REDD+ Kasigau Corridor Project: Lacking results and with questionable affiliations!

There are a December 2016 report written by Jutta Kill and published in parts by the European Union. The name of the Report are: “The Kasigau Corridor REDD+ Project in Kenya: A crash dive for Althelia Climate Fund”. This report tells a worrying story of how a project is a possible revenue source, instead of being there for climate change use or even local development. This sort of project and funding should be used for sort of projected land titles that saves the forests or create land that the owners can earn on instead of destroying the land. Something most of the REDD+ funds and projects is about, making sure the forest and the agricultural lands are kept and saved by the use of funding from donors and project builders.

One of the first hard-hitting quotes from the report are: “In addition, several reports document how land use restrictions imposed by the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project hit pastoralists and ethnic Taita and Duruma communities particularly hard while these groups receive very few if any of the benefits the REDD+ project provides to local communities” (Jutta Kill, P: 4, 2016).

So if there are donors who seems to be positive to projects and development projects that isn’t being there for the locals, than why are they offering the monies and using the time to facilitate the project in Kenya?

The Taita Hills REDD+ Project in Kenya has been marketed by Althelia, the project developer Wildlife Works Carbon, institutional funders like the EIB and media supporting market-based environmentalism as the Fund’s signature investment. Wildlife Works Carbon has been operating the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project in south-eastern Kenya since 2005” (Jutta Kill, P: 6, 2016). So with this in mind the Althelia has offered certain amount of money on the table, as this was the signature investment, even as it have no benefit for the local communities. The Althelia had done this: “For four of the projects, the Fund’s annual reports indicate that the investment is made in the form of loans whereas for the REDD+ project in Kenya, the 2015 audited financial report mentions an investment through an ‘Emission Reductions Purchase Agreement’ (ERPA). Four of the five projects are also covered by a US$133.8m loan guarantee that USAID has extended to the Althelia Climate Fund in 2014. As of 31 December 2015, investors had disbursed €18,36m of the €101m committed” (Jutta Kill, P: 5, 2016). So the development project are funded through loans that are guaranteed by the USAID, but extended into the Althelia Climate Fund, so the two are co-operating in the direct funding of the REDD+ Kenya. So they are rubber-stamping and giving faith to the projects.

The ‘Stand for Trees’ Initiative, a brainchild of Wildlife Works and supported by USAID, has become an important source of revenue – some say, a lifeline – for many private sector REDD+ projects” (Jutta Kill, P: 17, 2016). So that the Wildlife Works that works inside this REDD+ project, that are using the funds from USAID and EIB, are complicating it more as the other revelations that should worry the ones who cares about the environment and accountability of ones running it: “The Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project’s financial lifeline came from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank, and BHP Billiton, the mining company with a record of severe environmental damage and forced displacement of communities that stretches back decades and continues to this day” (Jutta Kill, P: 18. 2016). So why would a mining company cares about an environmental project in Kenya, unless they we’re earning funds and getting profits on the project?

You can really understand the issues of the IFC and BHP Biliton involvement, when the local communities gets no benefit or contributing to the projects.

So when you have the Althelia Climate Fund, which is funded with loans from the World Bank private corporation branch IFC and the USAID loans, together in corporation of BHP Bilition, as the REDD+ Project in Kenya is in works with both Wildlife Works, as the ‘Save the Tree’ brainchild. As this was the Althelia signature project. That there are problematic forces in play when the EIB are supporting the REDD+ projects as well, either directly through loans like USAID or like IFC. Therefore, the many actors are surely paying and donating favorable loans so the owners of the fund and the ones living of it makes this the lifeline for the Wildlife Works, even as this one doesn’t have the impact on local communities.

Just as one key observation:

One of the most striking observations was how locally, people referred to Wildlife Works as “the company”. The reasons for this seemed twofold. For one part of “the community”, Wildlife Works is “the company” that instructs guards to confiscate cattle and goats; that prevents the poorest community members in the area from collecting even dry branches for firewood when “the company” itself runs a charcoal production business on the REDD+ project area; that puts up water tanks on residents’ land without even asking permission, let alone paying for the use of the land; that claims to dedicate initially 1/3 of carbon revenue sales to local community projects, but does so in a way that means benefits from these “community” projects are captured by local elites. For example, ranch shareholders who receive 1/3 of the revenue from the carbon credit sales might also sit on the “community development committees” that decide how the 50% of the profit from carbon credit sales” (Jutta Kill, P: 21, 2016).

Another insulting observation:

A carbon offset provider offering carbon credits from the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project writes on its website that “committees determine what projects to undertake, prioritizing them by need and feasibility. ‘So many people have problems with water, so water projects—water tanks, water pipelines—always come first,’ said Pascal Kizaka, a local chief and committee board member” (…) “Exploring the location of one of the “water pipelines” advertised as an activity of the Wildlife Works Carbon REDD+ project revealed that far from what was suggested by the large placard outside the building (a One Vision Center), it seemed that the Wildlife Works contribution to the “water pipelines” project had been just the guttering along the side of the building’s roof and piping to connect the gutters with a water tank constructed by others. People also commented about bore holes put in by “the company” that had never provided any water” (Jutta Kill, P: 23, 2016).

So the Company, the Wildlife Works are supposed to provide water and pipelines. Still, there aren’t any who has been provided with the water, even as the REDD+ Committee Board Member Pascal Kizaka claims, as the locals and community says otherwise. This together with the lacking proof of the help with carbon credit sales and the control of land. This whole development project seems sketchy and a lifeline for Wildlife Works instead of being there for the local Kenyan Communities. Therefore, the use of IFC and Althelia Climate Fund, seems like way of misusing Carbon Tax and Carbon trading, instead of developing the Kasigau project for the Taita and Duruma communities. That deserves better and also deserves that when people and organizations comes in that they does not earn on their misfortune, but actually comes with projects serving them. If not this is just a way of fraudulent development industry, that no republic deserves. Peace.

KJE (Kampala-Jinja expressway): As expensive as it could be or more

JinjaRoad Roundabout Kampala

Kampala-Jinja Expressway KJE) the PPP road project that cost the double in 2 Years time:

Today UNRA put out a tender for the KJE or Kampala – Jinja Expressway. That will be a Public-Private Partnership, which means that the government project will be financially funding through the investors that will get back on their investment through the tolling of the commuters and traffic on the road after building the project/road. UNRA has the official follow-up of the KJE and will oversee that the company or companies that they keeps up with the set standards. Though it worrying to see how the numbers has gone up for the project from $ 0,5USD Billion in 2013 to Ministry of Transport set the contract for $ 1USD Billion on the same project. Here is the main quotes from different sources and I myself wonder if this in the re-up for a similar “Project 1034: Mukono-Katosi Road Scandal” with Corruption and also bad practices with financial issues since they did not follow “due diligence” on the contracts on that. But let’s hope, here is what that is out there now.

IMF reports in 2013 saying that the cost of the project would be $ 0,5USD Billions, that funding aren’t made with government money, but through PPP funding. This is all a part of the main issues which is this: “An additional investment of $200 million on the needed connectivity (e.g. roads, bridges) for the start of oil production in 2018 is also anticipated” (…)”Roads. The program mainly includes construction of roads linking Kampala with Jinja and with Mpigi, expected to start in FY2013/14 and be completed in five years at a cost of about $500 million each”  (IMF, 2013).

“According to the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) spokesperson Dan Alinange, the government has hired the World Bank’s International Finance (IFC) as advisor to help in the tender process” (…)”The six-lane, 77km Kampala-Jinja road will be the first PPP road project in Uganda and the second toll road in the country after the $470m Kampala-Entebbe road that is currently under construction” (…)”Alinange added: “We want to reduce congestion on this corridor for Uganda. We are aware there is enormous appetite for this sort of project and that’s what gave us confidence to structure Jinja-Kampala as a PPP” (RTT, 2014).

“The project involves the development of a six-lane 77-km road project. The project aims to improve road infrastructure in Uganda, improve road safety and facilitate trade and tourism. The project will be developed on a design, build, finance and operation (DBFO) basis. The total project investment is estimated at around US$1 billion” (Martin, 2014).

“One of the roads is the Kampala-Jinja expressway estimated at about $800m (about sh2.13 trillion). The new road will help decongest the old Kampala-Jinja road that forms part of the Trans-African highway” (…)”Construction of the 80km state-of-the-art road is expected to commence in 2015. About sh200b has been earmarked for compensation of the affected people” (…)Eng. David Luyimbazi said: “The investor will recover the money through charging a toll fee from road users over a 20- 25-year concessional period.” (Ogwang).

Background from the WB:

“In 2011, PPIAF provided follow-up support to identify and prioritize potential PPP projects. Ten priority projects were identified, including the Kampala-Jinja road, which is now under implementation with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) appointed as the transaction advisor” (…)”In May 2014, IFC’s Advisory Services in PPPs signed an advisory agreement with the GOU, through the UNRA, to develop a 77 km greenfield expressway between Kampala and Jinja” (World Bank, 2015).

More from PPIAF:

“One of the priority projects – Kampala-Jinja – road is now under implementation with IFC appointed as the transaction advisor. PPIAF recently approved a grant in partnership with Trademark EA (TMEA) and IFC to support two main tasks: the development of a tolling policy and an investment appraisal guidance tool, and strengthening the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA’s) capacity to implement PPP projects” (…)“In May 2014, IFC’s Advisory Services in PPPs signed an advisory agreement with the GOU, through the UNRA, to develop a 77 km greenfi eld expressway between Kampala and Jinja with a possible extension to include the 17 km Kampala Southern Bypass. Together with the existing Kampala Northern Bypass the expressway would form a ring road around Kampala City. The project, with an estimated capital cost of $1 billion, will seek a concessionaire to design, build, fi nance, and operate the road as a tolled facility” (PPIAF, 2014).

KJE:

“The project involves the construction of a green field dual carriageway expressway between Kampala and Jinja. The road extends from the boundary of the jurisdiction of the Kampala Capital City Authority (approximately 3 km from the city centre) to Jinja town tying in with the proposed New Nile Bridge. Consequently the nominal length of the project road is about 77km. The existing road, which will remain as a free alternative is a class 1 asphalt paved road in a fairly good condition” (UNRA, 2014).

“The Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) is the implementing agency for the planned KAMPALA JINJA TOLL EXPRESSWAY. It will link the capital with the important industrial area of Jinja. Past plans have been for four to six lanes for the 77-kilometre road. Cost estimates have also varied from USD 700 million to USD 1 billion. There are reports that the ministry of transport will be floating a USD 1 billion Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) tender and that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) will be the lead financial adviser. Construction could commence in 2015 with commissioning in 2020. COMESA has declared it to be a priority Project that is an important component of the Mombasa-Kampala – Kigali northern corridor” (APA, 2014).

Progress on Capacity improvement projects around Kampala:

Kampala – Jinja Express Highway (Funded under PPP), 77km, Detailed Engineering design completed Construction will be financed under PPP. Transactions Advisor (International Finance Cooperation) is assisting in structuring the project into a bankable PPP Project. Tendering for financing and implementation is expected in May 2015″ (UNRA, 2015).

Here is the tender dropped from UNRA today:

UNRA - KJE P1UNRA - KJE P2

Also this:

Reference:

Africa Project Access (APA) – ‘Africa Project Newsletter: Issue 234’ (Nov. 2014) link: https://www.wko.at/Content.Node/service/aussenwirtschaft/NEWSLETTER-234-November-2014.pdf

Martin, Miguel – ‘MegaProject 334: Uganda to tender Kampala – Jinja Expressway next year’ (17.10.2014) link: http://infrapppworld.com/2014/10/megaproject-334-uganda-to-tender-kampala-jinja-expressway-next-year.html

IMF – ‘IMF Country Report No. 13/375: UGANDA FIRST REVIEW UNDER THE POLICY SUPPORT INSTRUMENT’ (Des. 2013) link: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13375.pdf

RoadTrafficTechnology – ‘Uganda plans to float $1bn PPP tender for Kampala-Jinja road in 2015’ (17.10.2014) link: http://www.roadtraffic-technology.com/news/newsuganda-plans-to-float-1bn-ppp-tender-for-kampala-jinja-road-in-2015-4409054

Ogwang, Joel – ‘Govt joins World Bank to build $1.5b road projects’ link: http://www.newvision.co.ug/mobile/Detail.aspx?NewsID=641587&CatID=3

PPIAF – ‘PPIAF Supports Uganda’s Roads PPP Program’ (July 2014) link: http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/Impact-Story-Uganda-Roads.pdf

UNRA – ‘Investor Teaser June 2014: Design, Build, Finance & Operate: Kampala Jinja Expressway (77km) & Kampala Southern Bypass (17km)’ (June, 2014) link: http://www.inspiratia.com/Content/Files/View.ashx?FileID=cb5ec032-d0e6-4218-a24e-c248fd2c6d19

UNRA – ‘ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE KEY TO DEVELOPMENT’ (2015) link: http://www.eagle.co.ug/ads/UNRA2015.pdf

World Bank – ‘Partnering to Support Uganda’s Roads PPP Program’ (25.09.2015) link: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/09/25/partnering-to-support-ugandas-roads-ppp-program

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