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Archive for the tag “Machakos County”

PSK Position on the Unfortunate Incident of Death of Seven-Month-Old Baby at Shalom Community Hospital, Machakos (07.05.2019)

Machakos: Leader of Majority Mark Muendo Press Statement on the Refusal to Release Funds to the Assembly by Governor Alfred Mutua (26.11.2018)

Is it okay for Machakos County: That they get direct grants from the World Bank?

Today, the Governor of Machakos County appointed the County and Budget Forum. However, what was very revealing was what Dr. Alfred Mutua was implying within the documents, not who he appointed to the position. Usually that would be an important piece to look into.

However, today was the day where the Governor revealed directly that the World Bank Development secured 1bn Ksh per year for 6 years to the infrastructure building in the county. This being roads, electricity and other needed government services in the municipalities of Machakos.

Usually these sort of arrangements are done directly with the National Government or the Parliament, as to where the development is happening and where the grants are going. Which project that matter and what is sufficiently holding the standards of the stakeholders and the ones contributing the funding. Nevertheless, here the implication is that the World Bank is directly involved in all county functions from sewage to building roads. That their funding are going to do what the government is supposed to deliver. This being the natural delivery of the state and basic upkeep of the infrastructure. Instead of being tax-payers own money, they are using funds from abroad to do the needed development projects and to get the needed services in the municipalities of Machakos.

We can wonder what does the Jubilee government and Kenyatta think of this? When the Counties themselves are directly making arrangements and funding deals with the World Bank? In a republic filled to the brim of loans and lack of cash-flow, these sort of deals would be appropriate to go through the Central Government before the Local Government. However, that one has not captured the imagination. Because shouldn’t the Central Bank of Kenya or the Cabinet Secretary of Finance Henry Rotich signed it off before the County announced the loans?

That is what is bugging me, or is the counties so liberated from the Central Government now? But wouldn’t the rate of loans and grants be more uncontrolled and have less transparent system, if every Governor has the chance to grab these from Multi-National Financial Institutions and find ways to apply these locally? Even though they know directly what and where things need to be built and what is lacking. Still, they should have a rubberstamp from the CS and the National Treasury and CBK before thinking about it. Because in the mind of the Governor, he just announced it in passing together with the appointments to the different boards in his county. Peace.

Kenya: Governor Mutua letter to Deputy IGP – “Re: Sensational Letter from Ms. Wavinya Ndeti dated June 29th 2017 (30.06.2017)

Kenya: Report says that Safaricom is a helpful hand in the breaches of incepting intelligence for the Security Organization!

The international Non-Government Organization Privacy International dropped another gem today with a report on the surveillance and on how the Kenyan Authorities get their ability to get intelligence and how they use the communications platforms to get knowledge. The worrying way is how the Safaricom and the Kenyan Authorities together spies on the population.

This report through different methods and also interviews, as much as people who have worked on the inside has told stories how the Security organization has used the giant Kenyan Telecommunication Company Safaricom. All should be done with court orders, still there are proof now of internal squabble inside Safaricom where there are even undercover agents inside the company. Take a look at key points of the report!

Court order to require Intelligence:

“In practice, if not in law, Kenya’s surveillance regime appears bifurcated. The NIS intercepts both communication content and acquires call data records without warrants to gather intelligence and prevent crime, and police agencies acquire communications data with warrants to prepare criminal cases. If it’s ‘just’ for intelligence, explained one police ATPU investigator, then warrants are not sought: “For the sake of investigations, the DCI [Directorate of Criminal Investigations officer] attached to Safaricom will just give [it to] you… When you take someone to court, you have to make it proper now.” Safaricom stated to PI that they “only provide information as required by courts…and upon receipt of relevant court orders.” (Privacy International, P: 16, 2017).

Internet Providers and NIS:

“One internet service provider recalled the difference between his experiences with the police and with the NIS: “A [police] agency comes to me, and they give me the Occurrence Book (OB) number of the case they are investigating…. The NIS has unfettered access to data.” The NIS simply contacted this operator for the data it required. “They will say ‘give us [data for] whenever X calls Y over this time period’, for example…In instances involving terrorism, no warrants are produced. We have to comply or there is the threat that our licenses [will] be revoked.” A Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) officer confirmed his account: “they’ll get their license revoked [if they do not comply]… If I were them, I’d comply too” (Privacy International, P: 17, 2017).

Safaricom CID Connection:

“The major telecommunications providers have at least one law enforcement liaison, a police officer of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (CID) on secondment. This analysis focuses on Safaricom, by far Kenya’s most popular mobile service provider with over 60% of the market share. At Safaricom, around ten CID officers sit on one floor of the Safaricom central bloc. They provide information to all police branches” (Privacy International, P: 20, 2017).

“The reported presence of NIS officers undercover in Safaricom and possibly other telecommunication network operators presents serious concerns as to whether any civilian authority or mechanism would be able to effectively oversee the process of communications interception. “The way we know they are here is that they’ll be present, seconded from somewhere else, but then suddenly they’ll disappear,” explained one CA employee. “And then you hear your colleagues saying ‘didn’t you know, that guy was NIS?’ They keep very much to themselves. You’ll even find your boss some time suspecting you of being NIS.” According to sources, by building rapport with civilian officers, NIS are able to informally access communications data. “Of course [the NIS officer in Safaricom] will liaise with the Safaricom engineer… Once there is information that he needs, or that our office needs, he gets in, he talks to the engineer, he is given access,” explained a current NIS officer. “Because in Safaricom, every time you log into the database to check for a certain number, you have to put your code there. … It depends on the rapport he has with the engineers…. They trust him.” (Privacy International, P: 21, 2017).

The use of Safaricom and the surveillance shows the problematic relationship between the government and the private telecom company. That the State Security Agents are not using warrants getting intelligence and private intercepts online shows how little the value of the citizens are. When the government security agents can breach public space without court orders and when they have undercover agents inside the biggest telecom in Kenya, shows how they breach the public sphere to get access and intelligence from the inside. This is a worrying side. Peace.

Reference:

Privacy International – ‘Track, Capture, Kill: Inside Communications Surveillance and Counterterrorism in Kenya’ (15.03.2017)

Kenya: Documents showing that Safaricom is withholding Caller information in Mavoko Criminal Case 1650/2015

Safaricom Law 2016 P3

Doc 2:

Safaricom Law 2016 P2

Doc 3:

Safaricom Law 2016 P1

Doc 4:

Kenya Charge Sheet

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