

RDC: Declaration Politique du G7 (16.02.2017)





ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, February 16, 2017 – The African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the International Organization of La Francophonie (IOF) are increasingly concerned by the continuing impasse in the dialogue among the political stakeholders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) related to the implementation modalities of the 31 December political agreement.
The four partner organizations note that six weeks after agreeing on the modalities of a transition period leading to the holding of peaceful and credible elections by December 2017, the parties are yet to conclude discussions on the effective implementation of the agreement. This situation has the potential to undermine the political goodwill that led to the signing of the 31 December agreement.
In this context, the four partner organizations call on all stakeholders in the DRC, including the presidential majority and the opposition, to redouble, in good faith, their efforts towards a speedy conclusion of the ongoing talks.
The four partner organizations reaffirm the need for all parties to rally behind the mediation efforts led by the Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo (CENCO), and recall that the full and timely implementation of the 31 December agreement is critical in upholding the legitimacy of the transitional institutions until elections.

Kinshasa, 11 February 2017 – MONUSCO is concerned about the persistent conflict in the Kasais which is marked by violent atrocities committed by the Kamuina Nsapu militia including their recruitment and use of child soldiers whilst targeting symbols and institutions of State authority as well as the disproportionate use of force by the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in their response to the situation. Particularly, since 9 February 2017, there have been ongoing clashes between Kamuina Nsapu militia and Congolese Security Forces within the area of Tshimbulu (160 Kilometers South East of Kananga) with unconfirmed reports of between 30 to 50 deaths resulting from these clashes.
Maman S. Sidikou, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of MONUSCO, strongly condemns the actions of the Kamuina Nsapu militia in recruiting and using child soldiers as well as their acts of violence against the State. He expresses his concern about repeated reports of the disproportionate use of force by the FARDC and offers the Mission’s support to a credible investigation of this regrettable situation. He regrets the deaths and injuries suffered in these clashes and calls upon the Congolese Security Forces to act in line with acceptable standards of national and international laws in their response to the situation.
Since the outbreak of this crisis about six months ago, MONUSCO has sought to effectively support the Congolese authorities in addressing the situation at national and provincial levels. In addition to several engagements by the Special Representative at the political and security levels, the Mission has reinforced its civilian and uniformed personnel presence in the area. The Mission has also deployed one of its Mobile Monitoring Response Team in the area (Tshikapa, Dibaya, Bunkode, Tshimbulu and Luiza) to possibly prevent, investigate and document human rights violations in line with its mandate.
Note to Editors:
Following the decision of the Security Council in early 2014, MONUSCO redeployed most of its resources to Eastern DRC in 2014. There was also a drastic reduction of military and civilian personnel affecting the Mission’s presence in Kananga given the improved security situation at the time. Presently, the Mission has since December 2016, deployed a Military Company of soldiers in Kananga (Kasai central) with the task of protecting the Mission’s personnel and assets as well as carrying out Protection of Civilians.

The Drought Situation
The Horn of Africa is in the midst of a major drought resulting from La Niña and reduced moisture influx due to the cooling of the ocean water in the east African coast. Whilst Member States of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are adept at managing droughts, what makes the current drought alarming in the Equatorial Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) region is that it follows two consecutive poor rainfall seasons in 2016 and the likelihood of depressed rainfall persisting into the March – May 2017 rainfall season remains high. The most affected areas include, most of Somalia, South-eastern Ethiopia, Northern Eastern and coastal Kenya, and Northern Uganda.
The climate predictions and early warnings produced by IGAD through advanced scientific modeling and prediction tools, which were provided to Member States and the general public, have elicited early actions (preparedness and mitigation measures). Highly comparable to the 2010 GHA drought, the current depressed rainfall and resultant poor vegetation conditions since March 2016 eroded the coping and adaptive capacities of the affected people. It also depleted water points, reduced crops, forages and livestock production, increased food insecurity, and adversely affected the livelihoods of vulnerable communities in the region.
The number of food insecure human population in the region is currently estimated at 17 million. Certain areas in South Sudan and Djibouti are already under an emergency food insecurity phase, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) classification scale. In Somalia, the number of food insecure people doubled in the last year alone.
In the drought affected cropping lands (over Deyr area in Somalia and coastal Kenya), 70 to 100 percent crop failure has been registered. Livestock mortality has been particularly devastating amongst small ruminants with mortality rate ranging from 25 to 75 percent in the cross border areas of Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia. In addition, livestock prices have dropped by as much as 700 percent.
Terms of trade have declined in the region, with Ethiopia registering a figure of almost 10 percent. This is exacerbated by a substantial negative impact on external balances, as well as a small impact on financial sector-soundness in the other countries. The overall impact on fiscal positions is a likely increase in current budget spending and deterioration in the fiscal balance and weak adaptation capacity.
Despite the downtrend in global agriculture commodity prices, the drought has resulted in an increase in domestic food prices in the region. Cereal prices (e.g. maize) have gone up by about 130 percent, while those of critical food items such as oils, beans and wheat flour increased by at least 50 percent in some pastoralist areas. The limited financial and institutional capacity for effective adaptation to reduce exposure and vulnerability will result in limited safety net to the most vulnerable households.
Drought Response in the Horn of Africa
With the early warning and technical assistance provided by IGAD, Member States have initiated early action to mitigate the adverse impact of the current drought.
Somalia and South Sudan have declared drought emergencies. Kenya announced a doubling of expenditure on food relief to ease the pressure in the drought-affected counties, while Uganda shifted some of its development resources to finance emergency response in order to address food insecurity and livelihood protection. In Somalia, the President of the Federal Republic, as well as state and regional administrations led the issuance of appeals for support and coordinated actors and efforts that scaled-up food security activities to respond to the humanitarian needs of the country.
The USD 730 million allocated by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia boosted the response effort which, coupled by an above-average meher harvest, resulted to an almost 50 percent reduction in the number of food insecure people, for example, from 10.2 million to 5.6 million.
IGAD continues to reinforce the actions of its Member States using them as guide for complementary action on drought responses. Below are some of the major actions being undertaken by the IGAD Secretariat and its specialized institutions to manage the drought in the region:
Through the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) Platform, the ultimate purpose and objective of IGAD and its Member States is to mitigate the adverse effects of disasters through building resilience of relevant national institutions, communities and people, to end drought emergencies and contribute to the achievement of sustainable development in the region.
In this regard, IGAD will remain vigilant in monitoring and advising the people of the region on the drought situation through its’ specialized institution, the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC) domiciled in Nairobi, and shall continue to support and complement regional and national actions on drought response and recovery.







Earlier in November 2016, there we’re reports of movement from the M23 from Uganda into the Democratic Republic of Congo. As there we’re even clear violence from the rebels in December. Now that we in 2017 and another month gone, there are reports and official reports that Brigadier Sultani Makenga has fled his home and is on the move.
In mid-January the Ministry of Defence Minister Henry Okello Oryem in Uganda claimed there we’re little movement and they we’re still captured. Still, there we’re at the same time said to be 200 rebel soldiers moving across into the DRC.

Just as of yesterday when the news broke of fleeing Makenga and the raids of Police Stations in and around Kasese District and Rwenzori Sub-Region. As the raids we’re going after guns and bullets in these police stations. As Bwera Police Station we’re put on fire and they also burned down Luwero Town Council, therefore armed militants seems to be on the move.
There we’re reports in January from Nord-Kivu Governor Julien Paluku we’re writing of the movement of the M23 across the borders. Still, the reminiscent of past was not certain at that point. Because in the past the M23 has had sufficient weapons and training in Kisoro on the Ugandan border, where the UN had witness affidavits briefing the UNSC on the rebels. That was the Local Governor that broke the news and the FARDC and the Central Government in Kinshasa did not verify it. Therefore the intelligence between the Central and Local was different. Just as of now, there are indicated violence and attacks inside Uganda, but also news of escalation of M23 prescience of them in the DRC.
As it happen and news we’re out of M23, the DRC government and transitional government under “third term” President Joseph Kabila are running on it and keeping their power as they have to fight another militant group creating chaos in North and South Kivu’s. This is just a curious timing that the M23 just happen to come after the CENCO agreement and the new timeline for elections, elections where President Kabila cannot be a candidate with the current Constitution of the 3rd Republic.
It is just like a rabbit out of the hat, the M23 get guns and run-wild in Kasese and Rwenzori Sub-Regions, as the numbers of militants has differed from who is counting. Some said a 101 soldiers crossed the borders other said about 230. In mid-January the M23 we’re reported to take the village of Ishasha in Nord-Kivu. Reports in late-January we’re that FARDC lost two military helicopters in running battles in a town called Rushuru, also in Nord-Kivu, which is close to the Rwandan border. Therefore the insurgency could be from both Rwanda and Uganda as the attacks are happening close to the too nation at separate time.
Therefore the sudden resurgence of M23 and the message from Kinshasa seems so fitting and just. So all of a sudden the Elections have to be postponed again and give political mileage for Kabila. So he can be the hero who fights M23 again. We can question and should question why this is an issue that can destroy the elections when ADF-NALU and Mayi-Mayi are already causing issues in the provinces in the Kivu’s, as well as the FDLR that is still creating havoc. So M23 isn’t the only militants and rebels in the region.
That is why it is suspicious that the M23 are the sole reason for postponing the elections and ballots so there can be another government running the Republic. If there we’re other circumstances that we’re less fishy and without having the history of both M23 and the Kabila Regime, it might been substantial. Since it isn’t so and the actors and the politicians has played these ploys before we should question the reasoning and the effects of the violence.
The ones dying, the ones losing property and innocent suffering for the political games of the big-men in the region, that they uses rebels and militants to sufficiently steady their political life is demeaning. The M23 we’re as off the Nairobi Agreement deserters in Uganda. Some was also expected to come back and be contained in the DRC. Instead they are now returning with vile force, some are seen as thieves in the border regions, others are implicating that the M23 and UPDF is covering their tracks with burning of Police Stations and other facilities to make it seem like a fleeing insurgent force returning to Nord-Kivu.
We can certainly question the efforts and the timing, as it fits the time-frame and evidence Kabila needs to overstay in power without changing the laws. That has been the goal since long before the negotiations with CENCO or anybody else, it wasn’t like President Kabila we’re intent to stepdown. He even runs a transitional term before twice elected. Therefore that Kabila tries to succumb the rules and still being the President without any election. That is why the sudden launch of M23 into the Kivu’s of recent days and months. This story will not end, if so then the Kabila presidency would also have ended. Peace.
“The Democratic Republic of Congo has warned that the re-emergence of the M23 rebellion in the east is endangering a deal with the opposition intended to lead to a presidential election this year. In a letter to the president of the U.N. Security Council, Congo’s ambassador to the United Nations, Ignace Gata Mavita, detailed a series of M23 incursions that began in November and accelerated last month” (AfricaNews, 2017).