“The brutal search for missing arms in Mumias has been stopped. The order was made by the Mumias West area deputy county commissioner Philip Soi. This comes after a public uproar on police brutality during an operation to search for 7 guns stolen by armed men last week. Residents have accused police officers of using unnecessary force. Soi, stated that the police force will employ other alternatives in the search” (Kenya NTV , 2016)
Tag: Nairobi
Kilifi Governor Kingi before EACC (Youtube-Clip)
“Kilifi Governor Amason Kingi is at this hour being interrogated by the ethics and anti-corruption officials over claims of embezzlement of millions of shillings of public funds in his county. Kingi who arrived at the integrity centre an hour ago is accompanied by a host of ODM leaders and is expected to shed light on the spending of 51 million shillings in unexplained expenditure as well as 308 million shillings meant to acquire an 11 acre land for a bus park in Kilifi. Sam Gituku is at the integrity centre and Sam, what should we expect from the grilling session?” (Kenya Citizen TV, 2016)
Kenya: Kilifi County Govt has filed civil cases against 5 companies that stole 51M from county’s CBK accounts. Case to be heard on 1st December




Ruto asks Raila to come clean on graft (Youtube-Clip)
“But even as Odinga defended himself, deputy president William Ruto led Jubilee leaders in challenging the cord leader to be more open on whether he had personally benefited from corruption schemes in the country. The leaders especially want Odinga to explain whether or not, he abetted Mumias sugar company financial woes” (Kenya Citizen TV, 2016)
Population Displacement Continues to Rise in South Sudan (25.11.2016)

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continues to rise, and has now reached an all-time high of 1.87 million since December 2013, according to recent UN figures.
JUBA, South Sudan, November 25, 2016 –As the armed conflict in South Sudan approaches its fourth year, civilians continue to flee the violence that has gripped much of the country and resulted in vast humanitarian needs.
The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continues to rise, and has now reached an all-time high of 1.87 million since December 2013, according to recent UN figures. Over 212,000 IDPs are hosted in UN protection of civilian (PoC) sites across the country.
The IDP population at the PoC site in Bentiu, Unity, has reached more than 108,300, representing an increase of over 14 percent since August, and matching levels not seen since April of this year. More than 7,300 people have arrived at the site since the end of October, largely from Koch, Leer and Rubkona counties.
Insecurity and corresponding increases in humanitarian needs in these parts of Unity are likely driving the increase in displacement to the PoC site. Fighting, particularly in Leer, is likely to continue prompting people to move to the Bentiu PoC site or more stable areas in Unity.
“Worsening trends of insecurity are preventing IDPs from returning to their homes in many parts of the country. While civilians are grappling with deteriorating humanitarian conditions, access constraints are making it more difficult for IOM and relief agencies to deliver aid to the most vulnerable, particularly in recent weeks,” said IOM South Sudan Chief of Mission William Barriga.
As camp manager at the Bentiu PoC site, IOM tracks entries and exits at the site. It also registers IDPs for the efficient delivery of humanitarian services, and supplies relief agencies with data to inform response planning.
Displacement figures also remain high in Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal, the site of heavy fighting in June and ongoing insecurity. Over 41,000 people, the highest number since June, are sheltering at the PoC site adjacent to the UNMISS base and in collective centres across Wau town, according to IOM-led population counts.
Of the 174 IDPs who arrived at the Wau PoC site last week, all cited security concerns as their core motivation for seeking protection at the site.
Outside the town, IOM and humanitarian agencies have been unable to consistently provide assistance to populations in areas south of Wau, due to bureaucratic constraints and blockages since early July.
Violence also continues to drive increased displacement in other parts of the country, including areas around Yei, Central Equatoria.
Nearly 3 million South Sudanese have fled their homes in the past three years. With over 1.1 million refugees in neighbouring countries, over 362,000 people have fled the country since July, according to the UN Refugee Agency.
IOM continues to coordinate with relief partners to provide multi-sector humanitarian assistance to displaced and conflict-affected people across South Sudan.
South Sudan: PDM Press Statement on recent Massacres following the President’s Inflamatory Rhetoric against Equatorians (24.11.2016)


Kenya: Press Statement on the Status of the Recruitment of Chairperson, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (21.11.2016)

MPs turn violent, exchange blows after meeting Interior CS (Youtube-Clip)
“Two members of parliament from Laikipia County engaged in a physical confrontation as they emerged from a peace meeting convened by interior affairs cabinet secretary joseph Nkaissery at harambee house. Laikipia north MP Mathew Lempurkel clashed with nominated MP Sarah Paulata Korere during which they are reported to have exchanged blows and kicks. Both MPs recorded statements with the police accusing each other of assault” (Kenya Citizen TV, 2016)
Advocacy Brief on Kenya: 15th Session of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 16-24 November, 2016 (21.11.2016)

Background
At the height of the violence that gripped Kenya after the disputed 2007 elections, the Party of the National Unity and the Orange Democratic Movement, who were parties to the conflict, wrote to the International Criminal Court (ICC) seeking its intervention to stop what they called genocide. A local investigatory commission with international participation found that some actions during the post-election violence likely met the threshold of crimes against humanity and recommended the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Kenya, or in the alternative, the handover of the sealed evidence to the Prosecutor at the ICC.
Efforts to establish the Tribunal were defeated by political forces aligned to suspected perpetrators, hence triggering the handover of evidence to the ICC and the subsequent investigation. Six Kenyans were named in connection with seven crimes against humanity charges; the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed charges against four suspects. Two suspects – Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were subsequently elected President and Deputy President, respectively, before their trials could begin at the ICC. Thereafter, the Prosecutor withdrew charges against two suspects – Francis Muthaura and Kenyatta – citing witness bribery and intimidation, as well as failure by the Kenya government to cooperate with the court. The remaining case against Ruto and journalist Joshua arap Sang was terminated citing “intolerable levels of witness interference and political meddling”.
Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) has followed closely the developments around accountability for the crimes committed during the 2007 post-election violence. Since the opening of the investigations in March 2010, we have observed certain shortcomings and challenges on the part of the Government of Kenya, the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and the African Union (AU). This brief seeks to focus on key issues emerging from the situation that the ICC and international justice finds itself in today, while drawing linkages from how the Kenya cases and other ICC cases were managed. KPTJ also makes recommendations on actions that require to be undertaken by the ASP, the ICC and African governments in order to address the emergent challenges.
- Engage and Withdraw Simultaneously?
A Contradiction in the Mandate of the AU Open Ended Committee
- The 27th ordinary session of the African Union’s assembly in July 2016 issued a decision on the ICC[1] pursuant to a similar one from the previous session[2]. Besides praising the court’s termination of the case against Kenya’s Deputy President William Ruto, the AU outlined a five-point agenda for the Open-Ended Committee of Foreign Ministers on the ICC, which included the following:
- Engaging with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) before the January 2017 AU Summit and before the 15th Assembly of State Parties in November 2016.
- Maintaining the earlier decision from January 2016, to develop a comprehensive strategy to inform the actions of AU member states that are party to the Rome Statute; a strategy that includes collective withdrawal from the ICC.
- Concluding a review of the ICC’s interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute regarding the compulsion of unwilling witnesses to testify, with a view to inform debate at the 15th
- Conveying the message that AU member states object to the inclusion of language requiring the UNSC to mandate UN peace-keeping missions to enforce arrest warrants in Africa.
- Utilising the AU Mission in Brussels, Belgium, as the secretariat to the Open-ended Ministerial Committee and provision of institutional support to the African Group in The Hague, Netherlands, to ensure effective coordination of its activities.
- The AU has since held a meeting with the UNSC in September 2016 to present pre-formulated terms developed by the Open-ended Ministerial Committee as conditions to keep African States as parties to the Rome Statute. These conditions were as follows[3]:
- Immunity under the ICC’s Rome Statute for sitting heads of state and government as well as senior officials;
- Intervention of the ICC in cases involving African states only after those cases have been submitted to the AU or AU judicial institutions; and
- Reduction in the powers of the ICC Prosecutor.
- Recent developments have seen South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia commence processes to withdraw from the ICC; seemingly as part of actualising the intention cited in the agenda of the Open-ended Ministerial Committee. These actions expose the agenda by the AU to be disingenuous and presupposes that the deliberations within the ASP would be futile.. The wave of withdrawals occurs against a counter-wave of support for the Court by countries including Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana[4]; an indication that the strategy for mass withdrawal does not enjoy the consensus suggested by the AU decision of July 2016. These countries have suggested that concerns expressed by African states are not insurmountable and can be addressed within the framework of the ASP. Their support for the ICC underscores the fact that the obligations under the Rome Statute are State obligations and not AU obligations; as such, decisions on withdrawal will be based on national interest that cannot be assumed by the AU.
- Furthermore, the strategy for AU member states to withdraw undermines the other outlined agenda items of engagement with the ASP, such as the review of the interpretation of Article 93 of the Rome Statute and the enforcement of arrest warrants. Such contradictory actions raise the question of whether the AU is negotiating ICC reforms in good faith.
- In light of the foregoing, KPTJ recommends that:
- African States abandon and disregard calls for mass withdrawal from the Court and instead consolidate the member bloc to advance their concerns within the bounds of the ASP in deliberations based on good faith.
- African states should continue to publicly reaffirm their support for engaging with the ICC through the ASP and prevail on the AU to adjust its engagement strategy accordingly. We applaud the statements made by Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana.
- An ICC Liaison Office should be established at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to facilitate more productive and sustained communication between African States and the ICC as part of restoring a relationship that has become plagued by mistrust and misunderstandings.
- Absence of Accountability?
Peace, Security and Stability
- The characterisation of the ICC as undermining the peace and security of states or threatening their stability has become a recurring theme by those advocating disengagement or withdrawal from the ICC. In its notice of withdrawal, South Africa claims that its aspirations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts were being hindered by its obligations under the Rome Statute[5] to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when he attended the June 2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg. Kenyan government officials have also previously described the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto as an existential threat to peace and stability.
- A closer scrutiny of this assertion in the face of ongoing conflict situations suggests the contrary. The absence of accountability processes does not necessarily facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts; the South Sudan and Burundi conflicts instead point to protagonists willing to escalate violence, even in the context of peace negotiations. Burundi and The Gambia have commenced processes to withdraw from the ICC at a time when their respective governments stand accused of acts of repression and mass human rights violations. Rather than advance the cause for peace, the clamour for withdrawal from the ICC is playing into the hands of those wary of the prospects of accountability in the aftermath of conflict. Even more concerning is an apparent trend of rising post-election violence, such as that witnessed in Kenya previously and in Gabon currently, or violence stemming from efforts to instal third-term incumbencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Such trends are bound to persist in the absence of mechanisms for accountability, of which the ICC is a critical component.
- The assertion that the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Court) and its proposed expanded criminal jurisdiction through the Malabo Protocol would fill in any void created by a mass withdrawal from the ICC is erroneous. The African Court is a distant prospect for addressing the impunity gap: it is far from being operational. Since 2013, only five states namely Benin, Kenya, Congo, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania have signed but not ratified the Malabo Protocol, which requires the ratification of 15 states to begin operations. Kenya is the only state thus far that has made a financial pledge of USD 1 million to operationalise the court — a far cry from the resources required for a court of broad jurisdiction consisting of a mandate on human rights as well as international law and interstate disputes. It has previously been estimated that a singular international criminal trial costs USD 20 million to undertake. In addition, the protocol contains contentious provisions that undermine its viability as an alternative platform for international crimes, the most notable being the clause of immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. As a testament to the inability of the African Court to be an immediate replacement of the ICC as desired by some, even South Africa through its Justice Minister has indicated that it will ask for a review of the Malabo Protocol to address contentious issues. Furthermore, limited progress has been made towards establishing national mechanisms that can sufficiently undertake the obligation of accountability for international crimes.
- KPTJ recognises the pursuit of justice in conflict and post-conflict settings as an essential pillar of rebuilding democracies and restoring rule of law. These are the pathways to lasting peace, security and stability. Rather than push to void international justice mechanisms after the conflict to facilitate mediation, we recommend that:
- African states fully implement and consistently apply already established norms on democracy, peace and security as a preventative measure to conflict including: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and; the African Governance Architecture.
- African states must critically reflect on and address the issues of the African Court’s capacity, accessibility, legal standards outlined for crimes under international law and expunge provisions conferring immunity on sitting Heads of State and senior government officials. This process must not be rushed or predicated on a manufactured crisis precipitated by a strategy of mass withdrawal from the ICC.
- African states should establish robust and credible national mechanisms to address the accountability question at first instance and in complementarity with regional and international mechanisms. They must also broaden their policy considerations to include comprehensive reparation programmes for victims of international crimes.
- Disparity between State Obligations and Reality?
A look at State Cooperation
- The Kenya and Sudan cases have exposed the frailties within the Rome Statute framework in as far as state cooperation is concerned. These cases have laid waste to the presumption that States will willingly engage with the court in the face of cases seeking to prosecute sitting heads of state, their deputies or powerful elites in close proximity to power. State cooperation has only demonstrably worked in instances where the target for prosecution is a vanquished foe of conflict as seen in the cases of Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire, that are fast advancing a notion of “victor’s justice”. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the final recourse for addressing the lack of state cooperation rests with the ASP. The ASP being a political organ of the Rome Statute is influenced by political rather than purely legal considerations in making its decisions, which makes the issue of resolving the non-cooperation of states problematic. A final challenge to state cooperation is the failure of the United States, China and Russia to ratify the Rome Statute while also being members of the UNSC with the power of referral of matters to the court. This has created the notion of double standards within the international justice system and emboldened other states to disregard cooperation with the court.
- KPTJ calls on the members of the UNSC who have not ratified the Rome Statute to display leadership on State cooperation with the court by first ratifying the Statute and utilising its discretion on referral and deferral in a manner that adheres to the objectives of the Statute. We further wish to reiterate that state cooperation must denote effective cooperation that facilitates the mandates of the respective organs of the court and not feigned cooperation which creates the perception of facilitating the court but in fact consists of using procedural and technical obstacles to undermine the court. We call on the ASP to adopt a consistent and objective legal standard in the assessment of state cooperation.
- Are there lessons to be learned?
Taking stock of the experience in the Kenya cases
- The Kenya cases and the manner of their termination carry critical lessons for consideration to inform future actions by the court and the content of reforms within the strategic plans of its respective organs. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) as well as the bench on various occasions decried the instances of witness tampering and intimidation as well as non-cooperation by the state in responding to the OTP requests for information and a failure to execute ICC warrants of arrest with respect to three Kenyans suspected of witness tampering. This in fact has led to a finding of non-compliance against Kenya and led to its referral to the ASP under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. In the midst of all this, was an unprecedented and disruptive diplomatic effort that deliberately exerted political pressure on the court with a view to influencing the outcome of the Kenya cases. It is arguable that these diplomacy efforts yielded the concession of excusing President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto from continuous presence at their trial and that the current wave of withdrawals from the ICC on the basis of an apparent bias by the court against Africans are a fallout from these diplomatic efforts. The capitulations of the cases have also pointed to significant flaws in the investigative and prosecutorial approaches that informed the development of the cases and must lead to some introspection from the relevant mechanisms. The fact that the Trust Fund for Victims is yet to commence operations in Kenya cannot go without mention.
- KPTJ urges all the organs of the court to reflect on these experiences and take due cognisance of the following lessons and recommendations:
- The ICC, particularly the ASP, should do more to ensure that it does not allow political statements to interfere with the judicial independence of the Court.
- The ICC should ensure that it takes steps to respond to messages of a political nature and correct inaccurate statements in a timely manner. In addition, it should ensure that such key messages reach the right audiences, including victims and affected communities.
- The Court should continue to build its relationship with African States that openly support the mandate of the ICC; in addition, the ICC should do more to improve its relationship with, and image at, the AU.
- The Trust Fund for Victims should commence operations in Kenya, as victims have received little to no assistance from the Kenyan government.
- The Prosecutor should carefully consider when to request ‘summons to appear’ as opposed to ‘warrants of arrest’ and take into account the individual circumstances of each accused person in doing so, particularly their potential to intimidate witnesses and interfere with evidence.
- Swift action should be taken by the Prosecutor and the Court in instances of non-cooperation by States Parties. Any instances of non-cooperation should be resolved as speedily as possible, in such a manner that the outcome of proceedings on non-cooperation can be applied to strengthen an ongoing case and not be delayed to the point that the outcome is only of academic significance.
- The Prosecutor should continue to carry out a review of its investigative strategies and methods in order to improve its chances of success at trial.
- The Prosecution should ensure that its staff are able to spend as much time as possible on better understanding the context and nuances of a given situation country.
- Pursuit of reform without prejudice?
UN Reform vs ICC Reform
- The unique role played by UNSC in referral and deferral of cases before the ICC means that the debates on reforming the court and reforming the UN and in particular the UNSC have inevitably intersected. We have witnessed both undertones and overt accusations of imperialism and undue influence directed at the court on account of cases on Africa referred to it by the UNSC (Libya and Sudan). Arguments made to amend the Rome Statute to confer immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials are laced with grievance against the UNSC permanent five members possessing a de facto immunity from prosecution under the ICC on account of their veto power. The end result is a misdirected effort to amend the Rome Statute or in the extreme withdraw from the ICC on the basis of perceived excesses that are better addressed by engaging the broader debate of UN reforms.
- While KPTJ acknowledges the slanted relationship of the UNSC with the court and supports a robust conversation on its reforms, we call on states not to misdirect the agenda of reforming the UNSC into discussions on improving the functions of the court and occasion amendments to the Rome statute that sacrifice the future of the court as part of a bargaining process on UNSC reforms. We call on African states in particular, to distinguish the broader question of UN reforms as enshrined in the “Ezulwini Consensus” from the question of reforming the Rome Statute and reflecting on the performance of the court. We call upon African member states to the Rome Statute not to sacrifice the promise of justice for victims of atrocity crimes at the altar of grievance against the unequal power relations represented by the UN Security Council.
end/kptj/16.06.2016
——–
About KPTJ:
This brief was prepared by Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ), a coalition of Kenyan citizens and over 30 organisations working in the human rights, governance and legal fields that came together during the crisis over the disputed results of the 2007 presidential election to seek truth and accountability for the elections and the widespread violence that followed; and who continue to work closely with the victims of that period. It is a brief update on the situation in Kenya as pertains to pursuing accountability for the crimes against humanity committed during the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence as well as its adherence to its obligations under the Rome Statute.
[1] Assembly/AU/Dec.616 (XXVII)
[2] Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI)
[3] Press Release: “UN/African Union: Reject ICC withdrawal”. Available here: http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/552-un-african-union-reject-icc-withdrawal.html
[4] Article: “Which African states slammed Burundi, South Africa and Gambia’s withdrawal from ICC?” Available here: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/which-african-states-slammed-burundi-south-africa-gambias-withdrawal-icc-1589711
[5] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/South-Africa-Instrument-of-Withdrawal-International-Criminal-Court.jpg
South Sudan: Apparently “No Pardon” for Dr. Riek Machar; while Machar calls Kiirs Government a “Rogue Regime” the battles intensify as the UNSC Arms Embargo in the works!

Today is another day and on this blessed Sunday, the battles between the SPLM/A and SPLM/A-IO are continuing and are in many states like: Yei River State, Blue Nile, Upper Nile, Western Bahr El Ghazal and Unity State. With this in mind, the reports of today tell who the fragile situation is and what this can all mean for the near future. Because the SPLM-N are even in trouble in Sudan and in South Sudan, which makes the borders even worse; with this reality the world should act and give extend the mandate of UNMISS, the Arms Embargo would not work if there is still sold weapons without ending certificate; than the meaning of the trade will not be in the loop until their fetched by the International Community like MONUSCO this year. So here is the lot of the day!
No pardon for Dr. Riek Machar:
President Salva Kiir said on Sunday: “My brother Riek Machar thinks the only way for him to become the president of this country is violence, killing innocent people. I told him several times [that] there is no reason to fight. If you [Machar] wants to be the president, wait for elections, but he did not listen” (…) “They come asking me to pardon him. I tell them I have no problem with him. He is a citizen of this country and he can return anytime, but must denounce violence” (Sudan Tribune, 2016).
Offensive from SPLA:
Big government offensive on rebel Fatuyo’s base in Li-Rangu following the attack on Yambio, in which rebels showed off new RPG supply.
This is happening as fuel shortages are hitting the country, the issues with lacking of food-supply and the NGOs are under attack from SPLM/A-IO and also SPLM/A; this is happening with the full knowledge and with support from the Troika. That have set in force the process, but not considered the wish of power for the President and FVP Machar, who both of them has their agenda. This is happening as the sore and weak Kenyan Government cannot handle criticism of their commander, therefore they are leaving the UNMISS to show integrity, but instead losing their power and helpful assistance in the war-torn country.
As this is happening the Yei River State Officials are resigning because of the “Human Right Violations” in the state. There been reports of fierce battles between the State and the SPLM/A-IO in the Unity State.
Gen. Malik Agaar speaks out:
“Does Taban know how many lives we sacrificed for the independent of South Sudan?” Asked Malik Agaar” (…) “Does Taban know how the people of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile fought for the liberation of South Sudan?” He ask again?” (…) “Where was he when our bones littered the land of South Sudan?” And asked again. Taban looked between his legs as if he was peeing but he was just sweating” (…) “Taban we aren’t going anywhere, as SPLA-N we are here to stay whether you like it or not.” Malik Agaar concluded boldly looking in the face of Salva Kiir. At this point Taban was done” (…) “Until you become the President of South Sudan then you can do whatever you want to do to SPLA-N.” Malik Agaar warns” (…) “From today onwards I don’t want to hear from you, neither call me nor ask me.” Malik Agaar declared and that was by no mean a point of contention. It was the END of the meeting” (Alfa, 2016).
So another group who are in the borderland and creating problems in South Kordofan, Blue Nile State and in Darfur, the SPLM-N are now threatening the SPLM/A and the FVP Taban Deng Gai, who took over when Dr. Riek Machar fled Juba in July 2016. This has since inflamed the situation and now the fragile state has more trouble.

But the SPLM-N is already trouble also inside Sudan:
“On Sunday, the Khartoum North court judge Osama Ahmed Abdalla convicted the defendant of spying for violating article “53” of the Criminal Code, saying the prosecution presented coherent and strong evidence against the defendant” (…) “He pointed the prosecution witnesses proved that the defendant has conveyed military information about the Sudanese army in El Meiram area, South Kordofan to the ruling SPLA party in South Sudan” (…) “The judge added the defendant also, in collaboration with two others, handed over a government source to the SPLA, saying the source was assassinated by the latter” (Sudan Tribune, 2016).
So when the Gen. Malik Agaar attacks Gen. Taban Deng Gai for his actions, they are themselves into trouble elsewhere… the fragile border and frictions between Sudan and South Sudan. This has become better and there been visits from Juba to Khartoum as even Dr. Riek Machar came there after being in the woods of Democratic Republic of Congo and banished by the MUNSCO, the President Kiir has pardoned the 750 soldiers that we’re part of Machar’s group there, but is not willing to pardon him before he acts peaceful. Certainly the bloodshed between the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-IO is not over, as the SPLM-N are taking stand now and are under fire in Sudan as well.
There rumours that the SPLM/A-IO Dr. Riek Machar after leaving the safe shores of South Africa he is now taken by Army Operatives of the Ethiopian State on Ethiopian soil, while the U.S. is currently on working on blacklisting him for not being able to get arms on legal basis; though I am sure the blood money can pay for guns and ammunitions.
These rumours and reports are coming as Dr. Riek Machar has leached out this statement:
“We have been driven back to the bush,” James Gadet, a spokesman for Machar, told the AP on Saturday in a call from Nairobi, Kenya” (…) “(We) call on the international community to declare the regime in Juba a rogue government,” the document says, adding that international agencies monitoring the peace deal should “suspend their activities” until the agreement is “resuscitated.” (News Wires, 2016).

They can declare as much as they like, can call the TGoNU who cooperates with the IGAD-Plus and the UNMISS, also with the Troika a “Rogue Regime”, that might help their cause and help their loyal commanders, but it doesn’t strengthen their cause after the skirmishes this year.
President Salva Kiir might be totally wrong about his actions and decrees, but the initial violence comes as a result, but also the power-hungry FVP Machar has created as much violence on his own and also tried to kill the president in vain. Therefore both men do what they can keep themselves in power. The people, the citizens of the South Sudan are the losers who torn between two Parties and too Big-Men. Peace.
Reference:
News Wires – ‘South Sudan rebel chief urges armed resistance against government’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.france24.com/en/20160924-south-sudan-rebel-chief-riek-machar-kiir-urges-armed-resistance-against-government?ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_source=twitter&ns_mchannel=social&ns_linkname=editorial&aef_campaign_ref=partage_user&aef_campaign_date=2016-09-24
Sudan Tribune – ‘No amnesty for South Sudan rebel leader, says President Kiir’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60893
Sudan Tribune – ‘Sudanese court convicts former SPLM-N officer of spying for South Sudan’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60895
Alfa, John – ‘GEN. MALIK AGAAR OF SPLA-N IN is in JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN’ (20.11.2016) link: https://africanspress.org/2016/11/20/gen-malik-agaar-of-spla-n-in-is-in-juba-south-sudan/

