United Nations Security Risk Assessment of South Sudan by September 2015

Today is a day where I will discuss and show findings for certain UNMISS report that is from UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) its numbered: ST/SGB/2007/06. It is the United Nations Security Risk Assessment – South Sudan. It was approved 11^th September 2015! And here are some interesting findings. I think the quotes speak for themselves!

“Following the onset of the conflict in December 2013, UNMISS could not fully perform its mandate given it under Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) because of the security situation and the need to maintain impartiality. Subsequently, Security Council resolution 2155 (2014), 27 May 2014, fundamentally shifted the basis of UNMISS’ mandate from support of the Government in capacity-building in traditional UN peacebuilding areas to four key areas. In the line with the UN Security Council resolution 2223 (2015), UNMISS activities are:

• Protecting the Civilians
• Monitoring and investigating human rights
• The Creation of conditions conducive for humanitarian assistance
• Supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement” (UN SRA SS P: 2-3).

“Despite the attacks on the Akobo CSB and the BOR PoC in April 2014, that were more linked with the ethnic based targeting of South Sudanese sheltering within UN premises, generally speaking the UN is not a primary target for hostilities. Moreover, the UN is more often caught in crossfire during armed conflict and access is affected as a result of armed conflict. This will continue to be a risk”(…)“The fact that UNMISS hosts over 166,000 Internally Displaced People (IDP) increases the UN’s operational risk profile and reputation” (…)”PoC sites are volatile with the potential that the high level of tension amongst the IDPs may spill over in violent clashes. Staff members are therefore at a higher risk working within these sites” (UN SRA SS P: 3).

“The armed conflict, which is now in its second year, followed last year’s pattern where the dry season was fighting season enabling forces to take control of vast areas of the country. During the rainy seasons (July-Nov) the roads become impassable curbing direct clashes for the period. Even with the IGAD peace agreement signed in Juba on 26. August 2015, assessment is that the country security situation in 2015/16 will remain unsecure” (UN SRA SS P: 4).

“Currently there is no mainstreaming of Security within the UN activities/ programmes. Therefore, the policy that defines that security needs to be involved at all levels of management to ensure security is considered/ mainstreamed into all the activities or programmes is not applied, specifically in UNMISS” (…)”Maintaining security training would enhance the functional expertise of all international and national staff although programme managers would need to receive training in order to learn the identity inherent and associated risks in a timely manner” (UN SRA SS P: 5).

“Peace Operation: To help implement the mandated tasks, UNMISS will consist of a military component of up to 12,500 troops of all ranks and a police component, including appropriate Formed Police Units, up to 1,323 personell” (UN SRA SS P: 9).

“Humanitarian programme assessments have indicated that, as the violence deepens, the humanitarian needs and risk to aid workers increases. 27 aid workers are presumed to have been killed in South Sudan since December 2013 and over 150 NGO staff are unaccounted for” (…)”In Juba, there have been a growing number of armed attacks against humanitarian compounds” (UN SRA SS P: 10).

“At the height of the conflict large numbers of people split over the borders into neighboring countries seeking refuge in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Abyei; these numbers stand at approximately 510,000 individuals” (UN SRA SS P: 13).

“The increased risk specifically in Malakal and Bentiu would require an increase in the deployment of security staff and expansion of the collective security posture” (…)”As the rains of 2015 began to cut off supply lines, military offensives increasingly used riverine methods of transporting goods and fighters to the frontline. The method of delivery was also being used by humanitarian agencies to transfer large quantities of food to communities in need. In April 2015 a barge convoy hired by UNMISS to carry food and fuel supplies for the base in Malakal was attacked by RPGs and small arms fire , injured four persons. In July the government gave strict warnings that all river transportation should stop, further restricting aid delivery around the country. In September there have also been reported incidents of alleged attack on government owned barges and gunboats in Upper Nile State, the SPLA-io claimed responsibility ahead of verification” (UN SRA SS P: 14-15).

“Since the beginning of the conflict (December 2013) until June 2015, there were a total of 594 security incidents involving IDPs in UNMISS PoC sites. Cases include serious assaults, civil unrest, mob violence, robbery, death threats and harassment, and several locations have also recorded serious disruption to humanitarian operation” (…)”Continued accusations by the government actors or affiliates that the PoC sites are a sanctuary for supporters of the SPLA in Opposition also make the PoC sites a target; this point was actively demonstrated in the attack in the Bor in April 2014 resulting in the death of 55 IDPs within the UNMISS site. Similar incidents have occurred near PoC sites in Juba, Bentiu and Malakal” (…)”An outbreak of cholera started in South Sudan on 18 May 2015 reaching total of 1718 cases [dates 4 September 2015], this rapid spread is largely affecting areas of the state capital Juba and also a separate smaller spread in Bor. One death have been reported at the PoC site in Juba with a total of 76 cases of people who contracted cholera inside the site” (UN SRA SS P: 16).

“UNSMS will have to work much closer with the GoSS security agencies to ensure an improved  security response to UN security related incidences” (…)”In Juba a “blue zone” was implemented to manage the locations which were approved by UN security for International UN staff to reside in based on accessibility to the area, crime rates and distance to UN base in case of relocation and emergencies” (…)”Where the UN has a presence Operational Zones have been created where security clearances are not required in all main urban areas to allow for improved access. This approach is underscore by risk management as opposed to a risk adverse approach, this concept needs to be maintained and where possible further enhanced or monitored” (UN SRA SS P: 17).

“The disruption in oil revenues and devaluation of the currency as a result of the fighting has had a detrimental effect on the already weakened economy; government, civil servants, armed forces and police are having their salaries delayed. The breakdown in social infrastructure has reduced employment opportunities; creating desperation which has translated into crime” (…)”For example, the on-going cattle raiding and inter-clan revenge clashes that has been served in retaliation have devastated Lake States” (…)”Government officials have sometimes exacerbated tense situations with alienating remarks on their perception of the UN, often with accusations that the UN is favoring one side over the other within the conflict itself” (UN SRA SS P: 19).

“Animosity grew when the government made accusations that the UN was harboring rebels within its Protection of Civilian (POC) sites. Direct and veiled threats to attack POCs became widespread” (…)”The effect of this was in April 2014 when “armed youth” attacked the UNMISS base in Bor resulting in the deaths of 55 IDPs and injuring many others including UN peacekeepers” (…)”On 26 August 2014 under suspicious circumstances a UN contracted helicopter crashed near Bentiu in Unity State, killing three (3) aircrew and injuring one (1) other underlining the threats involved in working within South Sudan. Investigations into the cause of the crash were inconclusive” (…)”In the middle July 2015 there are approximately 166,142 people saying in seven (7) UNMISS bases (UN SRA SS P: 20).

“There is also notable internal political  friction between the Central Government and the Equatoria States who have been calling for the greater autonomy via a federal government system. This has lead to local Equatorian communities feeling threatened and evacuating their families from the area” (…)”In Jonglei state” (…)” During rainy season in 2014 there were major skirmishes between the SPLA and SPLA-io reported in Jonglei. The SPLA-io has continued to threaten to fire upon aircraft flying in the areas, which were seven of the eleven counties during this period; the last threat was on 17 July 2014” Upper Nile” (…)”Several major clashes between the SPLA and SPLA-io have occurred; during one heavy exchange some stray bullets entered the UNMISS camp killing and injuring IDPs and causing structural damage to UN resources. All UN personnel remain concentrated in UNMISS camp including several agencies who had to abandon their own compounds” (…)”Unity State” (…)”To the west of Bentiu, UN staff previously based in the former Mayom UNMISS County Support Base (CSB) regularly were “caught in cross fire” incidents when the parties to conflict attempted to take control of the strategically important town, which is principally inhabited by Bul Nuer. UN Mission and Agencies Funds and Programme (AFP) staffs have become the target with regular ambushes, the demand for their trucks, and/or fuel and the forceful attempt to board UN flight by military” (UN SRA SS P: 22). “Also in the Upper Nile UNICEF reports that 89 boys were forcibly recruited by an unnamed armed group in late February 2015. They were takin in an area currently under government control, which is defended by government-allied Shilluk militia commanded by Maj Gen Johnson Olony” (…)”There are reports of an LRA attack in Western Equatoria State in March 2015 when one person was killed, the village was looted and eleven people were abducted but four were later released. This resuming of LRA attacks has increased fear amongst the population as the last attack in the 2012” (UN SRA SS P: 23).

“The oil pipelines exit South Sudan in both Unity and Upper Nile State, oil is refined in Sudan before being exported. The potential loss of oil revenues affects both nations so good trade relations’ remains key to maintaining income” (UN SRA SS P: 23).

“Currently the flow of refugees is affecting both countries as fighting affects the communities and so they move on, in Sudan the fighting in South Kordofan has created an influx of refugees into South Sudan and the fighting in northern Unity State in South Sudan has meant many refugees travelled north to refugee sites within Sudan” (…)”Cross border grazing & migration rights also areas of dispute as they host well-armed Sudanese Misseriya cattle herders who move around South Sudan in search of feed for their animals” (UN SRA SS P: 24).

“South Sudan lacks an adequate air traffic control system, countrywide. The government took control of the country’s airspace from Sudan in 2011, but to date has not issued any “Notice to Airmen” (NOTAMs), There are areas, however, that the government has declared a “no fly zone” (i.e. over the Presidential Palace in Juba), suggesting that the government reserve the right to fire upon an aircraft that violates this airspace” (UN SRA SS P: 25).

“Use of the River Nile for transportation of UN supplies and fuel has proved difficult with the government threat against all river travel by humanitarian agencies. With military supply vessels regularly travelling the river to the frontline it is not a safe option for delivery of humanitarian provisions” (UN SRA SS P: 26).

“Communicable diseases in South Sudan constitute a major cause of morbidity and morality largely due to the limited access to clean water and sanitation being extremely poor with open defection rates, which reaches 60% in urban areas and 80% in rural areas” (UN SRA SS P: 29).

“In regards to infrastructure, the entire country remains underdeveloped. Road and air mobility is seriously jeopardized especially during the rainy season where whole regions are cut off. Electricity, food and clean water supplies are scarce and seriously impact UN operations in remote duty stations” (…)”Due to poor road conditions in both dry and rainy season and lack of infrastructure there is a heavy reliance on UNMISS and UNHAS air assets for the delivery of humanitarian aid” (UN SRA SS P: 30).

“The existing EU sanctions delivered in July 2014 had little impact on the de-escalating of the crisis, however further extensive UN sanctions were delivered in a tough UN Security Council Resolution on the 3 March 2015, the decision affects individuals through the freezing of their bank accounts and travel bans will affect all players who do not work towards peace and security. There is also an African Union (AU) report which has investigated human rights abuses last dry season which is completed but yet to be published” (UN SRA SS P: 41).

“There is an increase of visible signs of South Sudan being a failing state: there is no free media, intimidation, by government security is commonplace, economy close to collapse and lack of provision or accountability of the civilian population by the state with most funds diverted to fund the war effort. Law and order is collapsing too, in some states wages have been stolen or simply delayed for months on end, in urban area reports of police becoming active criminals, local courts do not function and reports that crimes are committed due to perpetrators acting with impunity” (…)”Large numbers of IDPs rely on the security of UNMISS peacekeeping forces for their protection, however crowd control measures can never maintain order if the IDPs turn on their protector if the tensions rise inside the confines of the POC sites, the numbers are simply overwhelming” (UN SRA SS P: 42).

Afterthought:
It is all worrying even with the Peace Agreement between the SPLA/M and SPLA-IO which signed a deal with amendments and tokens taken off. The worrying path is the records and analyses that the UN and UNMISS is delivering in this report. The numbers of people that are fleeing from South Kordofan in Sudan and the ones fleeing South Sudan to neighboring countries like Ethiopia, Uganda and DRC is massive! Should be worrying and the way the air-space is not secured. Also the reports on how the seasons are changing and making it difficult to spread necessities like food through air should be seen as a GIANT sign that something has to change. Infrastructure that is gone during rainy season and the air-drops has to happen for no open roads. River Nile isn’t safe and is in the front-line and dangerous travel with transportation of necessities though that path.

There are the issues with the skirmishes in different areas and also military assaults in the various states. Both between SPLA and SPLA-IO but they are not alone. There other military groups making it worse, also the report of even LRA has done damage in the country. Those also innocent children have been abducted and all the weakness of the security issues together with the fractions inside the SPLA making the reports and data on the ground more worrying.

On top of it all the sanctions that has been put on the Government of South Sudan and it hasn’t hit the ground running, but been useless and if it does anything it’s been just a certain individuals that has lost bank accounts, but it hasn’t stopped the fighting or stopped small-arms coming to the country!

There is so much more I could have put into ink and discussed because its powerful to see what the UNMISS is writing and discussing in the report. I have taken what I seen as main issues and fresh insights. I am sure somebody else would have taken more of the context and background into it, but that you can read somewhere else. Peace!

Reference:

United Nations Security Risk Assessment South Sudan – September 2015 – UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) & UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) – Approved 11. September 2015 – (Given out 15.09.2015)

Professor Lumumba at PAV Ansah Foundation Forum – “On the Subject of Governance!”

PLO Lumumba interesting as always! Right?

Ask ourselves! We should Ask Ourselves!

Peace.

UBOS Press Release: Uganda – Consumer Price Index – August 2015

UBOS Press Release: Uganda – Consumer Price Index – July 2015

Uganda – The Annual Report Audit General for FY ended 2014 – Value for Money Audit Volum 5: Quotes and Outtakes from this.

This blog here will be focused on the ‘Office of the Auditor General’ who released ‘Annual report of the Auditor General for the Financial Year ended 30^th June 2014 – Volume 5 Value for Money Audit’. What you will read is actual quotes from the paper or report. Here you get a vivid picture of how the financial year (FY 2013-2014) was in reality.

I haven’t taken everything from the piece. It would be too long and you might end up bored. Here is what should get your mind boggling and wonder. How could this be this way? Why is it like this? How did it end up like this? What does this tell me about the economic practices in Uganda? And so on. If you start to think like that, then it was worth using my time. Enjoy the quotes from the report. Hope you catch some wisdom.

When it comes to managing Public Debt:

“Public debt is incurred primarily for financing budget deficits, development of domestic financial markets, supporting the country’s Balance of Payment (BOP) position/foreign reserves and monetary policy objectives. In Uganda, public debt is managed by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) in liaison with Bank of Uganda (BoU). Government borrows internally from domestic markets through issuance of Treasury bills and Bonds by the BoU and externally through Bilateral and multilateral borrowings. Currently, over 60% of the public debt is external debt and 40% is domestic debt. GoU borrowing has been rising over the years from USD 5.7 billion in Financial Year (FY) 2011/12 to USD 7 billion in FY 2013/14. The growing National debt, if not properly managed, could revert to unsustainable levels as was the case in the past”.

“Interest rates on domestic debt have overall stabilised in recent years relative to their peak in 2011/12. However, they remain a cause for concern due to their high contribution to overall debt service costs and the relatively high yields which they attract stand in stark contrast to those achieved by comparator nations with similar credit ratings”.

When it comes to roads:

“The Uganda Road Fund invested a total of UGX 914 billion in road maintenance activities during the three years under review (2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014),4 with a total of 4,565km of roads maintained. Despite the increasing investment, there are reports and persistent public outcry about the poor state of roads and the deteriorating quality of works being executed. The physical and financial performance reports of designated agencies in FY 2011/12 revealed the following issues: budget indiscipline, poor absorption of road maintenance funds, inaccuracies in reporting, lethargy of Designated Agencies (DAs) in complying with reporting requirements, widely varying unit costs, risk of loss of funds through end of year procedures, and grave underperformance of periodic maintenance works” (…) ”The road maintenance needs in Uganda cannot be met due to limited resources, for example for FY 2011/2012, the total maintenance needs from the agencies was UGX 413.95bn, and the budget provided by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) was UGX 280.95bn, indicating a 32% deficit” (…) “The road maintenance equipment inventory maintained by the URF is incomplete; the inventory is only for 12 (55%) of the municipalities and it is outdated as it was submitted in January 2011”.

When it comes to Gas and Oil:

“Through a review of reports on procurement submitted by the oil companies to PEPD, it was noted that from 2010-2013, the oil companies spent a total of USD 1,171.8 million on purchase of goods and services. Of this, USD 329.9 million was paid to Ugandan service providers, representing 28% of the total spend for all the companies in the period under review” (…) “The Ugandan service providers comprised about 73% of the approved suppliers which implies that the total value of the procurements from them was less than their relative number” (…) “Ugandans employed in the oil and gas sector by the oil companies overall rose from 69% in 2012 to 80% in 2014, absolute numbers of employees decreased from 546 to 432 between 2013 and 2014; in particular, the nationals dropped from 370 to 347 over the same period” (…) “For all the 27 jobs advertised in the newspapers, attracting over 700 local applicants, none was appointed, citing lack of experience in the oil and gas sector. Instead, the recruitment report submitted by the CNOOC to PEPD recommended recruitment of expatriates” (…) “According to the Industrial baseline survey done by the Joint Venture partners (CNOOC, TEP and TUOP), 60% of the workforce required for the next phases will be technicians and craftsmen, which translates to a demand of 7,800 and 1,800 technicians and craftsmen at the peak and plateau phases, respectively, of development and production. With the current total of only 86 UPIK graduates, there is doubt that the projected demand will be met by the time production starts (2018)” (…) “There are still several areas with clear potential for enhancing national content, such as: establishment of a clear regulatory framework, performance targets and indicators for national content; determining the level of state participation; local supplier development; employment and training of Nationals by the oil companies and government; ensuring gender parity and involving host communities”.

When it comes to the Healthcare:

“The Uganda Health Systems Strengthening Project (UHSSP) is a project administered under the Ministry of Health (MoH)” (…) “UHSSP, is a five year project, which was established in 2010, commenced operations in February 2011 and is due to end on 31st July 2015. The UHSSP project is jointly funded by the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the World Bank to a tune of USD 14.31 million and USD 130 million, respectively” (…) “UHSSP was set up to bridge the existing gap of supply and maintenance of medical equipment in 46 selected health facilities in order to improve the quality of health care delivered to patients. The project has spent USD 24 million (UGX 60.480 billion) on procurement and supply of these medical equipment, yet some of the equipment remains unused in the facilities where it was supplied” (…) “For instance, at the time of audit field visit in September 2014, the project had supplied anesthetics machines to 165 HCIVs at a cost of USD 2,063,085.75, however, all the HCIVs visited were not utilising this equipment because they lacked the technical expertise to effectively utilise the equipment. In a related instance, 2 auto strainers valued at USD 25,345.68, which were issued to Mubende and Moroto Regional Referral Hospitals, are not operational because of lack of qualified staff” (…) “observations conducted during field visits to the seventeen selected beneficiary health facilities, it was noted that some of the equipment supplied, worth Euros 3,954.67 and USD 1,209,879.09, was not being used at all while other equipment was not optimally utilized” (…) “Through field inspections, it was observed that health facilities namely Mwizi had no power supply while others such as: Moyo, Aduku, Aboke Pakwach had unreliable solar power supply, and therefore, were not providing emergency obstetric care services when needed” (…) “that various equipment supplied by the project, worth USD 319,676.35 and Euros 347.24, required additional logistical supplies to be effectively put to use. Such equipment included anesthesia units which required regulators, oxygen cylinders and other reagents while incubator cultures, incubator baby, defribrators, counting chamber, colorimeter required Medias, distilled water, thermometers, tubes and batteries”.

When it comes to handling Public Debt Part 2:

“Uganda benefited from the various Debt relief initiatives like the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative in 1998, the Enhanced HIPC in 2000 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2006. Despite these initiatives, GoU borrowing has been rising over the years from USD 5.7 billion in Financial Year (FY) 2011/12 to USD 7 billion in FY 2013/14. The growing National debt, if not properly managed, could revert to unsustainable levels as was the case in the past” (…) “In the FY 2013/14 Public debt increased to USD 7 billion up from USD 6.4 billion in F/Y 2012/13, reflecting a 9.38% increment in one year alone, the increment was way above the GDP growth of 6.2% in the FY 2013/14. Domestic debt accounted for 9.55% (UGX 1,437 billion) of the National budget, 2014/15 an increase of 1.65% (UGX 397 billion) from 7.9% (UGX 1,040 billion) in financialyear 2013/14. External financing on the other hand increased from UGX 2,660 billion in F/Y 2013/14 to UGX 2,733 billion of the National budget, 2014/15 an increase of UGX 73 billion. As non-concessional borrowing increases, the need for proper debt management becomes even much greater” (…) “On average, 60% of public debt is external loans of which Multilateral loans constitute over 80%. The domestic debt is largely derived from the sale of bonds which constituted an average of about 60% over the period FY2011/12 – 2013/14 “ (…) “In evaluating whether the debt, acquisition process facilitates debt sustainability, the audit mainly focussed on the acquisition of external debt since it constitutes over 60% of the National debt portfolio” (…) “The 2012 corruption scandal involving the Prime Minister’s office resulted in a changed relationship between multilateral lenders to the Ugandan government and a consequent reduction in the amount of aid in the form of direct budget support. Budget support in 2011/12 amounted to 168m USD, but reduced to 24.1m USD in 2013/14. The shortfall has in part been filled through domestic financing” (…) “The lack of coordination between debt and cash management functions contributed to inaccurate forecasting of cash needs. This exacerbated the problem of unplanned cuts to government programmes and led to the needless issuance of short-term debt, with the associated debt service costs” (…) “it was noted that local government authorities still held significant cash balances accrued from non-tax revenues and unutilised balances which were not remitted to the Consolidated Fund regularly, and that some accounts containing cash lay dormant, risking embezzlement” (…) “the current economic conditions characterised by reduced exports and a depreciating Ugandan Shilling against the dollar (30% for the last 4 months) there is a risk of stress which can affect future sustainability. Interest rates on domestic debt remain a cause for concern due to their high contribution to overall debt service costs (78%)”

When it comes to Health Care Part 2:

“Over the past three financial years 2011/12, 2012/13 and 2013/14, there has been an 18% increment in the funding of RRHs from UGX 53.86 billion to UGX 63.56 billion” (…) “Jinja nd Lira RRHs revealed that Jinja RRH which ran a 13-bed Intensive Care unit only used 6 of the beds, leaving 7 beds idle in the unit while Lira RRH had not utilized its 16-bed ICU since FY 2012/13. The Hospital Directors of Jinja and Lira RRHs explained that more nurses wouldhave to be deployed as each bed required at least 2 full time nurses to the unit to ensure full utilisation of the unit without compromising the quality of care. The unit would also require full time doctors and an anaesthesiologist. In Lira RRH, management explained that the ICU had not been commissioned and that its underutilisation was also due to the absence of an oxygen plant” (…) “With the current ICU bed capacity in Uganda of 61 in all public and private hospitals, 23 unutilized ICU beds in Jinja and Lira represents a wasted resource. It is estimated that about 10 critically ill patients were deprived of ICU admission daily and as a result succumbed to their illnesses” (…) “Hospital managers in response attributed this to the lack of bio medical engineers and high costs of repairing the equipment, for instance, according to Jinja RRH, the maintenance of the En-Visor ultra sound machine and the repairs of the Duo-Diagnostic big x-ray machine requires not less than UGX 15 million, and without a medical equipment maintenance fund, it is a challenge to maintain and repair the radiology and imaging machines. Management of Fort Portal RRH attributed the low usage of the x-ray and ultrasound machines to stock-outs of the supplies, such as reagents and films required for the operation of this diagnostic equipment” (…) “The average doctor-patient ratio per year in RRHs was 12440:1 implying one doctor for 34 patients per day while clinician- patient ratio was 10652:1 annually implying one clinician for 29 patients” (…) “For example; Kabale, Fort Portal, Masaka and Mbale Regional Hospitals referred some special cases to Mbarara RRH for services like CT scan, renal dialysis, neurosurgeon, paediatric surgery. In addition, lack of adequate staff has led to referrals to the National Referral Hospital and this has further resulted in the congestion and handling of cases at National Referral Hospital which cases could be handled by the RRHs. The process of referrals is costly and in some cases patients lose their lives in the process of reaching the health facility to which they have been referred”.

 When it comes to Management of Sewage in Urban areas:

“Poor sanitation costs Uganda 389 billion shillings annually, equivalent to 1.1% of the national GDP” (…) “Fifty six percent (56%) of the pipes in Kampala were built in the 1940s and 86% of these have been operational for 35 years or more” (…) “National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC)” (…) “NWSC had spent UGX 10.9billion towards sewage management activities in the areas under its jurisdiction over the last three years” (…) “the volume of sewage generated in the different towns and the volume of sewage collected and treated by NWSC, a study conducted by Mott Macdonald on behalf of NWSC in December 2012 estimated that by 2014, a total of 238.9 ML of wastewater would be generated of which, only 8.38ML would be collected and treated. This leaves approximately 230.52 ML of generated sewage uncollected and therefore not treated”.

Short ending:

I hope this was worth your time and also giving you an indication on the matters on the ground. This is just a fragment on the matters and what got told in the report. This just comes as gift to you. Especially to all of you who don’t use time reading the report on your free will or are lucky enough to get the report in your mailbox. Never the less, hope you got enlighten and also got a picture on how the monies is spent in last FY. Peace.

EU Press Release: Christmas gift for Kenyan Exporters as EU restors duty-free access for Kenyan goods