South Sudan: Dr. Riek Machar’s close protection Bodyguards defected to H. E. Gen. Taban Deng Gai (02.06.2017)

Today 2 June 2017, the SPLM/SPLA-IO under the leadership of strong and charismatic leader His Excellency General Taban Deng Gai, First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan, Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/ SPLA-IO received and warmly welcome two Senior Officers from the Intelligent Bureau of Riek Machar.

1. Col. Khan Elijah Hon Top, Spy Chief of the Body Guards of Riek Machar.

2. Lt. Col. Koryom Wang Chiok, Chief Accountant of the Body Guards of Riek Machar.

The two comrades are fine military officers who have contributed immensely to the success of the movement.

The leadership warmly welcomes them back to the fold of the movement.

End

Letter from former Special Presidential Assistance Rwakakanba to State House – “Irregular Salary Payment for Month Ending 31st May 2017” (01.06.2017)

SPLM-IO: Talking Notes in the Teleconference with the UN Security Council on the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (31.05.2017)

A look into the Oil Road Cost: the Hoima-Butiaba-Wanseko Road!

As the Budget Framework paper for Financial Year 2017/2018 in Uganda, the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) requested for the roads a total of Shs. 1,779bn and the required just to build the road in this budget year alone where 1,107bn. This was seen as a strategic area from the state, as the road is seen as one of them Oil Roads. Which, is one of the most important projects the government has, as the future profits of these are soon all used before the drilling starts. This with the giant projects and the misuse of funds. This is epitome with the Hoima-Butiaba-Wasenko road! Just take a look at the reports collected on the road. But the official paper of the budget said otherwise than the framework, who was just nonsense.

While the Budget report to the Parliament of May 2017 Vote 113 UNRA Hoima – Wanseko Oil Road Shs. 29.00bn. This funds will be available after reconciliation of numbers. While the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) where planning proposed numbers for the Oil Roads and the Hoima – Wanseko road where the length of 83 kilometers, and the budget was 444bn. Which is a bit more than the vote! And doesn’t fit with the records even. The numbers are staggering and confusing. As to put it further every unit or kilometers are estimated to cost 5,35bn. So the cost of the oil-road just in this budget year is insane.

Hon. Cecilia Ogwal expresses concern about the cost of the Hoima-Butiana-Wasenko oil road of shs53billion per kilometre” (Parliament, 31.05.2017). The Road that is under construction and is upgraded are 111 kilometers road. If the MP’s estimate is correct means the road cost shs. 5,883bn or Shs. 5.8 trillions. In the budget plenary session on the 31st May 2017 she was also very adamant that the roads who we’re budgeted without feasability studies should be cut and get other use of the funds. Still, that didn’t happen. One of these roads was the oil-road of Hoima-Butiaba-Wasenko. But with this years Budget report and actual feasibility study alone, proves the state will use 444bn on the road. As the other reports prove what they we’re planning to use. But this project started in 2015 and the reports of the misspending on it, seems so big as it gets. So the Road development and the Oil Road could be proof of another UNRA scandal. Take a look!

The works on Hoima-Butiaba- Wanseko road are expected to start during the second half of 2015. This is subject to availability of funding for the project,” said Dan Alinange, the UNRA head of corporate communications” (Rwothungeyo, 2014).

Hoima-Butiaba-Wanseko cost Shs. 454bn:

Works minister John Byabagambi and the new Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) executive director Allen Kagina have agreed to handpick a contractor for Hoima-Butiaba-Wasenko road despite an earlier petition on influence-peddling and fraud in the process. Mr Byabagambi has also changed from his earlier position where he opposed the move, when he was still a junior minister. A whistleblower had raised the red flag in a petition to Ms Kagina indicating that the project cost had been inflated by Shs66 billion ($20 million)” (…) “The 111km road stretches from Hoima to Butiaba on Lake Albert and one of the major corridors in the oil-rich Albertine Graben in south western Uganda. The project is expected to cost Shs454 billion” (Musisi, 2015).

UNRA on the Spot:

The third road project, pointed out by the whistleblower is the 55km Hoima-Butiaba-Wanseko road. According to the dossier, bids for the road were opened on January 22, 2016 and the deal was awarded to China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) at Shs 398 billion. According to the whistleblower, this would translate into $2m per kilometre, which is exorbitant. The whistleblower notes that this is way above construction estimates posted on the Unra website, which are at $960,000 per kilometre. Later, after an outcry from some bidders, Unra cancelled the deal, the whistleblower says. “The IGG should investigate the people who crafted this ignominious evaluation and bring them to book. They should even be interdicted as investigations continue,” notes the dossier. The whistleblower claims that roads in the oil sub-region of Bunyoro have been restricted to only Chinese firms because of the funding from Exim bank. Local and other foreign firms, the dossier noted, were left out” (Kiggundu, 2017).

So the prices of the budget framework and the budget report of 2017/2018, as the whistleblower of early May 2017 are clearly saying that the $2m per kilometers on the Hoima-Butiaba-Wanseko. If the US Dollars are Currency converted into Uganda Shillings which means the price per kilometers are Shs. 7,187bn, that means the price calculated by the budget and the MoFPED are Shs. 5,35bn. That means that are a difference in the price per kilometers which is Shs. 1.837bn. If the budget would be correct than the total price for the 83 kilometers, would e 596bn. I also find it strange that the UNRA budget and length on the FY 2017/2018 is 83 kilometers, as the initial length was 111 kilometers. That is also a length of roads that suddenly couldn’t disappear.

This road is surely more expensive than the government wants it to be, or certainly some lost public funds. Not shocking in the nation run by National Resistance Movement. The total tally of the cost will be revealed, but is not yet. Peace

Reference:

Kiggundu, Edris – ‘UNRA on spot over Chinese contracts’ (03.05.2017) link: http://observer.ug/news/headlines/52685-unra-on-spot-over-chinese-contracts.html

Musisi, Frederic – ‘Minister, Kagina hand-pick contractor’ (26.06.2015) link:http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/Minister–Kagina-hand-pick-contractor/2466686-2765360-format-xhtml-9uhqklz/index.html

Rwothungeyo, Billy – ‘Hoima-Butiaba-Wanseko road for upgrade’ (02.01.2014) link: http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1336203/hoima-butiaba-wanseko-road-upgrade

Burundi: Persistante des Produits Petroliers au Burundi suite a la Crise Politique qui Secous le Burundi Depuis Avril 2015 (31.05.2017)

Burundi: Ministere de l’Energi – Communique de Presse no 03/2017 (30.05.2017)

FAO and WFP special report of 26th May 2017 explains the reasons for the famine and food insecurity in South Sudan

The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP) have gone through the basic problems of food production and general markets for it in South Sudan. Both FAO and WFP are explaining the food insecurity and reasons why. The conflict is the important factor, but there are many other reasons as well. But when people are fleeing their small-farms from rebels and the army. In South Sudan it is also the lacking rain-fall and the insecurity have been classified as famine. But to give you a sense from the report, these quotes, which explain a dire situation. This should be taken seriously, as the reports from these United Nations Organizations are the ones following the farmers on the ground and have organized supplies of specialized seeds. Take a look!

Hyperinflation:

Hyperinflation and limited import capacity due to insecurity and shortage of foreign currency have severely impacted market functioning and the availability of food commodities. Cereal prices increased up to ten times in 2016 following the sharp devaluation of the local currency and the increasing transport costs. The number of traders and the level of their food stocks have declined sharply during the second semester of 2016, with strong reduction in food availability and variety” (FAO & WFP, P: 7, 2017).

Food Insecurity:

Food insecurity has reached new records during 2016 (67 percent of the population at harvest time, with over 14 percent severely food insecure), twice the pre-conflict levels and a marked worsening from the same time last year, when food insecurity stood at 49 percent (12 percent severely food insecure). Only one-quarter (26 percent) of the households were found to have acceptable food consumption. The coming lean period of mid-2017 will likely see food insecurity levels rise further” (FAO & WFP, P: 7, 2017).

Cereal Production:

As in previous assessments, post-harvest losses and seed use for sowing in 2017 are assumed to account for 20 percent of total production, leaving a net amount of about 826 000 tonnes available for local consumption. This result is about 10 percent below the output obtained in 2015 and slightly below the last five-year average production estimates. The decline in 2016 is essentially due to displacements of farmers and disruption of farming activities following the increased insecurity and violence since July” (FAO & WFP, P: 23, 2017).

With a projected population of about 12 million in mid-2017, the overall cereal deficit in the January-December 2017 marketing year is estimated at about 500 000 tonnes, over 30 percent above the deficit estimated for 2016” (FAO & WFP, P: 7, 2017).

The Conflict of 2017:

Conflict in 2017 – The major factor influencing the general food security situation during 2017 remains the violent conflict that started in late December 2013. Not only this has not been resolved, the intensity of the conflict increased in mid-2016 (July) and is continuing into 2017. While conflict affected mostly the Greater Upper Nile Region (states of Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei) during the initial stage of the conflict. However, this has spread out across the country and in particular spread into the major producing areas of the country, such as Western and Central Equatoria and neighbouring areas of Eastern Equatoria. Western Bahr el Ghazal has also been affected by fighting. These situations have geographically wider repercussions: disruption of farming leads to drops in national crop production, while its impacts on markets and trade routes lead to problems in the supply of staple foods to the more remote areas of the country” (FAO & WFP, P: 36, 2017).

In January 2017, 32.3 percent of the population of South Sudan (about 3.8 million people) was classified in the IPC Phases 3 (Crisis), 4 (Emergency) and 5 (Catastrophe). In the lean period of mid-2017, this proportion is likely to rise to 46.7 percent (5.5 million people). The most serious situations are in Unity State (where the population in some counties is facing famine or risk of famine) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal – over 50 percent of the population is in IPC Phases 3 to 5. The situation is expected to worsen during the lean period of 2017 (up to July)” (FAO & WFP, P: 9, 2017).

This is all worrying and the conflict edges the crisis with natural effect. From the problems with production of cereals, to hyper-inflation together with the areas where the Republic are classified as famine. All of this is combination of downward spiral no nation want to be hold-in. The Republic of South Sudan and it’s citizens are in turmoil as the farmers cannot plow their dirt and raise their seeds. All major cultivated areas got affected by the crisis and conflict, this ha by all means been reasons for the food insecurity. If people don’t see it and isn’t worried that the production area for food has been the battleground between government and rebels. So the farmers there would be in crossfire. So if these areas and states doesn’t see peace, than the production will not rise to the needed levels. That should be key importance and be needed policy by the government to make sure they are producing enough food for their population. Peace.

Reference:

FAO & WFP – ‘S P E C I A L R E P O R T – FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO SOUTH SUDAN’ (26.05.2017)

South Sudan: Resolution Arising from Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) Mediation Meeting Held at State House Entebbe (26.05.2017)

Deliberately without thinking, Mwenda ‘spilled the beans’ of the NRM Police State!

It takes to two to tango, and it takes many hands to destroy a community, but it does not take many to usher in policies. Therefore, in the mix of Ugandan politics and with time the Police has added significance, as the IGP Kale Kayihura has many times told how to hold consultant meetings and even been teaching journalist how to do their jobs. This is in the effort to stifle the opposition and their mission to prove their viable candidates over the only man with a vision. Mr. President, His Excellency President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, he who Kayihura is so loyal too. So certainly, the Independent and Mwenda without thinking in his praise of the political police sessions and the use of the Police Force to either create an unlawful arrest, harass them and even obstruct political dissidents in their rallies. Let’s take the words of Mwenda himself for a minute.

“Hence, Kayihura’s most critical role has been to transform the police into an arm of the NRM. He secured for Museveni the loyalty of a major security institution that had been independent of NRM politics, hence reducing the role of the army in quelling protests. Kayihura did for Museveni what Central Bank governor, Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile did for IMF. Mutebile converted Museveni into a free market ideologue, thereby turning a Marxist revolutionary into an agent of imperialism” (…) “This masterstroke significantly shrunk the role of ISO and CMI in the soft game of consolidating Museveni’s power. Kayihura’s success here has come at the price of reduced emphasis on criminal investigations, hence negatively impacting the rate of its professional development in the force. However, overall Kayihura’s strategy has bolstered the position of the Uganda police politically, making it a powerful centre of power” (Mwenda, 2017).

The thing that strikes me and should strike anyone who cares about justice or free and fair policing. Is that he is saying it is a good thing, that the Police Force is embedded with the ruling regime. The development under IGP Kayihura is so that the Police get better control because they work directly for the NRM. Not that Police works for the Ugandans or after its supposed constitutions and laws, but for the mercy of the NRM. That is unique and shows how oppressive the mind of Mwenda has become. If not he has become subdued by the NRM and is now the grand apologist.

This sentence should boggle anyone with a sound mind: “Kayihura’s success here has come at the price of reduced emphasis on criminal investigations”, well Mr. Mwenda is not the Police Force supposed to catch criminals and do criminal investigations. Certainly, if it was an arm of a Political Party it would have other functions, but the UPF or Police Force are supposed to solve criminal activity and monitor that. They should not need to look and see, if Olara Otunnu are buying cassava, Norbert Mao feeding his chickens or be part of the convoy of Jennifer Musisi. That is just me though. Peace

Reference:

Mwenda, Andrew – ‘THE LAST WORD: Why Kayihura remains IGP’ (22.05.2017) link: https://www.independent.co.ug/last-word-kayihura-remains-igp/2/

[The Arms supplier to SPLA] President Museveni are involved in developing a work-plan for peace in South Sudan!

Entebbe State House 26. May 2017

There are something very wrong when an arms supplier of two decades like President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda, are involved in the mediation and peace negotiation in South Sudan. Even if President Salva Kiir Mayardit are wanting him. They have had a longstanding relationship, which is the proof of the arms trade and helping each with armies when needed be. Therefore the impartiality with having Museveni isn’t there. Museveni will secure Kiir and his fraction as that pays him in the long-run and not necessary the best for South Sudan. Just take a look!

On the 26th May at the State House:

Chaired a meeting of three different South Sudanese factions, seeking to reunite the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. The meeting at State House, Entebbe was attended by representatives of the SPLM in government, SPLM in opposition and former detainees. This followed a request by His Excellency Salva Kiir that I help in the mediation process. The meeting agreed to establish a working committee that will develop a workplan on implementation of the Arusha Accord, end the war and plan for peace. The meeting tasked as me as mediator, and new chair of the East African Community to determine time and venue for the next meeting, which I will do” (Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, 26.05.2017).

The relationship between Museveni and the conflict in South Sudan, can go back in to old libraries like the report from the Independent paper in the United Kingdom:

The Nigerian-owned Boeing cargo plane was forced to land at Larnaca on Tuesday during a flight from from Tel Aviv to Entebbe in Uganda. According to the Cypriot civil aviation authorities, it was carrying weapons to Uganda. A senior Ugandan official said yesterday it was the first his government knew of the consignment, and there is speculation that the weapons may be destined for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, struggling for survival in southern Sudan” (…) “The Sudanese government seems to regard Uganda as a supplier of the SPLA. Reliable sources in the area say Khartoum has been supplying dissidents elements in Uganda who have mounted random attacks near Sudanese refugee camps in northern Uganda” (Dowden, 1994). So Museveni has supplied the SPLA weapons for over 20 years and the recent reports show similar activity with Ukraine plane and pilot, instead of being a Nigerian one like the old report. Therefore, with the history of supplying weapons and ammunition to the SPLA. There isn’t like Museveni has chosen side in the conflict. The National Dialogue, which isn’t allowing Dr. Riek Machar and therefore excluding the real SPLM-IO, as well as the newly forged rebel-groups. Which is either dissidents of the SPLM-IO or the SPLM/A in the recent year.

So with the sanctions of who is taking part of the National Dialogue, it will not be sincere, since all of the parties are not involved. The rebels and their leaders are not in communication with the government. Therefore, President Kiir has an ally in the negotiation instead of mediator without any inside agreements. That means that President Museveni will be on the side of Kiir and not on a genuine peace-talks.

Like the interview of SMC in mid-May:

Q. What about IGAD efforts now in South Sudan?

A. For the South Sudan crisis the IGAD was also supported by the international community. In fact the agreement is ‘IGAD-plus agreement’. The IGAD on the one hand and on the other hand, the members of the international community including the TROIKA and a number of other countries were involved in bringing the government of South Sudan and the SPLA together in agreement. So on the ground there is an extensive understanding and cooperation between the IGAD and the international community” (SMC, 2017).

So even if it is a ceasefire now, the attacks and skirmishes still happens in different states. The situation is still dire and my faith in the National Dialogue isn’t there. As the IGAD-Plus Agreement haven’t been respected, by neither party. As the turmoil and crisis is in the matter of the current leadership. Both from the rebels and also from the central government.

With all this in mind, what will be President Museveni motives to make a work-plan for the mediation and implementation of the Arusha Accord. Will it be to generate a real peace or for the help of his friend in troubling time. With the knowledge of the connection between Ugandan Army and the SPLA, Museveni is more important to keep Kiir as an ally, than generate a real peace. The National Dialogue is flawed and it doesn’t help that you have a partial motivated leader like Museveni helping out. It is not to give the mediation any credibility. Since the weapon-brother and the ammunition supplier of the SPLA would not be sincere in wishing peace. He has made sure that President Kiir could battle his enemies and had enough bullets to silence them.

I never had faith in Museveni to deal with this, might the rest of the world do, but then they are naive and not thinking of the implications of selling guns and than discussing peace afterwards. It doesn’t seem to be real and fit. Like a beer producers are promoting careful drinking is insincere as they are in the business of trading the brew and not safety. Peace.

Reference:

Dowden, Richard – ‘Israeli weapons ‘bound for rebels’ in southern Sudan: Arms may be destined for SPLA fight against Khartoum’ (19.03.2017) link: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/israeli-weapons-bound-for-rebels-in-southern-sudan-arms-may-be-destined-for-spla-fight-against-1430077.html

The Sudanese Media Center (SMC) – ‘Interview: IGAD Special Envoy in Khartoum Lissane Yohannes’ (15.05.2017) link: http://smc.sd/en/interview-igad-special-envoy-khartoum-lissane-yohannes/