Kakira Sugar Limited addressing farmers strike (02.07.2018)
I write what I like.
“In this regard, we need to learn and apply lessons from emerging economies such as India, whose total healthcare industry revenue is expected to increase from US$ 110 billion in 2016 to US$ 372 billion in 2022 in response to deliberate investments in telemedicine, manufacturing of medicines and health technologies, medical tourism, health workforce training and risk pooling/health insurance, among others. In order to achieve this, we need to plan in a harmonized way. In Uganda, for instance, we, indeed, have a nascent pharmaceutical industry producing Aids/HIV, Malaria, Hepatitis-B, pharmaceuticals, etc. drugs. These are, however, still using imported pharmaceutical grade starch and imported pharmaceutical grade sugar. The pharmaceutical grade starch and sugar are crucial for making tablets and syrups for children’s medicines. Yet, the starch is from maize and cassava and the pharmaceutical grade sugar is from sugar. I am told the drugs would be 20% cheaper. Moreover, apart from helping in the pharmaceutical industry, more refined sugar is also needed in the soft drinks industry. Uganda is squandering US$34 million per year importing refined sugar for the soft drinks, about US$ 20 million for importing the pharmaceutical grade starches not including the other raw materials, US$ 77million for taking patients to India etc. Africa is incredibly rich but wasteful” (Yoweri Kaguta Museveni at THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE JOINT EAC HEADS OF STATE RETREAT ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND HEALTH FINANCING AND DEVELOPMENT, 22.02.2018).
Seems like the 1980s World Bank loans to restart Kakira Sugar Works hasn’t done enough, since the Ugandan state did right after the National Resistance Army takeover of the state. They went into an arrangement with the World Bank getting loans for the company, to restart. That deal was done 8th March 1988. As the documents said back in 198:
“Uganda currently imports US$15-20 million worth of sugar annually, which ranks second only to petroleum imports. Import substitution through restoration of domestic production capacity is therefore a high priority and eminently justified given the considerable comparative advantage Uganda enjoys as a result of its landlocked situation. Conditions for sugar production at Kakira are highly favorable. Cane growing benefits from excellent soils, good rainfall distribution (requiring only limited sunplementary irrigation) and relatively low levels of inputs of fertilizers and pesticides. The project brings back to the Kakira complex the original owners who have a demonstrated ability to manage sugar operations at Kakira and elsewhere” (SUGAR REHABILITATION PROJECT, 08.03.1988).
Therefore, what the President said today, the Sugar Rehabilitation Project, which was done to stop the heavy imports of sugar and for consumption, has clearly not worked as projected. Since his own state is squandering their resources and not even following the loans to make the project work. That is my take on it. The president of 32 years has clearly mismanaged this and not finished his job. Since he hasn’t been able to rehabilitate the industry.
When it comes to pharmaceutical industry there massive challenges, not just the sugar starch for medicine coverage of the pills. Nevertheless, the whole arrangement, since the technology to operate these machines are imported, as well is the parts. Not only the sugar starch, but also the ingredients are imported too, than you have few companies who has automated manufactures, which makes hard to make medicine on a larger scale. It is also high operation cost, because of use of back-up generators because of blackouts and shortfall of electricity. Because of this, it is expensive to have cold storage of the medicine and have a storage for the final products.
So the Idea from Museveni that it is simple, it is the whole system around it, that makes it more profitable to import ready made medicine, than actually produce it. Even if the added value of production would be there, but with the circumstances put by United Nations Industrial Development Organization, seemingly it is from 2009. However, the state of affairs hasn’t changed that much.
We can really estimate, that the adjustment and the needed organization to pull forward both industries during the years of NRM hasn’t been totally fruitful. If so, why would he complain about the imports of sugar and medicine, when he hasn’t been able to make it function with his 32 years of reign? Someone who has 3 decades, should have the ability and time to find the information, finalize plans and execute as seen fit. That is if he cared about the industries in question and their possible engines for growth and riches of Africa. Nevertheless, he hasn’t cared and haven’t used the time wisely. He has used the time bitching and not acting. That is just the way things is and it isn’t becoming better either.
He could have made sure that the pharmaceutical industry had energy, had the sufficient organization behind it to make the medicine, not only import and assemble certain medicine, he could have made sure the sugar industry was profitable and had the equipment to make the refined sugar used in the pharmaceutical industry. However, both is a lost cause, because it takes money and time. Both, is something he doesn’t have, since the narrative isn’t making him wealthy.
Alas, he we are at the status quo, with a President running for life and complaining about waste. When he has wasted 32 years and not made effort to change it. It is all talk and no fire. Peace.
“We have had a wonderful collaboration with IMF since 1987. We have managed to control inflation. By controlling inflation, we have succeeded in preserving the people’s earnings” – Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (State House, 2017).
Well, there been many who has set similarities with the inflation and price shocks of the year 1987. The Republic of Uganda has been through their mess before. The government of Uganda and the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) had just taken power in 1986. This was a year after the coup d‘etat, which brought the NRA into power. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in collaboration with International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had agreements and Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which promoted deregulation and less state control of the economy. This was also put forward to settle inflation and the deficit that the state had.
So, because some has put similarities between 1987 and 2017, as the prices has gone from about 3,000 Uganda Shillings (UGX) in 2016 and 7,000 Uganda Shillings (UGX) in 2017. There is clearly that there was problems in 1987, but whole another level. The Sugar Industry wasn’t established, the economy of Uganda needed export of coffee and this was the sole benefit of foreign currency into the economy.
“Inflation in Uganda is running as high as 200 percent, and low prices to farmers serve as a disincentive to agricultural production in a country of rich soil and mild equatorial climate” (…) “At the center of the debate is the issue of devaluation. In its first year in office, the Government revalued the currency from 5,000 to 1,400 shillings to the dollar, saying that the move would make imports cheaper. But exports have become increasingly expensive. Devaluation Debated. Some hard-line nationalists in Government insist that the cost of devaluation would be devastating. The cost of such imports as sugar, cooking oil and soap would increase significantly, they say, making the average Ugandan even worse off than he is now” (Rule, 1987).
“In 1987 the Uganda shilling was demonetizated during the currency reform and a currency conversion tax at a rate of 30% was imposed to further reduce excessive liquidity in the economy. There was an immediate drop in average inflation from 360.7% in May to about 200% cent in June. However, with the possible fears of complex and drastic currency reform, the premium shot up, representing essentially a portfolio shift to foreign currency, and possible capital flight, and suppressed inflation. The intended aim of the conversion tax, apart from reducing excessive liquidity, was to lend money raised through this tax to the government. This was to finance the budget deficit over a short period, rather than financing it through printing more money. Nonetheless, inflation shot up again within three months mainly due to renewed monetary financing of increased government expenditure, domestic credit expansion by commercial banks to meet coffee financing requirements and financing of the newly launched rural farmers scheme” (Barungi, P: 10-11, 1997)
“Prices for sugar and vegetable oil (both imported goods) increased rapidly in the early part of the year, falling between May and August — replicating the pattern of the premium between the parallel and the official exchange rate. The subsequent fall in sugar prices and stability of cooking oil prices were due to greater official imports. Inflationary pressures on food prices have been aggravated by supply shortages on account of severe transportation problems” (World Bank; P: 36, 1988).
“In October 1986, Mulema was replaced by Dr. Crispus Kiyonga, who has a medical background Kiyonga has a difficult task. The government’s finances are shaky at best. In an attempt to enable Ugandan citizens to purchase imported consumer goods, the government fixes their prices below world prices. This, of course, puts considerable pressure on the government’s finances: for example, in July 1986 the government imported $4.8 million worth of sugar to sell at subsidized prices” (Warnock & Conway, 1999).
Perspective from Kakensa: “Today sugar costs 7000/- per kilo. When Museveni came to power in 1986 each kilo was at 4/-(four shillings). Immediately he came to power he said Ugandan shilling had lost value, in 1987 all money was changed, not only changed but two zeros were cut off to give it value on addition to the 30% levied on each shilling. This means on every 100 shillings, you got 70cents. Those who had 100,000/- got 700/-” (Kakensa Media, 12.05.2017).
We can see there was certain aspects, but the sugar industry now is different. The Sugar factories are now real and the business are now in full affect. While, in 1987 the state needed coffee exports to get funding and foreign currency. The sugar was imported and was put on fixed prices. The inflation back then was because of the crashing economy after the bush-war and the effects of it. The Sugar prices now are rising for different reasons. These reasons are the yields of sugar-cane, the hoarding of sugar and the export of surplus sugar. Also, the production of ethanol and bio-fuel. That was not the situation and context in the past.
Still, history is repeating itself, since the NRM, let the prices run as crazy in the past. The price has gone up a 100% in a years time. Which, means the prices who doubled from 3000 to 7000 Uganda Shillings. This is not a stable and the ones who get hurt is the consumer and Ugandan citizens. Peace.
Barungi, Barbara Mbire – ‘EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND INFLATION: THE CASE OF UGANDA’ (March 1997).
Rule, Sheila – ‘UGANDA, AT PEACE, IS FACING ECONOMIC BATTLES’ (28.01.2017) link:http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/28/world/uganda-at-peace-is-facing-economic-battles.html
State House Uganda – ‘President commends Uganda – IMF collaboration since 1987’ (27.01.2017) link: http://statehouse.go.ug/media/news/2017/01/27/president-commends-uganda-%E2%80%93-imf-collaboration-1987
Warnock, Frank & Conway, Patrick – ‘Post-Conflict Recovery in Uganda’ (1999)
World Bank – ‘Report No. 7439-UG: Uganda – Towards Stabilization and Economic Recovery’ (29.09.1988)
There are various of reasons for the rising prices of Sugar and processed sugar in Uganda. This isn’t the first time or last cycle of inflation on the prices of this common commodity. Sugar is common in Uganda for concept of having in it in the chai or the milk tea. To sweeten the milk and the black tea the Ugandans drink. Therefore, the Ugandans are needing and using lots of it on daily basis. It isn’t a luxurious goods, but a daily usage, for ordinary use. It has become staple and is staple together with matooke, cassava, rice and maize flour. This is all seemed as basic for the Ugandan people. Sugar is something very important. Therefore, the rising prices says something is out balance.
The balance have now been lost a year after the election. The prices of goods and food was also rising in 2011, therefore, the Republic had the Walk 2 Work demonstrations. These was demonstrations against the rising food prices, which also meant the sugar at that time went up. The same is happening now. With also on alternative exception, that the producers are not only creating sugar for consumption anymore, but ethanol and bio-fuel. Therefore, the produce and profits are going to export bio-fuel and other products, instead of the sugar that the consumers in Uganda uses. This also is an explanation for the rising prices, as well the added exports to Kenya, where the producers gain more selling it there. Than in Uganda, take a look!
In April 2017 USMA commented:
“Uganda Sugar Manufacturers Association (USMA) says the increase in sugar prices has been prompted by the increase in cost of production and the deprecating shillings against major currencies. The Association’s Chairperson, Jim Kabeho says sugar millers were forced to announce what he called a paltry 4 percent increase on each 50-kilogram bag on ex-factory price. The increase according to Kabeho saw a 50-kilogram bag of sugar trading at one hundred and eighty five thousand shillings up from one hundred and seventy thousand shillings” (…) “Meanwhile a source at the Ministry of Trade Industry and Cooperatives who asked for anonymity says the Ministry suspects that the big players like Kakira could have decided not sell its sugar to the market so as to increase production at the ethanol its ethanol plant. The sources says sugar mills with ethanol plants are finally making money on sugar through on co-generation of power, alcohol and ethanol” (URN, 2017).
In April in Masindi:
“Masindi district leaders have risen up against the Masindi district Resident Commissioner, Godfrey Nyakahuma over stopping sugar cane buyers from buying cane from Masindi district. Last week, Nyakahuma launched an operation of impounding trucks of all sugar cane buyers who buy sugar cane from Kinyara sugar limited out growers and over five trucks loaded with cane were impounded by police” (…) “Byaruhanga added that that is a sign indicating that Kinyara sugar Factory has no capacity to crush the available sugar cane adding that since Uganda has a liberalized economy let everyone come and buy the abundant cane available instead of leaving the farmers suffer with the monopoly of Kinyara sugar factory. Amanyire Joshua the former mayor Masindi municipality said that if Kinyara is saying that sugar cane buyers are poachers, Kinyara sugar factory is a smuggler because it is also doing the same. Mary Mujumura the deputy speaker Masindi district blamed Byaruhanga Moses the presidential advisor on political affairs for failing to advise the president on political issues saying that he is not supposed to enter into business matters” (Gucwaki, 2017).
In May 2017:
“From last year’s average of Shs 3,000 per kilo of sugar, the price shot to Shs 4,000 early this year and is now hovering over Shs 5,500. A kilo of Kinyara sugar is the cheapest at Shs 5000, while Kakira sugar is selling at 6,000 a kilo. On the shelves, Kakira sugar and Lugazi sugar are scarce compared to Kinyara sugar, which is in plenty. Many dealers have now started hoarding sugar in order to benefit from anticipated price hike in the short term” (URN, 2017).
In May 2017 – Stanbic Statement:
“The only category to buck that trend was wholesale & retail, where staff costs rose and employment fell. Average purchasing costs also rose in April, reflecting increased prices for animal feed, food stuffs, raw materials and sugar. Higher cost burdens were passed on to clients, leading to a further increase in output charges” (Stanbic Bank, 2017).
President Museveni praises Kakira Millers:
“I would like to thank the Madhvani Group, despite the disappointment by Idi Amin. The family pioneered the production of sugar in Uganda. By 1972 they were producing 70,000 tons but today they have almost tripled the production to 180,000 tons,” he said. The President was today commissioning a state of the art ethanol distillery at Kakira Sugar Limited in Jinja district. The US$36 million facility, which is the largest in the East African Region, will be producing 20 million litres of ethanol annually” (…) “President Museveni pledged to address the issues to regulate the sugar industry but urged the Madhvanis to partner with farmers with large chunks of land for production of sugar-cane, as the cane is not a high value crop. He said people with small land holdings should be left to do intensive farming like the growing of fruits that give high returns. Turning to the issue of prices payable to sugar-cane out-growers, President Museveni advised the buyers and out-growers to sit together and agree on the prices taking into consideration the market prices globally” (Uganda Media Centre, 2017).
Government statement on the 11th May:
“Speaking to 256BN on condition of anonymity a government official monitoring the situation said the manufacturers have not increased the factory price, but he conceded that the situation is worrying. “At the factory prices are stable. Why is it that the prices at the retail gate are high. This means that there are some distributors who are using the hiding strategy in order to rob Ugandans. As Government we shall continue monitoring the situation until we come up with the solution” the official said. Affordability of sugar is considered a key barometer of an ordinary person’s well-being and its pricing can take on political dimensions when people cannot have sugar with their tea” (256BusinessNews, 2017).
Putting the price in pespective:
Kakensa Media reported this today: “Today sugar costs 7000/- per kilo. When Museveni came to power in 1986 each kilo was at 4/-(four shillings). Immediately he came to power he said Ugandan shilling had lost value, in 1987 all money was changed, not only changed but two zeros were cut off to give it value on addition to the 30% levied on each shilling. This means on every 100 shillings, you got 70cents. Those who had 100,000/- got 700/-” (Kakensa Media, 12.05.2017).
This is all proof of a systemic malpractice, where both export, together with lacking yields because of drought and also the production of ethanol and bio-fuel. All of this collected together are reasons for the rising prices of sugar. The sugar price goes up because the use of cane for other things than millers producers sugar for consumption, but for other export products. This is all making sure even as the Republic of Uganda has in the past produces to much, it now doesn’t. Since it elaborately uses the sugarcane for other products.
That has made the Madhvani Group rich and their exports of sugarcane products are clearly selling. Now even their basic milled sugar are sold more expensive on the Ugandan market. There are also proven problems by other millers, who either has to much cane like Kinyara Sugar Factor in Masindi. Which is ironical problem, as the Kakira and Lugazi sugar is empty on the shelves, while the sugarcane hoarding Kinyara are still in the shops. But Kakira which is produced by Madhvani Group, we can now understand, since they have bigger operation and is blessed by the President for their industrial production of ethanol and bio-fuel.
Therefore, the are more reasons than just shopkeepers not getting enough stocks. That the rising prices are not only that there is lacking production. It is the system of export and production. Where the cane isn’t only becoming milled sugar for consumption, but for all the expensive industrial exports like bio-fuel and ethanol. This is all good business, but also bad for consumers and citizens who are accustom with decent prices for their sugar. That is not the fact anymore, as the business and millers has found new profitable ways. So that the surplus sugarcane and also the other gains massive profits. This is all good business for the owners of the sugar-millers and sugar industry. The one who feels the pitch is the consumer and the citizens. Who see scarcity of sugar inside the shops and also the inflation of prices on the sugar. Peace.
256BusinessNews – ‘Government to issue statement on sugar’ (11.05.2017) link:http://256businessnews.com/government-to-issue-statement-on-sugar/
Gucwaki, Yosam – ‘MASINDI RDC IN TROUBLE OVER STOPPING SUGAR CANE BUYERS’ (28.04.2017) link: http://mknewslink.com/2017/04/28/masindi-rdc-trouble-stopping-sugar-cane-buyers/
Stanbic Bank Uganda – ‘Ugandan economic growth continues at start of second quarter’ (04.05.2017) link: https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey/PressRelease.mvc/143ca2b8e3d84c79b96aed4885b7337e
URN – ‘Sugar manufacturer’s association explains price hikes’ (14.04.2017) link: https://dispatch.ug/2017/04/14/sugar-manufacturers-association-explains-price-hikes/
URN – ‘Uganda: Sugar Crisis On for Another 2 Years – Manufacturers’ (09.05.2017) link: http://allafrica.com/stories/201705100129.html
Uganda Media Centre – ‘President Praises Madhvani Group’ (05.05.2017) link: https://mediacentre.go.ug/news/president-praises-madhvani-group
Members of Prince Charles’ Banking Environment Initiative fail to cut ties with companies that deforest in Africa.
KAMPALA, Uganda, August 23, 2016 – East African protesters have taken to the streets of London to demonstrate against banks that do business with Bidco Africa, highlighting the connection between global financial institutions, The Prince of Wales and widespread deforestation in Africa.
Barclays and Standard Chartered saw their London headquarters picketed due to their funding of Nairobi-based Bidco, a company that cuts down thousands of acres of pristine rainforest in Uganda, and engages in human rights and tax violations in Kenya and Tanzania.
The Bidco Truth Coalition (No2Bidco.org), an activist alliance, has revealed that the Banking Environment Initiative (BEI), based at Cambridge University’s Institute for Sustainability Leadership under the patronage of The Prince of Wales, is failing in its mission to lead the banking industry in collectively directing capital towards environmentally and socially sustainable economic development.
The BEI’s nine member banks are Barclays, Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Lloyds, Northern Trust, RBS, Santander and Westpac.
By signing up to BEI’s ‘Soft Commodities’ Compact, the nine banks have committed to only direct capital towards sustainable business models and achieve zero net deforestation among their client Companies.
Under BEI guidelines, member banks must drop clients that don’t measure up to socially and environmentally responsible policies.
Bidco Africa, which has engaged in multiple human rights, labour, tax and environmental violations, has publically stated that it does business with Barclays, Standard Chartered, Citibank, Equity Bank and Kenya Commercial Bank.
Bidco owns an oil palm plantation that has deforested 18,000 acres of rainforest in Uganda. Bidco has also grabbed land from over 100 smallholder farmers.
The environmental impact of the palm oil project has led activists to call on the UN Global Compact to eject Bidco from its roster of members.
In 2004, the World Bank pulled out of Bidco’s Uganda project, citing violations of the World Bank’s anti-deforestation policies.
But BEI has remained silent, and Barclays, Standard Chartered and other banks continue to do business with Bidco Africa.
The Bidco Truth Coalition calls on BEI, its patron, The Prince of Wales, and BEI’s nine member banks to publically state that they will no longer do business with Bidco and other companies that destroy the environment.
Bidco Truth Coalition unites groups to demand accountability for Bidco
KAMPALA, Uganda, May 31, 2016 – The Bidco Truth Coalition, an online activist organisation, has launched No2Bidco.org, a platform dedicated to charting the human rights and environmental violations of Bidco Africa, the Kenya-based edible oil producer headed by CEO Vimal Shah.
No2Bidco.org includes a catalogue of Bidco’s violations, including illegal labour practices in Kenya, deforestation in Uganda and tax evasion across East Africa. The platform also provides visitors with the ability to add their voices to a global campaign of petitions and letter-writing to reveal Bidco’s business practices.
No2Bidco.org’s central archive of independent reports about Bidco provides activists, businesses, governments and NGOs unfiltered access to information free from Bidco’s influence on the media.
No2Bidco.org includes a catalogue of Bidco’s violations, including illegal labour practices in Kenya, deforestation in Uganda and tax evasion across East Africa
The platform’s anchor organisation is the National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE), the respected Uganda-based Friends of the Earth affiliate. Other organisations include the Bugala Farmers Association, a Ugandan group of more than 100 farmers who lost their land to Bidco; Citizens for Tax Compliance, a Kenya-based group that advocates corporate tax compliance; the Association of Non-aligned Bidco Workers.
Founded in 1997, NAPE has been instrumental in giving a voice to farmers displaced by Bidco’s deforestation on Uganda’s pristine Ssese Islands. NAPE and its dedicated staff have a history of exposing corporations and governments that collude to earn vast sums of money at the expense of poor individuals.
The Bugala Farmers Association, which has successfully challenged Bidco in court for more than a year over its members’ loss of land, recently submitted a petition to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for partnering with Bidco. As a result, UNDP has launched an investigation into its partnership with Bidco.
The Association of Non-aligned Bidco Labourers is a group in Kenya and Uganda that gives informal representation to aggrieved casual workers at Bidco’s factories. Most workers supported have been terminated illegally, experienced abuse by Bidco management or been injured at the workplace.
The Bidco Truth Coalition invites other like-minded organisations to join the No2Bidco.org platform to demand change at Bidco and accountability for those who support the company.
“A multi billion shilling sugar processing plant in Atiak within the northern district of Amuru, will be commissioned soon” (…)”The USD$50M (UGX 175B) investment will have an installed capacity of 5,000Metric Tons, according to the project managers” (…)”The facility sits on 15,000 hectares of land half of which has now been planted with sugarcane” (NTV-Uganda, 2015).
You want more meat to the barbeque:
Check these blogs:
Here you get certain information about the land-grabs that is vital and pivotal to building of this kind of factory and development in Amuru:
Amuru Land Grab: What is Our’s is Our’s; What is theirs is ours; Whatever is yours, is still ours
Some prequel stuff as well:
Amuru Land Grabbing and MP arrested
Hope you also found this interesting! Peace.
There has been a lot of news and articles on this matter because of the sensitive issue of owning land. Land can secure families and secure the heritage of the local people in the area. The issue is how to deal with wish of growing society and also keeping traditions. Also settling people in after years of war with the LRA and settle especially the ones that are seen as Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs). Another issue is if the government tries to deal with big monies and doesn’t include local patrons or community. That disfranchises the people and also grows a bigger distrust from the community about the government institution. That also shows the true color of especially some of that is, also the matter in the Amuru Land grabbing. I will not look into the local squats between families and also IDPs and local farmers stealing land from each other. That is equally important. But don’t have the space to write and find a good way to put it into this one. NRM-Regime has from day one been laisses faire economics and not governmental business orientated even if the President of 29 years was into communist thinking in the 70s. Also into business that gains the government, but not actually the public and citizens always. Therefore we have the heavy prices and expenditure of roads. The deals and arrangements hasn’t been made in sincerity of the public, therefore has also the MPs from the area in now bot the 8th Parliament and the 9th Parliament has reacted to deals that been set in fruition. The Madhvani deal is the big one and the one with the most flesh and grants. Also the Apaa village dispute over the land becoming a hunting ground instead of being a village for the people who actually live there. Then I will show other deals that have been questioned. This was the gist!
Professor Ogenga Latigo spoke his mind:
“While referring to the process of land acquisition for the project, Professor Ogenga Latigo, the former Member of Parliament for Agago county and Leader of Opposition in the 8th Parliament indicated that ―Government mishandled the Amuru case, while others informants argued: ―”The idea is not bad but the approach of establishing the sugarcane factory [was wrong, and besides the project] is imposed on the people, the project should be started when the people have returned to their land. The priority should be to give chance to the locals to resettle before establishment of the sugarcane factory” (Serwajja, 2012).
Basic information from 2005:
“Gulu district in her endeavor to alleviate poverty and promote development is committed to mainstream environmental concerns in its implementation strategies. The district continues to rely on the natural resources as important sources of income. It is been noted that over 82% of the population depend on agriculture and this can call for immediate up-date on status of the natural resources in the district” (Langoya & Ochora Odoch, 2005).
Land Law information about in Uganda:
Until 1995, customary tenants did not legally own land they occupied. The land belonged to the State, and the tenants were merely permitted to live on it (Tenants at Sufferance). According to its preamble, the Decree was intended to provide for the vesting of title to all land in Uganda IN TRUST for the people of Uganda. The Constitution of 1995 vested land in the citizens of Uganda as opposed to land vested in the State, as was the case with the Crown Land and consequently Public Land.
• Customary tenants on Public Land were empowered to own land occupied.
• Three quarters of land in Gulu falls under customary tenancy hence Communal Land Management.
• The Land Act 1998 favoured the Acholi customary land holding e g. communal cultivation, communal grazing, and settlements” (Langoya & Ochora Odoch, 2005).
Important land law:
“Section 92 of Uganda’s Land Act (1998, Cap. 227) states that “a person who…makes a false declaration in any manner relating to land” or “willfully and without the consent of the owner occupies land belonging to another person”… “commits an offence.” Notably, however, the Penal Code Act does not mention land-related crime or theft, robbery, or grabbing of immovable property” (Northern Uganda Land Platform, P: 6, 2014).
“Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), or ‘mediation’ as it is known, is not as technical, costly, or time-consuming as formal court processes, and aims to promote harmony among community members rather than naming a winner and a loser” (Northern Uganda Land Platform, P: 18, 2014).
Virtually, there are no refugee settlements in the district. However, large number of people in rural areas has moved to the forty six Internally Displaced Persons’ Camps and urban areas (RUM). It is noted that the Population in camps have risen from 291,000 people in 2001 to 438,765 people in 2004 and those in the urban centres from 38,297 people in 1991 to 113,144 people in 2002. Due to the same insurgency, there is also movement of people from Gulu district to the neighboring districts of Nebbi, Adjumani, Apac, Lira, Masindi and other Districts, not mentioned here” (Langoya & Ochora Odoch, 2005).
“Three criteria are found to be reliable indicators of bad faith. These reveal themselves as the ADR process unfolds, and include:” (…)”RIGHTS: Land rights of each party. These are determined by family ties, marital status, and transactions (gifts and sales)” (…)”INTENT: Parties’ demonstrated willingness to (not) respect these land rights. Usually evidenced by the presence of any “warning signs” and/or similar actions, body language, and statements” (…)”POWER: Parties’ perceived ability/opportunity to deprive opponent of land rights. This is context-specific, and may be assessed through probing” (Northern Uganda Land Platform, P: 7, 2014).
Some information on the Area Land Committee(ALC):
“A major point of breakdown apparently concerns the integrity of the Lands Administration itself. Although Area Land Committees are the “eyes and ears” of the District Land Board—thus vital to the process of land surveying and registration at the grassroots—these bodies remain under-facilitated, unsupervised, and unsurprisingly corrupt” (Northern Uganda Land Platform, P: 75, 2014).
Witnesses from the ALC:
”There’s no supervision of ALCs. So they go and do the work the way they want… because they’re human, sometimes they’re stubborn. On the basis of relationship… they can favor somebody. There may be a boundary dispute that was really not resolved – but in their report they say the dispute was ‘decided” (…)”“…a nightmare. The Kakira Sugar Works Limited overdemands money! Your file can be lost if you don’t pay them. I have to be very bold with these people, and tell applicants what really goes on. The corruption is highly coordinated, you can’t penetrate it. They look at you as if you are stupid if you don’t hand them extra money. I think the reason why no official fee structure exists has to do with the people behind private survey firms. If survey rates become fixed, then they lose business.” (…)”If I want to do something, you have the knowledge, I have the money. Money is very evil. However principled I am in my work, there’s some degree to which I will bend. All government offices are strained. No department says they have enough facilitation to do their work… We need to agitate, put it to the government that resources be looked at. Facilitating the ALCs alone will not solve the problem. Instead of centralizing the court, where people cannot afford travel costs (80-100km away), can we facilitate departments to do their work?” (Northern Uganda Land Platform, P: 75, 2014).
One set of background for Acholi land grab:
“To a number of locals in Northern Uganda, the issue of Customary Land Titles/ Certificates continues to evolve, and the rush to pilot this project has raised a number of questions and concerns about state involvement in land-related issues” (…)”In 1995, the Constitution of Uganda gave the right to own land to Ugandan citizens and any Ugandan could settle anywhere following due procedure. Following the passage of the 1995 Constitution the customary land tenure system was uplifted to the level of freehold tenure” (…)”As such, a clear definition and understanding of public land becomes imperative to securing access to land rights. One such example is the act of Amuru District Land Board allocating 40,000 hectares of land to Madhvani Group of Companies for sugar cane plantations. This allocation was made in the understanding that the land was public land. To community members this was a clear mismanagement by the land boards and manipulation of customary land rights by state institutions” (Otim, Ina & Cody, 2012)
“Lending credence to the perception of threat was highly public pressure from central government (including the President personally) for the opening up of Acholi land to investors, large-scale commercial farming, and other forms of ‘development’. From early 2007 this pressure was focused on giving land – originally 40,000 hectares, later reduced to 20,000 – in western most Amuru District to the Madhvani-owned Kakira Sugar Works Limited for a sugar cane plantation” (United Nation, 2013).
Main issues in Acholiland on land:
“Many Acholis oppose the project not only because Acholi cultural land is not to be sold, but also because many of the owners of that land are still in camps and, because of displacement due to war and the consequences, have not yet been able to return to their ancestral birthplace” (Kligerman, P:28, 2009). A World Bank report in July 2008 recommended a moratorium on land titles to investors in Acholiland until residents had residents had returned home from camps and people had been “sensitized” to land issues (Atkinson, R, 2008). The report also recommended that the government demonstrate its commitment to protecting natural resource rights (Atkinson, R, 2008); this is remarkable support for the Acholi people, particularly considering that the World Bank is one of major promoters of land privatization globally” (Kligerman, P: 29, 2009).
Insecurity when it comes to Land in Acholiland:
“Previous and on-going attempts by private individuals to acquire private interests in land which is perceived to be owned communally. Acholi leaders believe that Government is engaged in designs to help well placed and politically influential people from other parts of the country to access and enclose land in Acholi land. Common Property Resources are particularly targeted by individuals as well as government agencies” (Rugadya, P: 3, 2009).
“Investor interest in the region; Pursuit of land access by large-scale commercial interests, speculators and grabbers was also causing tension particularly in the Acholi sub-region. The concern is that commercial agricultural interests will be cavalier in their treatment/understanding of land rights and land use issues. A number of highly publicized multiple attempts to acquire land in the sub-region presumably for investment and potential government development programmes, while some of these proposals may have been legitimate investment programmes to help re-establish peace and spur economic development activities in the region, the absence of a clear national policy and institutional framework for pursuing these initiatives has fueled the suspicion that “government” or investors as trying to usurp their land” (Rugadya, P: 4, 2009).
On Land Policy:
“Hostility towards government land policy is acute. MP Reagan Okumu asserts that there is a kind of ‘scramble’ for Northern Uganda, accompanied by a deliberate effort to deny Northern Uganda any development by scaring away investors. He says that because people in Northern Uganda are poor, whenever one flashes money around, they will sell their land at even low prices” (Otim & Mugisha, P:9, 2014).
Continuation on land and allocation of it:
“In Uganda, land is the single greatest resource for which a large majority of the population derives its livelihoods – because of the importance attached to land in all communities, conflicting interests in are unavoidable” (…)”Okoth-Ogendo describes land as a political resource which defines power relations between and among individuals, families and communities under established systems of governance” (Mabikke, P:6, 2011).
Allocation Part II:
“These land allocations dominate in the western area of Amuru district. These concessions have spurred major discussions on land grabbing in Acholi land. Central to these concerns has been highly public pressure from central government for opening up of Acholi land for “development” since early 2007 to allocate” (…)”land in Amuru district to the Madhvani Group for a large-scale sugar cane plantation. Reports from aggrieved Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG) – a group of Acholi parliamentarians accuse the GoU for assisting investors to grab land in northern Uganda. According to APG, the Central Government’s support for alienating land for commercial sugar cane farming in the north has been accompanied by powerful individuals gaining, or attempting to gain, private title to land that overwhelmingly belongs to communal landholding groups” (Mabikke, P:19-20, 2011).
On IDPs and Returnees:
“Some returnees allege that the government grabbed large tracts of their land while they were in the IDP camps and offered these tracts to private investors. For example, in March 2008, the Madhvani Group submitted an application to the Amura District Land Board for 20,000 ha of land near to the Nile River for a sugarcane plantation. The local government approved the application with an initial allocation of 10,000 ha for a period of 49 years. Some of this land is claimed by returnees. In November 2008, several parliamentarians from the Acholi sub-region filed an application in the High Court in Gulu and obtained an ex-parte (temporary) injunction against the Madhvani Group, Amuru District Land Board and other respondents for interfering or encroaching on the disputed land. In ensuing court hearings, the Amuru District Land Board was forbidden from issuing new leases on the disputed land until the hearing and determination of the main suit. As of June 2010, the suit is still pending in the High Court” (Veit, 2010).
“The Land Matrix database indicates that four large scale land deals amounting to 76,512 hectares were concluded in Uganda. In 1992, the government of Uganda signed an agreement with the Libyan government to allocate three large chunks of land, i.e. Bukaleba Beef Ranch (4,000 hectares), Aswa Ranch (46,000 hectares) and Maruzi Ranch (16, 376 hectares (Okello, 2006). Meanwhile, Egyptian government planned to establish grain farms on land totalling to 840,000 hectares (Kugelman and Levenstein, 2009) and Agri-SA holds about 170,000 hectares of arable land in Uganda (Mabikke, 2011). Similarly, the Ugandan government tried to allocate 7,100 hectares of land to the Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL) to produce more sugar although the civil society resisted the allocation through massive demonstrations and appealing to donors to block the proposal (NAPE and Friends of the Earth International, 2012)” (Serwajja, 2012).
First information on Sugar factory in Amuru district:
“Box 1. Madhvani Amuru sugar works proposal:
In 2006 news began to emerge of a planned sugar works to be built by the Madhvani Group on 40,000 hectares of land in Amuru district. The proposal envisaged a joint venture between the Amuru Sugar Works (owned by the Madhvani family) and the government, with a projected cost of US$80 million (Shs 162 billion) and included construction of a factory, a power generation plant, a water treatment plant and reservoir, workshops, stores, fuel stations and administration blocks, staff housing and amenities including hospital and educational facilities, etc.34 Amuru Sugar Works anticipated employing up to 7,200 people (25 foreign and the rest local) directly at the factory and some 5,000 on outgrowers’ farms, providing a livelihood to around 70,000 people in total. Five villages to accommodate 200 farmers each were to be built in the nucleus estate. In these villages, farmers would benefit from education and health services, while extension and credit services, agricultural equipment for land clearing, ploughing and furrowing, and a development fund would be used to support outgrowers. According to the proposal, 200km of road network would be built on both the nucleus estate and surrounding areas.5 Despite the proposed benefits of the project, a political storm over the proposal quickly grew, with the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG), under the leadership of MP Hon Livingstone Okello-Okello, arguing that the investment should not proceed until all internally displaced persons (IDPs) had safely returned and that the required land of 40,000 hectares was too big to be given out for a single investor, since the population was growing fast and in the process of returning from camps.6 Madhvani Group representatives, accompanied by President Yoweri Museveni, visited the north at the end of 2007 in a bid to gain support for the project. Museveni asked the Acholi paramount chief, His Royal Highness Lawii Rwodi David Onen Acana II, to undertake a consultative process by setting up a committee to assess the land in question, research the sugar industry and gather community views. The proposal has subsequently been reduced to 20,000 hectares for the nucleus estate and 10,000 for outgrowers. In July 2008 newspapers reported that during a meeting organised by the APG, residents resolved unanimously not to give their land to any investors. Most recently, following dissatisfaction regarding the ruling of the Amuru Land Board in favour of the Madhvani Group, a group of residents from Amuru district, led by MP Hon Simon Oyet, secured a court order stopping any transactions on land in the district, with the deputy paramount chief of the Acholi, Rwot Otinga Otto, calling on clan leaders and cultural heads to resist giving land to Madhvani if they are not consulted, saying: ‘Just rise up against whoever gives away land without your consent’” (International Alert, 2009).
The background to deal:
“The first public indication of Madhvani’s interest in a sugar cane plantation in the ‘north’s central part’ of Uganda – that is, Acholi – came in a New Year’s Day New Vision Business article, ‘Madhvani to set up second sugar factory’ (1 January 2007) . By July, this interest had become specifically identified as a 40,000 hectare tract of land in Amuru District – see, for example, two New Vision articles from 30 July 2007, one from the Local North section, ‘Acholi MPs asked to support sugar factory’, the other an Opinion piece by Gulu District
Chairman, Norbert Mao, ‘Sugar is sweet but Acholi cannot afford a raw deal’. It is important to note that the land sought by Madhvani is situated in an area cleared of people by the colonial government almost a hundred years ago and made a game reserve. But evidence of various Acholi group’s historical claims to customary land in the area, and its continued use through most of the 20th century for hunting by groups with recognized customary rights is extensive. It is also worth noting that this is also a part of Amuru where preliminary research indicates possible oil reserves, and where Government has given out licenses for oil exploration – as confirmed in a letter dd. 4 September 2008 from Daudi Migereko, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development, in response to a request for information on the matter by J.J. Okello-Okello, Chairman of the Acholi Parliamentary Group” (United Nation, 2013).
“The project entails acquisition of 40,000 hectares of land in perpetuity and at zero cost, implicitly the people of Lakang are meant to give away the land for development of the sugar industry. Half of the land, 20,000 hectares, will be used to establish a central business district (nucleus estate) of the factory that will entirely be under the management of the Madhvani Group and the remaining land will leased to the communities to grow sugarcane under the out-grower scheme. At the same time, the Madhvani Group will acquire a title deed to the land in question (40,000 hectares) in a quest to secure additional funding of about US$50 million from the African Development Bank” (Serwajja, 2012).
“A review of the feasibility study report for proposed sugar project in Amuru district revealed that the area was preferred because of availability of permanent source of water which would provide water for irrigation and proposed factory. The proposed project is located about 6 kms is near the river Nile. Other suitable conditions for sugar cane growing identified included suitable topography with undulating plains, reliable rainfall of 1029 mm annually and fertile soils (sandy clay loam and loam) and availability of spear type of grass which is easy to clear (Madhivani Group March 2007). For the investors acquiring land from the UIA, they had to ensure that the land had no conflicts. For investors who acquired land from the UIA and DLBs, there are guidelines that prescribe all the processes for acquisition” (…)”In Amuru district, an investor had fenced off land cutting off adjustment villages from a health centre and a weekly market. Similarly, in the Kaweeri coffee plantation, the community complained about restrictions of movement through the plantation to access their villages. Since part of the process of land acquisition does not require understanding a gender analysis, its implications on women and men will not be understood and therefore such scales and effects will not inform planned actions“(Kanyesigye, P:13 & 15, 2014).
On the 11th December 2014 Attorney General Peter Nyombi wrote this in a letter:
“In a cabinet meeting presided over by H.E. the President, while briefing cabinet on the progress made so far by regarding the above project you informed cabinet that the survey of the project land would be done after the by-elections in Amuru District” (…)”Could you therefore have the land surveyed and the occupants of the same established and their property on the same recorded and valued so that the project can go ahead” (Nyombi, 2014).
Two other cases:
“According to the minister’s letter dated 7th January 2008, Major General Julius Oketa had applied to be issued with a certificate of title for approximately 10,000 hectares of land located in Amuru district for a sugar industry. The letter shows that there was no functional
Area Land Committees (ALC) in place which would inspect the land before issuing the title” (Mabikke, P: 20, 2011)
“A similar case of alleged land grabbing is cited in the petition presented to the Speaker of the Parliament, filed by Hon. Okello-Okello John Livingstone – chairman APG. Okello reported several attempts of land grabbing involving senior government officials in northern Uganda.
In 1992 the GoU signed a protocol with the Government of Libya giving away the following large chunks of land namely;
• Bukaleba Beef Ranch 4,000 hectares,
• Aswa Ranch 46,000 hectares
• Maruzi Ranch 16,376 hectares” (Mabikke, P:20, 2011).
A third case:
“The case of land in Apaa Village (Amuru District) illustrates the suspicions of local people concerning the acquisition of large tracts of land. In 2005, when people were still living in the camps, land was given to Bruce Martin from South Africa who was investing in game reserves for sports hunting. When resistance from the community intensified, it is claimed that the government changed tactics and asked the neighbouring district of Adjumani to contest ownership and claim that this land actually lies within Adjumani District. The Adjumani District authorities then passed a council resolution giving the land away to the ‘investor’. Some participants in this research argued that the boundaries between the two districts of Adjumani and Acholi are clear, and that some district politicians are manufacturing the boundary conflict. During an interview with the District Chairperson of Adjumani, he showed a map of the area in dispute claiming the area belongs to Adjumani District” (Otim & Mugisha, P: 8, 2014).
On the 9th of September of 2015 the police arrested the Amuru MP Hon Gilbert Olanya. Residents has reacted to buy of land and grabbing of Apaa village. The Villages and the MP was forced into the Police car even with the NTV camera crew in the place.
The TDA press release said this: “Three people are now confirmed dead by sources in Apa. Several people suffered grave injuries and are being treated at Amuru health centre. The Member of Parliament Gilbert Olanya was arrested and is believed to be detained in Masindi police station” (Minbane, 2015).
I think I have said enough. If you’re not enlighten and gotten more clear information on the subject and the issue that these people are living through, then I am sure you should read more reports and dwell on the matter at hand. It is a sensitive matter that by my reckoning hasn’t been dealt in the best way. The arrangement and deals has been beneficiary for the government and state institutions, but not in favor of the demand in the districts. Also it has not put into an account what the local area needs or settlement of the IDPs after the long war in the war-torn area of the Northern Uganda. So many people are still in tents in the camps instead of building themselves into a stabile life. That is really growing prosperity and not just short and quick bucks with the sale of big areas located to foreign and not local merchants. Also fertile land is being sold to either facilitate a giant sugar-factory or as another big time deal to become hunting grounds instead of a place where the citizens can live and earn a livelihood. When this kind of actions happen from the government officials in Kampala and not directly with due diligence locally, then there will be frictions and anger towards the men who gave the businessmen the opportunity to occupy the lands. There are already as seen in many of the reports many smaller incidents between neighbors and family members to allocate lands in the Amuru and Adjumani district. Therefore this will be a sensitive issue that will not be over, especially not over until the next sunset. There will be many moons and even more hot air before a certainty is there. Especially when the Government overrules and sells the land without doing proper procedure and allocations, without checking the status of the area as it unfolds. They the government officials are just pocketing money quick and then send police to get rid of those who live there. At the same time having citizens in the camps as IDPs without a possibility to land and harvest, to find work to sustain them and live. That should have been the priority and not the businessmen from a far. Which is also the main reason why the locals reacts that strongly towards this land grabs and how they feel overrun and not listen to by the powers to be. In this case of the Government of Uganda and their LDC and certain ministries that have put the allocations into effect. An in this particular cases might put the quick monies before the additional and usually most important feature of any government institutions the people and the citizens before the contracts of selling the lands. Henceforth it’s understandable why people react and demonstrate when they feel wronged by the ones that supposed to serve you and secure security and care so you earn your livelihood. And that shouldn’t be too much to ask from the NRM-Regime, though it seems more likely that the big sums of monies matter more than the public reactions at this present time. Also that the continuation of disfranchising the northern districts of Uganda continues, especially with the Oil findings in Western/North Western Uganda – Bunyoro while Amuru and Adjumani will lose more to that area than even before. Peace.
Kanyesigye, Juliet – ‘Hearing the other Voice: Investor perspectives on Protection of Women’s Land Rights in Large scale Land Acquisition in Uganda’, Submitted to the World Bank Conference 2014 on Land and Poverty 23-27th 2015, Washington D.C.
Kligerman, Nicole – ‘Alienation in Acholiland: War, Privatization and Land Displacement in Northern Uganda (2009)
Langoya & Ochora Odoch, Walter – Gulu District Local Government – ‘District State of Enviroment Report (2005) – Gulu, Uganda
Mabikke, Samuel B – ‘Escalating Land Grabbing In Post-conflict Regions of
Northern Uganda: A Need for Strengthening Good Land Governance in Acholi Region’ (08-11.04.2011) – Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, University of Sussex
Minbane – ‘Press Release: TDA condems the violent and forceful eviction in Apa Uganda’ (08.09.2015) link: https://minbane.wordpress.com/2015/09/08/press-release-a-condemns-the-violent-and-forceful-eviction-in-apa-uganda-08-09-2015/
Northern Uganda Land Platform – ‘Power & Vulnerability in land Dispute Resolution – Evaluating Responses to Domestic Land Grabbing in Northern Uganda’ (Lira, May, 2014)
Nyombi, Peter – ADM/7/168/01 – ‘Re: Land for the Sugar Project in Amuru District’ to Hon. Daudi Migereko, Minister of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Kampala
International Alert – ‘Contributing to a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda:
A Guide for Investors’ (06.2009)
Rugadya, Margaret A. – ‘UNVEILING GENDER, LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
POST-CONFLICT NORTHERN UGANDA’ (November, 2008)
Serwajja, Eric – ‘The Quest for Development Through Dispossession: Examining Amuru Sugar Works in Lakang-Amuru District of Northern Uganda’ (17-19.10 2012) – Land Deal Politics Initiative (LDPI)
Otim, Denis Barnabas, Ina, Jahn & Cody, Emily – Refugee Law Project MUK – ‘Conflict Watch: “Land and Investment” – Balancing Local and Investor Interest’ (August 2012)
Otim, David & Mugisha, Police Charles – Saferworld: ‘Beyond the reach of the hoe: The struggle for land and minerals in Northern Uganda’ (April 2014)
United Nation – ‘LAND CONFLICT MONITORING and MAPPING TOOL for the Acholi Sub-region – Final Report March 2013’
Veit, Peter – ‘Focus on LAND in Africa – Breif: CONFLICT, DISPLACEMENT, AND LAND RIGHTS IN UGANDA: Uganda’ (December, 2010)
What the Ministry of Agriculture press release earlier this august:
The Press Statement from the Government of Uganda
Here is another blogger who has followed the land grabbing and has great article:
And a few sheets of information to prove that their more to this business then just some words here and there!
Another fact sheet as well:
More information read this: