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U.S. Congress does not want investigation to “go dark” when coming to encrypted data, co-op between private and federal agencies is needed; the Year-End Report claims!

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As the House in Congress together with Encryption Working Group, which are different senators from all spectre of the House; they are coming from two parts of the House that are working in the Committee on Energy and Commerce & Committee on the Judiciary. They are here working on the public and private sphere, on the matter on encrypted data can be open and closed. These are because the companies can close the data for the investigation of the security organization. Something that can be hard and needed data to figure out the needed intelligence that the authority’s needs, but still the privacy of the citizens and also company secrets can go away if these encrypted data is uncovered. Therefore the working group to try to find a position on this hard conundrum!

“On February 16, 2016, a federal magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued an order requiring Apple, Inc. to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in obtaining encrypted data off of an iPhone related to a 2015 shooting in San Bernardino, California. Apple resisted the order. This particular case was resolved when the FBI pursued a different method to access the data stored on the device. But the case, and the heated rhetoric exchanged by parties on all sides, reignited a decades-old debate about government access to encrypted data” (…) “The law enforcement community often refers to their challenge in this context as “going dark.” In essence, “going dark” refers to advancements in technology that leave law enforcement and the national security community unable to obtain certain forms of evidence” (EWG, P: 2, 2016).

“Congress should not weaken this vital technology because doing so works against the national interest. However, it should not ignore and must address the legitimate concerns of the law enforcement and intelligence communities” (EWG, P: 4, 2016).

Data cross boarders:

“Data flows with little regard for national borders. Many of the private companies that met with the working group have a multinational presence and are subject to the laws of many different jurisdictions. Several of these companies noted a trend towards data localization requirements in foreign countries, driven at least in part by the difficulty in obtaining data for use in routine criminal investigations. Conversely, current legal authorities may be inadequate for federal agencies attempting to access data overseas” (EWG, P: 5, 2016).

The challenge of improving law enforcement access to encryption depends on a multitude of factors. Federal law enforcement agencies like the FBI and the United States Secret Service face obvious challenges from the growing use of strong encryption. Although federal law enforcement agencies told the EWG that they encourage the use of encryption for the protection of sensitive information—including data retained by the federal government—they cite the increased use of encryption by suspected criminals and victims of crime as a severe challenge to their public safety mission” (EWG, P: 6, 2016).

“Public perception and recent tensions notwithstanding, there is already substantial cooperation between the private sector and law enforcement. Private company stakeholders demonstrated an ability to assist federal, state, and local agencies with access to information to the extent possible and with service of a lawful order, and expressed a willingness to explore ways to improve and enhance that collaboration” (EWG, P: 7, 2016).

“Exploring tools that might help companies clarify what information is already available to law enforcement officers, and under what circumstances” (…) “§ Examining federal warrant procedures to determine whether they can be made more efficient, consistent with current constitutional standards” (…) “§ Examining federal warrant procedures to ensure that they are clear and consistent with respect to law enforcement access to digital information” (…) “§ Examining how law enforcement can better utilize existing investigative tools” (EWG, P: 9, 2016).

“Although much of the debate has focused on requiring third party companies to decrypt information for the government, an alternative approach might involve compelling decryption by the individual consumers of these products. On a case-by-case basis, with proper court process, requiring an individual to provide a passcode or thumbprint to unlock a device could assist law enforcement in obtaining critical evidence without undermining the security or privacy of the broader population” (EWG, P: 12, 2016).

“Encryption is inexorably tied to our national interests. It is a safeguard for our personal secrets and economic prosperity. It helps to prevent crime and protect national security. The widespread use of encryption technologies also complicates the missions of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. As described in this report, those complications cannot be ignored. This is the reality of modern society. We must strive to find common ground in our collective responsibility: to prevent crime, protect national security, and provide the best possible conditions for peace and prosperity” (EWG, P: 13, 2016).

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When it comes to data encryption there will be hardships as the multi-national companies are not following borders, neither is this just about privacy, certain parts of the lawful “hacking” is breaching the codes and copyrights of technology for multi-national companies. These are with the example of Apple, who wouldn’t accept that FBI decoded their Iphone in February 2016. Certainly this question and the encryption of data will be a continued problem for authorities, security organizations and also civilians who want’s their privacy kept secret and not all in the open.

The fear that Big Brother can see everything and can connect into everything we have is worry, as much as it is that the companies we consumers has bought products can get all of information and data should also concern us; as much as it if the Security organizations could monitor every action and get hold of all our data. This will be a continued problem as the privacy, the need to unlock privacy terms and the use of National Security to keep an eye on the public sphere.

As long as the security organization can unlock when they need, but not to violate or even use the enforcement in ways where they can trespass into the data for the sense of security. U.S. enforcement shall be in regard for public safety, but shall also secure the privacy of innocent civilians, as much as copyright and encrypted data of giant corporations. Therefore the clear case-to-case work has to be done in corporation between security organization and also private companies, as they together can secure National Security and also the lives of innocent civilians. These are codes of conduct that needs to be clear, the indication of proper work and also co-op that the investigation needs to partake. Peace.

Reference:

Encryption Working Group – ‘Encryption Working Group Year-End Report’ (December 20, 2016)

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White House Report: U.S. Wire taps that occur without warrants and where security organization clearly violates privacy laws!

fitz-the-wire

Fitz: “What’s up, hotshot?”

McNulty: “I got a technical question. Remember those analog units we used to use to pull cell numbers out of the air? The C.F. something-something”

Fitz: “Yeah, Cell Frequency Identification Device”.

McNulty: “The triggerfish, yeah”.

Fitz: “That one, it could flag a number. Right, but the old analog machines? We used to have to follow the guy around stay close while he used the phone New digitals bing, we just pull the number right off the cell towers”.

McNulty: “So, you got any down out at Woodlawn that daddy can borrow?”

Fitz: “What about yours? – What? City has three of ’em, I remember right.

Homeland security grant sent ’em to you every big county department in the state”

McNulty: “No fucking way. Thanks” (the Wire season 3 episode 11, 2004).

Well, so there we have it, the U.S. Security Organization that are working tirelessly to protect and arrest criminals. On the way to do so, there are questions being made and questionable approaches made by the Security Agencies as they are using technology not to attain information on their possible suspects, but at the same time going into the privacy of innocent civilians. In this way by monitoring areas where well-known criminals are staying and taking information on bystanders and such; these acts can violate their trust in the security agencies as they are using this level of intelligence to attain the suspects. This can also be seen as a violation of the Fourth Amendment as they have rights who protect innocent civilian’s privacy. At the same time, the security agencies need technics to able to get intelligence on their suspects. This is the real-life The Wire and here is what I collected for the recently dropped White House report on the matter.

“[P]eople have a reasonable expectation that their cell phones will not be used as real-time tracking devices by law enforcement, and – recognizing that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not simply areas – that people have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location information. Thus, we hold that the use of a cell site simulator requires a valid search warrant, or an order satisfying the constitutional requisites of a warrant, unless an established exception to the warrant requirement applies” (U.S. Committee, 2016, P: 30).

“The Department of Justice has 310 cell-site simulation devices and spent more than $71 million in fiscal years 2010-14 on cell-site simulation technology” (…) “The Department of Homeland Security has 124 cell-site simulation devices and spent more than $24 million in fiscal years 2010-14 on cell-site simulation technology” (U.S. Committee, 2016 P:5).

“Cell-site simulators are devices that effectively transform a cell phone into a real time tracking device. A cell-site simulator—also known as an “IMSI catcher”—is a device that mimics a cell phone tower. These devices are commonly referred to as “Stingrays,” which is both a generic name and also refers to a specific type of IMSI catcher that is manufactured by the Harris Corporation. When the device is activated, cell phones in the surrounding area connect to the device in a similar way that the cell phones would connect to a cell tower. Once a phone connects to the cell-site simulator, the device is capable of obtaining specific identifying information for the phone, including information that enables law enforcement to determine the location of the phone and, more importantly, its user” (U.S. Committee, 2016 P: 7).

“From April to August 2015, Committee staff met with the component agencies and officials from DOJ and DHS leadership; from those meetings, two things became clear: (1) use of these devices was widespread; and (2) there was a lack of uniformity across the agencies regarding what court authority was required to deploy cell-site simulation technology under different operating scenarios” (U.S. Committee, 2016 P: 8).

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No Warrant before the surveillance:

“The Committee obtained information from federal, state, and local law enforcement that shows the majority of situations where a cell-site simulator is deployed involve the search for a specific, known cell phone. In this scenario, law enforcement first obtains the target cell phone’s number through traditional investigative methods. Once the target cell phone number is ascertained, law enforcement generally obtains the IMSI number that is associated with that cell phone number from the cellular service provider. A warrant is generally not a prerequisite to requesting the IMSI number from the service provider; in many instances, law enforcement obtains the IMSI number by issuing an administrative subpoena to a cell phone service provider” (U.S. Committee, 2016, P: 11).

Bystanders caught monitored to find the criminal phone:

“Whenever a cell-site simulator is deployed, there are collateral consequences for the non-target phones in the area. While searching for the target phone, the simulator will also make contact with other, non-target cell phones that happen to be within range of the simulator device, even if those phones’ owners are innocent bystanders who are not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing. The simulator identifies and collects these non-target phones’ unique identifiers as well. When searching for a specific IMSI number, the device identifies and drops contact with the non-targeted phones within a few seconds” (U.S. Committee, 2016, P: 12).

Difference between home and in public:

“During the course of the Committee’s investigation, it became clear the FBI was drawing a distinction between deploying cell-site simulators on targets in public places and deploying the devices to collect information when a person was in a private space, such as a home. If the device were to be deployed to detect a person when they were believed to be in their home, the FBI would obtain a warrant. When an individual was believed to be on a street or some other public space, however, the FBI relied upon an order under the Pen Register Statute” (U.S. Committee, 2016, P: 21).

IRS use of Cell phone surveillance:

“For each of the 37 investigations that the IRS reported using a cell-site simulator, the agency reported that it worked with an Assistant United States Attorney or State Prosecutor, and obtained “an order or a warrant” based on a finding of probable cause in 36 instances. On one occasion out of the 37, the IRS obtained authorization to deploy a cell-site simulator by obtaining an order pursuant to the Pen Register Statute. Ten of the federal cases resulted in indictments. Indictments were obtained in every instance where the IRS assisted a state or local police department’s investigation” (U.S. Committee, 2016, P: 25).

Use of the Technology in ill-intent:

“Cell-site simulator use inside the United States raises far-reaching issues concerning the use, extent, and legality of government surveillance authority. While the Committee’s investigation and hearing focused on law enforcement’s use of these devices, non-law enforcement and/or foreign government use of cell-site simulation technology also raises serious concerns” (…) “Law enforcement agencies are not the only groups who may use cell-site simulation technology. It is possible, if not likely, bad actors will use these devices to further their aims. Criminals and spies, however, will not be adopting the DOJ and DHS policies and procedures or any other ethics of surveillance. They will not be self-limiting in their use of these devices so as to not capture the content of others’ conversations. Criminals could use these devices to track potential victims or even members of law enforcement. One can imagine scenarios where criminals or foreign agents use this type of technology to intercept text messages and voice calls of law enforcement, corporate CEOs, or elected officials” (U.S. Committee, 2016, P: 33).

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Conclusion:

“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way” (U.S. Committee, 2016, P: 35)

With this in mind, the reality is that sometimes the U.S. Police Officers and Security Agencies are following innocent civilians in the hunt of criminals. These methods are also done without warrants and therefore done on free-will of the security agencies, which by all means are a violations of privacy of civilians, where the courts haven’t even been noted on the arrangement and the investigations that been done.

This should be scrutinized and should not be put under the rug, as this are common thread and done by government security organization without permission or where they didn’t follow instruction per request of the courts. Therefore the validation of their intelligence could be put under question as they we’re also taking in civilians who wasn’t doing any ill-intent.

Peace.

Reference:

U.S. Committee Staff Report – ‘Law Enforcement Use of Cell-Site Simulation Technologies:

Privacy Concerns and Recommendations’ (19.12.2016) written by Hon. Jason Chaffetz & Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.

China: Uighur Boy Attacks Inspectors To Defend The Family Business (Youtube-Clip)

Toddler picked up steel pipe to defend his grandma from China’s urban management force:
A video went viral on Chinese social media from Thursday shows a toddler picking up a steel pipe trying to defend his grandma from a group of Chengguan, the urban management force installed in Chinese cities whose job ranges from clamping down on illegal street vendors to enforcing rules on city sanitation, landscaping and parking. The toddler was captured shouting “don’t touch my grandma! Go away, don’t touch my grandma!” repeatedly while he held a steel pipe measured some twice his height, trying to push the Chengguan away. Onlookers’ laughter was heard throughout the whole video. The short video got hundreds of thousands of views on Chinese micro blogging platform Weibo, but a lot of the captions went with the sharing post were saying “this is just so funny! cute!” “wow, this kid’s future sure will be promising”, only a short portion questioned what the Chengguan had done to the kid and his grandma. WATCH: Little Chinese Boy with metal pipe defends family business against police inspectors Kids protects family business from inspectors. The toddler also tries to ‘fight’ a police officer” (The Venus Star, 2016)

china Media

 

#DearNextPresident: Nas: Fix the racial murders by Police Officers

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