Press Release: Number of Burundian Refugees Tops 250,000, Says UNHCR (07.03.2016)

kinama (1)

GENEVA, March 7 – With tension remaining high in Burundi, the number of people who have sought shelter in neighbouring states has now passed the 250,000 mark, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency notes, cautioning that people continue to flee and numbers could rise further.

UNHCR’s latest figures show that 250,473 people have been registered as refugees in Democratic Republic of the Congo (21,186); Rwanda (73,926); Tanzania (131,834); Uganda (22,330); and Zambia (1,197) since early April last year, when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced plans to run for a third term, which he later won.

The average rate of new arrivals per week is more than 1,000 in Tanzania, 500 in Uganda, 230 in Rwanda and 200 in Democratic Republic of the Congo. There have been small numbers of spontaneous returns.

Lusenda Burundi Refugee Camp

“Cool heads and continuing international attention are needed to avert further deterioration this year, and the right to leave the country and seek asylum should be respected,” UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming told a news briefing in Geneva.

“Despite recent high-level efforts to engage the government, we have not seen significant improvement in the security and human rights situation on the ground. The deteriorating economic situation is also a cause for concern which could trigger further displacement,” she added.

“Although there has been a slight lull in violence recently in Burundi, refugees arriving in the host countries continue to report human rights violations and difficulty in leaving Burundi. We have also been receiving a growing number of refugee reports about detention and sexual and gender-based violence in transit,” Fleming said.

Some 1,700 Burundian refugees have arrived in Democratic Republic of the Congo so far this year, down on the 2,051 of October last year, but still a steady flow. Many are living in poor rural areas, where conditions are harsh, and about two-thirds (14,772) are in Lusenda camp, which is nearing its capacity of 18,000.

Overcrowding is a problem in all host countries, including Tanzania, which has taken in more Burundians than any other. Nyarugusu camp hosts some 143,000 people, including almost 80,000 who have arrived since last April. The decongestion of the camp is a priority and new arrivals go to Ndutu, while others at Nyarugusu are sent to the recently reopened Mutendeli camp. Another camp is planned at Karago, but capacity there and at Mutendeli is limited by insufficient water reserves.

Nakivale Refugee Camp Isingiro District

In Rwanda, close to 48,000 Burundian refugees are living in Mahama camp, the largest camp in Rwanda, and more than 26,400 in Kigali and other towns. As the insecurity persists in Burundi they are running out of savings, which will increase their need for assistance. The Rwandan government, meanwhile, has clarified that it has no plans to relocate Burundian refugees and will keep its doors open.

In Uganda, about two thirds of Burundian arrivals in the past year are being hosted in Nakivale Refugee Settlement (14,876) in the South-West Region, 21 per cent in the capital Kampala, and the remainder in Kyaka II, Oruchinga and Kisoro settlements.

Most are young women and children, with a disproportionately low number of young men. Work is under way to extend settlement areas at Nakivale and other locations. Access to water continues to be a problem and UNHCR is delivering by truck in Nakivale, which is costly and unsustainable.

As with the other asylum countries, funding is a major problem which is affecting access to education, health care, livelihoods, counselling and more, though Uganda allows people to work and travel.

UNHCR requested US$175.1 million for the Burundi humanitarian response in 2016 and has to date received US$4.7 million, or about 3 per cent. –UNHCR

Joint Communique: 17th Ordinary Summity of the East African Community Heads of State

17 EAC Joint Communique P117 EAC Joint Communique P217 EAC Joint Communique P317 EAC Joint Communique P417 EAC Joint Communique P5

In remembrance of Dr. Andrew Kayira and the possible plot of the NRA to assassinate him on the 6th of March 1987

Andrew Kayira

Today it has been 29 years since the assassination of Dr. Andrew Kayira, the former rebel and government minister at his time. He even had an alliance with the NRA then military rebel-group of President Museveni and at one point even helped with his rebel-group attacking central barracks and taking weapons from the governmental forces of the then Obote II government. At one point he even had an alliance with Col. Gaddafi of Libiya who sent weapons from Burundi through Rwanda to both NRA and the UFM rebel groups to regain more support in Sub-Saharan Africa. This here is telling a story of why he possibly was killed, by who and some insights into the reports. Also the way the newly NRM tried to shut-up media who covered it after the coup d’état in 1986 when they controlled the media and wouldn’t release the information in 1988 when articles came out for the first time about the assassination of Dr. Kayira. Here take a look!

Report from 1983:

“the Ugandan Freedom Movement (UFM) led by Andrew Kayira, a minster in the short-lived Lule government which succeeded Amin, and member of the opposition Democratic Party’s militant, unconstitutional wing” (…)”Kampala is now relatively quiet and secure, and the UFM leader Andrew Kayira is reported to have left the country” (Crisp, 1983).

Treason Charge on the 8th March 1987:

“Former Energy Minister Andrew Kayira was killed by gunmen, some of whom were wearing army uniforms. He was acquitted two weeks ago of charges of treason. Journalist Henry Gombya said the men, armed with knives and guns, came to his house Friday night. Kayira had been living there since his release. Gombya said he hid in the bush and his wife and three children locked themselves in a bathroom. Kayira tried to hide in a bedroom but was found and shot in the head, arms and thighs, the journal ist said. Kayira, who was named energy minister last year, was arrested five months ago with 25 other prominent people. They allegedly were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the government of President Yoweri Museveni” (Orlando Sentinel, 1987).

NRA M7

Museveni ordered it:

“It is believed that he ordered the assassination of Kayiira. Kayiira was killed in March 1987, and his movement began to fall apart soon thereafter. As director of military intelligence, Kagame would have supervised  the assassination plan; certainly, say Ugandan, it could not have occurred without his imprimatur also” (De Hoyes, 1997).

What was the Pre-Text for the assassination of Dr. Kayira:

“Despite Kayira’s integration into the NRA and his subsequent appointment as Minister, it seems the NRA Government mistrusted him, resulting in his eventual arrest in October 1986. He was accused of treason for allegedly plotting to overthrow the Government of President Museveni, though he was acquitted and released by court on February 24, 1987. On 9 March 1987, Kayira was assassinated by unknown gunmen. After his death, his followers disintegrated. Some went into exile, others were integrated into NRA, while others deserted” (Refugee Law Project, 2014).

What the Scotland Yard Report says happen:

“On 6th March, 1987, at about llp.m. Dr Kayira and his friend, Mr, Henry Gombya, a B.B.C stringer, were having dinner with Gombya’s wife Victoria Naava ,24 , and three other girls Josephine Babirye, 19, Julian Nabwire, 14, and Annet Namatovu, 23, when about 10 armed men stormed the compound and attacked the persons present” (Scotland Yard).

Andrew Kayira P2

Witness report from Scotland Yard:

“According to Gombya, whilst the attackers were shouting at the occupants and kicking the door/ he in panic split Shs40 million which he had in his bedroom into two halves and threw Shs20 million into the banana plantation from the balcony leading from his room and left the remaining money in the bed for the suspects to steal. He then jumped from the balcony/ a height of 12 feet and ran down the driveway and on the second attempt managed to climb over the gate. He then hid in a banana plantation” (…)“Whilst this was happening the attackers were shouting to Dr Kayiira to open his bedroom door, which he did at the same time asking them what they wanted. Witnesses’ state that when Gombya escaped and was running towards the gates he was seen by one of the gunmen who raised the alarm and was told not to pursue him as the “UFM man” was in the house. This would suggest that the gunmen knew that Dr Kayiira was staying at the house” (…)”Police were eventually notified at Kabalagala Police Post some two miles away and arrived shortly after 7:30am. A photographer and scenes of Crime Officer arrived soon afterwards. Scenes of Crime examination was always going to be difficult as prior to police arrival villagers and other persons from the surrounding areas had descended onto the premises and went inside the house to satisfy their curiosity, and pay their respects” (Scotland Yard).

Aftermath:

“Investigations by the Kampala C.I.D under the direction of Simon Mugamba (Director of C.I.D) and Senior superintendent Fideiis Ongom (Officer in charge) commenced and quickly established that Gombya had requested from Mr Henry Kateregga, a Kampala businessman Shs40 million very urgently” (…)”As a result of their investigations the police were contacted by a man named Emmanuel Sebbunza, 17, who informed police that he had been involved with the people responsible for the killing of Dr Kayiira and although not at scene at the time of the offence, he assisted them in its preparation” (…)”He further stated that he had been paid money for both his assistance and to keep quiet about who took part. He states that the motive was robbery as the persons involved in the offence knew that Dr Kayiira was at the house and further that a large amount of money was in the house. He states however that it was believed that Dr Kayiira had the money. Mr Sebbunza further stated that arrangements for the offence were made at the shop of Muzeyi & Sons, Kampala, belonging to Mr John Katabazi, 28” (Scotland Yard).

NRA marching to Kampala 1986

Museveni action after the takeover of power:

“On Thursday 26th March 1987, at the request of President Museveni-the Ugandan President I (Detective Chief superintendent Thompson) attached to the serious crimes Branch New Scotland Yard, together with Detective Inspector Sanderson, scenes of crime officer attached to the Metropolitan Police Laboratory travelled to Uganda to assist the investigating officers because of the strong suggestions that the murder of Dr Kayiira was a ‘political’ one” (Scotland Yard).

Gomboya Statement:

“The majority of the attackers were dressed in NRA uniforms while others were dressed locally. Suspicion immediately fell on NRA soldiers when on the Saturday morning as hundreds of people were flocking my house to view the body of Kayiira which was still lying in a pool of blood in his bedroom” (…)”I told commander Kazoora that in my view, those who had killed Kayiira were likely to have been government enemies. I further told him, “If these people now return and shoot me dead, the government would find it quite difficult to prove it was not behind my death.” (…)”Mr Ssemogerere expressed surprise that “anyone would suggest that I was involved in the killing of your friend”. As he put it, on that day when Dr Kayiira was killed Mr Ssemogerere was the only Cabinet minister who came to my house and saw Dr Kayiira’s body lying in a pool of blood” (…)”The arguments went on almost the whole night until I finally made up my mind that the safest way for me would be the airport. I reached this decision for mainly one fact, Earlier in the day I had contacted my BBC colleague in Nairobi Mike Wooldridge whom I told about my fears concerning my safety. I told Mike that I had received information from the Uganda CID that I would be arrested as a murder suspect” (…)”He found this difficult to believe until I told him I had been to Mr Ssemogerere’s house to brief him about this new development. It was then that Mike volunteered to call Dr Besigye and find out from him whether I would really be arrested” (…)”The answer he got from Dr Besigye was; I want to assure the BBC and Henry that we have no intention of arresting him nor have we even suggested he be suspected In any way in this killing”. Dr. Besigye further told Mike Wooldridge that I was free to go anywhere but added “He may be needed to give evidence” (…)”Mr Wooldridge replied that since Dr Besigye had assured me I was not wanted he did not see any reason why I should not rest. Mike agreed with me that it would look like as if I was running away if I did not use the airport. Since in my heart I knew I was quite an innocent man who had just lost a great friend I did not see why I should try to leave the country as a criminal. My decision took everybody present by surprise!” (…)”But soon after my first interview the Uganda Foreign Affairs Minister Mr Ibrahim Mukiibi called the British High Commissioner in Kampala Mr Derek March to protest at what he called “the way your deputy helped a Ugandan journalist Henry Gombya to escape from Kampala”.Mr Mukiibi further told the British High Commissioner that I was “wanted” back in Uganda in “connection” with the killing of Dr Kayiira” (…)”The Investigating team also received evidence from some NRA soldiers from the 19th Battalion in Lubiri barracks which points to involvement of top NRA leadership and its lieutenants in the murder. According to these soldiers/ the murder of Dr Kayiira was planned days before his release. When the Directors of public prosecution (DPP) and CID jointly told government that there was no evidence to incriminate Dr Kayiira and several of co-accused in the alleged plot of treason this brief was received with a lot of reservations” (Scotland Yard).

M7 Makerere 1986

One Conclusion:

“There was also no evidence that Dr Kayiira put up any resistance. In addition, Gombya who was the owner of the money and other property in the house was not the prime target as he was ignored by the attackers when escaping. On the strength of the evidence the motive of the attackers was very clear: they wanted to kill Dr Andrew Kayiira. This gives credence to the 2nd hypothesis” (Scotland Yard).

Analyzed report:

“Despite President Museveni’s friendship with Dr Kayiira there had been recent mistrust of him by the President as a result of which Dr Kayiira was arrested in October 1986 for alleged;y ploting against the government, and subsequently releases by the court on February 24, 1987, due to lack of evidence” (…)”The release of Dr Kayiira surprised somee people and the subsequent murder of Kayiira led to strong rumours that his death was politically motivated and had been caused by the government’s hand” (…)”It was because of the above facts and the political overtones that the subsequent murder of Dr Kayiira was quickly seized on by various factions to suggest that his death was not only politically motivated, but might even have been carried out by President Museveni’s soldiers on the President’s orders. This charge is emphatically denied by the President” (Scotland Yard).

Fall Guy:

“It seems a British police report has been doctored to make it seem like I am a suspect or somehow involved,” said Mr Gombya, who fled Uganda after the killing and now lives in Farnborough, Hampshire. “Who carried out the shooting? I don’t know. Who ordered it? I believe it was President Museveni, and I’m not afraid to say it … I’m the fall guy.” (…)”There was speculation [at the time] about whether it was a politically motivated murder or a criminal attack,” said Peter Penfold yesterday. He was a diplomat at the British high commission in 1987. “I suppose both scenarios were plausible.” (Lewis, 2007).

Arrests after Article 1988 Uganda Front Page of ReportArrests after Article 1988 Uganda

I hope that gave some insights to the matter and that the truth will hopefully come out one day and that the men behind the killing of this man will get their punishment has he died for political reasons. This here is just one of many, still important as there been many killings and many assassinations under the NRM-Regime and their NRA. This one is significant as this was a way of getting rid of opposition forces and solidifies the regime after the civil war. Peace.  

Reference:

Crisp, Jeff – ‘National Security, Human Rights and Population Displacements in Uganda with special reference to events in Luwero District, Jan – Sept. 1983’ (October 1983) – British Refugee Council

De Hoyes, Linda – ‘Why London supports Rwanda’s confessed mass killer Paul Kagame’ (05.12.1997) – EIR News Service

Lewis, Paul – ‘I’m the fall guy for Ugandan murder, says ex-BBC man’ (20.01.2007) link: http://www.theguardian.com/media/2007/jan/20/bbc.uganda

Refugee Law Project – ‘COMPENDIUM OF CONFLICTS IN UGANDA – Findings of the National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Audit’ (2014) – Makerere University

Orlando Sentinel – ‘Treason Charge: Former Energy Minister Andrew Kayira was…’ (08.03.1987) link: http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1987-03-08/news/0110340050_1_treason-overthrow-the-government-arms-and-thighs

Scotland Yard – ‘SCOTLAND YARD REPORT THE MURDER OF DR ANDREW LUTAAKOME KAYIIRA: DEMOCRATIC PARTY VERSION’

“Why Africa has old leaders and young people?” (BBC News – Youtube-Clip)

Why Africa has old leaders and young people. The recent election victory of Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni has once again raised questions about term limits and democracy in some African countries. However, the Ugandan leader, who is entering his fifth term in office, is not the only one. The issue of presidential terms has caused public protests in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and in 2014 led to the ousting of Blaise Compaore, long-time leader of Burkina Faso. BBC Africa Business Report’s Matthew Davies looks at the contrast between Africa’s old leaders and its young population” (BBC News, 04.03.2016).

Official Congratulations letter’s to President Museveni from South Africa (President Zuma, 22.02.2016), Rwanda (President Kagame, 21.02.2016) and Republic of Korea (President Guen-Hyen, 23.02.2016)

ZA Congs 22.02.2016

Rwanda Congs 23.02.2016

South Korea Congs 23.02.2016

Rwandan gov. trained militia to topple Burundian gov,; UN confidential note to the UN Security Council on the matter; Rwandan gov. denies, while Burundian gov. verifies

Burundi-Museveni-Nkurunziza

Here today I am going through some worrying reports, the leaked note I have read, have been discussed in other media, therefore my article is thicker and deeper. As I want to show the results and responses of the governmental officials from Burundi and Rwanda on the matter. Some of it should be expected, as Rwandan response would never say that actually tried to topple President Pierre Nkurunziza, which President Kagame could have that in him, would not be new considering how he together with Uganda President Museveni went and toppled Mobutu Seko Seko.

The recent news has also been questioned by some sources; I will add that tape in the end where that journalist asks if it is manufactured. You can have your take on it. The matter of violence that President Kagame has in the past and near present time in DRC, he could have had the capacity to pull it off. He has it in his veins just like President Museveni. Therefore we should not be shocked if this is facts and that the Burundian authorities is aggravated, the way the Burundian government has gone against their own opposition is not a just, but the cause of stopping a neighboring country trained militia or guerilla force should be reasonable. That proves the fragile situation in Burundi and that behind the scenes the powers around try to earn coins on it. Here take a look!

Kivu Provines

Training of militia to topple Nkurunziza:

The Group spoke with 18 Burundian combatants, not associated with the Front National de Liberation (FNL) in Uvira Territory of South Kivu Province. They told the Group that they had been recruited in the Mahama Refugee Camp in eastern Rwanda in May and June 2015 and were given two months of military training by instructors, who included Rwandan military personnel, in a forest camp in Rwanda. Their training included military tactics and the maintenance and use of assault rifles and machine guns, as well as ideological and morale-building sessions. Some told the Group that they were also trained in the use of grenades, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. They were transported around Rwanda in the back of military trucks, often with Rwandan military escort. The Burundian combatants told the Group that there were least four companies of 100 recruits each being trained at the camp while they were there. Six of the trained combatants that the group spoke with were minors. They told the Group that the military training instructors at the camp knew that they were minors. The Burundian combatants showed the Group fake DRC identification cards that had been produced for them in Rwanda, so they could avoid suspicion while in the DRC. They crossed the Rusizi River in small groups at night from Rwanda into the DRC just south of the Kamanyola border post, with the assistance of a network based within the DRC. Like the FNL, they reported that their ultimate goal was to remove Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza” (UN, 2016).

BurundiNTVNews

Arms to the trained militia:  

“Several individuals were arrested in October to November 2015 in Goma, North Kivu Province, on suspicion of involvement in arms smuggling from the DRC to other countries. The perpetrators are Rwandan or Congolese nationals and were caught at the Congolese-Rwandan border post with the weapons. Some of the weapons were hidden in bags of green beans or manioc, and other were hidden in the chassis of a car. The Group interviews the perpetrators some of whom confirmed the weapons were to be used in support of armed groups in Burundi” (UN, 2016).

Burundian embassy to Hauge stated this:

“Burundi welcomes the fact that the international community is beginning to discover that the source of the insecurity afflicting Burundi is Rwanda. Information available to the government of Burundi and credible information from some media (France 24) and investigative reports by some International Experts, including UN Experts have confirmed that Rwanda which is a neighboring country to Burundi recruits, trains and arms Burundian citizens including minors in the MAHAMA Refugees Camp in Rwanda and sends them into to the territory of Burundi to commit armed attacks against civilians, security and military targets” (…)”   We know that some countries and some components of the international community have suspended or even stopped economic cooperation in order to force the democratically elected institutions by the sovereign people of Burundi and validated by the national and sub-regional judicial powers to submit and hand over power to anti-democratic Burundian forces. On the basis of credible information pointing to unprovoked acts of hostility and destabilization sponsored by Rwanda and executed by the violent opposition as the direct causes of the violence in Burundi, the Burundi Embassy in The Hague urges the countries which suspended economic cooperation with Burundi to review their positions” (Diplomat Magazine, 2016).

Kagame Nkurunziza 2011

Burundi response to the news:

“The CNDD-FDD Party condemns Rwanda over its neocolonial purposes for having implemented the plan of Burundi occupation so as to lead the country through an ethnical vision which Paul Kagame would have used as he had done it during the period of FPR Inkotanyi . The Burundian democrats remind him that if there had been no complicity and the politico –military support of the MINUAR, the FPR -Inkotanyi would have never taken the power in Rwanda and Paul Kagame has made use of genocide, sacrificing his own brothers to take the power. It is what he wanted to do in Burundi, while outrageously overusing the word genocide as experienced in his country” (…)”It is also unbelievable that the aggressor KAGAME has never been blamed by organizations such as the African Union, the United Nations , the European Union and other international organizations and that on the contrary, most of those organizations and States have not done nothing but connived, imposing him an international force. Burundian People cannot be mistaken taking into consideration what MINUAR has done to help Kagame take the power. KAGAME wanted and want to apply the same experience he has lived in his country. He has created a rebellion under the blessing of some politico- mafia settings among others Louis Michel, and his friends to bring back the G7 and the G10 of Buyoya to the power by the cheating of a putsch and a government of transition. Therefore, the dangerous use of the word genocide and ethnic are nothing but shields for those pseudo nostalgic politicians with bad ideas” (Nyabenda, 2016).

StampBurundi

Burundian Opposition claims:

”The opposition Burundi Democratic Rally (Radebu) chairman Jean de Dieu Mutabazi echoed the remarks, saying Rwanda was behind the war in a sister EAC member state and was worsening the unrest that has so far claimed hundreds of lives. “There’s this neighbour of ours, Rwanda, under the warmonger President Paul Kagame, who has been fighting in DR Congo and recently wanted to fight Tanzania,” Mr Mutabazi charged. “He is the one providing arms and logistical support to the rebels attacking Burundi.” Jacques Bigirimana, president of the FNL party, said although the belligerents were keen on national dialogue in a bid to end the political crisis, the country was under siege from what he termed as “destabilisation forces sponsored by Rwanda” (Ihucha, 2016).

Rwandan reaction:

“Last December, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame dismissed as “childish” allegations that Rwanda had stoked instability in Burundi and said Rwandan troops would play no part in any intervention in the neighbouring country” (Ihucha, 2016).

Rwandan Foreign Minister counters the report:

“Speaking to reporters on Friday, Louis Mushikiwabo, Rwanda foreign minister said that allegations were baseless and lies. “Rwanda hosting a big number of Burundian refugees in various refugee camps in the country does not mean training them to overthrow Burundian government? We cannot chase them back to their home country if they are not sure of their safety. Burundian government is in better position to look for a possible lasting solution to bring peace in Burundi,” she said” (China.org.cn, 2016).

Monuc

MONUSCO statement recently:

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has sovereign and primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens.  MONUSCO stands ready to support the Government in these efforts, in line with its mandate to protect civilians. In this regard, MONUSCO welcomes the Government’s acceptance of the Mission’s proposal to resume coordinated offensive operations, which resulted in an agreed arrangement for military cooperation on 28 January 2016. With regard to cooperation with the FARDC, MONUSCO is confident that the measures put in place with the Government to mitigate risk and provide appropriate monitoring where necessary will ensure that MONUSCO-supported operations against ADF, FDLR and other armed groups are undertaken in line with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy” (MONUSCO, 2016).

EALA statement on Burundi:

“Leontine Nzeyimana, Minister for EAC Affairs in Burundi however included a mix of representatives from government, political parties, and civil society. On her part, the minister noted: “As it has been happening in Burundi since the early 1960’s, the electioneering period was marked by negative propaganda intended to create in Burundi a political and institutional instability” (…)”The importance of this crisis to the EAC, the Report added, was brought home by accusations leveled against a Partner state by the Government-led delegation. Except for one Report, the delegation was unable to provide adequate evidence to the Committee to validate the claim that the Republic of Rwanda is hosting and militarily training Burundi refugees” (EALA, 2016).

The promised youtube-clip:

There is lots of statement that is hard to verify or grasp. Certainly all of the actors have a place in the motions and want to achieve something to prove their worth. The Government of Burundi is the one that is under fire, and for the moment they will be as long as the attacks on the opposition and way to civil war is continuing, while the refugees goes into DRC, Tanzania and Rwanda, even in Uganda.

The conflict and crisis has made the inter-dialogue stifled and the African Union hasn’t made any progress on the issues in the country. While Rwandan government might have seen it as it golden hour; as they saw it in the DRC back in day. So here we are in this day where Burundi is a pawn while the Government and Burundian National Forces, does not only fight their own public to stay in power, but might also fight against foreign trained forces; which it might happen and wouldn’t surprise me as the history of President Kagame lingers on. As he centers more and more power in Rwanda around himself in neo-Museveni way, he looks more and more like President Museveni, just a Rwandan counter-part. So President Nkurunziza is under fire and has a lot of work to generate peace, but this seems like a way to get there.

The results of this are that we can question if the Rwandan government wanted to bring down the Government of Burundian one. If not so the United Nations wanted this to slip out so their wish for peacekeepers could gain foothold in the UN Headquarters in New York, as they have seen the African Union have given-up the direct African answer to the conflict. Peace.

Reference:

China.org.cn – ‘Rwanda dismisses UN report on training Burundi rebels’ (05.02.2016) link: http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2016-02/06/content_37747742.htm

Diplomat Magazine – ‘Burundi’ statement on current situation’ (05.02.2016) link: http://www.diplomatmagazine.nl/2016/02/05/25834/

East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) – ‘EALA concerned about Republic of Burundi’ (05.02.2016) link: http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/press-releases/20160205/eala-concerned-about-republic-burundi

MONUSCO – ‘Press Statement of MONUSCO Regarding Operations Against Armed Groups in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (02.02.2016) link: http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10662&ctl=Details&mid=15045&ItemID=21686&language=en-US

Nyabenda, Pascal – ‘The 26th summit of the African Union Heads of State has proven that they have understood, Burundian People is deeply indebted to them’ (02.02.2016) Chairman of CNDD-FDD

Ihucha, Adam – ‘EALA declines to summon Rwanda over rebel claims’ (30.01.2016) link: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EALA-declines-to-summon-Rwanda-over-rebel-claims/-/2558/3055230/-/76bvilz/-/index.html

United Nations – ‘Security Council Committee Established Persuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo – !5th January 2016 (S/AC.43/2016/GE/OC.2) – Gaston Gramjo

The President’s black book chapter 2: The close tie between the GoU and M23; giving instantly amnesty to the guerilla; which make it seem more likely that it was a proxy war for the government

M23 Cartoon

There isn’t often I have gone through so many United Nations documents to pile up information about one single militias or guerilla force in the DRC. This is because I have had a suspicious feeling about the connection to the government of Uganda, as they have been busy before in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as they have done with their partners in Kigali, President Kagame and Government of Rwanda. As we will see here, this is the facts that the UN have claimed by their eye-witnesses, Amama Mbabazi is the man who has defended the Government of Uganda, he had to come with a threat towards the United Nations to silent this. Therefore you haven’t heard much about it…

As this will go first by year it is published, first you can read the defense of the Government of Uganda, then the evidence brought by the United Nations different committees and institutions from the “the Expert Group” and so on. This is interesting reading and should give you insights to a world the Rwandan and Ugandan government does not want the world to question, as much as they don’t want the questions come about the killing of Laurent Kabila… as that question the manner of how they brought a new regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this here is newer and fresher, close to today, as it then is more evidence that the UN has collected, and has pictured in their archives. Therefore take a look and hope it opens your mind.

Museveni Mbabazi

Part of Uganda Government defense against the allegation made by Amama Mbabazi:
“About the same time, H.E. Joseph Kabila, President of DRC, contacted President Museveni and explicitly requested him to intervene and facilitate dialogue between M23 and DRC Government. In accordance with article 23(2) of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, President Museveni convened four Extra-Ordinary Summits of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the security situation in Eastern DRC, three of which were hosted in Kampala using Uganda’s own resources” (…)”The UN must sort out the malignancy against Uganda by bringing out the truth about Uganda’s role in the current Regional efforts” (…)”In light of the above, withdrawing from Somalia, CAR, etc., becomes inevitable so that we keep watch on the DRC territory donated to the terrorists by the DRC Government and the United Nations” (Mbabazi, 2012).

5th Extraordinary Summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region declaration on M23 and violence in DRC:
“Gravely concerned about the advance and capture of the city of Goma and the town of Sake in Kivu Province, of the DRC, by the M23 rebel movement in spite of the directive of the previous Summits of ICGLR to cease hostilities and remain in positions they occupied in July 2012” (…)”HEREBY DECIDE AS FOLLOWS:” (…)”MONUSCO to occupy and provide security in the neutral zone between Goma and the new areas occupied by M23” (…)”This process shall be supervised by Chiefs of Defence of Rwanda, DRC and led by the Chief of Defence Forces of Uganda, with the participation of other Chiefs of Defence Staff from other member states”(ICGLR, 2012).

First piece of evidence:
“The report also accuses Uganda of backing the M23, providing troops and ammunition for specific military operations” (P: 5, Gil, 2012).

m23_in_goma

Government of Uganda Support of M23:
“Senior Government of Uganda (GoU) officals have also provided support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcement in DRC territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice, and facilitation of external relations, Units of Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) jointly supported M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the major town in Rutshuru territory, and the Forces Armees de la RDC (FARDC) base of Rumanbago” (P: 2, 2012). “Uganda’s more subtle support to M23 allowed the rebel group’s political branch to operate from within Kampala and boost its external relations” (P: 4, 2012). “UPDF Commanders sent troops and weapons to reinforce specific M23 operations and assisted in the M23’s recruitment and weapons procurement efforts in Uganda. Ugandan officials equally endorsed a “laissez-faire” policy authorizing local military and civil authorities to cooperate with M23 out of their personal ties to the RDF or the rebels” (UN, P: 9, 2012).

Weapons delivery to M23 from Uganda:
“Former M23 soldiers stated that UPDF officers based in Kisoro have been supplying M23 with small quantiles of weapons. One former M23 soldier said he hadaccompanied Makenga to Kisoro on three occasions at the beginning of July 2012” (…)”A former M23 soldier stated that UPDF commanders brought heavy weapons including 12,7 mm machine guns to the hill overlook Bunagana, on the Ugandan side of the border, in order to reinforce M23 during the attack, and subsequently left them with the rebels after they took the town” (…)”Two former RDF officers, two FARDC officers, one M23 cadre and one former M23 soldier stated that two trucks transported weapons and ammunition to Bunagana prior to the attacks on Rutshuru and Kiwanja. According to one FARDC officer, the two trucks mainly contained RPG-7 grenade launchers and machines guns” (UN, P: 11-12, 2012).

M23 Picture

More on the connection with GoU:
“Four Ugandan officials, an FARDC officer based in Bunagana, border agents as well as a former CNDP politician told the group that the Jomba Groupment chief based in Bunagana, Vincent Mwambutsa, regularly travels to Kisoro to organize recruitment and financial contributions for M23 with the Resident District Commander (RDC) of Kisoro, Milton Bazanye, his ally Willbaforce Nkundizana and local UPDF officers. One former M23 soldier confirmed that the rebels recruited 28 Ugandan civillians in Kisoro. A Ugandan official in Kisoro personally witnessed the UPDF taking recruits to the border” (UN, P: 12, 2012).

Ugandan known leaders and personalities involved in support of M23:
“A UPDF officer, a Ugandan leader, an M23 cadre, politicians, intelligence sources, a Kampala based diplomat and several businessmen stated that Gen. Salim Selah has been principal responsible for UPDF support of M23” (…)”A Ugandan Civil Society member, two M23 cadres and a Ugandan counter-intelligence report also affirmed that UPDF Western Division commander, General Patrick Kankiriho, has overseen military support to M23, including providing orders to Mukasa” (…)”Three Ugandan officials stated that in May and July 2012, General Kayihura held meetings with the rebels at Kisoro” (UN, P: 13, 2012).

Ugandan trading with illegal DRC gold:
“The Group estimates that 98 percent of the gold produced in DRC is smuggled out of the country, and that nearly all of the gold traded in Uganda – the main transit country for Congolese gold – is illegally exported from DRC. As a result, the governments of DRC and Uganda are losing millions of dollars annually in tax revenue, and tolerating a system that is financing armed groups in DRC” (UN, P: 1, 2013).

M23 Goma

One Connection between M23 and Uganda:
“The Ugandan army spokesperson stated that the former M23 “are not prisoners; they are soldiers running away from a war so we are receiving them and helping them because it is our responsibility.”28 He also compared the reception of M23 to what Uganda had done in 2012 when a Congolese army battalion had fled into Ugandan territory following fighting with the M23. President Museveni later indicated that he would not hand over Makenga to Congolese authorities and compared protecting him to the same support he gave Laurent Kabila against Mobutu in 1996” (…)”After being disarmed and registered at a Ugandan army facility in Kisoro on 13 November 2013, most of the former M23 fighters were transferred to the Bihanga military training center near Kasese” (…)”According to latest reports, Makenga and Kaina remain under Ugandan surveillance, while other former M23 officers and political leaders are reportedly able to move freely in Uganda” (SSPC, P:4-5, 2014).

AMISOM 32

Ugandan implications:
“Uganda, it is important to note, has received relatively little reprimand despite its implication in supporting M23. Its contribution of roughly one third of peacekeeping troops to the high-priority AMISOM mission, and threat to withdraw those troops in response to the GoE’s allegations, is likely a major factor in that lack of attention” (Jackson, 2013).

Findings from the M23 declaration:
“Recalling its declaration at Kampala, Uganda, on the 5th November 2013 that it had renounced rebellion and requested its ex-combatants to prepare for the process of disbarment, demobilization and social reintegration” (…)”Declares as follows: End of rebellion. M23 confirms it has renounced its rebellion. Amnesty: The M23 accepts that to benefit from the amnesty, each member of M23 shall be required to make a personal commitment in writing to refrain from the use of weapons or from participating in an insurgency movement to ensure success of any demand. Transitional security arrangements: The M23 commits itself to comply with and implement the transitional security arrangements, the details of which will be defined by the proposed Annex A as adjusted to reflect the changed situation on the ground, including the fact that some members of M23 fled to Uganda where they were received” (…)”M23 members reserve the right to change its name and become a political party accordance with the constitution and laws of DRC” (M23, 2013).

Risky move of amnesty to M23 member and combatants:
“The FIB’s impact was twofold. Most obviously, it had a military role, both in supporting the Congolese military (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, or FARDC) and in taking the fight directly to the M23, deploying sophisticated technology such as South African attack helicopters. But perhaps more importantly, it changed the dynamics of regional politics. In raising the political stakes for the M23 and its putative backers, particularly Rwanda, it forced them into a choice between allowing the group to be defeated or – in essence – declaring open war on the SADC. The result is that the east of the DRC, for the first time in many years, is no longer held hostage by rebel groups with significant links to neighbouring governments, though these undoubtedly remain. It was a high-risk move, and one that could have led the region back into inter-state conflict. But M23’s backers instead chose to disengage, allowing the group to fragment, signing a series of agreements known as the Nairobi Declaration in December 2013. Though it has not faded entirely – former M23 combatants, many of whom are currently in Uganda and Rwanda, represent a latent threat of re-mobilization that urgently needs to be addressed – the group is no longer able to directly shape events in eastern DRC” (Shepard, 2014).

M23 Goma P3

The situation of M23 by August 2015:

“At this stage, the amnesty provision and the repatriation process of the reportedly over 1,400 ex-M23 combatants which fled to Uganda and Rwanda in 2013 are amongst the most contentious. To date, only 182 ex-M23 combatants have been repatriated from Uganda to the DRC, while 13 have been repatriated from Rwanda. According to Ugandan sources, as of 4 August, 817 ex-M23 combatants are cantoned at the Bihanga Military Camp. About 327 residents of the camp have deserted, with no clarity on their whereabouts, 14 are admitted in hospital, 25 departed on sick leaveand are yet to return, 4 are deceased. The presence of hundreds of ex-M23 and are yet to return, 4 are deceased. The presence of hundreds of ex-M23 combatants in Rwanda and Uganda remains a serious source of concern for the GoDRC and the host authorities in Uganda and Rwanda. Yet, despite several attempts by the GoDRC to expedite the repatriation of the ex-M23 combatants, in line with the Nairobi Declarations and relevant decisions of the ICGLR Summits, there has been no progress in this process due to lack of even focus in the implementation of the Nairobi Declarations” (UN, 2015).

Afterthought:

As we can see there is a connection and the deflection from Government of Uganda (GoU) is expected, but if I had showed the riches gained by the imported gold from the areas that M23 took, would have showed the value for supporting the army as the common sense for the cooperation and support directly from the GoU.

He might have called President Kabila and told he would work on the matter and have the discussions in Kampala as a way of swaying away from the fact that they are behind and servicing the M23. We can see that and knowing that they gave arms, training, army men from the UPDF and even technical training. The pictures of the arms with Ugandan origin after the retreat and stop of violence from M23 should be proof enough of their involvement into the matter, what is worse is the witnesses claiming that certain big men in the government has supported and set things in order to fix the problems that M23 had at one point. That is something that we all should consider, as Salim Selah has been involved in a lot of shady arrangement in DRC before and has only backed away from the “Wonga Coup” to deliver arms to Thatcher’s son. Rest of the time he has done transport arrangements and fixing the army to keep Uganda in parts of DRC when needed. So the stories of him being involved would not be a shock in any way.

The suspect issue is how easy they could stay in Uganda, cross the borders and even get personnel and recruit in border areas. As this suspect connection together with the history of using military force from Uganda to get wealth out of the DRC. As they did in the late 1990s and in the beginning of 2000s; they haven’t just cooperated with the world to fight together will alliances to force away LRA and ADF-NALU. That is not the whole story, though the Government of Uganda won’t it to seem that way, as a way to clean their hands from the mud they have been swimming in. Takes a lot more than a shower to get the dirt off, you smell me?

Peace.

Reference:
Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum – ‘Consolidating the Peace: Closing the M23 Chapter – Prepared on behalf of the DRC Affinity Group December 2014’

Jackson, Henry M. – ‘DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING A 3D STRATEGY WORK IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA’ (Winter 2013)

Gil, Manuel Manrique – ‘The M23 and eastern D.R. Congo: An intractable problem or an opportunity to engage?’ (12.11.2012) – ‘European Parliament: Directorate-Generale for External Affairs: Policy Department’

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – ‘DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION (ICGLR) ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) 5th EXTRAORDINARY SUMMIT OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT’ (24.11.2012).

M23 – ‘Declaration of Commitments by the Movement of March 23 at the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue’ (12.12.2013) – Nairobi, Kenya.

Mbabazi, Amama – ‘Uganda’s Stand and Response on the allegations made by the UN Group of Experts and the subsequent endorsement of the allegations by the UN Security Council about Uganda’s purported support of M23 rebels’ (01.11.2012) – Statement in Parliament of Uganda

Shepard, Ben – ‘Beyond Crisis in the DRC The Dilemmas of International Engagement and Sustainable Change’ (December 2014) – Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,

United Nation – Letter dated 12 October 2012 from the Group Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo

United Nation – ‘Letter dated 12 December 2013 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit the final report of the Group, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012)’

United Nations – ‘OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION -Neutralization of Armed Groups’ (26.08.2015)

The Presidents’ Black book and the rewards He received from Kagame and Kabila and compensated military support of Kiir

Museveni 1986 Uganda

I know it is supposed to be celebration of 30 years of NRM rule in Uganda. I have discussed the economic situation and democratic deficit now and then. Today I write about something I have thought about for a long time and think is necessary to be told. Never enough as long as President Museveni is a leader and also President Kagame and the son-of Laurent, Joseph Kabila in Democratic Republic of Congo. There is a dark history in the way President Museveni took power in Uganda and right after. Here will not directly tell about the atrocities between the UNLA and NRA. There we’re massive breaches in the middle of the civil-war. This here will be snippets of histories from both former loyal men and documents that have been released recently that we’re not public before. They tell how Museveni ushered Kabila, used force to earn wealth for himself and Uganda, how he gave way to Kagame after he helped Museveni gain power in Uganda, And lastly a little story about the recent adventure of Museveni in South Sudan as loyalty to President Kiir. Some tricks doesn’t die easy, as long as he gain something with the use of arms and guns, President Museveni will take it. Take a look!

Gen David ‘Tinye’ Sejusa revealed this murders as ordered by Museveni:
“That after accusing Gen Kazini of sending money to elements of the SPLA, Museveni “ordered his execution by procuring the services of a 6ft 6in man to murder Kazini”. He went on to say: “Forget that trash of [Lydia] Draru. In case of Kazini, again some forex bureau, originally said to belong to Gen Kazini, but [which] actually belonged to a known relative of Museveni, was later to be used to pass the money for the payment of the executioners of Kazini, to the accounts of the assassins.” (…)”He said: “For those in the know, again Andrew Kayiira was said to possess money before he was gunned down by Museveni’s goons.” (Gombya 2013).

NRA marching to Kampala 1986

Human Rights Violations right after the Bush-War:
NRA embarked on revenge against people from Acholi, Lango and Teso; and second, the collapse of discipline within the NRA coincided with insurgencies in the North and East. Both the NRA and thevarious armed groups in the areas continued to attack and kill civilians. As a matter of fact, the same strategies of gross violations of human rights the UNLA had used in the Luwero Triangle and West Nile are being used by the NRA in these areas. Hospitals, schools, churches, granaries and houses have been destroyed by the the NRA. The insurgents have likewise looted, raped and murdered people from their own home areas. (Otunnu, 1992).

Killings in 1993:
“There is no evidence that the Government sanctioned political killings in 1993. There were, however, reports of extrajudicial killings. For example, on June 21, police and internal security officials arrested four intelligence officers accused of murdering two prisoners in Iganga district on June 7. The case received considerable media attention. Two of the four accused officers were released without charge; the other two were being held in Makindye military prison without charge at year’s end” (U.S. Department of State, 1994).

continental_shift

Museveni support of Kagame:
“Despite Museveni consistence denials, Uganda has given the RPF military support since it began the civil war in 1990. Kagame, a Tutsi who headed Ugandan military intelligence before taking over the RPF, served closely with Museveni in Ugandan civil war” (EXDIS, 1994). Mr. Claver Kanyaryshoki reminiscing: “In September 1990, precociously on 11th September , a three party summer was organized between MOBUTU, HABAYARIMA and MUSEVENI to control the borders of his country and to avoid the invasion of other countries. On that occasion, they issued a declaration signed by the three heads of state that was meant to prevent the destabilization of a neighboring country from Uganda. As the threat became clearer despite all these efforts, president HABAYARIMA sent his foreign affairs minster to MUSEVENI on the 24th September to tell him that the attack was imminent. MUSVENI reiterated that these were rumors. He let HABAYARIMA know that: “he did not to lose single second of sleep thinking about an attack from Uganda, as this would never be the case as long as (MUSEVENI] would hold power”. Later on, MUSEVENI claimed later on the same day he met Fred RWEGEMA, after receiving the Rwandan Minister Casimir BIZIMUNGU. He said he calmed down the Rwandese. However, in fact his meeting with RWEGEMA was intended to put the finishing touches on the details of the invasion. MUSVENI was to attend A UN Summit on the rights of the child in New York. He knew he would not be around and wanted that he operations be carried out in his absence. By doing so, he would then pretend to be innocent or not aware of them. This is an old habit in Uganda. Even in October 1982 with Rwandese nationals were deported, President Milton OBOTE was by any chance away in Italy” (Unofficial OTP Translation, 2006).

Museveni fallout with Laurent Kabila because of business:
“At first, in 1997, Uganda seemed ready to tolerate many of Kabila’s shortcomings if the new president of the DRC would address bigger economic issues, such as US$2 billion road linking Uganda and Kisangani and the need to train police and anti-smuggling units. Both Rwanda and Uganda had hoped that by helping Kabila take power, they would ensure security on their borders and also benefit economically from North Kivu’s natural resources including minerals, gold and diamonds. By May 1997, Ugandan businessmen had jumped into the fray, selling everything from frozen chicken to plastic mugs to Congo. But Kabila had other plans. The Kisangani project also never materialized. This lack of interest on Kabila’s side to open up Congo to Uganda’s business interests was a critical blow to the relationship between Museveni and Kabila” (International Crisis Group, 1999). “Kabila was assassinated on 17 January 2001, the date set for commemorating the 40th anniversary of the death of Lumumba, whose successor he claimed to be. No light has ever been shed on this crime either” (Garreton, 2008).

RwandAir Tanz Airbil-2 LR-2

The plundering under Museveni in 90s in the DRC:
“At the request of the panel, the Ugandan authorities provided extensive data, including production and export values for agricultural products such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. In terms of minerals, the data also cover gold and coltan production and export figures” (…)”The gap between production and export could originate from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo” (…)”Ugandan gold export does not reflect this country’s production, levels but rather that some exports might be “leaking over the boarders” from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The central bank reported that, by September 1997, Uganda had exported gold valued $105 Million, compared with $60 million in 1996 and $23 Million in 1995” (…)”Second, the data from the Ugandan authorities are silent with regard to diamond production and export” (…)”These diamond exports are suspicious for many reasons: (a) Uganda have no known diamond production; (b) Diamond exports from Uganda are observed only in the last few years, coinciding surprisingly with the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo” (…)” (c)” (…)”external observers on the need to control the rich diamond zone near Kisangani and Banalia” (UN, P: 19, 2001).

Salva Kiir Poster

Museveni’s adventure in South Sudan:
“Observers question how deployment of Uganda’s army, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), in South Sudan is paid for and who profits from it. At the beginning of the war, when Juba’s fall to the insurgents was a possibility, some of South Sudan’s national reserves as well as senior politicians’ assets were sent to Uganda” (…)”8 A return to intense combat or a protracted war in Uganda’s areas of operation would raise the financial and operational costs of the deployment. In February 2015, the defence ministry requested a supplementary budget allocation, in part to cover South Sudan operations, thus suggesting that they are as much strategic as economically motivated” (…)”Ugandan officials say these early payments do not appear in the national budget and speculate they may have been used for personal, not official purposes”.“The Report of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs on the Ministerial Policy Statement and Budget Estimates for the Fiscal Year 2015/16”, Parliament of Uganda, May 2015 (hardcopy with Crisis Group); Crisis Group Report, South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, op. cit., p. 23” (ICG, 2015)

Afterthought:
I don’t think I just discuss this deep subject to much. The stories and history tells enough and also the sadness of what the Ugandan Army has done after NRA/NRM took power in Uganda. This here is tales and stories of the darkness and shadow of President Museveni. Not only economic destruction in Uganda to personal gain, or democratic deficit to keep himself in power, this here is how he lived by the guns to keep loyal leaders in the neighborhood and also gain riches while looting the DRC. Peace.

Reference:
EXDIS – Unclassified American Government official update: SC-12252-94 ‘Rwanda Update’ (12.04.1994).
Otunnu, Ogenga – ‘Socio-Economic and Political Crisisin Uganda: Reason for Human Rights Violations and Refugees‘– Refuge Periodical, Canada – (October 14-17,1992)

Gombya, Henry D – ‘EXCLUSIVE: Museveni “ordered murder of Kayiira, Kazini and many others” (25.08.2013) link: http://www.thelondoneveningpost.com/exclusive-museveni-ordered-murder-of-kayiira-kazini-and-many-others/

International Crisis Group – ‘ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report Nº 3’ (21.05.1999)

International Crisis Group – ‘South Sudan: Keeping Faith with the IGAD Peace Process’ Africa Report N°228′ (27.07.2015)

Unofficial OTP Translation – Witness KVB46 – RP 31398-31403 BIS – ‘Report on the Interview between Counsel Yaovi Degli and Mr. Kanyarushoki Claver’ (20.11.2006)

United Nation – S/2001/357: ‘Report of the Panel of Expert on the Illegal Exploration of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (12.04.2001)

United Nation – DOCUMENT ICC 01/04-01/06 – ‘REPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’ (03.12.2008) Written by Robert Garreton.

U.S. Department of State – ‘UGANDA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993’ (31.01.1994).

Confidential: Note to the Security Council on Contigency Planning for Uniformed Personnel related to the Situation in Burundi (06.01.2016)

Security Council Note P1 UN BurundiSecurity Council Note P2 UN BurundiSecurity Council Note P3 UN BurundiSecurity Council Note P4 UN BurundiSecurity Council Note P5 UN BurundiSecurity Council Note P6 UN BurundiSecurity Council Note P7 UN Burundi

President Kagame End of Year Address | Kigali, 1 January 2016 (Youtube-Clip)

“You requested me to lead the country again after 2017. Given the importance and consideration you attach to this, I can only accept.  What remains is to follow the normal laws and procedures when the time comes. But I do not think our aim is to have a President for life, nor is it what I would want. Sooner rather than later, this office will be transferred from one person to another in a manner that will serve a purpose, not merely set an example, whether for ourselves or others. That is why we need to remain fully engaged on Rwanda’s journey of transformation.” 

President Kagame