The President’s Black Book Chapter 3: Bemba and Museveni; what is the ties between the two big-men?

Jeune African Bembe Cover

It’s recently been a court ruling in the International Criminal Court where Jean-Pierre Bemba was sentenced and guilty of crimes against humanity. As this happen there been questions about his sponsors and his actions, was it for his own cause or was it for the greater good? As the violence he spread in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was during the wars in late 90s and beginning 2000s as the Rwandan and Ugandan ignited the wars the neighbor country, even sponsoring guerrillas, while fighting other forces there, as they we’re using different methods even when the world was telling the RPA and UPDF to leave, while the guerrillas would still cover areas of minerals close to the borders, to secure funding for the governments of the neighbor countries. They will by all means repute this as this shadows their reign, but the moneys and sudden export of minerals without sustainable investments and business-growth proves that there was sudden changes by the warfare in the DRC.

In this picture President Museveni did what he could to have allies inside the DRC, so he could have business and projects there to reach his power and make himself even stronger. That has been his game since day one; not only to get rid of the leaders around him who is not loyal towards him, but also to get people who he knows is loyal to him no matter what.

Jean-Pierre Bemba was a useful tool and an allied who even with brokered peace gave more influence of Uganda into the DRC politics, as he was stationed as Vice-President under President Laurent Kabila, while this wouldn’t last, as the Ugandan and Rwandan did not like the idea of being distanced from the State House in Kinshasa. So as the time and dwindling reactions, the neighbors went into attack again, that ousted the transitional government and took down a second president in the DRC! In that picture and time, comes the relationship between Bemba and Museveni, Especially after the human rights violations and victims of war, as the spoils of it cost honor and integrity, also the visible. Even if the relations between the men and their armies lost their value, the open sponsorship and even training at one point proves how Museveni used his power and reach to put his fortune into the leadership of Bemba and his MLC. Take a look at what I have found about this men!

jean-pierre-bemba-01-1024x655

About the MLC:

“Current Leader: Jean-Pierre Bemba

Based in Gbadolite, the MLC has been backed by Uganda since the start of the war in 1998 although there have been occasional differences between the two. The MLC tried twice to establish a foothold in Ituri: in 2001 Bemba had nominal control of the short-lived FPC coalition of Ugandan- backed rebel groups and in 2002 the MLC attacked Mambasa in western Ituri but were forced backed by the APC of Mbusa Nyamwisi. The MLC has occasionally fought alongside the UPC and has been a rival of Mbusa’s RCD-ML” (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

Bemba creating his army:

“In spring 1998, Bemba sought to motivate a group of Congolese exiles to join an armed struggle with support from Kampala. He elaborated a political program with a network of friends and former classmates and discussed financing and training with Museveni. By Bemba’s own account, he met Museveni while exporting fish to Belgium through Uganda in the early 1990s, though it is widely believed that Mobutu used Bemba’s aviation companies to transport goods for Jonas Savimbi, then leader of União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), through Uganda throughout the 1980s. Another account claims that Bemba met Museveni through Museveni’s half-brother, General Salim Saleh, then chief of staff of the UPDF, while seeking to establish a link between ex-FAZ troops cantoned at the Kitona military base in southern DRC and UNITA forces in Angola. The MLC emphatically denies any involvement with the Angolan insurgency movement. But the firm belief, at least in Luanda, that Bemba, Uganda, and Rwanda had links to UNITA largely accounts for Angola’s switching sides in the Second Congo War to back Laurent Kabila and its strong antipathy toward Bemba to this day” (Carayannis, 2008).

Bemba in 1999:

“The main Goma faction of the rebel RCD on Monday welcomed Bemba’s signing of the accord. Its leader, Emile Ilunga, claimed Bemba was “not to be trusted”, but added: “We are gratified to learn that he has signed the accord as we had hoped he would. We have always wanted to sign the accord together with him”, Radio France Internationale reported” (…) “Ilunga, who was due to travel to Uganda on Monday evening for a meeting with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, earlier that day accused Uganda of not respecting the rebels’ decision-making process. “Wamba has no troops, and there is no point in his signing the ceasefire agreement … We’re astonished by Ugandan support of an individual, rather than working in the interest of the Congolese people,” AP news agency quoted Ilunga as saying”(IRIN, 1999).

“Jean-Pierre Bemba, a millionaire businessman and leader of the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), was accompanied to the signing in Lusaka by a senior aide of the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, and by Tanzania’s foreign minister, Jakaya Kikwete, officials said” (…)”But Mr Bemba warned that he would go back to war if a rival rebel group did not sign a truce within a week” (…)“Referring to the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), which has refused to sign the truce, he told Reuters: “If they do not sign within seven days, I will continue the fight to Kinshasa.” The RCD and Mr Bemba’s forces control 50% of Congo’s territory” (Gough, 1999). “Speaking to IPS by satellite-link, Bemba, who is also backed by Uganda, said it was too early to say whether the peace would hold, “but for the time things are very quiet, with no fighting near us” (Simpson, 1999).

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Bemba in 2000:

“A few days ago, Jean-Pierre Bemba, the rebel leader in Equateur Province, issued a challenge to Mr. Kabila and major Western nations that pushed the accord with more vigor than any of those who signed it” (…)”‘We are at a turning point,” Mr. Bemba, a 38-year-old businessman-turned-rebel, said this week in Gbadolite, his headquarters. ”Is Lusaka alive still or not? That is the question.” (…)”It is not certain whether Mr. Bemba is capable militarily of closing the airport. Nor is it clear if his major sponsor, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, would give his approval given that Mr. Museveni’s own friends, the United States and many European nations, would probably hold him responsible for such a departure from the Lusaka accord” (Fisher, 2000).

Bemba in 2001:

“But Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni also reiterated his commitment to pulling his troops from neighboring Congo, saying now that they have defeated Ugandan rebels operating there, it was time for his forces to leave. The force Museveni claims to have defeated is the Allied Democratic Front, a small Ugandan rebel group that has attacked villages throughout western Uganda from bases in Congo” (…)”Some participants appeared unconcerned that Uganda was pulling out of the peace agreement, and were pleased that Museveni would still withdraw his troops. “If the government decides to withdraw its forces from the Congo, it’s always favorable. This is in line with the Lusaka agreement,” said Kamel Morjane, the U.N. special representative for Congo. “If all parties show their goodwill there is no risk.” (…)”Kikaya Bin Karubi, the Congolese information minister, welcomed the promised troop withdrawal and said his country would stick with the Lusaka peace agreement no matter what. The leader of the Ugandan-backed rebels, Congolese Liberation Front Chairman Jean-Pierre Bemba, said the decision would have little impact on the war since, he insisted, Ugandan troops had not been involved in the fighting. Uganda is estimated to have had at least 10,000 troops in Congo at the peak of the war” (Muleme, 2001).

alliances

UN Allegation:

“In 2001, when Bemba took the reins of the unified movement RCD/ML, now called the FLC, he tried in January to broker an agreement between the Hema and Lendu belligerants. He got more than 150 traditional chiefs to participate in this agreement (had the Ugandans acted unilaterally, they would never have managed to achieve this), thus securing a halt to military training and youth recruitment by the UPDF, a measure of security on the roads, food security for the livestock, and the appointment of a governor who was not from the region as a way of providing greater assurance to all the parties. In the end, though, it was Bemba’s dependence on the Ugandans that frustrated the entire peace process” (…)”On more than one occasion, Bemba tried to exert his influence over the Ugandan Government, but Uganda ultimately took the final decisions” (…)”In July 2001, thanks to the efforts of the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the Mouvement de Libération du Congo and RDC/Bunia joined forces, taking with them Rober Lubala’s RCD/National and thus forming the Front de Libération du Congo (FLC)” (Garreton, 2009).

Bemba in 2002:

“Another former rebel movement backed by Uganda, the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Kisangani-Mouvement de liberation (RCD-K-ML), was pessimistic about prospects for the success of the Kabila-Museveni accord” (…)“The DRC is faced with two Ugandas – that of Yoweri Museveni, who acts from a distance in Kampala, and that of his army officers and soldiers involved in the ongoing pillage of gold and diamonds in Ituri [region, northeastern DRC],” said Honore Kadima, in charge of RCD-K-ML external relations. “I don’t see either of these Ugandas adhering to even one comma of the Luanda accord.” (IRIN, 2002). “The mutiny marked the return to prominence of the commanders who had been behind the earlier CMF mutiny. Following their training in Kyankwanzi (for new recruits) and Jinja (for officers), most of them had been sent to Equateur Province to join the MLC’s armed wing. After some months of fighting for Bemba, the soldiers had grown increasingly frustrated. They knew that fellow Hema were still dying in Ituri’s inter-ethnic clashes, and they felt that the MLC used them ‘like dogs’” (Tamm, 2013).

Some more on the MLC:

“The MLC had been involved in Ituri during the short-lived agreement of the Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC), a platform of the MLC, RCD-N and the RCD-ML, sponsored by Uganda under the leadership of Jean Pierre Bemba. But Nyamwisi refused to accept Bemba’s leadership in Ituri and his forces pushed Bemba and the MLC troops out of Beni and Bunia. In the last months of 2002, the MLC tried to fight its way back into Ituri with the support of Roger Lumbala’s RCD-N, claiming that Nyamwisi had violated the Lusaka Accord. In doing so, their combatants committed violations of international humanitarian law including the deliberate killing of civilians, numerous cases of rape, looting and some acts of cannibalism. Some of these violations may have been directed at the Nande ethnic group, targeted for their connection with Nyamwisi, himself a Nande” (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

ICC Court

ICJ Court case claims:

“The DRC claims to have seised an abandoned tank used in the Kitona attack. The Reply alleges the tank is Ugandan because it is the same mode1 as a tank used later by Congolese rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, who allegedly received his tank from Uganda. (DRCR, para. 2.40.)” (…)”Clearly Bemba’s hesitations vis-à-vis the inter-Congolese negotiations and the disengagement are linked to his quick enrichment, the greed of his Ugandan offïcer godfathers and the politics of self-aggrandizement practiced by his opportunistic, wandering ministers who annoy the people.” (ICJ, 2002).

ICJ Ruling document says:

“For its part, Uganda acknowledges that it assisted the MLC during fighting between late September 1998 and July 1999, while insisting that its assistance to Mr. Bemba “was always limited and heavily conditioned”. Uganda has explained that it gave “just enough” military support to the MLC to help Uganda achieve its objectives of driving out the Sudanese and Chadian troops from the DRC, and of taking over the airfields between Gbadolite and the Ugandan border; Uganda asserts that it did not go beyond this” (ICJ, 2005).

Cooperation in DRC during the war claims:

“The cooperation of the allied MLC rebel force was secured by the pre-payment of taxes. A letter from MLC commander Jean-Pierre Bemba informed civil and military authorities that Victoria was authorised to do business in the towns of Isirio, Bunia, Bondo, Buta, Kisangani and Beni (Ugandan Judicial Commission, Final Report, op. cit., 21.3.4, p.119). This letter was counter-signed by Kazini who further instructed his commanders in the same towns to allow Victoria to conduct its business ‘uninterrupted by anybody.’ The exception was Kisangani town itself, administered by an RCD-Goma backed Governor, although the UPDF controlled areas to the north of the town. Kazini issued a veiled threat to the Governor to cooperate with Victoria and later conspired to appoint Adele Lotsove as Governor of the new Province of Ituri in order to take control of the mineral producing areas, including those previously administrated by Kisangani (ibid., 21.3.4, p.122). In his reply to the Panel, Kazini stated: ‘In some cases, as in the case of Madame Adele Lotsove, in Ituri Province, our duty was confined to supporting existing administration (the Panel report concedes that Madame Lotsove had been appointed by Mobutu and was continued in office by Kabila).’ (See Reaction No.47, written statement from Major General James Kazini to the Panel, reproduced in UN Panel, Addendum, 20 June 2003, op. cit.)” (RAID, 2004).

From the WikiLeaks:

“During a May 24 meeting with Vice President Azarias Ruberwa, the Ambassador asked Ruberwa about his trip to Kampala for the inauguration of Ugandan President Museveni,  and the reported long meeting between the two.  Speaking from memory, Ruberwa provided an extensive read-out, noting by way of preamble that Museveni is a “complicated” person, and often difficult to read” (…)”According to Ruberwa, Museveni flatly denied that  there is continuing Kampala support of Congolese militia  groups.  Ruberwa said that Museveni added that the last support Uganda had provided to armed groups in the Congo was that given to Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC, and to combatants associated with Mbusa Nyamwisi. Ruberwa observed that Mbusa was next to him in the same meeting, but did not respond to the Museveni comment” (…)”Ruberwa noted, for example, that if all the detained MRC leaders were found with weapons, all inside Ugandan territory, it seemed logical to assume these weapons would find their way to Ituri, in apparent contradiction to Museveni’s assertions that there are no further arms flows from Uganda to support Congolese armed groups. In any event, Ruberwa asserted it is good periodically to point out to Museveni that the Congolese are aware of what is going on. The Ambassador asked if Museveni did not know that already. Ruberwa said “maybe,” but it seems useful to make it clear. Ruberwa added he believes it important for Kinshasa to send a senior-level person to Kampala to have an exchange with Museveni perhaps every three months to help avoid a major clash between the two governments” (WikiLeaks, 2006).

214850-congo-democratic Bemba 2006

Hope this was insightful and gives an edge as the reports are steady and many. Not only a one place and one person who thinks that there is a specific connection between President Museveni and Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC! That is very clear and the ways it happen and the timing prove the value Bemba had for Museveni and his ambition in the DRC. The excuse was always internal guerrillas who moved to DRC like ADF-NALU and LRA, but we all know that more to bait and more to gain by taking mineral rich areas and create businesses and use ammunition to gain that. That is something that never been an issue for Museveni as his best tool is a weapon, not negotiations and agreements, they can break when he see he has the upper-hand and ability to score over his counterparts.

Something he surely will do again. Bemba might never surface with the MLC and the Party MLC in any election in the DRC. As the ICC gave him a verdict and court ruling which set precedence for his life.

I know that the Yellow Men of NRM, and the NRM-Regime will fight against this and say something else, as even Amama Mbabazi did at his time in the ICC to fight the case between Uganda and the DRC on the reasons for the aggression from them. The same might happen again and the viciousness and ruthlessness of the President is visible, as those who studies his history(not the one he has rewritten) but more the remarks and voices around him, you’ll see the temperament and attitude of bush-warfare that is instilled in him, and not the political person or even a statesman of a like which he seems to be. Peace.

Reference:

Carayannis, Tatiana – ‘Elections in the DRC – The Bemba Surprise’ (February 2008).

Fisher, Ian – ‘Congo’s War Triumphs Over Peace Accord’ (13.09.2000) link: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/18/world/congo-s-war-triumphs-over-peace-accord.html?pagewanted=all

Garreton, Roberto – ‘REPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT DOCUMENT ICC 01/04-01/06’ – MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZAIRE (20.02.2009)

Gough, David – ‘Peace of the dead in Congo forests’ (02.08.1999) link: http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/02/6

Muleme, Geoffrey – ‘Uganda Withdraws From Congo Accord’ (30.03.2001) link: https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/181/33411.html

Human Rights Watch – ‘Democratic Republic of Congo – Volume 15. Number 11. (A)’ – “ITURI: “COVERED IN BLOOD” Ethnically Targeted Violence In Northeastern DR Congo” (July 2003)

IRIN – ‘Bemba signs Lusaka accord for MLC’ (03.08.1999) link: http://www.irinnews.org/news/1999/08/03/bemba-signs-lusaka-accord-mlc

IRIN – ‘DRC: Kabila and Museveni sign troop withdrawal protocol’ (09.09.2002) link: http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-kabila-and-museveni-sign-troop-withdrawal-protocol

International Court of Justice – ‘CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO – DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

  1. UGANDA RE JOINDER SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA VOLUME 1’ (06.12.2002)

International Court of Justice – ‘CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA) – 2005 19 December General List No. 116 (19.12.2005)

RAID – ‘Unanswered questions Companies, conflict and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (May 2004)

Simpson, Chris – ‘POLITICS: Little To Suggest The Congolese Peace Accord Will Hold’ (06.09.1999) link: http://www.ipsnews.net/1999/09/politics-little-to-suggest-the-congolese-peace-accord-will-hold/

Tamm, Henning – ‘UPC in Ituri The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo’ (2013)

 

WikiLeaks –‘RUBERWA ACCOUNT OF MAY MEETING WITH UGANDA PRESIDENT MUSEVENI’ (02.06.2006) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KINSHASA876_a.html

The President’s black book chapter 2: The close tie between the GoU and M23; giving instantly amnesty to the guerilla; which make it seem more likely that it was a proxy war for the government

M23 Cartoon

There isn’t often I have gone through so many United Nations documents to pile up information about one single militias or guerilla force in the DRC. This is because I have had a suspicious feeling about the connection to the government of Uganda, as they have been busy before in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as they have done with their partners in Kigali, President Kagame and Government of Rwanda. As we will see here, this is the facts that the UN have claimed by their eye-witnesses, Amama Mbabazi is the man who has defended the Government of Uganda, he had to come with a threat towards the United Nations to silent this. Therefore you haven’t heard much about it…

As this will go first by year it is published, first you can read the defense of the Government of Uganda, then the evidence brought by the United Nations different committees and institutions from the “the Expert Group” and so on. This is interesting reading and should give you insights to a world the Rwandan and Ugandan government does not want the world to question, as much as they don’t want the questions come about the killing of Laurent Kabila… as that question the manner of how they brought a new regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this here is newer and fresher, close to today, as it then is more evidence that the UN has collected, and has pictured in their archives. Therefore take a look and hope it opens your mind.

Museveni Mbabazi

Part of Uganda Government defense against the allegation made by Amama Mbabazi:
“About the same time, H.E. Joseph Kabila, President of DRC, contacted President Museveni and explicitly requested him to intervene and facilitate dialogue between M23 and DRC Government. In accordance with article 23(2) of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, President Museveni convened four Extra-Ordinary Summits of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the security situation in Eastern DRC, three of which were hosted in Kampala using Uganda’s own resources” (…)”The UN must sort out the malignancy against Uganda by bringing out the truth about Uganda’s role in the current Regional efforts” (…)”In light of the above, withdrawing from Somalia, CAR, etc., becomes inevitable so that we keep watch on the DRC territory donated to the terrorists by the DRC Government and the United Nations” (Mbabazi, 2012).

5th Extraordinary Summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region declaration on M23 and violence in DRC:
“Gravely concerned about the advance and capture of the city of Goma and the town of Sake in Kivu Province, of the DRC, by the M23 rebel movement in spite of the directive of the previous Summits of ICGLR to cease hostilities and remain in positions they occupied in July 2012” (…)”HEREBY DECIDE AS FOLLOWS:” (…)”MONUSCO to occupy and provide security in the neutral zone between Goma and the new areas occupied by M23” (…)”This process shall be supervised by Chiefs of Defence of Rwanda, DRC and led by the Chief of Defence Forces of Uganda, with the participation of other Chiefs of Defence Staff from other member states”(ICGLR, 2012).

First piece of evidence:
“The report also accuses Uganda of backing the M23, providing troops and ammunition for specific military operations” (P: 5, Gil, 2012).

m23_in_goma

Government of Uganda Support of M23:
“Senior Government of Uganda (GoU) officals have also provided support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcement in DRC territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice, and facilitation of external relations, Units of Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) jointly supported M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the major town in Rutshuru territory, and the Forces Armees de la RDC (FARDC) base of Rumanbago” (P: 2, 2012). “Uganda’s more subtle support to M23 allowed the rebel group’s political branch to operate from within Kampala and boost its external relations” (P: 4, 2012). “UPDF Commanders sent troops and weapons to reinforce specific M23 operations and assisted in the M23’s recruitment and weapons procurement efforts in Uganda. Ugandan officials equally endorsed a “laissez-faire” policy authorizing local military and civil authorities to cooperate with M23 out of their personal ties to the RDF or the rebels” (UN, P: 9, 2012).

Weapons delivery to M23 from Uganda:
“Former M23 soldiers stated that UPDF officers based in Kisoro have been supplying M23 with small quantiles of weapons. One former M23 soldier said he hadaccompanied Makenga to Kisoro on three occasions at the beginning of July 2012” (…)”A former M23 soldier stated that UPDF commanders brought heavy weapons including 12,7 mm machine guns to the hill overlook Bunagana, on the Ugandan side of the border, in order to reinforce M23 during the attack, and subsequently left them with the rebels after they took the town” (…)”Two former RDF officers, two FARDC officers, one M23 cadre and one former M23 soldier stated that two trucks transported weapons and ammunition to Bunagana prior to the attacks on Rutshuru and Kiwanja. According to one FARDC officer, the two trucks mainly contained RPG-7 grenade launchers and machines guns” (UN, P: 11-12, 2012).

M23 Picture

More on the connection with GoU:
“Four Ugandan officials, an FARDC officer based in Bunagana, border agents as well as a former CNDP politician told the group that the Jomba Groupment chief based in Bunagana, Vincent Mwambutsa, regularly travels to Kisoro to organize recruitment and financial contributions for M23 with the Resident District Commander (RDC) of Kisoro, Milton Bazanye, his ally Willbaforce Nkundizana and local UPDF officers. One former M23 soldier confirmed that the rebels recruited 28 Ugandan civillians in Kisoro. A Ugandan official in Kisoro personally witnessed the UPDF taking recruits to the border” (UN, P: 12, 2012).

Ugandan known leaders and personalities involved in support of M23:
“A UPDF officer, a Ugandan leader, an M23 cadre, politicians, intelligence sources, a Kampala based diplomat and several businessmen stated that Gen. Salim Selah has been principal responsible for UPDF support of M23” (…)”A Ugandan Civil Society member, two M23 cadres and a Ugandan counter-intelligence report also affirmed that UPDF Western Division commander, General Patrick Kankiriho, has overseen military support to M23, including providing orders to Mukasa” (…)”Three Ugandan officials stated that in May and July 2012, General Kayihura held meetings with the rebels at Kisoro” (UN, P: 13, 2012).

Ugandan trading with illegal DRC gold:
“The Group estimates that 98 percent of the gold produced in DRC is smuggled out of the country, and that nearly all of the gold traded in Uganda – the main transit country for Congolese gold – is illegally exported from DRC. As a result, the governments of DRC and Uganda are losing millions of dollars annually in tax revenue, and tolerating a system that is financing armed groups in DRC” (UN, P: 1, 2013).

M23 Goma

One Connection between M23 and Uganda:
“The Ugandan army spokesperson stated that the former M23 “are not prisoners; they are soldiers running away from a war so we are receiving them and helping them because it is our responsibility.”28 He also compared the reception of M23 to what Uganda had done in 2012 when a Congolese army battalion had fled into Ugandan territory following fighting with the M23. President Museveni later indicated that he would not hand over Makenga to Congolese authorities and compared protecting him to the same support he gave Laurent Kabila against Mobutu in 1996” (…)”After being disarmed and registered at a Ugandan army facility in Kisoro on 13 November 2013, most of the former M23 fighters were transferred to the Bihanga military training center near Kasese” (…)”According to latest reports, Makenga and Kaina remain under Ugandan surveillance, while other former M23 officers and political leaders are reportedly able to move freely in Uganda” (SSPC, P:4-5, 2014).

AMISOM 32

Ugandan implications:
“Uganda, it is important to note, has received relatively little reprimand despite its implication in supporting M23. Its contribution of roughly one third of peacekeeping troops to the high-priority AMISOM mission, and threat to withdraw those troops in response to the GoE’s allegations, is likely a major factor in that lack of attention” (Jackson, 2013).

Findings from the M23 declaration:
“Recalling its declaration at Kampala, Uganda, on the 5th November 2013 that it had renounced rebellion and requested its ex-combatants to prepare for the process of disbarment, demobilization and social reintegration” (…)”Declares as follows: End of rebellion. M23 confirms it has renounced its rebellion. Amnesty: The M23 accepts that to benefit from the amnesty, each member of M23 shall be required to make a personal commitment in writing to refrain from the use of weapons or from participating in an insurgency movement to ensure success of any demand. Transitional security arrangements: The M23 commits itself to comply with and implement the transitional security arrangements, the details of which will be defined by the proposed Annex A as adjusted to reflect the changed situation on the ground, including the fact that some members of M23 fled to Uganda where they were received” (…)”M23 members reserve the right to change its name and become a political party accordance with the constitution and laws of DRC” (M23, 2013).

Risky move of amnesty to M23 member and combatants:
“The FIB’s impact was twofold. Most obviously, it had a military role, both in supporting the Congolese military (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, or FARDC) and in taking the fight directly to the M23, deploying sophisticated technology such as South African attack helicopters. But perhaps more importantly, it changed the dynamics of regional politics. In raising the political stakes for the M23 and its putative backers, particularly Rwanda, it forced them into a choice between allowing the group to be defeated or – in essence – declaring open war on the SADC. The result is that the east of the DRC, for the first time in many years, is no longer held hostage by rebel groups with significant links to neighbouring governments, though these undoubtedly remain. It was a high-risk move, and one that could have led the region back into inter-state conflict. But M23’s backers instead chose to disengage, allowing the group to fragment, signing a series of agreements known as the Nairobi Declaration in December 2013. Though it has not faded entirely – former M23 combatants, many of whom are currently in Uganda and Rwanda, represent a latent threat of re-mobilization that urgently needs to be addressed – the group is no longer able to directly shape events in eastern DRC” (Shepard, 2014).

M23 Goma P3

The situation of M23 by August 2015:

“At this stage, the amnesty provision and the repatriation process of the reportedly over 1,400 ex-M23 combatants which fled to Uganda and Rwanda in 2013 are amongst the most contentious. To date, only 182 ex-M23 combatants have been repatriated from Uganda to the DRC, while 13 have been repatriated from Rwanda. According to Ugandan sources, as of 4 August, 817 ex-M23 combatants are cantoned at the Bihanga Military Camp. About 327 residents of the camp have deserted, with no clarity on their whereabouts, 14 are admitted in hospital, 25 departed on sick leaveand are yet to return, 4 are deceased. The presence of hundreds of ex-M23 and are yet to return, 4 are deceased. The presence of hundreds of ex-M23 combatants in Rwanda and Uganda remains a serious source of concern for the GoDRC and the host authorities in Uganda and Rwanda. Yet, despite several attempts by the GoDRC to expedite the repatriation of the ex-M23 combatants, in line with the Nairobi Declarations and relevant decisions of the ICGLR Summits, there has been no progress in this process due to lack of even focus in the implementation of the Nairobi Declarations” (UN, 2015).

Afterthought:

As we can see there is a connection and the deflection from Government of Uganda (GoU) is expected, but if I had showed the riches gained by the imported gold from the areas that M23 took, would have showed the value for supporting the army as the common sense for the cooperation and support directly from the GoU.

He might have called President Kabila and told he would work on the matter and have the discussions in Kampala as a way of swaying away from the fact that they are behind and servicing the M23. We can see that and knowing that they gave arms, training, army men from the UPDF and even technical training. The pictures of the arms with Ugandan origin after the retreat and stop of violence from M23 should be proof enough of their involvement into the matter, what is worse is the witnesses claiming that certain big men in the government has supported and set things in order to fix the problems that M23 had at one point. That is something that we all should consider, as Salim Selah has been involved in a lot of shady arrangement in DRC before and has only backed away from the “Wonga Coup” to deliver arms to Thatcher’s son. Rest of the time he has done transport arrangements and fixing the army to keep Uganda in parts of DRC when needed. So the stories of him being involved would not be a shock in any way.

The suspect issue is how easy they could stay in Uganda, cross the borders and even get personnel and recruit in border areas. As this suspect connection together with the history of using military force from Uganda to get wealth out of the DRC. As they did in the late 1990s and in the beginning of 2000s; they haven’t just cooperated with the world to fight together will alliances to force away LRA and ADF-NALU. That is not the whole story, though the Government of Uganda won’t it to seem that way, as a way to clean their hands from the mud they have been swimming in. Takes a lot more than a shower to get the dirt off, you smell me?

Peace.

Reference:
Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum – ‘Consolidating the Peace: Closing the M23 Chapter – Prepared on behalf of the DRC Affinity Group December 2014’

Jackson, Henry M. – ‘DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING A 3D STRATEGY WORK IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA’ (Winter 2013)

Gil, Manuel Manrique – ‘The M23 and eastern D.R. Congo: An intractable problem or an opportunity to engage?’ (12.11.2012) – ‘European Parliament: Directorate-Generale for External Affairs: Policy Department’

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – ‘DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION (ICGLR) ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) 5th EXTRAORDINARY SUMMIT OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT’ (24.11.2012).

M23 – ‘Declaration of Commitments by the Movement of March 23 at the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue’ (12.12.2013) – Nairobi, Kenya.

Mbabazi, Amama – ‘Uganda’s Stand and Response on the allegations made by the UN Group of Experts and the subsequent endorsement of the allegations by the UN Security Council about Uganda’s purported support of M23 rebels’ (01.11.2012) – Statement in Parliament of Uganda

Shepard, Ben – ‘Beyond Crisis in the DRC The Dilemmas of International Engagement and Sustainable Change’ (December 2014) – Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,

United Nation – Letter dated 12 October 2012 from the Group Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo

United Nation – ‘Letter dated 12 December 2013 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit the final report of the Group, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012)’

United Nations – ‘OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION -Neutralization of Armed Groups’ (26.08.2015)

ADF or Obusinga bwa Rwenzururu? – Museveni struggle with counterrevolutionary insurgency

In 1990 Yoweri Museveni gave the Millitary Academy in Bombo a document explaining how to fight counterrevolutionary insurgency (Museveni 2000, S: 132). Why I am pointing this out today. It’s because of the tragic events in Kasese and Bundibugyo(Bagala, 2014) where its reported now 90 dead. The document was in a book published in 2000 called ‘What’s Is Africa’s Problem?’ Then I will address this document and this with the state it is in today. With doing so, I will there after discuss short history of ADF, LRA, ADM and UMLA whom all interconnected. After that show how the ADF has reacted to recent events and how we come to the news of recent of the tragic deaths in Kasese and Bundibugyo. This will be long post, but hopefully this will give you some new knowledge on the matter.

Museveni had four points to fight counterrevolutionary insurgency:

  1. Fight for the right cause
  2. The cause of the government must be for a just one.
  3. Politicizing the population
  4. Diplomatic weapons

(Museveni, 2000)

First Point: Fight illiteracy and make government policy on land for the population (Museveni, 2000, S: 132). In 2014 there new reports of bad schools and its sorry state, Margret Nakitto the Mukono Muncipal Education officer explains to Red Pepper: “We as a municipal, we always carry out village meetings with communities where the locals identify their basic necessities then we handle them over to the district that in most cases has positively responded to our requests”, she continues:”  Active learning is in government schools unlike private schools that hire mercenary who force pupils to cram what they do not understand”(Red Pepper, 2014). Second part of first point is to rebuild infrastructure (Museveni. 2000, S: 133). Museveni himself said for the budget in 2014/2015: “Uganda is now connected from corner to corner. You can now drive on tarmac road to all corners of Uganda. As a result of this shift in resources, Uganda has achieved connectivity across the country” (State House, 2014). So we have to see if that is true. The weakness of the national economy can lead to counterrevolutionary insurgency (Museveni 2000, S: 133). World Bank reports that since 1986 to 2014 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has gone from around 4.80 Billion USD to 21.48 billion USD (World Bank, 2014). There would be issues with ideology, political and general conceptual underdevelopment (Museveni, 2000, S: 133). Reasons for underdevelopment in Uganda stemmed from the colonial administration into the new independence policies of manufacturing. The government continued with the new policies of to the agricultural sector. In agricultural sector has the focus is on the traditional foods and also the non-traditional for export like coffee. Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) has liberated the economy and also opened for more unemployment. SAP was abounded in 2009 where the focus turned into a principal marcoeconomics element such as economic growth to trickledown economy, inflation control, and export of raw materials, and also to focus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Kashumbashi writes: “Uganda is now defined as a failed state vulnerable to domestic and external shocks including inability and /or unwillingness to control borders against the influx of illegal immigrants that have heightened political tensions as competition for services and resources particularly land ownership intensifies. Thus, notwithstanding its huge resource endowment and strategic location, Uganda remains mired in under-development and extreme poverty because of unfavourable economic policies and political instability, civil wars and violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms”(Kashumbashi, 2014).

Second Point: The cause of the government must be for a just one (Museveni, 2000, S: 134). Where the focus was on correct building of the army and graduation of the military (Museveni, 2000, S: 134). Museveni says: “Military training is not easy. It is tough but builds your stamina, body and character”(…)”This emphasis you have done, of political education and discipline is very welcome and I want to thank you very much for that”(UGO.co.ug, 2014).

Third Point: Politicizing a Confused Population (Museveni, 2000, S: 136). That the manipulation of the population and peasantry ignorance and bandits taking advantages previous political mobilization. There could also be tribal intoxicants with the issues between the “south” and the “north” (Museveni, 2000, S: 137). With the basis of the discipline of the army would give security to the population. Good prompt management and utilization of intelligence information for the government (Museveni, 2000, S: 137-138). Col Felix Kulayigye said “the truth telling process could turn chaotic since most of the conflicts in the country were tribal” (…) ”while many people keep accusing government of wrong doing yet there are many civilians and religious leaders who protected insurgents especially during the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel conflict” (Red Pepper (2), 2014). So there must be done something wrong by the government and the plans that Museveni had in the 1990 unto 2014.

Fourth Point: Diplomatic Weapons (Museveni, 2000, S: 139).

If you handle diplomacy in the right way and manner then will you get the weapons you need, and when you need them. So that continuance of weapons needed to combat counterrevolutionary insurgency (Museveni, 2000, S: 139-140). If the numbers from NationMaster can be used as a guideline, approximant number of UPDF forces (exact number of forces in 2000) it was 50.000 Armed Combat Forces. Battle-related deaths were in 2007 up to 91. The price of the army per capita was 6, 13 USD. Use of GDP was 2, 9% was in 2006, in 2013 down to 1, 8 % of GDP. Personnel for the army were up 47.000 in 2005. The amount of Weapons Holdings the UPDF had in 2001 was 286.000 (NationMaster, 2014). So if this numbers are somewhere near the truth of today’s picture, Museveni sure has made a well spent with Diplomatic Weapons.

Short LRA:

This was how Museveni himself in 1990 commented on how the Ugandan government should succeed in beating the issue of counterrevolutionary insurgency. This week we saw the second guerilla group in 20 years attacking northern parts of Uganda. The most famous one is LRA (Lord Resistance Army). LRA now is on the run between Central African Republic (C.A.R), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan; they are on the run from UPDF who is going after them there. This has led to clashes with ‘Seleka’ in C.A.R which wasn’t intended in general, but rumors are out that ‘Seleka’ is supporting LRA (Ronan, 2014).

Short history of ADF:

It started first of in Uganda as Ugandan Muslim Liberation Army (UMLA) this after they accused NRA (NRM) killing Muslims in 1979 at Nyamitaga in Mbabara and also the killings of Muslims at Butambala near Mpigi (Prunier, 2009, S: 84). UMLA was founded in January in 1995 (Prunier, 2009, S: 84). Monarchist of the Baganda Kingdom of Uganda wasn’t happy with the restoration of the Kabaka Mutesa II that happened in 1993 and became only a cultural institution with no power. Allied Democratic Movement (ADM) was founded in London later in January 1995 (Prunier, 2009, S: 85). The UMLA had it firsts attacks were in February at Buseruka, near Lake Albert in Bunyoro. This was on 20-28 February 1995 and went bad for the UMLA. So they fled the area and settled down in Bunia in DRC. Through the met of Tabliq a Khartoum supported group who worked together with Sudanese Army Security Service who controlled at the time Bunia Airbase and Khartoum was hostile to Uganda and NRM (Prunier, 2009, S: 86). This sponsored relationship from Khartoum led to the alliance of the ADM and the UMLA, whom became in the DRC the ADF (Prunier, 2009, S: 87).

ADF made a mark 13. November 1996. Museveni called Mobutu and told he would enter DRC to attack the ADF guerillas at their bases in Kasindi, DRC and Mobutu was surprised. Then leader of ADF Ssentamatu Kayiira said “to reintroduce multi party politics in Uganda, stop Museveni’s nepotism giving all the juicy jobs to Westerns (meaning people from Ankoli and Kigenzi) and re-establish cordial relations with Uganda’s neighbor” (Prunier, 2009, S: 120.121). This made Museveni enters the conflict at the time in DRC and fight ADF in Bunia and Kasindi (Prunier, 2009, S: 121). By mid-October in 1998 Museveni went into Sudan to fight to both strike back at LRA and also ADF since they got air support from Juba, the numbers was up to 50.000 IDPs in January 1998 and by July 70.000. Amama Mbabazi was commenting on this at the time: “Khartoum’s plan is to destabilize the region to prepare the ground for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and Arabism”(Prunier, 2009, S: 196).

MONUC (UN Peacekeeping Force in DRC) hunted down with FARDC the ADF in late December 2005 where they ended up killing 86 ADF combatants (Prunier, 2009, S: 208).

Later the ADF still exists, but not only as guerrilla force on the footholds of Ruwenzori to a rogue mining company. They are not seeing in Kampala as a threat anymore, but something of the past (Prunier, 2009, S: 321,322).

ADF Now:

Recently suggest that ADF-NALU has 800 to 1.400 combatants in the DRC-Uganda. The funding of the organization is off Illegal logging and gold-mining, this money is being handled with a network of cars and motorcycles, this then being transferred to and from London, Kenya and Uganda. There has been attempts crush the guerrilla army in 2005 and 2010 (IRIN, 2014).

Lt. Col Paddy Ankunda of the UPDF and he comments: “The threat is real. ADF is recruiting, training and opening new camps in eastern DRC. We are alert and very prepared to deal with any attack on our side of the border” (…)”We are sharing intelligence information with the DRC government [and] FARDC [DRC’s national army] about their activities. We hope FARDC will be able to deal with the group” (…)”There is no doubt; ADF has a linkage with Al-Shabab. They collaborate. They have trained ADF on the use of improvised explosive devices” (…)”What is worrying us is that the ADF has been carrying out a series of abductions, recruitment and attacks in DRC without much resistance from FARDC”(IRIN 2, 2013). This is after what he said in 2013 and still nothing said about in international press or any action from them.

Stephen Oola commented also: “The allegations that ADF is regrouping are not new and should not come as a surprise. What should worry us as a country is the apparent collective amnesia of treating our own exported armed insurgencies as other people’s problems” (…)”The LRA [Lord’s Resistance Army] and ADF are Uganda’s problems and will remain so, no matter where they are located at a particular time, until we seek a comprehensive solution to conflicts in this country”(IRIN 2, 2013).

Museveni commented himself to African Report this in August 2013: “I have told President Kabila and the UN that they should deal with these killers” (…)”We can’t have neighbours who are murderers. ADF killers are in Congo, if they dare to if they dare to attack Uganda they will suffer the consequences” (…)”I urge Ugandans to look after our people fleeing the conflict in Congo. These are our people, the boundaries are foreign” (…)”Slowly by slowly we shall bring Africa back together. An elephant always carries the weight of its tasks however heavy” (Olukya, 2013).

Museveni congratulates Kabila on 2. December 2013 said “The DRC army operations overrun the headquarters of the ADF in the Eastern Region. I want to thank President Kabila and congratulate him upon this successful operation of flashing out the ADF” (NewVision.co.ug, 2014).

What Museveni failed with his counterrevolutionary insurgency plans from 1990?

My suggestion would be that he didn’t follow the four points of the 1990 military document given to Bombo Military Academy in Uganda. Museveni and UPDF can’t fight the right wars since they can’t have done that, then this kind of armies wouldn’t exist still after 20 years and making havoc in Kasese and Bundibugyo. The cause for safety of their own citizens should be JUST one, but does this matter at this point for the UPDF? They are used in Somalia, South Sudan, DRC and C.A.R, are there still forces to use in the country? If they are, where are they stationed at and how hungry are they? Since you can’t let the ADF just walk into your territory and start shooting without any warning, then killing both army personnel and also civilians.Politicizing the population is captured in the second point, how can a government and police let a guerrilla just walk over the borders and make hazardous event and tragic outcome. That UPDF isn’t stronger in the area must be a wake-up call for the brigadiers and generals of the Ugandan Army. This must be an answer to the ADF battles in 2013 and now their revenging the UPDF and DRC army. Fourth point is Diplomatic Weapons, I am sure that Museveni and UPDF getting the weapons he need. He has recently been in Russia and become more connected to them, also his ties to USA in the fight against LRA and the Al.Shabab in Somalia. UPDF is sure getting the modern weapons of this time from them and sure it’s part of the aid.

The sad new reports from several sources:

Paddy Akunda: “There was an attack by tribal gunmen on our barracks in Bundibugyo [Western Uganda] and we repulsed them, killing so far 41 of the attackers. The operation is ongoing”(AllAfrica.com, 2014). Ms Namaye says: “he attackers were coordinated by local leader and politicians, who are yet to be interrogated” (…)”Investigations are pointing to area politicians and a witch doctor who hails from Democratic Republic of Congo who helped them attack out stations” (Bagala, 2014). Lt. Ninsiima Rwemijuma has commented: “More than 80 suspected militants are now in custody”. The military is saying ‘it’s not a full blown insurgency’. They suspects it to be: Obusinga bwa Rwenzururu. Who is a part of the Bakonzo tribe and have a long tense relationship with neighboring tribe Bamba. Rwemijuma continues: “It is hard to confirm that this is a rebel group or not” (…)”This is a subject matter that needs investigation” (Muhumuza, 2014).

More interesting reports are armed men went into the barracks of Kasese and took ammunition from the place. Also fears of civil war sparking off in Kampala. Even UPDF Officer has reported that tanks has vanished and soldiers. Muzhoozi is reported also to hold a dozen meetings over the political unrest (Welinformers.com, 2014).

I mean it today:

Peace!

Links:

AllAfrica.com: ‘Uganda: Dozens Killed in Clash With Ugandan Police’ (06.07.2014), Links:http://allafrica.com/stories/201407070244.html?aa_source=mf-hdlns

Bagala, Andrew (Monitor.co.ug), – Death toll in Kasese, Bundibugyo attacks rises to 90, (Updated: 07.07.2014). Links:http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Death-toll-in-Kasese–Bundibugyo-attacks–rises-to-90/-/688334/2374884/-/cewe5b/-/index.html

IRIN – ReliefWeb: ‘Briefing: ADF-NALU militia in DRC’ (27.01.2014), Links:http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/briefing-adf-nalu-militia-drc

IRIN 2 – ‘DRC-based Ugandan rebel group “recruiting, training”’ (11.07.2013), Links:http://www.irinnews.org/report/98400/drc-based-ugandan-rebel-group-recruiting-training

Kashambuzi, Eric (the London Evening Post) – Why Uganda has failed to develop and eradicate poverty (Updated: 05.07.2014), Links: http://www.thelondoneveningpost.com/features/why-uganda-has-failed-to-develop-and-eradicate-poverty/2/

Muhumuza, Rodney (AP) – ‘Fears of rebellion as Uganda’s army battles gunmen’, Stripes.com, (07.07.2014), Links: http://www.stripes.com/news/africa/fears-of-rebellion-as-uganda-s-army-battles-gunmen-1.292272

Museveni, Yoweri K. – What Is Africa’s Problem? (2000), University Of Minnesota Press, USA.

NewVision Reporter – ‘Museveni hails Kabila for flashing out ADF rebels’, (10.02.2014), Links:http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/652370-museveni-hails-kabila-for-flashing-out-adf-rebels.html

NationMaster.com: Uganda Military Stats (Read 07.07.2014), NationMaster (Updated I don’t know), Links:http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Uganda/Military

Olukya, Godfrey – ‘Uganda: Museveni warns DRC rebels’, African Report, (06.08.2013), Links: http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/uganda-museveni-warns-drc-rebels.html

Red Pepper: ‘State Of The Gov’t Schools In Uganda’ (Updated: 02.07.2014), Links: http://www.redpepper.co.ug/state-of-the-govt-schools-in-uganda/

Red Pepper (2): ‘Kulayigye: Uganda Not Ready for Truth Telling’ (29.05.2014), Links:http://www.redpepper.co.ug/kulaigye-uganda-not-ready-for-truth-telling/

Ronan, Paul: Behind the headlines: ‘UPDF clashes with Seleka in eastern CAR’ (02.07.2014), Links: http://www.theresolve.org/2014/07/behind-the-headlines-updf-clashes-with-seleka-in-the-car/

Prunier, Gerard: Africa’s World War (2009), Oxford University Press. UK

The State House of Uganda: 2014/2015 budget poised to boost infrastructure sector (02.06.2014) Links: http://www.statehouse.go.ug/media/news/2014/06/12/20142015-budget-poised-boost-infrastructure-sector

UGO.Co.Ug: UPDF Officers Demonstrate Skills Acquired In Intense Training (02.07.2014), Links: http://news.ugo.co.ug/updf-officers-demonstrate-skills-acquired-intense-training/

WelInformers.com: ‘Senior UPDF officers vanish with military hardware, Museveni, Muhoozi hold meetings’ (07.07.2014, Links:http://www.weinformers.net/2014/07/07/senior-updf-officers-vanish-with-military-hardware-museveni-muhoozi-hold-meetings/

World Bank: Uganda GDP – (Updated 2014), Links: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/uganda/gdp