies as potential partners – including Exxon Mobil, Total (France), and the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC). After Tullow concludes its process of selecting a partner, likely in January or February 2010, Tullow will present the “bids” to the Uganda government and work with Ugandan officials to gain approval of the much larger oil partner” (…)”O’Hanlon referred to Minister Mbabazi, who facilitated an August 2009 meeting between ENI and Tullow, as ENI’s “patron” in Uganda, and said ENI created a shell company in London – TKL Holdings – through frontmen Mark Christian and Moses Seruje – to funnel money to Mbabazi. O’Hanlon also noted what he described as Onek’s recent unsolicited “grandstanding” before Parliament in support of ENI, and similar statements of support during a recent Indo-African energy conference in New Dehli. Onek made impossible claims at the Indo-African conference regarding ENI’s ability to export 100,000 – 200,000 barrels per day within two years” (…)”O’Hanlon said ENI’s Uganda deal is part of a wider effort, facilitated by Heritage, to gain control of all oil fields on both sides of Lake Albert. In addition to its exploration blocks in Uganda, Tullow claims to have exploration rights on the Congolese side of Lake Albert” (WikiLeaks, 2009).

This here must been seen as interesting, doest it? Aye? Especially so close to the elections, I am sure the local media would not like this to come out, especially the New Vision and such. I am sure Amama Mbabazi will not like this, but the history is the history, and people should know this, so you make the right decision on the polling day! Peace.

Reference:

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: BESIGYE’S DETAINED BROTHER GRANTED BAIL’ (03.07.2007) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KAMPALA1089_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: IF A TREE FALLS IN MABIRA FOREST, WHO WILL HEAR IT?’ (02.05.2007) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KAMPALA744_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘RESPECTED EDITOR RESIGNS; GIVES VIEWS ON UGANDAN MEDIA’ (20.11.2008) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KAMPALA1524_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: CORRUPTION SCANDAL’S POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS’ (29.05.2009) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KAMPALA909_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: MUSEVENI AND NRM SPEAK OUT AGAINST TORTURE’ (27.10.2009) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA1249_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: GOVERNMENT RE-ARRESTS PRA SUSPECTS’ (02.03.2007) Link:  https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KAMPALA367_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: DEATHS, DETENTIONS, AND DISTRUST AFTER KAMPALA RIOTING’ (14.09.2009) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA1055_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: DISTRICT PROLIFERATION AS POLITICAL PATRONAGE’ (20.11.2009) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA1326_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘LOCAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS IN UGANDA SIGNAL TROUBLE IN 2011’ (10.06.2009) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA576_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘CONTENTIOUS UGANDAN BY-ELECTION AND ITS LESSONS FOR 2011’ (18.12.2008) Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KAMPALA1613_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: ALLEGATIONS OF “GHOST” VOTERS HAUNT ELECTORAL COMMISSION’ (17.11.2009) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA1323_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘POLICE ARREST MAYOR (AGAIN) AND TEAR GAS OPPOSITION IN WESTERN UGANDA’ (10.12.2009) Link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA1391_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: SECURITY REPORT DETAILS OIL SECTOR CORRUPTION’ (13.01.2010) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10KAMPALA19_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: TULLOW SEES CORRUPTION IN OIL SALE’ (17.12.2009) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA1401_a.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: NRM LAUNCHES MEMBERSHIP REGISTRATION DRIVE’ (23.09.2009) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA1097_a.html

The President’s black book chapter 2: The close tie between the GoU and M23; giving instantly amnesty to the guerilla; which make it seem more likely that it was a proxy war for the government

There isn’t often I have gone through so many United Nations documents to pile up information about one single militias or guerilla force in the DRC. This is because I have had a suspicious feeling about the connection to the government of Uganda, as they have been busy before in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as they have done with their partners in Kigali, President Kagame and Government of Rwanda. As we will see here, this is the facts that the UN have claimed by their eye-witnesses, Amama Mbabazi is the man who has defended the Government of Uganda, he had to come with a threat towards the United Nations to silent this. Therefore you haven’t heard much about it…

As this will go first by year it is published, first you can read the defense of the Government of Uganda, then the evidence brought by the United Nations different committees and institutions from the “the Expert Group” and so on. This is interesting reading and should give you insights to a world the Rwandan and Ugandan government does not want the world to question, as much as they don’t want the questions come about the killing of Laurent Kabila… as that question the manner of how they brought a new regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this here is newer and fresher, close to today, as it then is more evidence that the UN has collected, and has pictured in their archives. Therefore take a look and hope it opens your mind.

Part of Uganda Government defense against the allegation made by Amama Mbabazi:
“About the same time, H.E. Joseph Kabila, President of DRC, contacted President Museveni and explicitly requested him to intervene and facilitate dialogue between M23 and DRC Government. In accordance with article 23(2) of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, President Museveni convened four Extra-Ordinary Summits of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the security situation in Eastern DRC, three of which were hosted in Kampala using Uganda’s own resources” (…)”The UN must sort out the malignancy against Uganda by bringing out the truth about Uganda’s role in the current Regional efforts” (…)”In light of the above, withdrawing from Somalia, CAR, etc., becomes inevitable so that we keep watch on the DRC territory donated to the terrorists by the DRC Government and the United Nations” (Mbabazi, 2012).

5th Extraordinary Summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region declaration on M23 and violence in DRC:
“Gravely concerned about the advance and capture of the city of Goma and the town of Sake in Kivu Province, of the DRC, by the M23 rebel movement in spite of the directive of the previous Summits of ICGLR to cease hostilities and remain in positions they occupied in July 2012” (…)”HEREBY DECIDE AS FOLLOWS:” (…)”MONUSCO to occupy and provide security in the neutral zone between Goma and the new areas occupied by M23” (…)”This process shall be supervised by Chiefs of Defence of Rwanda, DRC and led by the Chief of Defence Forces of Uganda, with the participation of other Chiefs of Defence Staff from other member states”(ICGLR, 2012).

First piece of evidence:
“The report also accuses Uganda of backing the M23, providing troops and ammunition for specific military operations” (P: 5, Gil, 2012).

Government of Uganda Support of M23:
“Senior Government of Uganda (GoU) officals have also provided support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcement in DRC territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice, and facilitation of external relations, Units of Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) jointly supported M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the major town in Rutshuru territory, and the Forces Armees de la RDC (FARDC) base of Rumanbago” (P: 2, 2012). “Uganda’s more subtle support to M23 allowed the rebel group’s political branch to operate from within Kampala and boost its external relations” (P: 4, 2012). “UPDF Commanders sent troops and weapons to reinforce specific M23 operations and assisted in the M23’s recruitment and weapons procurement efforts in Uganda. Ugandan officials equally endorsed a “laissez-faire” policy authorizing local military and civil authorities to cooperate with M23 out of their personal ties to the RDF or the rebels” (UN, P: 9, 2012).

Weapons delivery to M23 from Uganda:
“Former M23 soldiers stated that UPDF officers based in Kisoro have been supplying M23 with small quantiles of weapons. One former M23 soldier said he hadaccompanied Makenga to Kisoro on three occasions at the beginning of July 2012” (…)”A former M23 soldier stated that UPDF commanders brought heavy weapons including 12,7 mm machine guns to the hill overlook Bunagana, on the Ugandan side of the border, in order to reinforce M23 during the attack, and subsequently left them with the rebels after they took the town” (…)”Two former RDF officers, two FARDC officers, one M23 cadre and one former M23 soldier stated that two trucks transported weapons and ammunition to Bunagana prior to the attacks on Rutshuru and Kiwanja. According to one FARDC officer, the two trucks mainly contained RPG-7 grenade launchers and machines guns” (UN, P: 11-12, 2012).

More on the connection with GoU:
“Four Ugandan officials, an FARDC officer based in Bunagana, border agents as well as a former CNDP politician told the group that the Jomba Groupment chief based in Bunagana, Vincent Mwambutsa, regularly travels to Kisoro to organize recruitment and financial contributions for M23 with the Resident District Commander (RDC) of Kisoro, Milton Bazanye, his ally Willbaforce Nkundizana and local UPDF officers. One former M23 soldier confirmed that the rebels recruited 28 Ugandan civillians in Kisoro. A Ugandan official in Kisoro personally witnessed the UPDF taking recruits to the border” (UN, P: 12, 2012).

Ugandan known leaders and personalities involved in support of M23:
“A UPDF officer, a Ugandan leader, an M23 cadre, politicians, intelligence sources, a Kampala based diplomat and several businessmen stated that Gen. Salim Selah has been principal responsible for UPDF support of M23” (…)”A Ugandan Civil Society member, two M23 cadres and a Ugandan counter-intelligence report also affirmed that UPDF Western Division commander, General Patrick Kankiriho, has overseen military support to M23, including providing orders to Mukasa” (…)”Three Ugandan officials stated that in May and July 2012, General Kayihura held meetings with the rebels at Kisoro” (UN, P: 13, 2012).

Ugandan trading with illegal DRC gold:
“The Group estimates that 98 percent of the gold produced in DRC is smuggled out of the country, and that nearly all of the gold traded in Uganda – the main transit country for Congolese gold – is illegally exported from DRC. As a result, the governments of DRC and Uganda are losing millions of dollars annually in tax revenue, and tolerating a system that is financing armed groups in DRC” (UN, P: 1, 2013).

One Connection between M23 and Uganda:
“The Ugandan army spokesperson stated that the former M23 “are not prisoners; they are soldiers running away from a war so we are receiving them and helping them because it is our responsibility.”28 He also compared the reception of M23 to what Uganda had done in 2012 when a Congolese army battalion had fled into Ugandan territory following fighting with the M23. President Museveni later indicated that he would not hand over Makenga to Congolese authorities and compared protecting him to the same support he gave Laurent Kabila against Mobutu in 1996” (…)”After being disarmed and registered at a Ugandan army facility in Kisoro on 13 November 2013, most of the former M23 fighters were transferred to the Bihanga military training center near Kasese” (…)”According to latest reports, Makenga and Kaina remain under Ugandan surveillance, while other former M23 officers and political leaders are reportedly able to move freely in Uganda” (SSPC, P:4-5, 2014).

Ugandan implications:
“Uganda, it is important to note, has received relatively little reprimand despite its implication in supporting M23. Its contribution of roughly one third of peacekeeping troops to the high-priority AMISOM mission, and threat to withdraw those troops in response to the GoE’s allegations, is likely a major factor in that lack of attention” (Jackson, 2013).

Findings from the M23 declaration:
“Recalling its declaration at Kampala, Uganda, on the 5th November 2013 that it had renounced rebellion and requested its ex-combatants to prepare for the process of disbarment, demobilization and social reintegration” (…)”Declares as follows: End of rebellion. M23 confirms it has renounced its rebellion. Amnesty: The M23 accepts that to benefit from the amnesty, each member of M23 shall be required to make a personal commitment in writing to refrain from the use of weapons or from participating in an insurgency movement to ensure success of any demand. Transitional security arrangements: The M23 commits itself to comply with and implement the transitional security arrangements, the details of which will be defined by the proposed Annex A as adjusted to reflect the changed situation on the ground, including the fact that some members of M23 fled to Uganda where they were received” (…)”M23 members reserve the right to change its name and become a political party accordance with the constitution and laws of DRC” (M23, 2013).

Risky move of amnesty to M23 member and combatants:
“The FIB’s impact was twofold. Most obviously, it had a military role, both in supporting the Congolese military (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, or FARDC) and in taking the fight directly to the M23, deploying sophisticated technology such as South African attack helicopters. But perhaps more importantly, it changed the dynamics of regional politics. In raising the political stakes for the M23 and its putative backers, particularly Rwanda, it forced them into a choice between allowing the group to be defeated or – in essence – declaring open war on the SADC. The result is that the east of the DRC, for the first time in many years, is no longer held hostage by rebel groups with significant links to neighbouring governments, though these undoubtedly remain. It was a high-risk move, and one that could have led the region back into inter-state conflict. But M23’s backers instead chose to disengage, allowing the group to fragment, signing a series of agreements known as the Nairobi Declaration in December 2013. Though it has not faded entirely – former M23 combatants, many of whom are currently in Uganda and Rwanda, represent a latent threat of re-mobilization that urgently needs to be addressed – the group is no longer able to directly shape events in eastern DRC” (Shepard, 2014).

The situation of M23 by August 2015:

“At this stage, the amnesty provision and the repatriation process of the reportedly over 1,400 ex-M23 combatants which fled to Uganda and Rwanda in 2013 are amongst the most contentious. To date, only 182 ex-M23 combatants have been repatriated from Uganda to the DRC, while 13 have been repatriated from Rwanda. According to Ugandan sources, as of 4 August, 817 ex-M23 combatants are cantoned at the Bihanga Military Camp. About 327 residents of the camp have deserted, with no clarity on their whereabouts, 14 are admitted in hospital, 25 departed on sick leaveand are yet to return, 4 are deceased. The presence of hundreds of ex-M23 and are yet to return, 4 are deceased. The presence of hundreds of ex-M23 combatants in Rwanda and Uganda remains a serious source of concern for the GoDRC and the host authorities in Uganda and Rwanda. Yet, despite several attempts by the GoDRC to expedite the repatriation of the ex-M23 combatants, in line with the Nairobi Declarations and relevant decisions of the ICGLR Summits, there has been no progress in this process due to lack of even focus in the implementation of the Nairobi Declarations” (UN, 2015).

Afterthought:

As we can see there is a connection and the deflection from Government of Uganda (GoU) is expected, but if I had showed the riches gained by the imported gold from the areas that M23 took, would have showed the value for supporting the army as the common sense for the cooperation and support directly from the GoU.

He might have called President Kabila and told he would work on the matter and have the discussions in Kampala as a way of swaying away from the fact that they are behind and servicing the M23. We can see that and knowing that they gave arms, training, army men from the UPDF and even technical training. The pictures of the arms with Ugandan origin after the retreat and stop of violence from M23 should be proof enough of their involvement into the matter, what is worse is the witnesses claiming that certain big men in the government has supported and set things in order to fix the problems that M23 had at one point. That is something that we all should consider, as Salim Selah has been involved in a lot of shady arrangement in DRC before and has only backed away from the “Wonga Coup” to deliver arms to Thatcher’s son. Rest of the time he has done transport arrangements and fixing the army to keep Uganda in parts of DRC when needed. So the stories of him being involved would not be a shock in any way.

The suspect issue is how easy they could stay in Uganda, cross the borders and even get personnel and recruit in border areas. As this suspect connection together with the history of using military force from Uganda to get wealth out of the DRC. As they did in the late 1990s and in the beginning of 2000s; they haven’t just cooperated with the world to fight together will alliances to force away LRA and ADF-NALU. That is not the whole story, though the Government of Uganda won’t it to seem that way, as a way to clean their hands from the mud they have been swimming in. Takes a lot more than a shower to get the dirt off, you smell me?

Peace.

Reference:
Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum – ‘Consolidating the Peace: Closing the M23 Chapter – Prepared on behalf of the DRC Affinity Group December 2014’

Jackson, Henry M. – ‘DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING A 3D STRATEGY WORK IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA’ (Winter 2013)

Gil, Manuel Manrique – ‘The M23 and eastern D.R. Congo: An intractable problem or an opportunity to engage?’ (12.11.2012) – ‘European Parliament: Directorate-Generale for External Affairs: Policy Department’

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – ‘DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION (ICGLR) ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) 5th EXTRAORDINARY SUMMIT OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT’ (24.11.2012).

M23 – ‘Declaration of Commitments by the Movement of March 23 at the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue’ (12.12.2013) – Nairobi, Kenya.

Mbabazi, Amama – ‘Uganda’s Stand and Response on the allegations made by the UN Group of Experts and the subsequent endorsement of the allegations by the UN Security Council about Uganda’s purported support of M23 rebels’ (01.11.2012) – Statement in Parliament of Uganda

Shepard, Ben – ‘Beyond Crisis in the DRC The Dilemmas of International Engagement and Sustainable Change’ (December 2014) – Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,

United Nation – Letter dated 12 October 2012 from the Group Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo

United Nation – ‘Letter dated 12 December 2013 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit the final report of the Group, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012)’

United Nations – ‘OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION -Neutralization of Armed Groups’ (26.08.2015)