




Dr. Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) do not need to have dialogue or negotiation with the National Resistance Movement (NRM) or the President himself. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni needs more the dialogue than the FDC and their party needs it. It is the NRM government and NRM regime who needs legitimacy and needs funds. That is proven with Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) who proves with the 16 trillion shillings funds the for the 2017/2018 budget of the 30 trillion shillings needed. With this in mind there is certainly that the NRM needs more international support to fix missing funds.
That Museveni would need Besigye now a year after the General Election of 2016 shows how dire the situation is, the added debt and the troubling waters on the giant infrastructure projects, as much as the missing funds for the salaries or the other financial expenses that are occurring for the government. So the proof of issues is growing as the direct budget support has dwindled down as well as the elite and the cronies still expect to be fed by the regime.
Besigye has still a forged treason case, as much as Rwenzururu king Charles Wesley Mumbere has as well. The FDC headquarters was attacked and a crime-scene as the FDC Youth and FDC P10 was attacked as the defiance campaign was even banned by the Deputy Court Justice Stephen Kavuma. As well, the Police Force under IGP Kale Kayihura monitored and followed the leadership of FDC like they we’re criminal. There were many detained and house-arrested, there was more people hurt and hospitalized by state security organization. Also, the many inflicted and detained without warrants or court order shows the impunity of the state towards the FDC.
So after this impunity, after the illegal house-arrest of Besigye and the others who has been taken into prison without any justice served, why should the FDC try to sell their soul to the Movement? That is waste of time and waste of energy, it would be like the men who traded their political lives in Nairobi talks: “The NRA and the government signed a peace and power sharing agreement in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital Dec. 17 that called for an immediate cease-fire, the freezing of all troop movements and a half share of the ruling Military Council for the NRA” (…) “The provisions of the accord were largely ignored and both sides used the lull in the fighting to reposition and resupply their forces. The guerrillas claimed the military committed widespread human rights abuses after the accord was signed” (Charles Mitchell – ‘The National Resistance Army of rebel leader Yoweri Museveni…’ 26.01.1986 link: http://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/01/26/The-National-Resistance-Army-of-rebel-leader-Yoweri-Museveni/5549507099600/ ). So the agreement done by NRA in December 1985 wasn’t a big deal, so that Museveni could do a final sting and coup to gain power, which he has never left.
A negotiation with Museveni would only enforce his rule and his longevity in power nothing else. Besigye would not be offered anything substantial; his part in the matter would end in little or nothing. FDC would get the stick, but not get the price. Just like they wouldn’t feel a difference between now and then since the price of going into partnership would benefit Museveni. The Movement would get beneficiary funding and regard internationally since FDC has a higher standing abroad than Museveni.

Museveni is well-known now because of his 7 terms and his position of executive since 1986. The reality of this that a negotiation or dialogue with Museveni at this stage is redundant, unless the President all of sudden turns his own self sideways. That he would go back on all his empty promises and all of his glory. Certainly Museveni could do so, but he knows that he has too many people on his consciences to leave it all behind. The President has eaten too much of the state coffers and cannot leave the bank-accounts behind. The family is too connected and has all the leverage in the state. The movement is built around him and if he fails than the party does as well.
The Movement and Museveni would not co-sign their powers or the authority, not after the rigging and the massive misuse of the state funds, therefore the lacking funds for the current budget. Museveni knows that his loyal friends abroad will not give in to his ways anymore, therefore hoping to play other cards. Use his political brain to suck other donors in. That while waiting for more oil-monies and also trade of other with making the UPDF to mercenary army in Equatorial Guinea or South Sudan if needed. This is because they need to get fresh funding for the State House, which hasn’t paid their payment-arrears to the owners of the Okello House!
So Besigye doesn’t need Museveni at this point, he needs his party and the loyalty of his supporters. That is more than Museveni has who needs to pay for loyalty and to secure funding for the movement itself. Therefore the jobs and funds to come steady, there is always more mouths to feed and more people to silence with brown envelopes. So Museveni needs foreign support and foreign aid as the Uganda Revenue Authority has just enough regulations and taxes to bring in funds that scrape the surface, but not fill the state coffers.
So again I say and I stand by it, Museveni is the only one earning political capital on negotiations and dialogue, nothing is really to be earned by the FDC or Besigye. So with this in mind, Museveni will only gain and Besigye will only lose on it. If you know you would lose, why give way to somebody who comes to take it all and deplete it all? Peace.






Kinshasa, 11 February 2017 – MONUSCO is concerned about the persistent conflict in the Kasais which is marked by violent atrocities committed by the Kamuina Nsapu militia including their recruitment and use of child soldiers whilst targeting symbols and institutions of State authority as well as the disproportionate use of force by the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in their response to the situation. Particularly, since 9 February 2017, there have been ongoing clashes between Kamuina Nsapu militia and Congolese Security Forces within the area of Tshimbulu (160 Kilometers South East of Kananga) with unconfirmed reports of between 30 to 50 deaths resulting from these clashes.
Maman S. Sidikou, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of MONUSCO, strongly condemns the actions of the Kamuina Nsapu militia in recruiting and using child soldiers as well as their acts of violence against the State. He expresses his concern about repeated reports of the disproportionate use of force by the FARDC and offers the Mission’s support to a credible investigation of this regrettable situation. He regrets the deaths and injuries suffered in these clashes and calls upon the Congolese Security Forces to act in line with acceptable standards of national and international laws in their response to the situation.
Since the outbreak of this crisis about six months ago, MONUSCO has sought to effectively support the Congolese authorities in addressing the situation at national and provincial levels. In addition to several engagements by the Special Representative at the political and security levels, the Mission has reinforced its civilian and uniformed personnel presence in the area. The Mission has also deployed one of its Mobile Monitoring Response Team in the area (Tshikapa, Dibaya, Bunkode, Tshimbulu and Luiza) to possibly prevent, investigate and document human rights violations in line with its mandate.
Note to Editors:
Following the decision of the Security Council in early 2014, MONUSCO redeployed most of its resources to Eastern DRC in 2014. There was also a drastic reduction of military and civilian personnel affecting the Mission’s presence in Kananga given the improved security situation at the time. Presently, the Mission has since December 2016, deployed a Military Company of soldiers in Kananga (Kasai central) with the task of protecting the Mission’s personnel and assets as well as carrying out Protection of Civilians.

The Drought Situation
The Horn of Africa is in the midst of a major drought resulting from La Niña and reduced moisture influx due to the cooling of the ocean water in the east African coast. Whilst Member States of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are adept at managing droughts, what makes the current drought alarming in the Equatorial Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) region is that it follows two consecutive poor rainfall seasons in 2016 and the likelihood of depressed rainfall persisting into the March – May 2017 rainfall season remains high. The most affected areas include, most of Somalia, South-eastern Ethiopia, Northern Eastern and coastal Kenya, and Northern Uganda.
The climate predictions and early warnings produced by IGAD through advanced scientific modeling and prediction tools, which were provided to Member States and the general public, have elicited early actions (preparedness and mitigation measures). Highly comparable to the 2010 GHA drought, the current depressed rainfall and resultant poor vegetation conditions since March 2016 eroded the coping and adaptive capacities of the affected people. It also depleted water points, reduced crops, forages and livestock production, increased food insecurity, and adversely affected the livelihoods of vulnerable communities in the region.
The number of food insecure human population in the region is currently estimated at 17 million. Certain areas in South Sudan and Djibouti are already under an emergency food insecurity phase, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) classification scale. In Somalia, the number of food insecure people doubled in the last year alone.
In the drought affected cropping lands (over Deyr area in Somalia and coastal Kenya), 70 to 100 percent crop failure has been registered. Livestock mortality has been particularly devastating amongst small ruminants with mortality rate ranging from 25 to 75 percent in the cross border areas of Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia. In addition, livestock prices have dropped by as much as 700 percent.
Terms of trade have declined in the region, with Ethiopia registering a figure of almost 10 percent. This is exacerbated by a substantial negative impact on external balances, as well as a small impact on financial sector-soundness in the other countries. The overall impact on fiscal positions is a likely increase in current budget spending and deterioration in the fiscal balance and weak adaptation capacity.
Despite the downtrend in global agriculture commodity prices, the drought has resulted in an increase in domestic food prices in the region. Cereal prices (e.g. maize) have gone up by about 130 percent, while those of critical food items such as oils, beans and wheat flour increased by at least 50 percent in some pastoralist areas. The limited financial and institutional capacity for effective adaptation to reduce exposure and vulnerability will result in limited safety net to the most vulnerable households.
Drought Response in the Horn of Africa
With the early warning and technical assistance provided by IGAD, Member States have initiated early action to mitigate the adverse impact of the current drought.
Somalia and South Sudan have declared drought emergencies. Kenya announced a doubling of expenditure on food relief to ease the pressure in the drought-affected counties, while Uganda shifted some of its development resources to finance emergency response in order to address food insecurity and livelihood protection. In Somalia, the President of the Federal Republic, as well as state and regional administrations led the issuance of appeals for support and coordinated actors and efforts that scaled-up food security activities to respond to the humanitarian needs of the country.
The USD 730 million allocated by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia boosted the response effort which, coupled by an above-average meher harvest, resulted to an almost 50 percent reduction in the number of food insecure people, for example, from 10.2 million to 5.6 million.
IGAD continues to reinforce the actions of its Member States using them as guide for complementary action on drought responses. Below are some of the major actions being undertaken by the IGAD Secretariat and its specialized institutions to manage the drought in the region:
Through the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) Platform, the ultimate purpose and objective of IGAD and its Member States is to mitigate the adverse effects of disasters through building resilience of relevant national institutions, communities and people, to end drought emergencies and contribute to the achievement of sustainable development in the region.
In this regard, IGAD will remain vigilant in monitoring and advising the people of the region on the drought situation through its’ specialized institution, the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC) domiciled in Nairobi, and shall continue to support and complement regional and national actions on drought response and recovery.



