Opinion: The new U.S. Intelligence Report following ‘Grizzly Steppe’ as ICA Assessing report reveals little, but the conspiracy and motive is explained!


Today, The Intelligence Community Assessment Report of 6th January 2017 was released, which has been delivered and now is in the public. There we’re already one report out ‘Grizzly Steppe’ of 26th December 2016 that we’re released jointly together Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and  National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) where the key aspect we’re this:

“This document provides technical details regarding the tools and infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and military intelligence Services (RIS) to compromise and exploit networks and endpoints associated with the U.S. election, as well as a range of U.S. Government, political, and private sector entities. The U.S. Government is referring to this malicious cyber activity by RIS as GRIZZLY STEPPE” (…) “This activity by RIS is part of an ongoing campaign of cyber-enabled operations directed at the U.S. government and its citizens. These cyber operations have included spearphishing campaigns targeting government organizations, critical infrastructure entities, think tanks, universities, political organizations, and corporations leading to the theft of information. In foreign countries, RIS actors conducted damaging and/or disruptive cyber-attacks, including attacks on critical infrastructure networks. In some cases, RIS actors masqueraded as third parties, hiding behind false online personas designed to cause the victim to misattribute the source of the attack. This JAR provides technical indicators related to many of these operations, recommended mitigations, suggested actions to take in response to the indicators provided, and information on how to report such incidents to the U.S. Government” (Grizzly Steppe, 2016).

With this in mind the newly made report which is 10 pages longer or little more than the Joint Report from FBI & NCCIC in December 2016. Therefore a new report made in January 2017 should have more indications than that one, as it is also given to the President-Elect.

“Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.” Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin” (ICA, P: 7,  2017)

“We assess with high confidence that Russian military intelligence (General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU) used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets and relayed material to WikiLeaks” (ICA, P: 8-9, 2016).

“By their nature, Russian influence campaigns are multifaceted and designed to be deniable because they use a mix of agents of influence, cutouts, front organizations, and false-flag operations. Moscow demonstrated this during the Ukraine crisis in 2014, when Russia deployed forces and advisers to eastern Ukraine and denied it publicly” (…) “The General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) probably began cyber operations aimed at the US election by March 2016. We assess that the GRU operations resulted in the compromise of the personal e-mail accounts of Democratic Party officials and political figures. By May, the GRU had exfiltrated large volumes of data from the DNC” (ICA, P: 12, 2017).

“We assess with high confidence that the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets” (ICA, P: 12-13, 2017).

“Putin’s public views of the disclosures suggest the Kremlin and the intelligence services will continue to consider using cyber-enabled disclosure operations because of their belief that these can accomplish Russian goals relatively easily without significant damage to Russian interests” (ICA, P: 15, 2017).

If the National Intelligence Organizations of United States together says it has been interference, than it more than one chief and one mind behind the investigations. As the reports are piled up with more assessments of the Presidential Election of 2016 and the end-game that we’re in favour of Putin. Since it ended in favour and to the Russia friendly President Candidate, the DNC and now the Security Organizations are blaming the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) instead we’re now seeing a full blow-out of information and circulated reports made by serious authorities.

These ones doesn’t drop intelligence with ease, they dislike being open to the press and keeps things hidden in the shadow is their business, therefore even smallest drops proves that it isn’t longer conspiracy. Assange of WikiLeaks has claimed it we’re private persons and not Russian Agents giving the documents to WikiLeaks. The public dumping of loads upon loads of DNC e-mails has had to hurt the confidence in Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Party Presidential Nominee Hillary Clinton. Which the releases of E-Mails did with the uncovering of all kind of bad behaviour and the operations behind a Presidential Candidate in the midst of it. Something we have not really seen before and the ability to see how a Presidential Candidate really operates and how the operation has PACs to fuel monies to keep commercial, corporate media and all the other pieces of the puzzles are dancing after a Presidential Candidate in the United States. The best way to learn that is to read the mails and put it in order, to see to how they build organizations to get people elected. Therefore the DNC leak has given lots of knowledge that usually would have been in shadow and not on the sidewalk.

The acts have malicious, but also eye-opening, sure Podesta must hate WikiLeaks, as much as the others like WADA must hate FancyBears. There are others who has dropped intelligence that we’re mentioned, what was strange was that none of the connected to Anonymous or Anonymous who has operated in the United States.

What was weird that in the other one, there we’re clearly indicated operatives and nicknamed hackers mentioned in the December 2016 report, but none in the January 2017. Like they are hidden in the sphere and not known, because they could been more direct about the origin, as the other report isn’t clear about the origin, but the existence of some operatives who has hacked pages. The key of missing information is where the ones who is known is really from and why isn’t that revealed, as it would give more credibility to the report. Because when the direct actors isn’t actually portrayed, but assessed, therefore next time they could reveal more flesh on the bone. There are lose ends to between the bidding and the end-game.

There are motive and there are indicated acts of malice. But what is sure how the DNC documents went online could be more than what these reports are saying. They have not been showing the whole trip of the process of shadowing or even fishing documents of servers. What they have done is showing is the means of what it really took to hack it.

You have a motive, means for a conspiracy and possible outlets for the hacked information, you have some well-known hackers who might have hacked, but their origin is not revealed. Therefore the reports are in the flawed, they are eye-opening, but certain aspects are left in the dark, from the same dark the hackers came from and open the world to how the DNC did their work. Peace.


Intelligence Community Assessment – ‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections’ – ICA 2017-01D | 6 January 2017

NCCIC & FBI ‘TLP White’ – ‘GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity’ (29.12.2016)