
Rwanda 1994: Gen. Paul Kagame letter of 10. August 1994 (Confidentiel)



“The people back home wouldn’t buy a ring if they knew it cost someone else their hand” – Maddy Brown (Blood Diamond, 2006).
The European Union are acting out of care and thinking of transparency for the industrial imports and mineral exporters. This is happening just a little month after the United States opened up their legislation for importing more from conflict zones. While the European Union plans to close the gate from areas and from sources that export Conflict minerals.
So the EU laws are becoming more stricter than the United States, even if the law they have enacted in the European Parliament and Council of the European Union, will be effective from 2021. So it is 4 years until it has giant effect and gives time to refinery and importers to change behavior. Something that is necessary, as well as the public have to grow concern of the affects of buying conflict minerals. Even as the conflict minerals still come into the market of Europe and into the refineries so the consumers doesn’t know and cannot follow where their products who contain minerals comes from war-zones.
That the European Union takes this serious and acts upon this Nobel, and proves that they does not want to support militias and guerrillas that keeps control of mineral rich areas and their exports to supply weapons and continue warfare in for instance the African Great Lakes Region. Take a look!
Background of new rule:
“This Regulation, by controlling trade in minerals from conflict areas, is one of the ways of eliminating the financing of armed groups. The Union’s foreign and development policy action also contributes to fighting local corruption, to the strengthening of borders and to providing training for local populations and their representatives in order to help them highlight abuses” (EU, P: 8, 2017).
Conflict Minerals from Great Lakes Region:
“The Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy should regularly review their financial assistance to and political commitments with regard to conflict-affected and high-risk areas where tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold are mined, in particular in the African Great Lakes Region, in order to ensure policy coherence, and in order to incentivise and strengthen the respect for good governance, the rule of law and ethical mining” (EU, P: 16, 2017).
Trade of Minerals funds armed conflicts:
“Preventing the profits from the trade in minerals and metals being used to fund armed conflict through due diligence and transparency will promote good governance and sustainable economic development. Therefore, this Regulation incidentally covers areas falling within the Union policy in the field of development cooperation in addition to the predominant area covered which falls under the common commercial policy of the Union” (EU, P:17, 2017).
Important Article:
“Article 3: Compliance of Union importers with supply chain due diligence obligations
1. Union importers of minerals or metals shall comply with the supply chain due diligence obligations set out in this Regulation and shall keep documentation demonstrating their respective compliance with those obligations, including the results of the independent third-party audits” (EU, P: 23, 2017).
Date of Application:
“Articles 1(5), 3(1), 3(2), Articles 4 to 7, Articles 8(6), 8(7), 10(3), 11(1), 11(2), 11(3), 11(4), Articles 12 and 13, Article 16(3), and Article 17 shall apply from 1 January 2021” (EU, P: 51, 2017).
What the statements on the law:
“The Commission will consider making additional legislative proposals targeted at EU companies with products containing tin, tantalum, and tungsten and gold in their supply chain should it conclude that the aggregate efforts of the EU market on the responsible global supply chain of minerals are insufficient to leverage responsible supply behaviour in producer countries, or should it assess that the buy-in of downstream operators that have in place supply chain due diligence systems in line with the OECD guidance is insufficient” (…) “In the exercise of its empowerment to adopt delegated acts pursuant to Article 1(5), the Commission will take due account of the objectives of this Regulation, notably as set out in recitals (1), (7), (10) and (17). In doing so, the Commission will, in particular, consider the specific risks associated with the operation of upstream gold supply chains in conflict affected and high-risk areas and taking into account the position of Union micro and small enterprises importing gold in the EU” (…) “In response to the request of the European Parliament for specific guidelines, the Commission is willing to develop performance indicators specific to the responsible sourcing of conflict minerals. By means of such guidelines, relevant companies with more than 500 employees that are required to disclose non-financial information in conformity with Directive 2014/95/EU would be encouraged to disclose specific information in relation to products containing tin, tantalum, tungsten or gold” (EU, P: 57-58, 2017).
The European Union is doing something positive with this. That they show effort and care for the imports and what affects the export has locally, so if the minerals export is shady, the export will cease. So if the due diligence regulation works and the industry complies, the effect can be enormous. The consumer will also know that there are not supporting by third party purchase to pay for ammunition rebels, warlords or guerrillas in far away lands. This should all be seen as step of making a better world and honorable society. Where the money is where the mouth is! Peace.
Reference:
Council of the European Union – ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas – Outcome of the European Parliament’s first reading (Strasbourg, 13 to 16 March 2017) – (20.03.2017).


“For Africa as we wait to see what unfolds and adjust, we should be learning the lesson that we should not be entirely dependent. We will wake up to the reality there are things we should be doing for ourselves. You have made it appear that your situations are perfect and you want others to emulate you. Then you are surprised by what unfolds. It is what you have been hitting us with that is coming back to bite you. I did not change the constitution. If you want to know the truth you will find it is the people who did, not me. My satisfaction lies in the truth that we have not been involved in harming our people. What we are doing is to develop our country. If we don’t take care of ourselves, no one else will. As long as Rwandans are happy, we will keep doing what needs to be done. We will be listening to what others say but we will not be distracted from what needs to be done.”
-President Paul Kagame speaks to Gerard Baker, editor in chief of the Wall Street Journal, at the closing session of Invest in Africa conference.
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, the long lingering Executive of Rwanda has compelled his words against dependency of the West. Surely, he has had this in mind for while in his own haven, as the Rwandan government has been a donor friendly. Therefore, that he claims now to take a stand against them shows the sudden change of attitude. However, it is sudden donors and programs that have stopped coming Kagame’s way, therefore the Rwandan government have started to run a giant tab of external debt instead of donor aid grants. Like look at some quotes from companies that establish the economic output and the financial flow of nations, like Deloitte and KPMG!
Rising debt:
“According to BMI, total external debt levels in the country have been rising steadily in recent years, from 16.1% of GDP in 2010 to an estimated 30.5% of GDP in 2015. Debt levels for 2016 and total external debt are forecast to amount to 35.2% of GDP and will be composed mostly of government debt” (Deloitte, P: 4, 2016).
Failing Foreign Aid, therefore rising debt:
“The primary headwind to the Rwandan economy in the 2016-2025 period will be the impact on debt as a result of falling foreign aid. Despite prudent fiscal policies to date, increases in debt levels will follow from the fall in foreign aid, since Rwanda is now deemed fit to transition from grant-based financing to loan-based financing by the IMF” (Deloitte, P: 5,2016). “The government has been compelled to adopt a more prudent fiscal policy stance in an attempt to reduce the country’s dependence on donor support and increase fiscal autonomy. Recent external headwinds have encouraged the government to ease demand for imports by reassessing its infrastructure investment programme. This will undoubtedly have a negative impact on economic growth. That being said, the benefits of lower donor dependence and improved macroeconomic stability should outweigh the costs related to lower growth over the short term. Turning to external balances, Rwanda’s wide merchandise trade deficit is expected to maintain a shortfall in the overall current account going forward” (KPMG, P: 4, 2016).
“Aid harmonization has been improved and progress continues to be registered in the implementation of the Paris and Busan commitments especially the use of national budget and procurement systems. The Bank was the 6th largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) provider to Rwanda in 2013/14, accounting for 9.4% of total ODA26. The World Bank and EU invest in agriculture and energy whereas the leading bilateral DPs focus, among other things, on human development and social protection (Annex 8a). Annex 8b summarizes the progress made in implementing selected indicators as captured by the Donor Performance Assessment Framework. Use of the sector budget support (SBS) instrument has increased the share of Bank support disbursed using country systems. Under the DPCG, the Bank actively participates in activities to enhance the implementation of EDPRS II such as the 2014/15 assessment of SWGs” (AfDB, P: 9, 2016).
So if you look at the financial policies of the republic of Rwanda, some of it is not really chosen as the donors funds that has been suspended or stopped might be for several of reasons. That might be that if they accept the funds they have to follow a spectre of policies and interferes with the power that Kagame wish to achieve. The RPF and Kagame has total control of Rwanda, the export and the import, also owns dozens of the businesses. So the Rwandan government had to switch their economy with more loans, instead of donor aid. The loans are coming in through external debt as the external donor funds and grants have dwindled.

Therefore, the excuse of suddenly wanting to be independent is more a need, than a wish. If it was a wish earlier, than the AGOA or USAID to the RPF would have stopped decades ago. That should be common knowledge of the relationship between Paul Kagame and Bill Clinton. It is not that it is positive that the Rwandan Government want’s less aid is a healthy stance. Still, the excuse isn’t eaten by me.
The reality is that the increased debt instead of donor grants will hurt the economy, as the levied interest rates and other cost will hurt the economy. It isn’t healthy to be dependent of the aid either, but the reasons now seem more to reactionary than real intent. I am sure Paul Kagame would love funds from Belgium and France to build hospitals and clinics in rural regions of Rwanda. So, suddenly the West isn’t good enough, especially when they are questioning his reasons for staying in power and not having any successors while his regime is keeping a close lid on the opposition. Therefore, the economy and independent from the world becomes more important because then he needs to less show of transparency and accountability. Peace.
Reference:
AfDB – ‘RWANDA BANK GROUP COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER 2017 – 2021 (October, 2016).
Deloitte – ‘Rwanda Economic Outlook 2016 The Story Behind the Numbers’ (June 2016)
KPMG – ‘Economic Snapshot H2, 2016 – Rwanda’ (15.10.2016) link:
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/za/pdf/2016/10/KPMG-Rwanda-2016-Snapshot.pdf

After reading a Forbes article on Illicit Financial Funds leaving Ethiopia, as they question the need for and the use of donor aid to Ethiopia. I had to read the reports that it partly was based and make my own assumptions. The difference is that I want to focus on the East African Nations and their Illicit Financial Funds that leaves the States. So that the values and the amounts show’s lack of governance and regulation of finance gives way for the African governments and corporations to get away with transferring funds without legal bounds. This is a way of misusing funds and also money laundering through lacking revenue service and authorities to keep up the upkeep of the states. Take a look!
“IFFs are illegal movements of money or capital from one country to another. GFI classifies such flows as illicit if the funds crossing borders are illegally earned, transferred, and/or utilized. If the flow breaks a law at any point, it is illicit” (GFI, 2015).
“African governments have a political interest in IFFs because these flows impact their national development aspirations and encroach on state structures. They therefore have law enforcement and regulatory agencies whose duties include preventing IFFs. Among these are the police, financial intelligence units and anti-corruption agencies. Governments also have customs and revenue services and other agencies whose purposes are thwarted or hindered by IFFs” (IFF, P: 35, 2016).
“The widespread occurrence of IFFs in Africa also points to a governance problem in the sense of weak institutions and inadequate regulatory environments. IFFs accordingly contribute to undermining state capacity. To achieve their purposes, the people and corporations behind IFFs often compromise state officials and institutions. Left unchecked, these activities lead to entrenched impunity and the institutionalization of corruption” (IFF, P: 51, 2016)
“Most African countries do not have enough highly trained lawyers, accountants and tax experts to carry out the oversight functions to prevent or punish perpetrators of illicit financial outflows. The few that exist are often overworked and unable to prepare sufficiently to take on top-class representing large corporations” (IFF, P: 72, 2016).
Illicit Financial Funds ranking in the years of 2004 – 2013:
| Nation | IFFs | Ranking |
| Burundi | $87m | 124 |
| Congo (DRC) | $225m | 107 |
| Djibouti | $375m | 96 |
| Ethiopia | $2,583m | 46 |
| Eritrea | $38m | 133 |
| Kenya | $83m | 125 |
| Rwanda | $359m | 97 |
| Somalia | $0m | 147 |
| Sudan | $1,311m | 67 |
| Tanzania | $482m | 90 |
| Uganda | $715m | 78 |
*(in millions of U.S. dollars, nominal)
* Global Financial Integrity December Report 2015
Total IFFs in the years of 2004 – 2013 (GER+HMN)
| Nation | Total IFFs |
| Burundi | $866m |
| Congo (DRC) | $2,254m |
| Djibouti | $3,745m |
| Ethiopia | $25,835m |
| Eritrea | $115m |
| Kenya | $829m |
| Rwanda | $3,589m |
| Somalia | $0m |
| Sudan | $13,115m |
| Tanzania | $4,820m |
| Uganda | $7,149m |
*(in millions of U.S. dollars, nominal)
* Global Financial Integrity December Report 2015
* “Trade misinvoicing (GER) dominates measurable illicit outflows, averaging 83.4 percent of total illicit outflows during the years 2004 to 2013. However, there has been a noticeable growth in the hot money narrow (HMN) estimate of balance of payment leakages over those years as well. Though initially only accounting for 6.9 percent of illicit outflows in 2004, HMN rose to 19.4 percent of illicit flows by 2013” (GFI, P: 10, 2015).
If you look at the charts there are some monies that is missing and gone away on all sorts of schemes and tax exemptions, all sort of added invoicing or other types of financial instruments to make sure the monies doesn’t end where they are supposed to be. The East African states have misused giant amount of funds.
Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda are topping the list. What is weird for me and the report it is not specifying the Sudan as the Khartoum republic or putting South Sudan alone! So the report and the values put on South Sudan, which was independent in 2011, there do not know what of part of Sudan who has illicit funds. Still, the values and the amount of million dollars Illicit Financial Funds (IFFs) from Ethiopia for instance. You can wonder how much of the government budget that is eaten by this sort of financial mismanagement and misuse of public funds. The reserves and state coffers have to be hit when it is these amounts of dollars that are lost. Uganda have also gotten rid of giant amount of funds, these is 10 higher than the revelation during the Oil Probe with the 2.4 Trillion shillings, which is about $640-700m dollars. That we’re oil revenue that has not been remitted to the state, just these values is ten-times of what was revealed in the Ugandan courts. So there is other revenue that the State House, Bank of Uganda and Uganda Revenue Authority not have complied to or have registered as there is a loss of $7,149 million dollars.
These is just two financial instruments as the HMN and the GER that is explained under the table, the other ways of misusing funds, I haven’t even covered. This is just how much that is miss-invoicing and Hot Money Narrow, the others can be shown at another time. The numbers shown here alone show the extent of misuse of funds in a decade. That is the public loss and the state coffers that been looted by the regime and their lack of will of following and regulating the financial markets. Therefore, the state and institutions does not have the will or capacity to follow the money. This shouldn’t be evident, but it is and not a good look. Peace.
Reference:
Illicit Financial Flows iff – ‘Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa’
Global Financial Integrity – ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013’ (December 2015)

As noted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights:
“a lack of effective oversight has contributed to a lack of accountability for arbitrary or unlawful intrusions on the right to privacy in the digital environment. Internal safeguards without independent, external monitoring in particular have proven ineffective against unlawful or arbitrary surveillance methods. While these safeguards may take a variety of forms, the involvement of all branches of government in the oversight of surveillance programmes, as well as of an independent civilian oversight agency, is essential to ensure the effective protection of the law.” (United Nations, P: 2, 2016).
This here is evident that State and Government uses their force with their communication surveillance without transparent or use of the legal aide to gain data on their own citizens and also their communications. That means the data and meta-data we leave behind can be stored and checked by the security agencies, where they can surveillance and follow us to secure that we are not misusing or contacting wrong people. This can indirectly make people guilty before conducting crimes. The Police and Security Agencies than can follow and investigate without warrants or court-orders citizens without any jurisdiction. Therefore the real big-brother can follow all communication and use this as evidence of conspiracy and criminal intent if needed be. This information can again be delivered in reports to Central Government that will again take the whole groups of people as a den of thieves instead of activist and political opposition.
This sort of work can and will often cross the belief of a difference between a private and public sphere. Where the communications between citizens can be taken into account in investigations and that is done without knowledge of the citizens. So with that in mind, the United Nation Special Rapporteur on the rights of pricy briefing from November 2016 is telling stories on how this is done in dozens of nations. Their stories are not peaceful and the possible interference shows how their own citizens are shadowed by their own government. Just take a look!
Rwanda:
“In Rwanda, interception warrants are issued by a prosecutor designed by the Minister of Justice. As such there is no requirement of prior judicial authorisation. Nor there seems to be independent judicial oversight on the application of the law: the only monitoring envisaged is by inspectors appointed by Presidential Order. The Human Rights Committee expressed concern that the law “permits the interception of communications without prior authorization of a judge” and recommended, inter alia, that the State party “ensure the effectiveness and independence of a monitoring system for such interception, in particular by providing for the judiciary to take part in the authorization and monitoring of the interception.” (United Nations, P: 3-4, 2016).
Zimbabwe:
“In Zimbabwe, the Interception of Communications Act allows senior officials to individually make applications for warrants of interception. The applications are submitted to the Minister of Transport and Communications or “any other Minister to whom the President may from time to time assign the administration of [the] act”. Under the Act, the Minister is the sole arbiter of whether the grounds for a warrant are met and determines the warrant’s duration, up to a period of three months (after which renewal requires the authorisation of an administrative court.) In 2014, using powers granted to him under the constitution, President Mugabe assigned the Act’s administration to the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). There is no public information on how these functions are exercised in practice within the OPC, which is an executive body led by the President and the Head of the Civil Service” (United Nations, P: 4, 2016). “In Zimbabwe, the only oversight of the warrant regime comes from Prosecutor-General, but there is secrecy surrounding the process. The Prosecutor-General receives an annual summary from the Minister detailing “the particulars of every warrant which, during that calendar year, was issued by him or her but not renewed.” However, this information is not made public in any form. The Prosecutor-General can also request additional information from the Minister and make binding recommendations to the Minister; however, these recommendations are not public. There is no additional mechanism for independent parliamentary or judicial oversight of the regime as a whole” (United Nations, P: 12, 2016).
New Zealand:
“In New Zealand, there is no judicial prior authorisation for interception of communications or access to communications infrastructures. Instead the relevant warrant is authorised by the Minister. The Commissioner of Security Warrants, a retired judge, is only required to jointly authorise interception warrants when the communications of New Zealanders may be intercepted. Reflecting on this, the Human Rights Committee expressed concern “about the limited judicial authorization process for the interception of communications of New Zealanders and the total absence of such authorization for the interception of communications of non-New Zealanders” (United Nations, P: 4, 2016).
United Kingdom:
“Similarly in the United Kindgom, under the current RIPA there is no requirement for, or process enabling, the prior independent authorisation of the interception of communications. Instead, a Government minister issues warrants without reference to any judicial or other independent authority. There is only qualified provision for judicial authorisation under RIPA for intrusive surveillance by police (but, notably, not the intelligence services), with regards to requests for encryption keys, and when local authorities seek access to communications data” (United Nations, P: 5, 2016). “In the United Kingdom, there are concerns about the Intelligence and Security Committee. The ISC lacks sufficient independence from the government: the Prime Minister has sole power to nominate MPs to the ISC. She also has power to veto publication of any material by the ISC. For these reasons, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights expressed “concern that the executive control of this Committee may be too strong” (United Nations, P: 10, 2016).
Venezuela:
“In Venezuela, for example, although the decision to authorise communications surveillance is made by a judge, judges – particularly first instance judges who are often employed on temporary contracts – frequently lack independence and impartiality” (United Nations, P: 5, 2016).
Russia:
“Considering the interception regime in Russia, the European Court of Human Rights noted that while interceptions may be authorized by a judge, there was no effective oversight, in particular in light of the lack “publicly available regulations or instructions describing the scope of their review, the conditions under which it may be carried out, the procedures for reviewing the surveillance measures or for remedying the breaches detected” (United Nations, P: 6, 2016).
Poland:
“In Poland, there is no ex-ante review system for metadata collection, only a general ex-post requirement of submission once every six months of a generalized metadata report to a competent district court. Further, certain metadata information does not even require the ex-post review” (United Nations, P: 6, 2016)
Mexico:
“In Mexico. Articles 189 and 190 of the “Ley Telecom” impose a two year data retention requirements on telecommunications providers, requiring them to keep their users communications data. There is no judicial warrant requirement for accessing the metadata, and that includes in particular no judicial authorisation for mobile phone location tracking (which can be done in real time)” (United Nations, P: 8, 2016).
Morocco:
“In Morocco, there are at least eight government agencies that can potentially monitor communications. These services operate in near complete opacity. The Human Rights Committee expressed concerned at the lack of clarity regarding the law authorising and regulating the activity of such services and the lack of monitoring mechanisms” (United Nations, P: 9, 2016).
Uganda:
“In Uganda, despite increasing significantly the surveillance powers, there is no clear oversight mechanism under the 2010 Regulation of Interception of Communications Act or the 2015 Anti-Terrorism (Amended) Act in Uganda. None of the intelligence agencies with the power to conduct surveillance under these acts are subject to independent oversight however they all report to the President. Any reporting that may be conduced by the agencies to the President is not made public” (United Nations, P: 9, 2016).
Macedonia:
“In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), long-standing concerns on the lack of effective supervision and control of the activities of the Macedonian Security and Counter Intelligence Service (UBK) to limit unlawful interference with the privacy of personal communications were brought into sharp focus in 2015, following the revelation that over 20,000 persons, including political figures, members of non-governmental organisations and journalists, were subjected to communication surveillance. The only body authorised to supervise the work of the UBK is a Parliamentary Commission. According to media reports, the UBK’s written reports to the Commission contained no data on the agency’s use of what are called “specific investigative measures”, such as eavesdropping” (United Nations, P: 10, 2016).

These stories give insight into how far the breaches are and how they are done in each country. Certain intelligence that are collected unfairly from the citizens and without permission, not even with court orders and put into structures that can be recollected by the ones who have been followed; this has been in secrecy and with knowledge even from the person with the most power. Those Presidents can interfere and collect this intelligence without having court orders or a warrant says a lot of their breaches of power and how they value the private communication. When they of using technology and using the interception of communication between people to find intelligence and collect their meta-data for later see the pattern of behaviour.
This shows how the National Security is using the private communication into collecting evidence and pattern of behaviour where they can oversee society and use this to detain and arrest dissidents. What is also worrying is in the power of the Executive and the Central Government who can easily access and take the collected data without the need of the Courts or legislative branches. Therefore this can be done in the dark and they can do this without consent or have any accountability for their work as they use surveillance to follow their own citizens.
This is just a few of the nations of the world. There are certainly more intelligence gathered without knowledge and where the UN Special Rapporteur has gotten know-how of. This briefing is only skimming the surface of what’s apparently going on. We as citizens should at least ask our own government to comply with freedoms and liberty, only use these technologies to incept meta-data and communications between people when courts and real National Security is at risk. Not just when they can, but when it is fit. If not then innocent people are followed without any concern and without any justice delivered. Peace.
Reference:
United Nation – ‘Briefing to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy – Monitoring and Oversight of Communications Surveillance’ (November 2016)









