UN World Food Programme in diplomatic tangle because of the Rwandese beans exported to Burundi (12.04.2017)

Burundi: Le Ministère de la Défense Nationale annonce qu’aucun Groupe armé n’a été aperçu traversant la frontière entre le Burundi et le Rwanda (13.03.2017)

Rwandan gov. trained militia to topple Burundian gov,; UN confidential note to the UN Security Council on the matter; Rwandan gov. denies, while Burundian gov. verifies

Here today I am going through some worrying reports, the leaked note I have read, have been discussed in other media, therefore my article is thicker and deeper. As I want to show the results and responses of the governmental officials from Burundi and Rwanda on the matter. Some of it should be expected, as Rwandan response would never say that actually tried to topple President Pierre Nkurunziza, which President Kagame could have that in him, would not be new considering how he together with Uganda President Museveni went and toppled Mobutu Seko Seko.

The recent news has also been questioned by some sources; I will add that tape in the end where that journalist asks if it is manufactured. You can have your take on it. The matter of violence that President Kagame has in the past and near present time in DRC, he could have had the capacity to pull it off. He has it in his veins just like President Museveni. Therefore we should not be shocked if this is facts and that the Burundian authorities is aggravated, the way the Burundian government has gone against their own opposition is not a just, but the cause of stopping a neighboring country trained militia or guerilla force should be reasonable. That proves the fragile situation in Burundi and that behind the scenes the powers around try to earn coins on it. Here take a look!

Training of militia to topple Nkurunziza:

“The Group spoke with 18 Burundian combatants, not associated with the Front National de Liberation (FNL) in Uvira Territory of South Kivu Province. They told the Group that they had been recruited in the Mahama Refugee Camp in eastern Rwanda in May and June 2015 and were given two months of military training by instructors, who included Rwandan military personnel, in a forest camp in Rwanda. Their training included military tactics and the maintenance and use of assault rifles and machine guns, as well as ideological and morale-building sessions. Some told the Group that they were also trained in the use of grenades, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. They were transported around Rwanda in the back of military trucks, often with Rwandan military escort. The Burundian combatants told the Group that there were least four companies of 100 recruits each being trained at the camp while they were there. Six of the trained combatants that the group spoke with were minors. They told the Group that the military training instructors at the camp knew that they were minors. The Burundian combatants showed the Group fake DRC identification cards that had been produced for them in Rwanda, so they could avoid suspicion while in the DRC. They crossed the Rusizi River in small groups at night from Rwanda into the DRC just south of the Kamanyola border post, with the assistance of a network based within the DRC. Like the FNL, they reported that their ultimate goal was to remove Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza” (UN, 2016).

Arms to the trained militia:  

“Several individuals were arrested in October to November 2015 in Goma, North Kivu Province, on suspicion of involvement in arms smuggling from the DRC to other countries. The perpetrators are Rwandan or Congolese nationals and were caught at the Congolese-Rwandan border post with the weapons. Some of the weapons were hidden in bags of green beans or manioc, and other were hidden in the chassis of a car. The Group interviews the perpetrators some of whom confirmed the weapons were to be used in support of armed groups in Burundi” (UN, 2016).

Burundian embassy to Hauge stated this:

“Burundi welcomes the fact that the international community is beginning to discover that the source of the insecurity afflicting Burundi is Rwanda. Information available to the government of Burundi and credible information from some media (France 24) and investigative reports by some International Experts, including UN Experts have confirmed that Rwanda which is a neighboring country to Burundi recruits, trains and arms Burundian citizens including minors in the MAHAMA Refugees Camp in Rwanda and sends them into to the territory of Burundi to commit armed attacks against civilians, security and military targets” (…)”   We know that some countries and some components of the international community have suspended or even stopped economic cooperation in order to force the democratically elected institutions by the sovereign people of Burundi and validated by the national and sub-regional judicial powers to submit and hand over power to anti-democratic Burundian forces. On the basis of credible information pointing to unprovoked acts of hostility and destabilization sponsored by Rwanda and executed by the violent opposition as the direct causes of the violence in Burundi, the Burundi Embassy in The Hague urges the countries which suspended economic cooperation with Burundi to review their positions” (Diplomat Magazine, 2016).

Burundi response to the news:

“The CNDD-FDD Party condemns Rwanda over its neocolonial purposes for having implemented the plan of Burundi occupation so as to lead the country through an ethnical vision which Paul Kagame would have used as he had done it during the period of FPR Inkotanyi . The Burundian democrats remind him that if there had been no complicity and the politico –military support of the MINUAR, the FPR -Inkotanyi would have never taken the power in Rwanda and Paul Kagame has made use of genocide, sacrificing his own brothers to take the power. It is what he wanted to do in Burundi, while outrageously overusing the word genocide as experienced in his country” (…)”It is also unbelievable that the aggressor KAGAME has never been blamed by organizations such as the African Union, the United Nations , the European Union and other international organizations and that on the contrary, most of those organizations and States have not done nothing but connived, imposing him an international force. Burundian People cannot be mistaken taking into consideration what MINUAR has done to help Kagame take the power. KAGAME wanted and want to apply the same experience he has lived in his country. He has created a rebellion under the blessing of some politico- mafia settings among others Louis Michel, and his friends to bring back the G7 and the G10 of Buyoya to the power by the cheating of a putsch and a government of transition. Therefore, the dangerous use of the word genocide and ethnic are nothing but shields for those pseudo nostalgic politicians with bad ideas” (Nyabenda, 2016).

Burundian Opposition claims:

”The opposition Burundi Democratic Rally (Radebu) chairman Jean de Dieu Mutabazi echoed the remarks, saying Rwanda was behind the war in a sister EAC member state and was worsening the unrest that has so far claimed hundreds of lives. “There’s this neighbour of ours, Rwanda, under the warmonger President Paul Kagame, who has been fighting in DR Congo and recently wanted to fight Tanzania,” Mr Mutabazi charged. “He is the one providing arms and logistical support to the rebels attacking Burundi.” Jacques Bigirimana, president of the FNL party, said although the belligerents were keen on national dialogue in a bid to end the political crisis, the country was under siege from what he termed as “destabilisation forces sponsored by Rwanda” (Ihucha, 2016).

Rwandan reaction:

“Last December, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame dismissed as “childish” allegations that Rwanda had stoked instability in Burundi and said Rwandan troops would play no part in any intervention in the neighbouring country” (Ihucha, 2016).

Rwandan Foreign Minister counters the report:

“Speaking to reporters on Friday, Louis Mushikiwabo, Rwanda foreign minister said that allegations were baseless and lies. “Rwanda hosting a big number of Burundian refugees in various refugee camps in the country does not mean training them to overthrow Burundian government? We cannot chase them back to their home country if they are not sure of their safety. Burundian government is in better position to look for a possible lasting solution to bring peace in Burundi,” she said” (China.org.cn, 2016).

MONUSCO statement recently:

“The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has sovereign and primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens.  MONUSCO stands ready to support the Government in these efforts, in line with its mandate to protect civilians. In this regard, MONUSCO welcomes the Government’s acceptance of the Mission’s proposal to resume coordinated offensive operations, which resulted in an agreed arrangement for military cooperation on 28 January 2016. With regard to cooperation with the FARDC, MONUSCO is confident that the measures put in place with the Government to mitigate risk and provide appropriate monitoring where necessary will ensure that MONUSCO-supported operations against ADF, FDLR and other armed groups are undertaken in line with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy” (MONUSCO, 2016).

EALA statement on Burundi:

“Leontine Nzeyimana, Minister for EAC Affairs in Burundi however included a mix of representatives from government, political parties, and civil society. On her part, the minister noted: “As it has been happening in Burundi since the early 1960’s, the electioneering period was marked by negative propaganda intended to create in Burundi a political and institutional instability” (…)”The importance of this crisis to the EAC, the Report added, was brought home by accusations leveled against a Partner state by the Government-led delegation. Except for one Report, the delegation was unable to provide adequate evidence to the Committee to validate the claim that the Republic of Rwanda is hosting and militarily training Burundi refugees” (EALA, 2016).

The promised youtube-clip:

There is lots of statement that is hard to verify or grasp. Certainly all of the actors have a place in the motions and want to achieve something to prove their worth. The Government of Burundi is the one that is under fire, and for the moment they will be as long as the attacks on the opposition and way to civil war is continuing, while the refugees goes into DRC, Tanzania and Rwanda, even in Uganda.

The conflict and crisis has made the inter-dialogue stifled and the African Union hasn’t made any progress on the issues in the country. While Rwandan government might have seen it as it golden hour; as they saw it in the DRC back in day. So here we are in this day where Burundi is a pawn while the Government and Burundian National Forces, does not only fight their own public to stay in power, but might also fight against foreign trained forces; which it might happen and wouldn’t surprise me as the history of President Kagame lingers on. As he centers more and more power in Rwanda around himself in neo-Museveni way, he looks more and more like President Museveni, just a Rwandan counter-part. So President Nkurunziza is under fire and has a lot of work to generate peace, but this seems like a way to get there.

The results of this are that we can question if the Rwandan government wanted to bring down the Government of Burundian one. If not so the United Nations wanted this to slip out so their wish for peacekeepers could gain foothold in the UN Headquarters in New York, as they have seen the African Union have given-up the direct African answer to the conflict. Peace.

Reference:

China.org.cn – ‘Rwanda dismisses UN report on training Burundi rebels’ (05.02.2016) link: http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2016-02/06/content_37747742.htm

Diplomat Magazine – ‘Burundi’ statement on current situation’ (05.02.2016) link: http://www.diplomatmagazine.nl/2016/02/05/25834/

East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) – ‘EALA concerned about Republic of Burundi’ (05.02.2016) link: http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/press-releases/20160205/eala-concerned-about-republic-burundi

MONUSCO – ‘Press Statement of MONUSCO Regarding Operations Against Armed Groups in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (02.02.2016) link: http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10662&ctl=Details&mid=15045&ItemID=21686&language=en-US

Nyabenda, Pascal – ‘The 26th summit of the African Union Heads of State has proven that they have understood, Burundian People is deeply indebted to them’ (02.02.2016) Chairman of CNDD-FDD

Ihucha, Adam – ‘EALA declines to summon Rwanda over rebel claims’ (30.01.2016) link: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EALA-declines-to-summon-Rwanda-over-rebel-claims/-/2558/3055230/-/76bvilz/-/index.html

United Nations – ‘Security Council Committee Established Persuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo – !5^th January 2016 (S/AC.43/2016/GE/OC.2) – Gaston Gramjo

President Pierre Nkurunziza (CNDD-FDD) is elected for the third term in Burundi and the EAC Election Observer Mission – Preliminary Statement on the Election

 

Today the results came from the Electoral Commission in Burundi wasn’t unexpected. We all knew that would happen. It’s not really much to say. We all expected it and there wasn’t really much news value in that. Other than the Government of Burundi will go into an uncertain future. With People of Burundi will not recognizing that Pierre Nkurunzia is again for the third time president of the Country. The president can use the High Court judgement, but that doesn’t stop the foreign pressure or local dissidence. The situation will be fragmented and sore wound after the violence want give more legitimacy to the President of Burundi. EAC had Election Observation Mission on the Election Day and has followed the election apparently. While the African Union and European Union suspended their missions and observers to it. So that they wanted to show that they didn’t’ want legitimacy to the actions of the president. There been oppressive actions towards the opposition in the country after the Coup d’état in the country. I think that the Preliminary Statement of the Election is worthy for everybody who follow Burundi show read it. Enjoy. Peace.

The East African Community deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to the Republic of Burundi for the 21 July 2015 Presidential Election. Hon. Abubakar Zein, a Member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), was the Head of the Mission and has released the Preliminary Statement of the Mission as below:

The East African Community Election Observation Mission to the Presidential Election of 21 July 2015 in the Republic of Burundi – PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, Bujumbura, 23 July 2015-

1. INTRODUCTION
2. In response to the invitation by the Independent National Electoral Commission of Burundi (CENI); the Standing Decision of the East African Community (EAC) Council of Ministers to observe elections in all EAC Partner States and the Decision of the 3rd EAC Emergency Summit on Burundi of 6 July 2015, the EAC deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to the Republic of Burundi for the 21 July 2015 Presidential Election.

2. The EAC EOM was led by Hon. Abubakar Zein, a Member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and comprised 25 members drawn from the EALA, National Electoral Management Bodies, National Human Rights Commissions, Ministries of EAC Affairs, and Civil Society Organizations from four EAC Partner States namely the Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda. The Mission deployed seven teams to observe the polling and counting processes in Bujumbura, Gitega, Ngozi, Kirundo, Mwaro, Muramvya, Karuzi, Muyinga, Rumonge, Bururi and Makamba Provinces.

3. The EAC has followed the Burundi electoral process since January 2015 through consultative sessions by the EAC Eminent Persons (PEP), Pre-Election Assessment Mission (PEMi), the EAC Council of Ministers and EAC Emergency Summits. Through these initiatives, the EAC, while appreciating the state of affairs, identified challenges facing the electoral process and made appropriate recommendations. The Mission’s findings are also informed by the report of the aforementioned initiatives.

4. This statement contains preliminary findings, recommendations and conclusions made by the Mission based on independent observation, interaction with electoral stakeholders including the CENI, political parties, civil society organizations, security agencies, and the media, among others. As the electoral process is still ongoing, this statement limits itself to the assessment made up to the polling and results counting processes. In due course, the Mission will avail a more detailed final report on the electoral process in Burundi through the EAC policy organs.

1. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

General Political Context

5. The political context of the 2015 presidential election has been characterized by the controversy surrounding the incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidature for a third term. This was viewed by some actors as a violation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 and the Constitution 2005 of Burundi. Other actors maintained that the first term did not count thus, the incumbent qualifies to vie in the 2015 presidential election. The incumbent’s nomination on 25 April 2015 sparked demonstrations in Bujumbura and some parts of the country which turned violent.

6. The confirmation of the incumbent’s candidature by the Constitutional Court resulted in the deterioration of security situation and the prevailing political impasse in the country. There were persistent violent protests and an attempted coup d’état on 13 May 2015 which resulted in scores of deaths and deterioration of the human rights situation in the country. From the foregoing background, there was an influx of refugees estimated to be around 150,000, some of whom were registered voters, to neighboring countries including the Republic of Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

7. Successive dialogues mediated by the Joint International Facilitation Team comprising the EAC, African Union, United Nations and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) were convened between Government, opposition representatives and other stakeholders in order to resolve the political stalemate. There were three successive EAC Emergency Summits on the situation in Burundi, and subsequent appointment of President Yoweri Museveni of the Republic of Uganda to facilitate a High Level Political Dialogue in a bid to resolve the political stalemate. The Mission noted that the Political Dialogue was postponed on the eve of the election without consensus.

8. The presidential election which was initially scheduled to take place on 26 June 2015 was postponed to 15 July 2015 following a request by the EAC 2nd Emergency Summit and eventually to 21 July 2015. The 3rd EAC Emergency Summit requested for a delay until 30 July 2015 in order to allow for dialogue and consensus building on contentious issues among all the stakeholders.

9. Lack of political consensus on key issues on the electoral process during the High Level Dialogue including the election calendar, insecurity, the candidature of the incumbent president, return of refugees, media freedoms and civil liberties, perpetuated uncertainty and fear. This state of affairs contributed to some opposition candidates withdrawing from the presidential race.

Legal and Institutional Framework

10. The 2015 presidential election is governed by the Constitution 2005 and a set of laws regulations and decrees. The Constitution provides for fundamental rights and freedoms which are important for the participation of citizens in the electoral process. Article 8 of the Constitution provides for election by equal and universal suffrage. The suffrage is also extended to the citizens in diaspora thereby guaranteeing their enfranchisement.

11. Whilst the framework is adequate for the conduct of democratic elections in Burundi, there have been violations of the fundamental civil and political rights that limited citizen participation in the electoral process. For instance, the attempted coup d’état heightened the closure of several private media outlets thereby impacting on the rights to freedom of expression. Similarly, this denied the citizens an alternative source of information that is critical in making an informed choice in the election.

12. The amendment of the Electoral Code 2014, introduced the use of a single ballot paper that replaced the multiple ballot system. The Mission is of the opinion that this reform is a positive measure as it is able to contribute to enhancing the secrecy of the ballot as well as the overall cost of administration of elections but needed to be accompanied by adequate voter education.

13. The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) is the election management body in Burundi comprising five commissioners who are appointed by the President subject to approval of the National Assembly. While CENI enjoys constitutional independence, it does not enjoy the confidence of a substantial proportion of stakeholders. The desertion of the Vice President and one Commissioner as well as withdrawal of members of the Catholic Church from the CENI structures in May 2015 impacted on public’s perception on the credibility of CENI.

14. The Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to arbitrate election disputes for Presidential and legislative elections in Burundi. It is also tasked with announcement of final election results for presidential election. While the Court constitutionally enjoys independence and impartiality, the desertion of the Vice President of the Court impacted on public’s perception on the credibility of the Court.

Voter Registration and Voters’ Roll

15. There were a total of 3,849,728 registered voters for the 2015 elections. The first voter registration exercise was conducted between November and December 2014. The CENI made efforts to enfranchise more voters in March 2015 through a partial voter registration upon the request of political parties and also allowed for inspection of the voters’ roll by the parties.

16. The Mission noted that the two-step voter registration process was operationally cumbersome. The registrants were issued with a récépissé (waiting slip) and were later to be issued with a voter’s card. The two-step process affected the distribution of the voter cards as the cards had not been distributed by 26 May 2015, being the initial date of parliamentary and communal elections before the postponement of polls.

Election Campaign

17. All political parties and candidates should be allowed to campaign freely as per the law and with due regard to expression of fundamental freedoms of association, assembly and speech in line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. According to the Electoral Code, the election campaign lasts for 14 days.

18. The campaign environment was generally tense and characterized by fear and uncertainty. The political stalemate surrounding the candidature of the incumbent president, concerns relating to the security of candidates and their supporters and the subsequent postponement of polls impacted the electoral process and implementation of the campaign calendar.

19. Some candidates to the presidential election participated in the political dialogue aimed at resolving the political stalemate, a process that took place during the campaign period. This impacted on the candidates’ ability to solicit for votes and for the voters to make informed decisions on leaders of their choice. This uncertainty was further accentuated by the reported withdrawal of some candidates from the presidential race, a few days before the polls.

Media environment

20. An already constrained media in a shrinking democratic space was further affected by the attempted coup d état. The media environment during the electoral process was affected by the ongoing political stalemate. During the period of the failed coup d’état, five private media outlets were destroyed on 13 and 14 May 2015, namely, Radio and Television REMA, Radio and Television Renaissance, Radio Isanganiro, Radio Publique Africaine (RPA), and Radio Sans Frontiere Bonesha FM. The limited access to alternative sources of information apart from the State broadcaster, especially during the electioneering period, limited space for pluralistic ideas and impacted upon the playing field among political competitors. This in turn constrained the options for voters to be adequately informed on the electoral process and make informed choices.

Security Environment

21. The Presidential election in Burundi was held against a backdrop of a tense and violent pre-election period. April to June 2015 witnessed some of the most violent incidents, including a failed coup d’état. Arising from the observed pattern of behaviour over the period, and following a risk assessment mapping, it was noted that the Provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Kayanza had experienced unprecedented violence over the three weeks preceding the presidential polls.

22. On the eve of the polls, there were incidents of shooting, grenade attack and subsequent reports of three deaths in Bujumbura which heightened fear among the population. It was also noted that within Bujumbura city, the following areas were restive with unpredictable security environment: Cibitoke, Mutakura, Buterere, Ngagara, Jabe, Nyakabiga, Kanyosha and Musaga. The Mission did not deploy observers in the above captioned regions as a result of the unpredictable security environment. However, there was relative calm in other parts of the country.

Civic and Voter Education

23. The conduct of civic and voter education had challenges and was exacerbated by insufficient funding. The withdrawal of funding by development partners impacted on the voter education which led to reprioritization of resources by the Government of Burundi. In this regard, the Mission noted that voter education initiatives were minimal despite CENI having introduced a single ballot paper of which voters needed to be adequately educated.

Polling and Counting Processes

24. The EAC observers visited a total of 80 polling stations. The polling process was generally calm and peaceful. Whereas most stations opened on time, some opened later than the stipulated time of 6:00am. In some stations, voting had not started as late as 10.00 am. In Bujumbura, anxiety over insecurity and late arrival of election materials impacted on the timely opening of the polls.

25. In most polling stations visited, polling personnel were present and election materials were in adequate quantity. The polling personnel generally managed the polling process in a professional manner. Apart from the CNDD-FDD party agents who were present in all stations visited by the EAC Observers, there was a notable absence of party agents of most opposition political parties despite the obligatory requirement by Electoral Code.

26. Beside the EAC observers, the Mission noted the presence of domestic observers and international observers from the MENUB, ICGLR, as well as embassies of Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya. Most polling stations closed at 4pm as stipulated in the Electoral Code. The counting process took place immediately after the closure of the polls and registered no incident in all polling stations visited by EAC observers.

26. The EAC observers noted that the voter turnout was generally ranged from low to average in most polling stations visited.    

PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Based on the above findings, the EAC Election Observation Mission to the 21 July 2015 presidential election makes the following recommendations:  

a) To All National Stakeholders: 

Pursue an all-inclusive and honest dialogue in order to find a sustainable solution to the political impasse prevailing in Burundi.

b) To the Government: Ensure that peace and security is guaranteed for all citizens of Burundi; Undertake measures to ensure that law and order is maintained in a manner that uphold respect for human rights;

iii. Ensure that there is adequate funding for the conduct of elections;

– Undertake measures to ensure safe return and reintegration of refugees in Burundi;

– Undertake capacity building measures to strengthen and enhance the efficiency of governance institutions to promote sustainable democratic development;

– Enhance the capacity of security agencies in respecting the fundamental human rights of the citizens while maintaining law order;

vii. Undertake measures to remove restrictions on media freedom and allow private media.

c) To Parliament:

– Pursue legal and institutional reforms aimed at safeguarding the independence of the CENI and the Judiciary;

– Delink the registration of political parties from the Ministry of Interior.

d) To CENI: 

– Consider merging of voter registration and issuance of voters cards in order to enhance operational efficiency and minimize the challenges experienced in the 2015 electoral process;

– Undertake voter education in collaboration with relevant stakeholders to enhance public awareness and participation in electoral processes.

e) To the East African Community: 

Continue engagement with all stakeholders to find a sustainable solution to the prevailing political impasse in the country.

 f) To the International Community: 

Sustain engagement with the Government and all national stakeholders in order to address the prevailing political, social and economic challenges in the country.

CONCLUSION: 

The people of Burundi have enjoyed relative peace since the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000, which constitutes the bedrock for building democracy, sustainable peace and development in the country. The Mission notes that the electoral period has been characterised by anxiety and uncertainty. The Mission notes with concern that successive efforts to build consensus through inclusive dialogue among Burundi stakeholders have not been successful.

30. The Mission noted that there was relative peace on the polling day. However, the principle of choice was generally hampered by among others, insecurity ( a general feeling of fear and despondency in some parts of the country), confinement of democratic space, civil liberties including freedom of speech, assembly, media, campaigning and the boycott by opposition parties.

31. The electoral process fell short of the principles and standards for holding free, fair, peaceful, transparent and credible elections as stipulated in various international, continental as well as the EAC Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation.

32. The EAC Observation Mission urges all stakeholders to maintain calm and to re-engage in candid and inclusive dialogue in order to find sustainable solution to the political impasse prevailing in Burundi.

33. The Mission would like to thank and extend its profound gratitude to the people and the Government of Burundi, CENI and MENUB for their cooperation during the mission.

Issued at Royal Palace Hotel, Bujumbura this 23 July 2015

Signed by

…………………………………………

Hon. Zein Abubakar

Head of Mission