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Archive for the tag “Richard Nixon”

Two newly declassified notes from 1954: Proves further plans by CIA and British to overthrow the Iranian Government!

Newly declassified notes are telling a story, a very short story on how the Americans and British planned a coup in Iran. The idea was from the British who set the problem like this: “The British Foreign Office has informed us that it would be deposed to attempt to bring a coup d e’tat in Iran, replacing the Mosadeq Government by one which would be more “reliable”, it the American Government agreed to cooperate” (Department of State, 26.11.1954).

Therefore, they continue to explain their plans, as the British has informed the US Department of State, their possible hostile takeover and coup d’etat, this is if they could cooperate over a cup of coffee and biscuits, to find plans to change the government in Teheran.

Reasons for the hostile takeover was: “While the Embassy representative (Bernard Burrows) did not give details of the British reasoning, it appears that the Foreign Office has come to this conclusion because (a) British Intelligence has reported that an organization which could handle this job exists in Iran, and (b) the Foreign Office sees virtually no prospect of an oil settlement with Mosadeq and has little hope that his Government will be able to prevent a communist takeover” (Department of State, 26.11.1954). So, the problematic government was because it couldn’t settle an oil agreement and therefore, the British justified a takeover, also used the Cold-War threat, to entice the Americans. Clearly, they wanted to settle the score and make sure they got the oil they needed for a cheap price.

It continues: “Another obvious and vital consideration is the degree of assurance we can have that preparations for the move and our connection with it would not become known, and that the coup would eventually succeed. CIA believes that the project is probably feasible and that it could probably be handled in such way that British and American connection with it never be proven. However, there can never be absolute assurance in regard to a matter of this kind especially in a country like Iran. Many things could go wrong” (Department of State, 26.11.1954). So the cooperation between the US and UK was planned in way, that they hope they didn’t leave behind trace of their conspiracy to bring down the Mosadeq government. That their loyal and possible coup-makers will not spill the beans and say they we’re supported by foreign forces. Clearly, the conspirators and planners knew they we’re trying to deceive the Iranians.

The second note, which is stated on the ‘Memorandum of Conservation’ on the subject of “British Proposal to Organize a coup d’etat in Iran”, that is made on the 3rd December 1954. An important quote there was: “Mr. Nitze asked whether it would not be possible to test out the organization with which the British are in contact in Iran by undertaking a campaign against Kashani and the Trudeh without trying to displace Dr. Mosadeq. If such a campaign were successful it would give good evidence of the possibility of staging a coup d’etat to put in a new government. Mr. Burrows did not think this would be interested in an operation which did not involve the removal of Mosadeq” (Department of State, 03.12.1954). So after a week of informal talks between the British and Americans, they are discussing more clearly the possibility of an actual coup. But, the price of it has to be paid, that being removing Mosadeq totally from the throne.

The last part of the note was actually this: “It was agreed that no action would be taken at the present time but that we would keep the suggestion in mind. It was also agreed that there should be no further discussion between CIA and the British intelligence representatives on the subject until further notice” (Department of State, 03.12.1954). So this documents shows they are planning further coups in Iran, just a year after the planned one in 1953. The CIA was really ready for puppet government in the Middle East. Also, because the British wanted the oil secured, they could force another leadership in Tehran. With this history and trying to control the republic, you can understand why the Iranians doesn’t trust the United States and the United Kingdom today. Peace.

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The historical call between Kissinger and Marder: Shows how the NSA became a WaPo source!

In December 12, 1972 there was a unique phone call between Journalist Murray Marder at the Washington Post and the then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger under President Richard Nixon. Here we can see allegations from the Washington Post and the Nixon Government warfare in Vietnam. How it is explained and how the sudden approach of Marder get the truth and also get Kissinger to explain the situation, instead of getting angry and stop listening to press. Something, today’s government should learn, since this is not stopping the spin, but explaining the facts. Also, come forward. We are even seeing that Kissinger went to become “government source”, instead of being named in paper. Just take a look!

Let me show you pieces of the conservation between Marder and Kissinger to give some context:

Kissinger: Yes, Murray.

Marder: Henry —-

Kissinger: Not that goddamn paper deserves a return call

Marder: Ah, you mean the editorial or me or what?

Kissinger: The Editorial. No you’ve been 80 % rational. But for a newspaper that’s accusing us of not showing enough goodwill; now to accuse us of naivety is almost more than one’s morality can stand. But go ahead, you’re not responsible for the editorial”

He later continues:

Marder: This is what I wanted to get at because the Press Office response was it was untrue that Kissinger asked for 126 charges. But we said, well, we thought it was too much because that leaves the question: “well, was it 125 or was it anything or was it –”

Kissinger: The last day we asked for none whatsoever. You know, I don’t know how the sons-of-bitches are counting – they might, during the course of 15 days, if they count every word that was ever suggested in these discussions, they might amount to something, I don’t know. We did not – – there were never more than 8 points seriously at issue at any time during the 15 days. All of this is off-the-record”

Later again:

Marder: Which I’m not trying to do obviously because of this is the kind of thing you get a sweeping accusation from somebody of 126 charges.

Kissinger: The major issue that was discussed occurred in one place and did not recur through the document.

Marder: um-humm.

Kissinger: It is just not true.

Marder: Right.

Kissinger: You know, it might be hard to accept it. The U.S. Government may be telling the truth and Hanoi may be lying but it’s just barely conceivable.

Marder: No, the question here was just simple the way the way he is slinging the 126 around, it was obvious to anybody following this that there are not 126 charges probably in the entire agreement in any substantive form and he has gone on to say that – –

Kissinger: Look, can anybody really believe that having negotiated the Berlin agreement, the Shanghai communique, the SALT agreement, that one could be so wrong at the end of October as to think that 126 issues could be settled in three or four days?

Marder: No, I would think absolutely not.

Kissinger: Or is it more likely that we raised exactly the issues that I mentioned at the end of October? Issues on the assumption of a decisions to settle are easy. And on the assumption of a decision not to settle become insoluble.

Marder: Yeah, yes. I would have no problem with that”

Later in the conversation:

Marder: What is not clear to me is do you see a probability of them dumping everything into that record? That would mean a break and everything if they would go that far.

Kissinger: They wouldn’t do that; they wouldn’t look to good.

Marder: I would think there is a limit. The point is that they probably do not want to break off the negotiations but want to register some great indignation and dismay and generate whatever support pressures from China and Moscow to support them there.

Kissinger: I think that’s right. Murray, I’ve got to run but will you write this please by keeping White House or anybody else out of it.

Marder: All right but I must use something – – Administration sources said the charge of 126 has no foundation whatsoever.

Kissinger: That’s right”

Finally:

Marder: This is why I called you because the White House thing left that hanging.

Kissinger: Hell, it wasn’t anything like 10. I mean, in fact, only 10 things that were ever seriously discussed.

Marder: Right.

Kissinger: There may be a lot of things but all of this is basically irrelevant because all of those issues have in fact practically been settled.

Marder: Right, right. Just one brief thing, the timing discernible at all on any next move on their part?

Kissinger: I have no estimate on that.

Marder: Um-humm.

Kissinger: Okay, Murray.

Marder: Thank you, Henry.

Kissinger: Right. Tell ______ that I deeply appreciate his editorial.

Marder: I will”

If you see how the conservation was between the National Security Advisor and Washington Post Journalist. Shows how the political game is played and what efforts being made. How it went from I hate that editorial, to I appreciate it. Certainly, politician will act first in defense and say the papers are wrong. But when he changed and listened to Kissinger, the story got altered and the information being given made sense. So it wasn’t a spin. Maybe, the White House of today could learn from it today.

U.S. History: H.R. Haldeman note on Nixon order to “monkey wrenching” Vietnam-War Peace Negotiation (22.10.1968)

During a phone call on the night of Oct. 22, 1968, Richard M. Nixon told his closest aide (and future chief of staff) H.R. Haldeman to “monkey wrench” President Lyndon B. Johnson’s efforts to begin peace negotiations over the Vietnam War. Nixon long denied giving such an order, but Haldeman’s notes, which were quietly made public in 2007 and were recently discovered by the historian Jack Farrell, prove he was lying.

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US Election: The Statement on Trump from former Republican National Security Officials

Trump Security Letter August 2016 P1Trump Security Letter August 2016 P2Trump Security Letter August 2016 P3Trump Security Letter August 2016 P4Trump Security Letter August 2016 P5Trump Security Letter August 2016 P6Trump Security Letter August 2016 P7Trump Security Letter August 2016 P8

Confessions of a Republican (LBJ 1964 Presidential campaign commercial) VTR 4568-26 (Youtube-Clip)

Serial #: VTR 4568, No. 26
Date: 1964
Event: 1964 Presidential Campaign
Location: Unknown
Credit: Democratic National Committee
Rights Info: No usage fees. User must observe DNC guidelines. Contact LBJ Presidential Library for more information.

Description: Black and white television advertisement. This ad from the Democratic National Committee during the 1964 election portrays concerns of a Republican voter about Republican nominee Barry Goldwater.

Subjects: 1964 presidential election, Barry Goldwater

Source: LBJ Liberary

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