Uganda: Police denies being involved in recent community attacks as one of the paraded suspects claimed yesterday (25.04.2017)

Opinion: Succession when talking about Mzee is nonsense!

“You do not lead by hitting people over the head — that’s assault, not leadership.”

― Dwight D. Eisenhower

There is an ancient saying that you cannot teach old dogs new tricks, neither can you do with President who has been running a republic since 1986. Therefore, with this in mind, the new comic relief from the National Resistance Movement (NRM) is hard for me to take serious. Certainly, with the knowledge of all the men and possibly woman who could have become the leader of the party and the Executive of Uganda.

Still, in 2017, we are at the same crossroads, the same junction and nothing has changed. The partners and participants are practically the same, unless some new cronies and sugar-babies of the Movement comes into the mix. Perhaps, the most stunning fact is that old men like Gen. Otafiire steadily sink the world with his endless wisdom.

It is as if Museveni still is the Shepard and the Ugandan people is helpless sheep needing his guidance. The reality is that the belief that he can do something he has not done is pointless. The only card he has left is to destroy more kingdoms with force and kill more his opposition. If he had proved some sort of democratic figments in his in body, it has surely died with age. As his words are now more important than legislation.

The President handpicked elite and cronies, the suiters and the ones trying to eat while can. As they know not what will happen when their master stop breathing. The plans and the succession plans has not been official or even portrayed, there been rumors of Maj. Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, those leaks turned into a besieged offices and depleted staff at Daily Monitor, back-in-the-day.

Still, if he is the viable candidate to takeover and the family dynasty that the President tries to create is hard to know. Since none in public can read the mind of the old man with the hat. So that the “news” that NRM Members of Parliament finally planned to talk about the succession seems far-fetched! Should it been done a decade or two ago, if it was a serious attempt?

He is on his unofficially seventh term as President and leader of the NRM. The founder and current leader of it. Not as he has given in without weapons in the past and instead of dialogue, he still sends Special Force Command or the Flying Squad to doze of possible enemies. Not as if it is an open discussion, more like a ruckus of who can get first to the brown envelopes and get the license to blead the state out of more funds.

Therefore, here I am, and not believing one single bit that President Museveni or the NRM NEC or any other parts of the NRM have the slightest care in mind to change him for somebody else. NRM and the NRM elite needs Museveni and his cronies, the crony system is there because of him. No question and no one with a clear mind would not see that. He gives and takes away as he sees fit. When he needs you he pays you and your extended family, but when your aspirations or goals to become bigger than him. Then you securing that you become a fringe candidate.

Museveni and his family, Museveni as his business partners does not need succession. The ones asking for it now will become renegade NRM MPs and could end up independent in the Parliament, as in the past when MPs has taken a stand towards the NRM NEC or the almighty himself. I doubt there will be change of guards, as there have not been for decades upon decades.

What we can be sure of is that President Museveni and President Mugabe are doing the same thing in their nations, holding the power without hesitation of what will happen when they leave and what sort of power vacuum that will be unleashed. What we do know is that the NRM will use all of their tricks and manipulation, all sort of writings and public display to make this sort thing normal. Peace.

Opinion: Democratic Party and Uganda People’s Congress turns more and more into NRM-Lite!

“Power is a curious thing. Who lives, Who dies. Power resides where men believe it resides. It is a trick, A shadow on the wall.”  ― Lord Varys (Game of Thrones).

“Adjective: Denoting a low-fat or low-sugar version of a manufactured food or drink product” (…) “Origin: 1950s: a commercial respelling of light, light” (Oxford Dictionary – Lite).

This here isn’t something based on evidence, but more a genuine feeling I have is not only one I share, but many others. There is something at stake and someone who has agreed the negotiations so these so-called opposition parties isn’t really so. That is why the Uganda People Congress has some MPs in the Cabinet and the same with Democratic Party. The same can be said that both of these parties, still have slots or parts of the delegations to the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in Arusha.

What we do know is that James Akena, the newly concurred leader of UPC could easily do some trade-off with NRM in 2015. That isn’t just mere speculation as his party did decent and there haven’t been any controversy or lashing out from NRM MPs towards the UPC in ages. Secondly, the DP has become the good DPs and the ones that even are parts of NRM Celebrations. There is something up with these two parties, just like Uganda Federal Alliance and Beti Kamya all of a sudden is a bigger support of the NRM government than the former NRM historical’s and the NRM hardliners.

The President and his NRM CEC must see their State House visits as a blessed and ease ways of figuring out how to undress the opposition and how to deal with them. All needs a meal-ticket, the question is who will give in to the regime and at what cost. Therefore, the arrangement and the deals behind the close doors show the conning way of the illegitimate regime who uses all sorts of methods to undermine the opposition. The FDC has clearly given in too, in my book, with even becoming the shadow-government in Parliament. Something the FDC NEC shouldn’t have considered and agreed upon, because when NRM together with the President agreed to get a UPC minister and DP minister, it would be hard to have shadow-government with members from these parties. That would be rare and weird to explain.

We can even wonder if Norbert Mao even cared of losing his slot as Member of Parliament in the 10^th Parliament, as the DP was behind Amama Mbabazi Presidential Candidate through the The Democratic Alliance (TDA). Why I say that now? Since he is snickering and defending the NRM on NBSFrontline, attacking Lord Mayor Lukwago and the FDC when he can, just as we would expect Akena, since he has been bought sometime during the 2015. The price and the value of the UPC is for him and his closest allies to know.

DP’s Mao on the other hand is worrying, that Fred Mukasa Mbidde went so easily and elected into the EALA, also how little care the DP has given to the DP Cabinet Member Florence Nakiwala. Who could have thought the party would trade these folks that easily? That without any worry and without care has let it go, that they have set the standard of being a mediocre party who has no courage and no fighting spirit.

Maybe, Mao has gotten tired of fighting as the campaign he himself has a Presidential Candidate was sour, it wasn’t a joyful journey as the promises and the ride against the police force wasn’t ideal. Therefore, the battle even for his own MPs place got lost and as a leader who isn’t in Parliament, while the ones in Parliament are getting cosy with the NRM. That might be why Mao is complied with the forged friendships and trading in Parliament, to make sure they can gain the most. Still, the value and integrity of DP is dwindling, with every forged agreement with NRM makes them more and more alike, less different.

The NRM regime and NRM caucus in Parliament is adding DP and UPC, they are just turning into branches of the regime instead of being rooted on their own and on their own framework. It is just like Mao and Akena, just shift-bosses instead of being their own factory leaders. They work less for their own product and delivery, more and more to please the Executive through agreements and negotiations.

That is why the NRM has swallowed their paths and the lacking spine of DP and UPC has given way for this. Therefore, the current affairs and state makes them like a light version of the NRM. For this reason DP = NRM Lite and UPC = NRM Lite. Both parties are old and have a long history; they were established long before NRM, still the abolishment from Obote, made the other obsolete. So Museveni’s trick of being in the shadows of these parties before and after the parties, this is essentially killing of the multi-party system. That the NRM are tarnishing the DP and UPC to becoming NRM knocks-offs.

All of this is mere speculation, but still, there aren’t any official agreements in public between UPC and DP towards to the NRM, but their friendliness and co-operations are evident of certain negotiated deals. You will not hear Akena or the UPC complain about the NRM, just like Mao suddenly defends on national TV their position towards NRM and attacks Lukwago. There is just some uncertainty of how and what they have done behind closed doors. Beyond a shadow of a doubt some worrying signs that can and should be questioned, especially not accept as the acceptance of these parties to the NRM gives way to establish deep concerns of the value of opposition at all in Uganda. Since the DP and UPC have been thresholds for such, now it is FDC, even with a FDC NEC who doesn’t concern their legitimising the Parliament.

We all should ask and question the recent efforts from DP and UPC as legitimate opposition, even as parties without connections or how possibly they have accepted agreements with Movement. This surpass the judgement and the recognition of their existence, it is more the mere fact of lacking attention to transparency and accountability, as they are giving way to a regime who certainly does not care about procedures or acts or rule of law. The parties are therefore giving the Movement acceptance and are silently supporting their rule with these sorts of acts. Certainly, something the founders of these parties would turn in their graves and wanted to resurrect to adjust the malfunctions of these parties. Peace.

Opinion: I miss Olara Otunnu, already!

After this General Election of 2016, he promised to step-down after the continuing process of keeping him away from the Presidency of Uganda People’s Congress as there we’re a strange placement of UPC in connection with the NRM government, as they got cabinet positions. The fighter and long-time human-rights activist and politician said he would give up politics.

“Tension at the opposition Uganda People’s Congress Party hit the boiling point on Friday, as supporters of the newly elected party President Jimmy Akena, battled with outgoing president Dr Olara Otunnu” (…) “The latter, who announced his resignation at the end of his term, is unsatisfied with the process through which Mr Akena was elected president last week, citing irregularities that characterized the entire process that must be probed” (…) “Sources in the party told us a new committee led by one Patrick Mwondha was set up, which will provide interim leadership until the July Delegates Conference when the new President will be endorsed” (…) “The council will handle all party activities leading to the July 10th National Council and July 11th National Delegates Conference” (…) “All this took place in the presence of president elect Jimmy Akena, who was occupying the party Vice President Joseph Bossa’s office” (Segwa, 2016).

This continued with a long process where Jimmy Akena finally overpowered Otunnu and kicked him out of the party, together with others who has essentially cleared the party of the loyalist behind Otunnu.

Therefore the realization that we do something bold again could appear, but instead he did this: ““Ambassador Olara Otunnu, the embattled UPC president’s time at the helm of one of Uganda’s oldest political parties is up. The man eagerly waiting to hand over power says his attempts have since been failed from 12th of June 2015,when he scheduled to officially hand over power only to be sabotaged by what he calls the Akena faction coup – d’état” (NBS TV Uganda, 10.05.2016).

Now months after I have to drop a few words for this man. Who has a long history in Uganda Politics and all of sudden has silently disappeared, something he didn’t deserve and he could have become more vital if people had given the man a chance. That is not something I alone could believe as he has been important for many during his years in the UPC. A place and heart of a fraction that Akena never can carry, because honest political craft isn’t Jimmy Akena’s way, if it we’re so the battle for Presidency of late would have been without tension, court dates and kicking out people out of the famous Uganda House.

But when looking away from the hurt, let look at the gentleman that Ugandan people now has lost, as he turned civilian and surely has a position with good people around him. Because he has the experience and the wisdom to lead and to focus his capacity at greater things!

In 1982 – New York:

“’There’s been a mistake,” he told Mr. Otunnu, who is Uganda’s representative to the United Nations. ”We don’t accept diplomats.” Mr. Otunnu kept looking, and found another apartment. ”Everything looked O.K.,” he said, ”but when I came on the appointed day with my check, I was told it was no longer available. I had a friend call up and cross-check, and he found the apartment was still available. So I went back with him, and they were embarrassed – they said the apartment was indeed available, but they couldn’t give it to me because I was a diplomat.” (…) “He found a third apartment, but he was again rejected and again for the same reason. Mr. Otunnu, who eventually found an apartment in a new building, remembers his experience with anger. But, he said, it is a ”common story” for diplomats.” (Bennetts, 1982).

In 2009 – ‘About his role in 1985:

Melina Platas Izma asks: “Some of your critics have alleged that you were involved in the coup of 1985. What is your reaction?”

Otunnu: “That is absolute falsehood. It is a vicious smear campaign being peddled for political reasons. At the time of the coup, I was based in New York. First, there were those reports about tensions in military barracks on the outskirts of Kampala. When I contacted my superiors in Kampala, I was assured that the incidents were not serious and were nothing to be concerned about. But then, in very quick order (and to my great shock), came the coup itself. I knew absolutely nothing about it and had no part whatsoever in its planning or execution. After the coup, I travelled to London for a previously scheduled meeting of the Commonwealth Commission on Small States. While in London, I was summoned home. At that time, I called Mzee Milton Obote from Shafiq Arain’s office. He told me how the coup by Bazilio Okello had unfolded. He knew I had nothing to do with it. He concluded the conversation by telling me: “The situation in Kampala is very dangerous. Be careful. And stay in touch when you can.” I did stay in touch with him. During the Nairobi peace talks, I travelled to Lusaka to consult Mzee.  Much later I would visit him while I was now based in New York. From time to time, he would send me messages. In fact one of the persons who carried an important personal letter from Mzee to me on one occasion was Chris Opoka, the current Secretary General of UPC. When I reported to Kampala, at the urging of Paulo Muwanga and Tito Okello, I accepted the assignment to initiate and facilitate the peace talks. That was my primary responsibility as minister. At the time, in a television discussion with Col. [Zed] Maruru, I defended the record and programmes of UPC from what was a wholesale visceral condemnation of the party without any regard to facts. I argued for an objective assessment of UPC’s record across the board – both its achievements and mistakes. Incidentally, soon after the coup, and before I left New York, Museveni had called from Gothenburg in Sweden (my telephone number was given to him by Betty Bikangaga from Geneva), urging me to return home to facilitate contacts and eventual peace talks: “The people who are in charge in Kampala know you and we know you; you can serve as a go-between and help to build confidence for talks.” (Izama, 2009)

His own statement in 1994 as member on the Commission on Global Governance:

“I think it would be equally difficult to have Germany and Japan join as permanent members without seeking some way to redress the imbalance which will be accentuated–the North-South imbalance within the Council. At the very least during this transitional period, we would need to have what one might call “tenured members” of the Council. Those who would serve for a period longer than two years–maybe five, six or seven years–but who would not be permanent members. A possible formula would be three-plus-one. Three tenured members would be drawn from the three regions of the world which are now not represented on a permanent basis–Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia. The remaining one would be a global seat, tenured, elected on the basis of some rough standard of good UN citizenship. It would allow a number of countries, who would not necessarily belong to the three regions mentioned previously, but who contribute very actively to the purposes of the UN, to be invited to serve on this tenured basis” (…) “Now I come to the use of the veto, which obviously has to be discussed in any context, whether it is transitional or long-term. In the long term, I am not sure what the fate of the veto is going to be. I have a feeling that it will be a major issue of discussion. As we move into a world that is more democratic (in spirit if not always in practice), the veto will increasingly be questioned. But in the transitional package, I see the veto being retained by those who now have it, for purely practical purposes. They will not cooperate on anything that prejudices their right of veto” (Otunnu, 1994).

In 2005 – His work for Children in Conflict:  

“Reacting to his departure as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF said today that it was deeply grateful to Olara Otunnu for being an outspoken advocate for millions of children caught in conflict around the world” (…) “She praised Mr. Otunnu for insisting that egregious violations of the rights of children in armed conflict cannot be overlooked or forgotten, and that the cloak of impunity must be lifted for all war crimes and abuses committed against children” (…) “Ms. Salah also hailed Mr. Otunnu for his close work with UNICEF in negotiating the landmark resolution passed by the Security Council last week, which establishes a comprehensive monitoring and reporting system for children affected by armed conflict” (UNICEF, 2005).

In 2007 – Otunnu could return:

“The Ugandan Government would not accept &rewarding8 the disaffected diaspora and &terrorists8 through the peace process. Museveni argued that if regime critics such as former U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu wanted to return to Uganda to run for office, they could do so. If northern Uganda was &thirsty8 to have Otunnu represent it, then a member of Parliament should vacate his seat for Otunnu to compete” (WikiLeaks, 2007).

In 2010 – Leadership role:

“Last weekend, UPC delegates gave you a hoe to get back to work for Uganda, and the job is very big. Luckily, you bring to the job two very distinct qualities that will allow you to become part of nation building. Foremost, as a former diplomat on the world stage, you are known across the globe; when you call, leaders pick up their phones to listen. Your ability to network, and to connect internationally will serve Uganda well as a developing country” (Opiyo, 2010)

In 2013 – liberate Uganda:

“The selection of Prof Omara-Otunnu who comes from northern Uganda may raise eyebrows to many in Uganda but a source close to FUF told The London Evening Post, that the front’s leadership is determined to have leaders from all regions of the country and that no particular tribe would monopolise the front as is the case in the ruling National Resistance Movement. Omara-Otunnu will need all his international experience in bringing together many Ugandans who have for years been frustrated by Museveni’s leadership and are being united because they all share one desire, that of removing Museveni from power and returning the country back to the people” (…) “A practical idealist and visionary, Prof Omara-Otunnu has devoted most of his adult life to promoting democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and the ideal and practice of a common humanity around the globe. He engages these causes as a scholar advocate and a practitioner, by shaping policy and building structures and alliances through which to effect positive change in society. For his achievements, Professor Omara-Otunnu has received international recognition, including the luminary award given by the international affairs council to individuals who have made significant contributions that have profoundly impacted the world” (Gombya, 2013).

When you see this kind of words and his rich history from the cradle and in the midst of battles as the rise of Museveni was happening, while he also became a negotiation partner for the government of Obote. So he was on the losing side of history. Olara Otunnu we’re a man who at one point of time, though if I remember correctly that the youth had a say in the Obote government after the fall of Idi Amin where Museveni we’re Minister. So the turn of the coup of 1985, made him flee and also his reputation after years abroad made him a candidate for international works in the United Nations Organizations and partners. Therefore he is man with wide knowledge of the world and of his own nation.

Therefore it saddens me that he is now totally silent. That a man of this stature we wing-clipped by James Akena. That a man of hypocrisy and deceit like Akena could bring a man like this down! Otunnu had deserved another outcome. He has been steady and wanted the positive change of an accountable-government and a transparent election where a government like that would be elected. Certainly a vision he hasn’t seen in his time. Where also a transgression in his own party lead to his fall, as Akena made power moves and in the end cut the ties with the man of a rich history and also knowledge.

Otunnu, the diplomat who has a long career has now been gone into oblivion. The reality is that the man who has worked hard for justice for children and against war-crimes. As well as working of peaceful change from Museveni. That hasn’t occurred instead a man who turned loyal against all odds to Museveni got control over UPC. The Party that are old and stood against the Museveni paradigm is now gone. The UPC that stood against and lost that is well known now.

Otunnu has had many transition and been through many storms, been in exile and been through the worst of the worst. Many might not know this, but they should. He is not a relic or forgotten man; he should be a treasure to counter the NRM propaganda and the NRM control of the historical facts. He has been in the midst of the creation of the NRM from the outside and knows what the losing team looks like. He knows the struggle to get back their legacy and recharge a broken party. A party that betrayed him and took him for granted.

UPC was too good and to deceitful to be connected with Olara Otunnu! Olara Otunnu deserves credit for the work for the cause and I miss him from the public sphere. I am sure it does him good to be out of the spotlight. But the politics and the history of Uganda needs men like this. Who fights within reason and with enlightenment, with the tact and procedure and not with brown-envelopes and impunity! Peace.

Reference:

Bennetts, Leslie – ‘DIPLOMATS HAVING TO SCRATCH FOR APARTMENTS’ (06.06.1982) link: http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/06/realestate/diplomats-having-to-scratch-for-apartments.html?pagewanted=all

Gombya, Henry – ‘EXCLUSIVE: Otunnu set to lead new Ugandan liberation front’ (10.10.2013) link: http://www.nyamile.com/uganda-in-south-sudan/exclusive-otunnu-set-to-lead-new-ugandan-liberation-front/

Otunnu, Olara A. – ‘1994 Conference – Statement by Olara Otunnu’

Former President, International Peace Academy 1990-98; Member, Commission on Global Governance) link: https://www.globalpolicy.org/the-dark-side-of-natural-resources-st/water-in-conflict/32794-1994-conference-statement-by-olara-otunnu.html

Opiyo, Oloya – ‘Olara Otunnu, UPC has given you a hoe get back to work’ (17.10.2010) – New Vision

Segawa, Nixon – ‘Olara Otunnu Overthrown as UPC President’ (05.07.2015) link: http://www.chimpreports.com/olara-otunnu-overthrown-as-upc-president/

Melina Platas Izama – ‘Olara Otunnu on the way’ (06.07.2009) link: https://melinaplatas.com/2009/07/06/olara-otunnu-on-the-way/

Unicef – ‘UNICEF thanks Olara Otunnu’ (03.08.2005) link: https://www.unicef.org/media/media_27835.html

WikiLeaks – ‘UGANDA: A/S FRAZER DISCUSSES LRA, CONGO, AND SOMALIA WITH PRESIDENT MUSEVENI’ (14.09.2007) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KAMPALA1449_a.html

History repeats itself: King Mutesa II and the KY traded his inheritance with Milton Obote; does his son, Hon. Akena sell the same inheritance of the UPC, when he goes into government with Museveni and his NRM?

“I can confirm that we are in talks whereby the core UPC minimum agenda that addresses key issues like health, education and agriculture will guide all engagements over the next 5 years. As UPC we firmly believe in the need for a peaceful transition cannot exclude Museveni, and therefore any meaningful transition cannot exclude him and NRM from this transition,” says James Akena

Just as mid-November 2015, there was speculation of a convenient marriage between National Resistance Movement and the Uganda People’s Congress, during the Campaign before the General Election of 2016 and as a preparation before the 10^th Parliament. The Parties have stalled before as the founder and first Prime Minister Milton Obote, didn’t have many kind words for now President Museveni, as his son James Akena, the now President of UPC have traded for brown envelopes of shillings and longevity. He was tired of running in the wilderness, while the NRM continue to have the finger in every pocket and he wanted to be able to get something extra. So as Mid-June 2016 and the new Cabinet, even UPC MPs was elected into the 81 large Cabinet as a token of the Memorandum of Understanding between Akena and Museveni. Something Obote back in the day would have slapped.

This is what Dr. Olara Otunnu has said about the marriage recently:

“They are his weapons of choice to destabilise UPC” (…) ”This is not an alliance between UPC and President Museveni but an alliance between masqueraders Jimmy Akena, Betty Amongi and Museveni” (…) “It is inconceivable that UPC would go to bed with President Museveni. It hasn’t happened and it will not happen. Never” (Atukunda, 2016).

Planned cooperation since 2011, apparently:
“President Yoweri Museveni on Wednesday this week held a meeting with NRM leaders from Lango sub region who were aggrieved with the appointment of 2 UPC members in the new cabinet, leaving out party members who sacrifice a lot for the ruling party. The President told the group: “I know you honourable are wondering why I picked some people out of the family (NRM) to the cabinet. I am only sorry that I did not tell you people earlier, but I have been in clandestine relationship with them (UPC) since 2011,” Museveni told the NRM members according to sources who attended the meeting” (Sewakilyanga, 2016).

So with this in mind, that Dr. Olara Otunnu has talked long time about Museveni moles in the UPC Party and with the knowledge of the UPC-NRM alliance. There are certainly that the UPC are no on the short side of the stick, as they are not the ruling party as they once we’re when father of James Akena was running the country under the UPC-Banner after independence and traded for loyal support Baganda together with the UPC-KY marriage. This was in the 1960s, but the way the party folded and lost relevance, as the resurrected Conservative Party, have never been able to take the place in the political spectrum as the Kabaka Yekka once had, as Dr. Milton Obote abolished the kingdom and also lost his place Prime Minister, before the Coup d’état against him as well, that ushers in the Dictator Idi Amin. That also opens for the surge and military operations together with Tanzanian troops to invade and set in place for a second term for President Obote. That also gives now President Museveni, a place in his cabinet, before he goes to the bush to bring down Obote. So with all the blood and tears, it is weird that the man that had the ability to bring down the father. The man who got rid of the father and run the country, are now collaborating with peaceful with his son James “Jimmy” Akena who runs his father’s party and from his father’s foundation, Milton Obote Foundation and headquarter in Uganda House.

With this quick recap of history and neglect, it is just weird that UPC who swallowed KY with ease and tried to silence the Central Kingdom of Uganda, Baganda and Mengo circuit of Kampala, still they are now forging a similar trade, as a minor agreement with NRM for their own goodwill, to be a loyal partner with NRM instead of working on their own.

So with all of this in mind, let us take a look at the 1960s struggle between convenient marriage then between Kabaka Yekka and the Uganda People’s Congress, then between the King Mutesa II and Dr. Milton Obote as they we’re going together in the first election to gain traction in the newly made Parliament and also force way for the first PM Obote, whom later would force the Baganda and king in Exile, as he wanted to centralize all power in the Executive and not have to tangle with royals or kingdoms, as he abolished it. But before that and while in the beginning, he had a cordial agreement who both parties earned on and gain majority in Parliament, as they could get a grander place then the Democratic Party of the day. Take a look!

First Report on the KY-UPC Alliance:

“According to the terms of the KY-UPC alliance, UPC leader Milton Obote became Uganda’s first post-independence Prime Minister in a coalition government with KY, while the Kabaka of Buganda, Mutesa II, was named Uganda’s ceremonial president by constitutional amendment in 1963.25 From independence in October 1962 to June 1966, however, the UPC-KY alliance disintegrated as the UPC expanded and aggressively centralized the powers of the federal government, showing little sympathy for Baganda nationalism or the rights of Uganda’s kingdom governments. Indeed, the UPC repeatedly attacked KY as a “tribal” party that was unable to meet the nation-building challenges that Uganda faced after independence” (Scott, 2006).

Report from March 1962:

“Buganda and its king, the Kabaka, have been especially reluctant to cooperate with the rest of the country in its evolution towards a more centralized form of government. On the last day of 1960 it went so far as to declare its independence from the rest of Uganda” (…)”The UPC on the other hand is determined  to get into power, and many of their political maneuvers have a reckless flavour to them. Obote is unkindly reported to be willing to sell his soul to become the first Prime Minister of Independent Uganda. Some observers feel that his compromise with the Kabaka was just that. Buganda has quite a history of broken agreements, and the big question today is how far they will honour their word to support the UPC. The Kabaka, affectionately known around here as King Freddie, is the dominant figure in Buganda. A shrewd politician, he has a remarkable ability, no doubt inherited from his illustrious forbears, of playing one side off against each other (and often winning)” (…)”The Buganda-UPC coalition had fielded a new but all but unbeatable party calling itself Kabaka Yekka (Kabaka Only). There were high spirits in the UPC Camp, while the DP was exhibiting a stiff upper lip. Both sides claimed to be able to form for a national government even if they got less than half of the seats in the Lukiko” (Wright, 1962)

“In forty-eight hours the outcome was clear. As one newspaper summarized it:

The Result as always in Buganda when the Kingdom’s status and identity seems to be threatened, was a solid closing of the ranks and yet another demonstration that, as far as the vast mass of Buganda are concerned, nationalism ends at the kingdom boundaries” (…) “soon after we talked to Basil Bataringaya, the DP’s able Secretary-General who was in charge of the campaign” (…) “He was by no means pessimistic, however, about the DP’s future. He felt it had picked up much ground outside of Buganda at the expense of the UPC since last election. He was also sure that UPC’s marriage of convenience with Kabaka Yekka would work to its disadvantage outside Buganda where most tribesmen are intensely suspicious of the Baganda” (Wright, 1962).

This is what Mrs. Winklmaier wrote on the 6^th May of 1962:

“The Election results turned out as we expected. 21 seats of the National Assembly go to Buganda. They are elected indirectly through the Lukiko (Buganda Government) That means “Kabaka Yekka” (Nur der Kabaka) The other 61 seats are elected through the people outside of Buganda in a secret election. 37 seats went to UPC (Uganda Peoples Congress) and 24 seats to DP (Democratic Party). The Democratic Party is made up of the last Government. Then there are still 9 more seats, which are elected by the new Government. UPC is more or less a communist party. I cannot understand that UPC and Kabaka Yekka went together in a coalition. I don’t think that the Bugandas are aware of the consequences yet. [ The names of these two parties alone made it clear to me, that they cannot work together.] We are acquainted with both, our new Prime Minister, Mr. Milton Obote, as well as the former DP Prime Minister, Mr. Benedicto Kiwanuka. We are also acquainted with other Ministers of the New Government. One certainly cannot say that these are incompetent people – quite to the contrary. Moskau has a very good hand and in fact understands to fish for the best” (Winklmaier, 2008).

I think that says enough and gives you’re ideas on my perspective on the matter and also see the similarties, between KY and UPC of back then and today, today it is UPC who is ones that is trading it all for the little coins in NRM cabinet, while KY traded their legitimacy together with the ambitious Obote to control the new Parliament and Cabinet, as the independent country and new government loomed the nation. Today the UPC is one of the old parties, still their weakness is so obvious as the internal conflict between Otunnu-UPC and Akena-UPC continues, while the UPC now is really embedded, as proven with the ministerial position to two party cadets, the wife of Akena and also another family member of the Obote clan in the Cabinet.

Just the proof the issues with the alliance, not only Otunnu who has issues with it, there are more men who disagree with Hon. Akena trade off. Peter Walubiri says this: “Museveni gave Akena money and soldiers and they hijacked the electoral process. He wants to take over our party but he will not succeed,” (…) “We [UPC] have not got any ministers, people can leave the party anytime they want and those too have left. We are going to expel them” (…) “Everyone supporting Akena is no longer UPC, but Movement. Those that want to eat are the ones going to Museveni” (…) “Justice Musota decided that Otunnu is still president until fresh elections are held, Akena has never been UPC president. They hijacked the electoral process” (Mayemba, 2016).

So the convenient marriage between the parties might end up with fractioned party, even more fractioned and create more fracas between Otunnu, Akena and the ones that despise the agreement made between NRM-UPC. As there was surely some who disagreed back in the day with UPC-KY agreement, though with the time, their voices have been silent or haven’t surfaced. the UPC are surely only helping Museveni and not their own cause, one can wonder how much the trade for the agreement and what cost it has for Museveni, as he get his former nemesis son James Akena on his side, with ding-ling little coins and a ministerial position, but not any real power. While the UPC continues to wrangle and in-fighting that even the agreement creates more fire, and the hut is on fire, and the whole village sees it. Akena can claim there are no fire in the hut, but the villagers see it and feels the smoke in their lungs. With this in mind, the Akena-UPC are no marginalize the UPC even more, even if he thinks he is getting a good deal, he is not. The only one earning on it is Museveni, as he get UPC embedded and under his control, while he gives away to measly cabinet position. That is for him, nothing and also scrap-metal as they are meagre seats and not pivotal in government as it is not Education, Defence or Foreign Affairs, but Fisheries and other smaller ministries that doesn’t have power or reach to create havoc. Peace.

Reference:

Atukunda, Rogers – ‘POLITICS Otunnu calls Amongi a mole, Akena fights Bbosa’ (20.06.2016) link: http://www.theinsider.ug/otunnu-calls-amongi-a-mole-akena-fights-bbosa/

Mayemba, Abubaker – ‘We shall expel Akena group for joining Museveni – Walubiri’ (20.06.2016) link: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/44903-we-shall-expel-akena-group-for-joining-museveni-walubiri

Sewakilyanga, Ivan – ‘I started working with Obote’s son in 2011 Museveni (17.06.2016) link: http://mycampusjuice.com/2016/06/17/i-started-working-with-obotes-son-in-2011-museveni/

Scott, James Peter – ‘Re-examining Uganda’s 1966 Crisis: The Uganda People’s Congress and the Congo Rebellion’ (2006) – University of Victoria, Canada

Winklmaier, Sonja – ‘Letters From Sonja: The Unlikely UPC – Kabaka Yekka Union’ (21.05.2008) link: http://www.ugpulse.com/people/letters-from-sonja-the-unlikely-upc-kabaka-yekka-union/405/ug.aspx

Wright, Ian Michael – Received letter 10.03.1962: Letter to Nolte, Richard H. – ‘Politics in Uganda I: The hoe and The Chair’ (10.03.1962) – Institute of Current World Affairs (ICWA), New York, USA

Why are the leaders of our time so hooked-on Power? And some theories for why they don’t leave the Executive Power to somebody else..

We are living in a day and age where leader’s doesn’t leave from their office. You have likes of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasongo who is making himself ready for another election in his country this year and he has been in power since 1979. You have the likes of President Paul Biya of Cameroon who has been the President since 1982 and was in government since 1970s. In Zimbabwe the President of the day President Robert Gabriel Mugabe has been the Commander in Chief.  And the list goes on.

We have the third term phenomenon of President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda both of them have changed the laws or used Courts to allow them to stay in power. So the leadership roles are sufficient to stay. You have the likes of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni who has been in charge since 1986 and stayed ever since, changed laws again and again to linger in power and is rumored to fix the age limit to stay passed his 7^th Term.

So with this in mind, I will discuss it today. It is not a new phenomenon or a new change of guards. There are always leaders who linger and overstay their time in power. As President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda took power with a coup d’état in 1973 and was in power until his plane got shot down in 1994. Just like the overthrow of first President Patrice Lumumba of Democratic Republic of Congo in 1965, who by foreign powers supposed to install Mobutu Seko Seko Kuku Ngebendu Wa Za Banga who was born Joseph-Desire Mobutu who was the President of DRC from 1965 until 1997. So there are leaders of the past who has not left office and is now long gone.

The issue with this is the way we build society around people instead of institutions and government structures. The Structures of government is kept weak and is not strong with procedure and predicated work for the civil service. That is why the leaders can linger and the way they keep it is fueling resources away from the government structures and institutions, keeping the progress weak and keeping the circle around them tight knit. Instead of having inner-circles with wits, knowledge and people who wants to succeed in their field; the leaders around the president is instead hungry men and woman who works for more and better civil service for the citizens.

That is because the leaders who circle all of government around themselves are not interested in great policies or deliver the promised pledges to the communities since then they have to give away power. When a leader tries to strengthen the power all around themselves then the necessary leadership is not about the government, but about the person who rules. The ruler set the standard ,not the laws of the state or the laws of the Parliament. As the Executive can fix the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, can rig the Constitution and make draconian laws that issues more help for the Executive; instead of the Constitution and the Parliament representing the citizens and for the citizens it becomes for the Executive.

That is why the Executive or the Ruler, the President doesn’t want to leave power since the whole state is built around the one person. The One Person who has in his image or her image built the government around themselves. And when they have it all for themselves they don’t have to fight for anything else then themselves. That is what matters, if he schools is depleting, health care is non-functioning, roads have bigger potholes then the ones on the moon, the government loans are worse than the subprime-mortgage and so on. That doesn’t matter because the situations doesn’t hit the Executive, because the government funds goes directly to him instead of the ministries, departments and sections of government than really-really need it!

The Power that starts with personal movement of fights and liberation, the ones that are personalized towards the one man who saved them all and then doesn’t leave is that the EGO and used to be center of attention. To have the voice of being right, so they can’t do things wrong in their own mind as they risk to lose their wealth and strength if they are out of office.

Some of these leaders have lived on the strength of the loyalty to foreign powers as they need their alliance in a region to secure peace in the neighbor country or during the cold war as the Americans did whatever they could to control the world and not lose nations to the Soviet communism. Therefore they fall of Said Barre of Somalia and the struggles of the Ethiopian Dirg of the 1970s. As the Cold War complex policies dissolved and built governments with influence of American and Russian strengths of the time. Take the example of President Mengistu Hailemariam who kept the Power from 1974 – 1991 with the Soviet influx and the Communist agenda that made the result of Somalia invasion with support of the Americans in 1977. So he himself had taken power in 1969 in Somalia the army fueled government of Said Barre as his power-play internally to keep the power together with the back and forth from the leadership at the time led to his fall, as he also had long-term squabble with Ogaden and Ethiopian neighbor after the tried invasion there. This the fall after 20 years might be because he circulated all power amongst himself and not in the powers of structures and department to delegate the powers.

That is the problem with the leaders who get fueled with power. They circulate all power and decisions are under the Executive. So with this in mind instead of building institutions and government structures, they build the armies and police force to enforce the Power of the Executive, not only to enforce national security, but to secure the Power of the Executive. Therefore the first to get payment are the armies and police officers before the teachers and other civil servants.

The Rulers and the Executives keeps the ignorant yes-men around them to secure that they don’t get to opportunist or wanting to get the Executive position. Therefore they elite around the Ruler get lots of perks, tax-exemptions, cars, housing and servants while the rest of the country can’t afford that. Unless it is foreign investors in businesses owned by the Party Elite or the Government elite that belongs to the inner-circle of the Executive; as the license and openings happens on the watch of the Executive and the Power not the legal justice system or the society binding corporate bondage towards the procedures of setting up business in the country. So the way the Executive get drunk on power is set on the fact that they having everything at nearly no cost.

The Presidents who are drunk on Power have centralized all powers around them and not the government structures and the decrees and the policies are made to keep them in power; not to build a grand state who offers their citizens what they need. Therefore the laws becomes for the MPs and the Elite that fuel the money and Power towards the President, then the President delivering to the People.

The remains of Mobutu’s Palce

So with the Inner-circle finding ways to support the President instead of serving the citizens as a government is supposed to do. Why are the Executive and rules high-on-power you asked?

That is because all of the Power, all of the resources and all of the goodwill of the nation is determined by the Executive. As the Power is resumed and determined by the Executive there is hard to leave that, as the knowledge of the system given to coming new leader can take away what the Executive already have built around itself. Therefore the security of having the power instead of giving it the next; that is why the lingering Executives and Presidents are like alcoholics!

Let me explain why the similarities are there. An Alcoholic has the hunger and need for another drink and beer. They do whatever they can to get another drink and beer, at all means and steal if they have to get that fizz. So the Alcoholic is so used to the alcohol that the feel of it weaken and needs much of it to feel it. The Alcoholic just need another brew and another brew. And never stops taking in the alcohol. In the beginning the alcoholic never think that they would end being so, and the same with power-hungry individual. It just became a habit. The alcoholic needs the alcohol, just as the Executive is drunk on power and needs some more drinks. The Executive gotten so used to and the habit of getting their will and generating the funds out of the governmental funds; so if they don’t get more the donor-funds or the Bretton-Woods Loans to their nations then they feel something is missing. They need the spotlight to be the king of the nation and the supreme ruler.

So the drunkenness and needed attention, the needed judgement and decision rate from the Executive that lingers in powers while they build the government system around themselves and weakens the people around them. So they are more needed and so that ambition gets squirrelled around them. There can only be one vision, one leader and one nation under God. That is the usual factor and the events that unfold as the dissidents and opposition get harsh treatment without any cost spared. Something that happens because they crossed the territory of the Executive and the rules of set-up by the President and the predicated actions are seen as violations of laws and constitution; that apparently been rigged in favor of current leader. Therefore another bottle of beer for the President as the sufficient drunkenness of power is staggering. Suddenly change would be hard and taken with haste. Because the drunken leaders will with force and madness go all-inn if they all of sudden loose it, they will be become bush-warriors or stealing elections to continue their Presidency. As we have seen through 2015 and 2016 that is how far these leaders goes to get the shot of power and not stop drinking from the fountain of government power. Peace.  

Mzee and his Militarized State; the Guns never left the Executive it seems!

“Soldiers feel that the Police are not serious with the criminal elements and that they are corrupt. The army had to come in and insist that criminals must be punished. It happens in all countries, there is a time when the army assumes the duty of internal security”. General Museveni (Daily Nation – Nairobi – January 26, 1987).

This is ironic that President Museveni said in 1987. We can see that times has changed or that his mind set to other perspective then directly from the bush. With the guerrilla warfare and the so-called liberation struggle, that has been discovered more and more about the tactics done to get power.

It is surely and clearly many ways President Museveni talked democratic values while it has been uncovered that he oppressed the media and opposition. It has done that since day one of the regime, just different how far and to what extent. It has always tried to look beautiful on the surface and smiles to the donors and Election Observers Missions while in the end, the institutions built around the Mzee. That the Electoral Reforms haven’t really been there for free and fair elections. When I went through the 1996 elections the stories are similar to today’s oppression of the opposition.

While opening up for free-market thinking has over time and letting the United Kingdom, Kenyan, South African, Indian and Libyan businessmen got easy trading ability in the country, while the exports and trade boards are gone, less of unions and other governmental structures. In the later years the government has started with micro-credit, Operation Wealth Creation and Youth Livelihood Programs as a cheap way of trying to patch up with the loss of sufficient structures that are sold out, by government to get loans in the beginning of its administrations.

We can easily see that the government who came to power with the guns and ammunition, and still has MPs directly from the army is bound to have the militarized effect on the politics. As the Police are acting with direct force and not following always rule of law. While the government overflows with former colonels and generals becoming politicians instead of businessmen and civil servants as the President is a bush-man himself and been part of two insurgents to power. One in the end of 70s and one in the famous 1986, so the guns never left the power and stayed there; even the tale with the donor-funding of the army from abroad to fight dirty wars the U.S. don’t want to stick their finger in, as in Somalia and Central African Republic.

The Electoral Reforms as discussed briefly the NRM-Regime have stifled most of the time any kind of reform and ruling power therefore had to have two elections on referendum to release the Multi-Party Democracy and also been making the difference between using government funds and using the well-known factor of promises pledges from direct government subsidies to the big-men and chiefs, even Parejo’s and other SUV’s given to men to secure the votes and loyalty to the Mzee.

There been steady shifts in leaders underneath Mzee as he has taken down the men who has been built by his leadership, as he want the ones with his former MPs, VPs and PMs as they wanted to elevate themselves and leave him behind. As the founding father of NRM, nobody else should rule the party and have the Executive control. He took it with a gun and easily takes pictures with it to show where his strength is.

The government have used all kind of methods and tricks to gain riches to NRM elite and leave the certainty of other manufactures, industries and even achieve certain outcomes only for the closest allies of the NRM, even on Town Council levels where NRM members and NRM elders have closest call to get add-ons and secure funding for projects, while the opposition and other institutions have to get hands-out by international NGOs or Bilateral funds to get enough for what they need. The Resistance Councils and the now Local Councils are built for securing de-facto loyalty to the Executive and learn the strength of regime, not to be a democratic system.

The Police and Army is built around loyal men in the top and men the Executive can trust to follow his suit and have his family close connected, even with Gen. Salim Selah not in direct leadership position as he has been involved into too much thefts, thieving and other activities to clean the leadership to look decent for international community, even with Brig. Muhoozi Kainerugaba who is groomed and quickly up the ante with running the Special Forces Command. The ruthlessness of the army and Police never left, and the new laws in place have given lee-way to them to use it as free-for-all to shut down dissidents. While the leadership is steady shifting  and moving as they don’t want the DPC, RPC and Army commanders to be on short-leach and not be to homely where they work.

The continuation of post-election violence in Bundibugyo and Kasese, the way the army is deployed there days on days, shooting Rwenzururu Kingdoms security guards, while the treat of the ADF-NALU who is stations right over the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and as always the Police issues statements blaming other forces, even when video footage and other eye-witness counter their words and intelligence; in the end insulting the intelligence of the people.

The NRM-Regime and the words of their Executive is now totally different than what he was talking the first years of their reign. The Economy is dire, the donors are more futile and less interested in involving themselves in a militarized economy and where the NRM-Elite instead of the citizens and general population, the ones that get funding is direct funded projects as roads and buildings, but not economic prosperity as the inflations is high, the value of currency dwindles, the amount of monies to buy ordinary food-stuffs, the government have added higher loans to sufficiently take up the vacuum of the loss of donor-funds to the governmental budgets.

The whole picture is not as it should be after the ruling-party have run the country for 30 years, the picture should be a steady economy, a secure police-force respected and honor the citizens, an army working for securing the borders and doing international missions not for securing funding, but to generate peace. The country should have beneficiary institutions and taxations with representation, the ones that been done have not delivered, the steady progress has not been delivered, and when is when the media has blasted or BBC have got a whiff of it. As the NBS or NTV cannot whip the power to change, the same with the papers as they are mostly censored and controlled as the radio-stations have lost their transmitters, license and even their hosts been detained while being on air, the Daily Monitor ransacked for two days and the NTV banned from following the Presidential Campaign trail of the Executive.

There is an issue when the army is such a big part of nation, in the parliament, in the streets, in deployment and around all the time. The internal security is based on the army, not the police who is also militarized with sections of special units with military equipment for breaking down demonstrations and other gatherings of opposition, even independents who was former NRM have struggled with army and the Police Force. As the detaining of Opposition without charges, house arrests of Presidential Candidates and taking people with Candidates Declarations Forms from the Polling Station.

The whole picture is not of the state of business, the way of government that NRA and the NRM promised, it has overtaken the control of the institutions, but not given the accountability and transparency, not the economic landscape or investment climate that they have promised for so long, the basics are much of the same and the deals between the oil companies and drilling has been happening behind closed doors; like not open dealings and showing how the companies pay for their operations and how the government structures are as the oil-laws are not strict and not fully operative yet.

The tear-gas operations and the live bullets are not showing the proof of democratic values and society. The internal security and the structures are not strong, when the army enters all kind of operations, as they even killed bed-bugs in neighborhoods of Kampala in mid-February as the KCCA didn’t have the manpower to reach the area, as the UPDF have been used in any kind of processes, even the training-center of the army Kyankwanzi the National Leadership Institute and military training camp; where the NRM MPs has had retreats before the new parliament like the 9^th and 10^th Parliament went there.

The Kyankwanzi resolutions or decrees as party MPs has set precedence for the coming term and the evolution of the ruling-party as the structure in the last go-around left many of the old-foes behind, and the former secretary-general and Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi behind. While this time the struggles with Justine Kasule-Lumumba, Jacob Oulanyah and Rebecca Kadaga might go through hardships in the coming 10^th Parliament as the internal security means the security of the Executive and bring down the men and woman who has ambitions. That is why the Executive have centered the powers close to him. As even ambassador’s claims he is hard to read, the generals of UPDF fear him and just want to do his will, and the same with the police force who has a loyal Inspector General who follows every whiff from him. Even former Warlords and M23 are yearly on the payroll from the State House. As they are securing the security of the state and the government institution as civilian militia-men that does their army bidding; also does discreet business for the Executive as their role have never been told to the world. Therefore we can only be guessing at this point; though they are not cutting the grass at Entebbe or Nakasero!

The way the Army is embedded in the society and external politics, the guerrilla warfare brought the Executive first to a Ministerial Position before the General Election of 1980 and again at the takeover in 1986. He came with the gun and never left it, and never let it go, in all endeavors and structures the embedded army has followed, the loyal cadres and commando have continued, the re-payment of loyalty and offered protection have come in handy. The kickbacks and graft never left the offices, the building of the businesses have also centered the government officials, while the former government businesses has been sold for quick bucks or privatized.

The internal security can be questioned with the army running the streets in Kasese, Kapchorwa and Kampala as a steady force and looking like Marshall Law or state of emergency as the government shows the display of power, and the Police rides around in Personal Armored Carrier and have mortars as Journalist lose their cameras and the media get muffled with. The insecurity created and the ballots been stolen in broad daylight, the impunity of law of fellow citizens is not creating the peaceful atmosphere the Executive have promised and said he delivered, as the Kenyan funding of the campaign and Sudanese Army men proves the Executive went far to secure his stay in power, instead of trusting the ballots and votes, he trusted his instinct and went for the guns and ammunition that have given him the power before, as he had loyal well-paid puppets in the Electoral Commission and generals in the Campaign Team, together with losing NRM Primaries who was paid off; in his mind this should have gone in silence and gotten the credible result needed to be respected statesman abroad, instead the announcement and the cracks of the army and the social media showed the true colors and not the story given by the Executive or his party cadres, which shows the payments and party program is shell of keeping power by any means, instead of building fruitful societies and institutions for better tomorrow. The lies are not invisible anymore, the questions the actions and killings is not only in the hands of semi-army police force and the general populations knows it. As the mourning of the announcement and the weakness of the state comes forward; therefore army had to be deployed and the reshuffling of Police Commanders happening a month after Election Day.

You can lie once and fool the crowd, but lie twice and then the storm comes on the horizon. That is what is happening now and the Executive knows and knew before these elections that the people are tired of his lies and reprogrammed pledges. As the changes of society has only brought bottled water from mountains of the Rwenzori and cellphones, certainty at one point the Universal Primary Education and extended Local Councils that has benefited, but also after a while the schools started to disappear and become depleted. The more districts, sub-counties and counties have taken a toll on the economy. Also been set-up to secure more loyal cadres in Parliament and locally. Through the chain-of-command as the structure is militarized and set to fix the monies, the government institutions, government businesses, government organizations and the commission to be loyal to the Executive, even the churches and holy institutions, if possible they can have some dissidents and opposition; that is just enough for the country to have a rouse and jolly while eating the donor-funding and letting the people stay poor while the NRM-Elite stays powerful. Especially the NRM and the Executive does not care about the FDC and their claims to justice, as the justice is the basics, but for the NRM it is to keep Power and let their Executive stay continuously. And by the minute does not seem to want to leave the country in a state that he promised when he took power.

As his guns does not seem to be silenced, the level of fear, the way the PAV rides down the streets and highways, the way the roadblocks are put, the way the Police detain without charges and the way the government mend laws to fit the Executive, the way the banks are demonstrating their will of following him to earn monies, the way the businesses are centered around him and given favorable deals, the way the harassment of opposition and media, the way the army and police involve in politics and daily life, it does not seem as a democratic and just society. The detention of the ballots and preventative arrest of citizens are worrying, as much as the control and efficiency of it. The pride of the government and its institutions are weak when the KCCA need the Army to fight local problems, the Executive does not trust anything else and therefore the biggest smiles on the photos from him comes in army fatigue and guns as that is the place he feels the best, not in the office or at state meeting. If not it is on his farm relaxing while the monies are piling in without doing anything. Peace.

The President’s Black Book Chapter 3: Bemba and Museveni; what is the ties between the two big-men?

It’s recently been a court ruling in the International Criminal Court where Jean-Pierre Bemba was sentenced and guilty of crimes against humanity. As this happen there been questions about his sponsors and his actions, was it for his own cause or was it for the greater good? As the violence he spread in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was during the wars in late 90s and beginning 2000s as the Rwandan and Ugandan ignited the wars the neighbor country, even sponsoring guerrillas, while fighting other forces there, as they we’re using different methods even when the world was telling the RPA and UPDF to leave, while the guerrillas would still cover areas of minerals close to the borders, to secure funding for the governments of the neighbor countries. They will by all means repute this as this shadows their reign, but the moneys and sudden export of minerals without sustainable investments and business-growth proves that there was sudden changes by the warfare in the DRC.

In this picture President Museveni did what he could to have allies inside the DRC, so he could have business and projects there to reach his power and make himself even stronger. That has been his game since day one; not only to get rid of the leaders around him who is not loyal towards him, but also to get people who he knows is loyal to him no matter what.

Jean-Pierre Bemba was a useful tool and an allied who even with brokered peace gave more influence of Uganda into the DRC politics, as he was stationed as Vice-President under President Laurent Kabila, while this wouldn’t last, as the Ugandan and Rwandan did not like the idea of being distanced from the State House in Kinshasa. So as the time and dwindling reactions, the neighbors went into attack again, that ousted the transitional government and took down a second president in the DRC! In that picture and time, comes the relationship between Bemba and Museveni, Especially after the human rights violations and victims of war, as the spoils of it cost honor and integrity, also the visible. Even if the relations between the men and their armies lost their value, the open sponsorship and even training at one point proves how Museveni used his power and reach to put his fortune into the leadership of Bemba and his MLC. Take a look at what I have found about this men!

About the MLC:

“Current Leader: Jean-Pierre Bemba

Based in Gbadolite, the MLC has been backed by Uganda since the start of the war in 1998 although there have been occasional differences between the two. The MLC tried twice to establish a foothold in Ituri: in 2001 Bemba had nominal control of the short-lived FPC coalition of Ugandan- backed rebel groups and in 2002 the MLC attacked Mambasa in western Ituri but were forced backed by the APC of Mbusa Nyamwisi. The MLC has occasionally fought alongside the UPC and has been a rival of Mbusa’s RCD-ML” (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

Bemba creating his army:

“In spring 1998, Bemba sought to motivate a group of Congolese exiles to join an armed struggle with support from Kampala. He elaborated a political program with a network of friends and former classmates and discussed financing and training with Museveni. By Bemba’s own account, he met Museveni while exporting fish to Belgium through Uganda in the early 1990s, though it is widely believed that Mobutu used Bemba’s aviation companies to transport goods for Jonas Savimbi, then leader of União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), through Uganda throughout the 1980s. Another account claims that Bemba met Museveni through Museveni’s half-brother, General Salim Saleh, then chief of staff of the UPDF, while seeking to establish a link between ex-FAZ troops cantoned at the Kitona military base in southern DRC and UNITA forces in Angola. The MLC emphatically denies any involvement with the Angolan insurgency movement. But the firm belief, at least in Luanda, that Bemba, Uganda, and Rwanda had links to UNITA largely accounts for Angola’s switching sides in the Second Congo War to back Laurent Kabila and its strong antipathy toward Bemba to this day” (Carayannis, 2008).

Bemba in 1999:

“The main Goma faction of the rebel RCD on Monday welcomed Bemba’s signing of the accord. Its leader, Emile Ilunga, claimed Bemba was “not to be trusted”, but added: “We are gratified to learn that he has signed the accord as we had hoped he would. We have always wanted to sign the accord together with him”, Radio France Internationale reported” (…) “Ilunga, who was due to travel to Uganda on Monday evening for a meeting with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, earlier that day accused Uganda of not respecting the rebels’ decision-making process. “Wamba has no troops, and there is no point in his signing the ceasefire agreement … We’re astonished by Ugandan support of an individual, rather than working in the interest of the Congolese people,” AP news agency quoted Ilunga as saying”(IRIN, 1999).

“Jean-Pierre Bemba, a millionaire businessman and leader of the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), was accompanied to the signing in Lusaka by a senior aide of the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, and by Tanzania’s foreign minister, Jakaya Kikwete, officials said” (…)”But Mr Bemba warned that he would go back to war if a rival rebel group did not sign a truce within a week” (…)“Referring to the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), which has refused to sign the truce, he told Reuters: “If they do not sign within seven days, I will continue the fight to Kinshasa.” The RCD and Mr Bemba’s forces control 50% of Congo’s territory” (Gough, 1999). “Speaking to IPS by satellite-link, Bemba, who is also backed by Uganda, said it was too early to say whether the peace would hold, “but for the time things are very quiet, with no fighting near us” (Simpson, 1999).

Bemba in 2000:

“A few days ago, Jean-Pierre Bemba, the rebel leader in Equateur Province, issued a challenge to Mr. Kabila and major Western nations that pushed the accord with more vigor than any of those who signed it” (…)”‘We are at a turning point,” Mr. Bemba, a 38-year-old businessman-turned-rebel, said this week in Gbadolite, his headquarters. ”Is Lusaka alive still or not? That is the question.” (…)”It is not certain whether Mr. Bemba is capable militarily of closing the airport. Nor is it clear if his major sponsor, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, would give his approval given that Mr. Museveni’s own friends, the United States and many European nations, would probably hold him responsible for such a departure from the Lusaka accord” (Fisher, 2000).

Bemba in 2001:

“But Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni also reiterated his commitment to pulling his troops from neighboring Congo, saying now that they have defeated Ugandan rebels operating there, it was time for his forces to leave. The force Museveni claims to have defeated is the Allied Democratic Front, a small Ugandan rebel group that has attacked villages throughout western Uganda from bases in Congo” (…)”Some participants appeared unconcerned that Uganda was pulling out of the peace agreement, and were pleased that Museveni would still withdraw his troops. “If the government decides to withdraw its forces from the Congo, it’s always favorable. This is in line with the Lusaka agreement,” said Kamel Morjane, the U.N. special representative for Congo. “If all parties show their goodwill there is no risk.” (…)”Kikaya Bin Karubi, the Congolese information minister, welcomed the promised troop withdrawal and said his country would stick with the Lusaka peace agreement no matter what. The leader of the Ugandan-backed rebels, Congolese Liberation Front Chairman Jean-Pierre Bemba, said the decision would have little impact on the war since, he insisted, Ugandan troops had not been involved in the fighting. Uganda is estimated to have had at least 10,000 troops in Congo at the peak of the war” (Muleme, 2001).

UN Allegation:

“In 2001, when Bemba took the reins of the unified movement RCD/ML, now called the FLC, he tried in January to broker an agreement between the Hema and Lendu belligerants. He got more than 150 traditional chiefs to participate in this agreement (had the Ugandans acted unilaterally, they would never have managed to achieve this), thus securing a halt to military training and youth recruitment by the UPDF, a measure of security on the roads, food security for the livestock, and the appointment of a governor who was not from the region as a way of providing greater assurance to all the parties. In the end, though, it was Bemba’s dependence on the Ugandans that frustrated the entire peace process” (…)”On more than one occasion, Bemba tried to exert his influence over the Ugandan Government, but Uganda ultimately took the final decisions” (…)”In July 2001, thanks to the efforts of the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the Mouvement de Libération du Congo and RDC/Bunia joined forces, taking with them Rober Lubala’s RCD/National and thus forming the Front de Libération du Congo (FLC)” (Garreton, 2009).

Bemba in 2002:

“Another former rebel movement backed by Uganda, the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Kisangani-Mouvement de liberation (RCD-K-ML), was pessimistic about prospects for the success of the Kabila-Museveni accord” (…)“The DRC is faced with two Ugandas – that of Yoweri Museveni, who acts from a distance in Kampala, and that of his army officers and soldiers involved in the ongoing pillage of gold and diamonds in Ituri [region, northeastern DRC],” said Honore Kadima, in charge of RCD-K-ML external relations. “I don’t see either of these Ugandas adhering to even one comma of the Luanda accord.” (IRIN, 2002). “The mutiny marked the return to prominence of the commanders who had been behind the earlier CMF mutiny. Following their training in Kyankwanzi (for new recruits) and Jinja (for officers), most of them had been sent to Equateur Province to join the MLC’s armed wing. After some months of fighting for Bemba, the soldiers had grown increasingly frustrated. They knew that fellow Hema were still dying in Ituri’s inter-ethnic clashes, and they felt that the MLC used them ‘like dogs’” (Tamm, 2013).

Some more on the MLC:

“The MLC had been involved in Ituri during the short-lived agreement of the Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC), a platform of the MLC, RCD-N and the RCD-ML, sponsored by Uganda under the leadership of Jean Pierre Bemba. But Nyamwisi refused to accept Bemba’s leadership in Ituri and his forces pushed Bemba and the MLC troops out of Beni and Bunia. In the last months of 2002, the MLC tried to fight its way back into Ituri with the support of Roger Lumbala’s RCD-N, claiming that Nyamwisi had violated the Lusaka Accord. In doing so, their combatants committed violations of international humanitarian law including the deliberate killing of civilians, numerous cases of rape, looting and some acts of cannibalism. Some of these violations may have been directed at the Nande ethnic group, targeted for their connection with Nyamwisi, himself a Nande” (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

ICJ Court case claims:

“The DRC claims to have seised an abandoned tank used in the Kitona attack. The Reply alleges the tank is Ugandan because it is the same mode1 as a tank used later by Congolese rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, who allegedly received his tank from Uganda. (DRCR, para. 2.40.)” (…)”Clearly Bemba’s hesitations vis-à-vis the inter-Congolese negotiations and the disengagement are linked to his quick enrichment, the greed of his Ugandan offïcer godfathers and the politics of self-aggrandizement practiced by his opportunistic, wandering ministers who annoy the people.” (ICJ, 2002).

ICJ Ruling document says:

“For its part, Uganda acknowledges that it assisted the MLC during fighting between late September 1998 and July 1999, while insisting that its assistance to Mr. Bemba “was always limited and heavily conditioned”. Uganda has explained that it gave “just enough” military support to the MLC to help Uganda achieve its objectives of driving out the Sudanese and Chadian troops from the DRC, and of taking over the airfields between Gbadolite and the Ugandan border; Uganda asserts that it did not go beyond this” (ICJ, 2005).

Cooperation in DRC during the war claims:

“The cooperation of the allied MLC rebel force was secured by the pre-payment of taxes. A letter from MLC commander Jean-Pierre Bemba informed civil and military authorities that Victoria was authorised to do business in the towns of Isirio, Bunia, Bondo, Buta, Kisangani and Beni (Ugandan Judicial Commission, Final Report, op. cit., 21.3.4, p.119). This letter was counter-signed by Kazini who further instructed his commanders in the same towns to allow Victoria to conduct its business ‘uninterrupted by anybody.’ The exception was Kisangani town itself, administered by an RCD-Goma backed Governor, although the UPDF controlled areas to the north of the town. Kazini issued a veiled threat to the Governor to cooperate with Victoria and later conspired to appoint Adele Lotsove as Governor of the new Province of Ituri in order to take control of the mineral producing areas, including those previously administrated by Kisangani (ibid., 21.3.4, p.122). In his reply to the Panel, Kazini stated: ‘In some cases, as in the case of Madame Adele Lotsove, in Ituri Province, our duty was confined to supporting existing administration (the Panel report concedes that Madame Lotsove had been appointed by Mobutu and was continued in office by Kabila).’ (See Reaction No.47, written statement from Major General James Kazini to the Panel, reproduced in UN Panel, Addendum, 20 June 2003, op. cit.)” (RAID, 2004).

From the WikiLeaks:

“During a May 24 meeting with Vice President Azarias Ruberwa, the Ambassador asked Ruberwa about his trip to Kampala for the inauguration of Ugandan President Museveni,  and the reported long meeting between the two.  Speaking from memory, Ruberwa provided an extensive read-out, noting by way of preamble that Museveni is a “complicated” person, and often difficult to read” (…)”According to Ruberwa, Museveni flatly denied that  there is continuing Kampala support of Congolese militia  groups.  Ruberwa said that Museveni added that the last support Uganda had provided to armed groups in the Congo was that given to Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC, and to combatants associated with Mbusa Nyamwisi. Ruberwa observed that Mbusa was next to him in the same meeting, but did not respond to the Museveni comment” (…)”Ruberwa noted, for example, that if all the detained MRC leaders were found with weapons, all inside Ugandan territory, it seemed logical to assume these weapons would find their way to Ituri, in apparent contradiction to Museveni’s assertions that there are no further arms flows from Uganda to support Congolese armed groups. In any event, Ruberwa asserted it is good periodically to point out to Museveni that the Congolese are aware of what is going on. The Ambassador asked if Museveni did not know that already. Ruberwa said “maybe,” but it seems useful to make it clear. Ruberwa added he believes it important for Kinshasa to send a senior-level person to Kampala to have an exchange with Museveni perhaps every three months to help avoid a major clash between the two governments” (WikiLeaks, 2006).

Hope this was insightful and gives an edge as the reports are steady and many. Not only a one place and one person who thinks that there is a specific connection between President Museveni and Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC! That is very clear and the ways it happen and the timing prove the value Bemba had for Museveni and his ambition in the DRC. The excuse was always internal guerrillas who moved to DRC like ADF-NALU and LRA, but we all know that more to bait and more to gain by taking mineral rich areas and create businesses and use ammunition to gain that. That is something that never been an issue for Museveni as his best tool is a weapon, not negotiations and agreements, they can break when he see he has the upper-hand and ability to score over his counterparts.

Something he surely will do again. Bemba might never surface with the MLC and the Party MLC in any election in the DRC. As the ICC gave him a verdict and court ruling which set precedence for his life.

I know that the Yellow Men of NRM, and the NRM-Regime will fight against this and say something else, as even Amama Mbabazi did at his time in the ICC to fight the case between Uganda and the DRC on the reasons for the aggression from them. The same might happen again and the viciousness and ruthlessness of the President is visible, as those who studies his history(not the one he has rewritten) but more the remarks and voices around him, you’ll see the temperament and attitude of bush-warfare that is instilled in him, and not the political person or even a statesman of a like which he seems to be. Peace.

Reference:

Carayannis, Tatiana – ‘Elections in the DRC – The Bemba Surprise’ (February 2008).

Fisher, Ian – ‘Congo’s War Triumphs Over Peace Accord’ (13.09.2000) link: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/18/world/congo-s-war-triumphs-over-peace-accord.html?pagewanted=all

Garreton, Roberto – ‘REPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT DOCUMENT ICC 01/04-01/06’ – MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZAIRE (20.02.2009)

Gough, David – ‘Peace of the dead in Congo forests’ (02.08.1999) link: http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/02/6

Muleme, Geoffrey – ‘Uganda Withdraws From Congo Accord’ (30.03.2001) link: https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/181/33411.html

Human Rights Watch – ‘Democratic Republic of Congo – Volume 15. Number 11. (A)’ – “ITURI: “COVERED IN BLOOD” Ethnically Targeted Violence In Northeastern DR Congo” (July 2003)

IRIN – ‘Bemba signs Lusaka accord for MLC’ (03.08.1999) link: http://www.irinnews.org/news/1999/08/03/bemba-signs-lusaka-accord-mlc

IRIN – ‘DRC: Kabila and Museveni sign troop withdrawal protocol’ (09.09.2002) link: http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-kabila-and-museveni-sign-troop-withdrawal-protocol

International Court of Justice – ‘CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO – DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

6. UGANDA RE JOINDER SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA VOLUME 1’ (06.12.2002)

International Court of Justice – ‘CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA) – 2005 19 December General List No. 116 (19.12.2005)

RAID – ‘Unanswered questions Companies, conflict and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (May 2004)

Simpson, Chris – ‘POLITICS: Little To Suggest The Congolese Peace Accord Will Hold’ (06.09.1999) link: http://www.ipsnews.net/1999/09/politics-little-to-suggest-the-congolese-peace-accord-will-hold/

Tamm, Henning – ‘UPC in Ituri The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo’ (2013)

 

WikiLeaks –‘RUBERWA ACCOUNT OF MAY MEETING WITH UGANDA PRESIDENT MUSEVENI’ (02.06.2006) link: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KINSHASA876_a.html

The 1996 election and the 2016 elections; staggering similarities of government party and actions towards the opposition! The difference now is Besigye VS M7; then it was Ssemogerere VS M7!

As President Museveni lost with no swagger in 1980 he later returned twice with armies to become the president in 1986. The 1986 where NRA took the power; that story knows all of Uganda well; what Uganda has forgotten is the tactics and ways of rigging the elections of 1996. Even Dr. Kizza Besigye was ready for somebody else in 1996. That says something as the NRM tactics was using levels of fear and tell the general public: “if you vote for somebody else then the Obote-Dictatorship will return!” There is something wrong with that picture as this should be the ushering of democratic values that was installed and promised in the 10 Point Program from President Museveni. This was also the Election that ushered in the Universal Primary Election (UPE) while has done certain things with educations and spreading schools around the country, after many years to many of them has been neglected and has shown that the promise and reform was easier then actually achieving quality school education under the NRM-Regime.

The democratic values and fair elections were not achieved in 1996. As the countless reforms says. The Western nations and International Organizations accepted the result as a positive move for Uganda, even with the malpractices and also because still at this time the world saw President Museveni as the new breed of leadership. He would go away from all the things he might have built later in his presidential career. 1996 Elections was “No-Party” election with a new Interim Electoral Commission who was far from impartial. Kind of what the Electoral Commission proves without any subtlety in today’s election climate.

Besigye against Museveni candidature in 1996:

“Though Besigye was a National Political Commissar, minister and Museveni confidant, by 1996 – as his 1995 decision, and that of other officers like  now Lt. Gen. David Tinyefuza and the late Lt. Col. Serwanga Lwanga to oppose entrenching the Movement’s monopoly of power in the constitution and the  near-banning of political parties – the differences were public” (…)”However, it has now emerged that Besigye and other people in the NRM and army  in 1996 were opposed to Museveni running as the Movement presidential  candidate” (…)”In 1996 Besigye relented at the last minute to go and campaign for Museveni in Rukungiri. He appeared at no more than two rallies, and spoke at one. The very personal and acrimonious face off between the two men last year therefore arose from a feud that had been simmering for about 10 years” (COO, 2002).

How not to vote for Ssemogerere:

“The Constant refrain during Museveni’s 1996 presidential campaign was that a vote for his opponents would cause a return to the past, the former dictator Milton Obote was waiting in Zambia to return to power if Museveni was defeated. One of Museveni’s presidential election poster featured a picture of skulls and bones besides a mass grave in Luwero with the caption: “Don’t forget the past. Over one million Ugandans, our brothers, sisters, family and friends, lost their lives. YOUR VOTE COULD BRING IT BACK”; another campaign advertisement stated bluntly: “A vote for Ssemogerere is a vote for Obote” (Bouckaer, 1999).

How the sentiment was during the campaign:

“Ssemogerere seems to have hugely underestimated the depth of fear and hatred for Obote and his party among the majority of Buganda. Virtually everyone interviewed  who had voted for Museveni emphasized that they had voted in part to avoid any chance of a return to the violence and anarchy of the early 1980s. The effect of Ssemogerere alliance with UPC, however, does not seem to have been intimidating. Most people felt shift in sentiment against Ssemogerere in the last two months prior to the election. The Museveni campaign strategy of increasingly emphasizing the UPC and Obote connection towards the end of the campaign period was felt to been effective” (IFES, 1996).

Museveni used the laws to stifle Ssemogerere campaign:

“The Ssemogerere camp tried to set up branches in the country. This ran foul of the law against setting up party structures. The police constantly frustrated this method of trying to reach the voters. There was a simpler and more effective method used by the Museveni camp. It is simply to announce campaign task forces and groups for given locations. While Ssemogerere was attempting to organise by “structure”, Museveni was organising by “process”. The former violated the existing law; the latter did not. The task force approach recognises the criticality of patrons who mediate the delivery of the votes of their peasant flock. In this approach it is not direct contact with voters, which is not feasible in backward areas with all forms of barriers (language), but contact with the patrons who go through lesser nested patrons to reach the final voters. Yoweri Museveni set up a more effective patron–client campaign network than Ssemogerere’s party structure approach” (Kotorobo, 2000).

How it ended:

“Hours after the Interim Electoral Commission (IEC) led by Stephen Akabway had announced provisional results on May 10; the IPFC candidate Ssemogerere dismissed them as false at a press conference at IPFC headquarters in Kabusu, Kampala. Ssemogerere said: “I cannot accept these results as valid”. The New Vision, The Monitor, as well as the Crusader newspapers of the following day, quoted him as having said. “I have been a patient person in public life. I thought this was the best thing for this country. I have spent time with people I don’t agree with for the sake of democracy. I have not known time before or after independence, when people of different political beliefs, religions and nationalities have come together for once. Now all this has been shattered by the stubbornness of [Yoweri Museveni] wanting to cling to power,” he added. During the press conference, Ssemogerere also revealed 54 cases of malpractices recorded by DP across the country. The 64-year-old DP stalwart said rigging of votes included intimidation of voters by the State, use of pre-ticked ballot papers, use of fake voter’s cards and doctored voter registers” (Mugabe, 2016).

Questionable freedom of speech during the 1996 campaign:

“The Government controls one television station and the radio station with the largest audience. There are three local television stations, three local radio stations, and five stations available by satellite. Uncensored Internet access became widely available through three commercial service providers in major cities, although its price was prohibitive for all but the most affluent noninstitutional users. Freedom of speech did not fare well in the context of the transition to constitutional government, including the presidential and parliamentary elections. Guidelines imposed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs prevented members of the former constituent assembly from addressing groups outside their constituencies. Electoral rules prohibited “campaigning” by presidential challengers until the official start of the campaign 39 days before the election. However, in their official capacity, President Museveni and senior members of the Government were free to travel throughout the country for months prior to the election. Rallies in support of all three presidential candidates suffered varying levels of harassment from thugs, in some cases resulting in physical injuries. It appeared, however, that such incidents were particularly directed at President Museveni’s opponents. Yusef Nsubuga Nsambu, a leader of the Conservative party and a supporter of presidential challenger Dr. Paul Ssemogerere, was arrested in May and charged with sedition for his unflattering descriptions of President Museveni. He was released unharmed 2 days later” (U.S. Department of State, 1997).

Celebrating the victory:

“KAMPALA, UGANDA — Thousands of President Yoweri Museveni’s supporters drove through the capital honking car horns and chanting “No change” Saturday to celebrate his first electoral victory” (…)”When Museveni was declared the winner on national radio Saturday, tens of thousands of his supporters poured onto Kampala’s streets, chanting “No change” in the local Luganda language, blasting car horns, and waving branches and flags” (Bashor, 1996).

One reason why he won the 1996 Election:

“Not all NRM successes showed the system’s popularity. The government manipulated small constituencies to gain beholden candidates in many special interest seats created by the 1995 constitution for women, youth, workers, the disabled and the army” (ICG, 2012).

Reports of malfunctions during the 1996 elections:

““The election drew a lower turnout than expected and suffered some logistical problems, but Ugandans generally avoided widely feared violence” (…)“Many of the country’s 8.4 million voters stayed away from the polls, and in many districts, turnout hovered around 50 percent. Logistical problems also hampered voting. At numerous polling stations, Ugandans complained that their names were not on the list of registered voters. “We have waited for hours, and we cannot vote,” said Patrick Nuwgaba, 20, surrounded by about 20 people who said they had been barred from voting. “We have our voter cards, but they say the numbers we have don’t match the numbers they have for us.” Despite those problems, calm prevailed around the country. Election observers reported, however, that in some pro-Museveni districts, especially in western Uganda, Ssemogerere backers had difficulty voting because of hostile crowds” (Buckley, 1996).

Questions about the victory:

”Within 24-hours of voting — and while the ballot papers were still being counted — the Inter Political Forces Cooperation (IPFC) backing the main opposition candidate Ssemogerere, announced that the constitutionally imposed “no-party” elections had been rigged” (…)”We have left it up to individuals to decide whether to stand,” Ssemogerere told IPS. “The electoral process is wrong and its going to be wrong again. If anyone stands they should know it will be with those disadvantages.” (…)”The IPFC’s compromise decision was reminiscent for some people of the 1980 elections in which the UPC are widely believed to have cheated the DP of victory — leaving Ssemogerere open to accusations of legitimising the government when he then took up position as leader of the opposition” (…)”Museveni was backed by, and represented his Movement “no- party” system of government while Ssemogerere was supported by the DP and UPC alliance and represented a return to multi-party politics — a return which would have required a change to the constitution” (Bozello, 1996).

As we see about this Dr. Kizza Besigye and other opposition candidates get the same treatment that Dr. Paul Ssemogerere of Democratic Party in 1996. The vote-rigging, the issues with meeting people, with consulting the party members in the districts, the time for campaigning which apparently happens also before the pre-election period in Uganda in 2015. President Museveni doesn’t only recycle pledges his Police acts similar in 2015 as in 1996. That should be thought of as he talks of that the Movement brings progress. If progress means the same structure that doesn’t offer people freedom or liberty to discuss politics. Then it is NRM for you tomorrow. As the 1996 experience shows; there is a multi-party elections tomorrow, but the signs of 1996 looks strikingly similar, and the Police Force and Governmental institutions is structured to facilitate for the ruling party and funding his campaign while the opposition struggles with unleveled campaigning field that has been all through to the 18^th Feburary polls. There is a certainty that Dr. Kizza Besigye has used smarter tactics than Dr. Paul Ssemogerere, but them both has fought the same monster which used the same style of campaigning in 2015-2016 as before the 1996, as he then gave 40 days campaigning as the districts was less, and the same now to the other candidates.

The fear used to intimidate candidates has been used in 2016. As even the security outfits has been deployed and both the army and Special Forces Command; they have been there following opposition and the police has target their trail as the Electoral Commission has given okay to their campaign trail in the start of the campaign in November 2015. This here shows the levels of fear and strong militarized politics that President Museveni feeds on; that has occurred through the whole campaign in the same way it did in 1996. That 2016 and 1996 looks so alike is staggering. The names of the other “actors” are different, but the end-game is the same. Though we hope that the people who are ready for change will see it as the old-man with the hat will do what he can to keep power; even if the people are ready for something else then his empty promises. Peace.

Reference:

Bashor, Richard – ‘In First Direct Election Since ’62, President Wins Overwhelmingly’ (12.05.1996) – Chicago Tribune.

Bouckaer, Peter – ‘Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political Repression in Uganda’ (August 1999).

Borzello, Anna – ‘UGANDA-POLITICS: ‘Where-To-Now’ Conundrum For Opposition’ (16.05.1996) – Inter Press Service

Buckley, Stephen – ‘INCUMBENT LIKELY WINNER IN UGANDAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE’ (11.05.1996) – Washington Post

Katorobo, James – ‘The Uganda Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 1996’ (2000)

Mugabe, Faustin – ‘How free and fair was the Uganda 1996 election after 10 years of rule by the political party of the National Resistance Movement?’ (30.01.2016).

International Crisis Group (ICG) – ‘UGANDA: NO RESOLUTION TO GROWING TENSIONS’ (05.04.2012).

International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) – ‘Uganda: Long Term Observation of 1996 Presidential and Legislative Election (May-July 1996).

Onyango-Obbo, Charles (COO) – ‘Besigye Opposed Museveni’s Bid in 1996, And Set Off Movt Demons’ (15.12.2002) – Daily Monitor

U.S. Department of State – ‘Uganda Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996’ Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, (January 30, 1997).

President Museveni is not running for his 5th term, but he is running for the 7th! Proving it by going through his previous terms

I know for some of you people this will blow your mind; some of you will tell I told you so. Other people will be like? How dare you insult my intelligence, well it depends on how you deem history and how you let the victors rewrite it. As President Museveni has been a victor and won over his predecessors like Yusuf Lule, Tito Okello and Milton Obote, even Idi Amin together with Milton Obote and the Tanzanian Army in late 1970s. So President Museveni has won the power through guns. At the same time as he has lingers he has tried to rewrite history as the people neglect certain fact.

We are supposed to see the people of Uganda to elect the 10^th Parliament as this is the end of the 9^th Parliament. I will not discuss that matter, as that is not important me. We could discuss if there only been 9 functional Parliament and representative government since independence in 1962, or should we also count the ones that we’re before this since the British introduced Parliamentarism in Uganda in 1882. Then it is with certainty more than 10 of them. If so is that based on the new constitution after independence or the newly written to fit NRA/NRM in 1995? Then so I understand the coming 10^th Parliament. Still, this is also worth discussing and the matter of how we value the predecessors and the tools they left behind for the men of today who rule. Feel me?

This here is not a reflection on how Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) lost and got 4% in the 1980s and 1 seat in Parliament, as this was the first outfit for President Museveni. Museveni didn’t even get a seat as he lost to Sam Kutesa in the distric he was running in; that is a worthy side-note!

His first term – Overthrowing Okello in 1986:

But his first term started as he was sworn in and the New York Times described it like this:

“KAMPALA, Uganda, Jan. 29— Yoweri Museveni, whose National Resistance Army descended on this battered capital city last week and overthrew the military Government of Gen. Tito Okello, was sworn in today as the new President of Uganda” (Rule, 1986). Here is in my opinion his start of first term, as he took it by the gun. As he was sworn in as President of Uganda, which initial means he got the appointment of rule as he defeated his opposition at that time.

 His Second Term – Election in 1989:

“The elections in 1989 also included elections for the majority of seats in parliament. Candidates for all these elections stood strictly as individuals and not as representatives for a party although several of them publicly were known supporters for one of the older parties – including the UPC. The Ugandan constitution was abolished in 1966, and no basic consensus has ever since appeared on the most basic issues like: how to elect a President and whether the country should be an unitary state or a federation including several kingdoms” (P: 40, 1994, Tidemand). “As already noted, the 1989 elections were held under strict anti-party rules since the NRM government had suspended all political party activities. Indeed, the Resistance Councils and Committees Elections Regulations, 1989, forbade all use of party symbols, sectarian appeals, and threats of force, the offer of food or drinks and the display of candidates’ posters. The absence of open campaigning made it impossible to discuss policies” (Bwana, 2009). “Out of a total of 278 seats, 210 members were elected without party affiliation” (African Elections).

This here election was one, and gave NRM time to rebuild and rewrite a new constitution. So this gave way for his second term in my opinion. Since the first term was from 1986 – 1989. From 1989 to 1996 is his second as there weren’t elections towards the parliament and presidential candidates, which means that the country was still controlled tightly by the NRM. Before the 1996 election there was election a Council for writing the new Constitution. That was put into place in 1995.

His Third term – 1996 elections:

“The presidential election was preceded by an aggressive electoral campaign which was dominated by intimidation, vote buying, bribery and promises of material benefits. These methods were employed by both the opposition and the incumbent government during the 39 days which were allowed for presidential campaigns. It would seem that the aggressiveness of the campaign was dictated to some extent by the limited time allowed for each candidate to cover all of the country’s 39 districts, which meant that candidates were allowed one day of campaigning in each district. Again, this arrangement favoured the incumbent, President Museveni who had been in power for 10 years and was therefore well known to the electorate, compared to his challengers. Moreover, the electoral law allowed him the continued use of his presidential privileges which made the 39 campaign days less problematic” (Muhumaza, 1997). “The I996 presidential election was deemed a ‘step forward’ by many Western diplomats, although before the election some diplomats privately questioned how the election could be fair because of the fact that political parties were not able to organise to compete with the political machinery of the NRM (Reuters, 6 May I996). Despite private reservations, the official donor attitude was that the losers of the election should not contest the results. When Paul Ssemogerere went to the European Union Parliamentary Committee on Development to complain about the unfairness of the election, the committee told him to accept his defeat (The New Vision, 3 June I996)” (Hauser, 1999).

Interesting allegation about campaign money to Museveni in 1996:

“It was for instance alleged that one presidential candidate received funds equivalent to 600 million shillings (US$600,000) from certain foreign organisations while on a pre-election visit to Europe; and that another candidate had been funded certain Islamic countries. Similar insinuations were hurled against President Museveni who was alleged to have got financial contributions from the Indian community in Uganda” (Muhumaza, 1997).

The election results from the 9^th of May 1996:

The results was: “Yoweri Kaguta Museveni: 74.33 %, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere: 23.61 % and Muhammad Kibirige Mayanja: 2.06 %” (African Election Database).

This here was the official first term as he was this one. Even if he had already been ten years in power, that is why I am saying this is his third term, as he had the first one from 1986 to 1989, when the overthrow Okello, second after the parliamentary elections to the first presidential election in 1996. That lasted to the 2001.

Before the next election this was reports on the great democratic environment President Museveni was building:

“Political parties are prohibited from holding party conferences, a ban which severely hampers their own internal reform. Since this ban has been in place since 1986, reform in the structure and leadership of political parties has been virtually impossible. Attempts to hold party conferences have been met with strong and unambiguous warnings from the Ugandan government that they would prevent such meetings” (…)”Since coming to power, the NRM has used a state-funded program of political and military education called chaka-mchaka to spread its message that political parties are destructive sectarian organizations responsible for Uganda’s past woes, an argument that resonates given Uganda’s recent political history. Chaka-mchaka thus serves to rationalize the NRM’s denial of political rights of freedom of expression, association, and assembly. Government leaders, including President Museveni, often refer to advocates of democratic reform as their “enemies.” Other structures of local government such as the local councils (LC) and the Resident District Commissioners (RDC) serve to ensure support for the NRM, and often create a hostile climate for advocates of pluralism” (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Fourth Term – General Election in 2001:

“KAMPALA, Uganda, March 14— President Yoweri Museveni swept the hard-fought elections here today, in a victory that he called an acclamation of 15 years of peaceful rule but that his main opponent said was won only by extensive cheating” (…)”My votes are like Lake Victoria,” Mr. Museveni told tens of thousands of supporters this afternoon who marched to an airstrip downtown after the results were announced. ”They never dry up.” (…)”The main election monitors in Uganda said, however, that most allegations of cheating appeared to be against forces loyal to Mr. Museveni, estimating preliminarily that between 5 and 15 percent of the vote may have been won fraudulently. The fraud included people being forced or influenced to vote by election officials, intimidation and people being denied the right to vote” (Fisher, 2001).

The Election results from the 12^th March 2001:

The results are: “Yoweri Kaguta Museveni: 69.33 %, Kizza Besigye: 27.82 %, Aggrey Awori: 1.41 %, Muhammad Kibirige Mayanja: 1.00%, Francis Bwengye: 31 % and Karuhanga Chapaa: 0.14 % (African Election Database).

Reactions to the election:

“Amnesty International (AI) agrees with the Besigye opposition that “the Presidential elections in Uganda have been marred by allegations of human rights abuses, both before and after the elections on 12 March 2001. An increasing number of human rights violations against opposition supporters, including illegal arrests and detention without charge, ill-treatment in detention, and alleged unlawful killings were reported by the Ugandan press in the weeks leading up to the elections. In some instances, supporters of President Museveni were also targetted.” (Afrol.com, 2001).

This here was the official second term, while I am saying it is the fourth one, that lead to him opening the Multi-Party elections in 2005. Also the referendum on term limits came into force in 2005. As the constitution made in 1995 gave the limit of the Executive Power and President had the ability to be elect twice. As he wasn’t elected in between 1986 to 1996; 10 years without accountability and still becoming a donor pleasant government as Structural Adjustment Program got eaten up by the Government of Uganda in that period. As President Museveni even met with U.S. President Clinton; as he was the new future leader of the “third world” development.

Here are the issues in 2005 with the abolishment of term limits:

“Museveni and his supporters, who pushed a controversial constitutional amendment rescinding presidential term limits through Parliament this month, are urging an overwhelming “yes” vote while the weak and fractured opposition want the country’s 8,9-million eligible voters to boycott the polls” (…)”Under current rules, political parties are allowed to exist but may not have branch offices and may not field candidates in elections. The only fully-functioning political entity is Museveni’s own “Movement” organisation to which all Ugandans theoretically belong” (Mayanja, 2005).

As it was voted in by the public he was allowed to be the Presidential candidate in yet another election. The one that happen in 2006!

Fifth term – 23^rd February 2006 Presidential Election:

As some context and pretext over the other issues written in between 2001 and 2006; this here is following the close and tense contest that was held in 2006; as the NRM was weaken over time, as the fatigue of running the country since 1986. As the fourth term was already showing how much they tried to continue to work under the Movement System, instead of giving way to Multi-Party Democracy, as people voted in the second referendum poll. Here is some things happening right before:

“A spokesman for the ruling National Resistance Movement told New Vision that the government had complained to the U.S.-based Web server which hosts Radio Katwe, Brinkster Communications Corporation, claiming that the site was publishing “malicious and false information against the party and its presidential candidate.“ (…)”Local journalists have expressed fears that the government could similarly block The Monitor’s Web site on election day, when the newspaper plans to keep a running tally of votes from across the country. “Our Web site has been going offline every day for the last three days” for several hours at a time, Monitor Group Managing Director Conrad Nkutu told CPJ. He added that while the problem appeared be a technical glitch, “we are also suspicious it might not be.” (CPJ, 2006).

Election results from 2006:

The results are:

Number of Votes	% of Votes
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (NRM)	4,109,449	59.26%
Kizza Besigye (FDC)	2,592,954	37.39%
John Ssebaana Kizito (DP)	109,583	1.58%
Abed Bwanika	65,874	0.95%
Miria Obote (UPC)	57,071	0.82%

(African Election Database)

Aftermath after the first Multi-Party after NRM got into Power:

“The multi-party elections of 2006 saw only slight improvements from 2001, notably in the area of media freedom. Dr Besigye ran against President Museveni for the second time, but now as the leader of a new political party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), and garnered 37.39% of the votes, as against Museveni’s 59.26% majority. Dr Besigye’s Supreme Court case regarding the 2006 elections has become famous due to the ruling that Museveni was the rightful winner despite the Court’s acknowledgement of widespread electoral malpractices and vote rigging which were considered not to have substantially affected the results of the elections” (…)”For any engagement with these political parties a number of issues need to be taken into consideration, these include the multi-party system and the fact that the political playing field remains un-levelled in favour of the NRM. As such, donors operating in Uganda need to be cognisant of the implications of this, for the ruling party and for opposition parties. International donors have and continue to play a significant role in financing and monitoring Uganda’s elections. In the 1990s, the UNDP was the lead institution for donors who wanted to co-finance Uganda’s elections. The UNDP’s mandate involved managing a donors’ basket fund, and recruiting and supervising specialised technical assistance to support the EC and civil-society organisations to carry out tasks allocated to them” (Sekaggya, 2010).

Sixth Term – General Election in 2011:

Some Pretext: “The 2011 Uganda elections have attracted a record 8 Presidential candidates from seven political parties and one Independent candidate. All the Presidential Candidates have been on the campaign trail marketing their manifestos to Ugandans and have dispelled earlier assertions that some of them, seen as weak, will pull out of the campaigns that like in 2006 were expected to majorly be between incumbent Yoweri Museveni of the National Resistance Movement and Dr. Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change” (Rulekere, 2011). “FGD respondents said that this happens mainly on the election eve whereby candidates and/or their agents carry gifts and money in vehicles which have had number plates removed and they pack somewhere in the village and then walk from door to door giving money and/or gifts” (…)”Daily Monitor of Friday 7, January 2011 carried a lead story that President Museveni gave out $2.15 million (USh5 billion) in cash and pledges between July and October 2010 but the opposition is charging that such patronage is giving the incumbent an unfair advantage in the February 18, 2011 vote. Mr Museveni always conducts a countrywide tour before each election, during which he makes pledges and donations Critics say this is a disguised campaign that allows him to offer inducements to potential voters out of the public purse, a privilege unavailable to other candidates” (…)”Incumbent candidates have readily used their access to state resources to provide an unfair edge when running for re-election. This includes cash payments from the state treasury, use of state owned property and vehicles, as well as the fulfilment of campaign pledges during the campaign period. Voter have given up on their elected officials to fulfil campaign promises and seek to extract as much benefit as they can around the campaign period” (DMG, 2011)

The results are:

Candidate (Party) [Coalition]	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (NRM)	5,428,369	68.38%
Kizza Besigye (FDC) [IPC]	2,064,963	26.01%
Norbert Mao (DP)	147,917	1.86%
Olara Otunnu (UPC)	125,059	1.58%
Beti Kamya (UFA)	52,782	0.66%
Abed Bwanika (PDP)	51,708	0.65%
Jaberi Bidandi Ssali (PPP)	34,688	0.44%
Samuel Lubega	32,726	0.41%

(African Election Database)

The Commonwealth Observation Group noted this:

“The main concern regarding the campaign, and indeed regarding the overall character of the election, was the lack of a level playing field, the use of money and abuse of incumbency in the process. The magnitude of resources that was deployed by the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), its huge level of funding and overwhelming advantage of incumbency, once again, challenged the notion of a level playing field in the entire process. Media monitoring reports also indicated that the ruling party enjoyed a large advantage in coverage by state-owned radio and TV. The ruling party in Uganda is by far the largest and best-resourced party and following many years in power, elements of the state structure are synonymous with the party. Further, reports regarding the “commercialisation of politics” by the distribution of vast amounts of money and gifts were most disturbing. Indeed, the „money factor‟ and widespread allegations of bribery and other more subtle forms of buying allegiance were key features of the political campaign by some, if not all, the parties. By all accounts, the 2011 elections were Uganda‟s most expensive ever. It is therefore important that for the future serious thought be given to election campaign financing and political party fundraising. This is more so given that there are virtually no checks on the levels of campaign financing and expenditure due to the cash-based nature of the campaign and the lack of stringent campaign financing regulations, both of which facilitate the use of illicit payments to voters as inducements and has the potential to undermine their free will” (Commonwealth Observers Group, 2011).

Important how President Museveni could run in the 2016 Election:

The Kyankwanzi Resolution of 2014 – President Museveni’s right for Sole Candidacy in the NRM:

“RESOLUTION ON PARTY COHESION AND GOVERNANCE

We, the undersigned members of the NRM Caucus attending a retreat at the National Leadership Institute(NALI) Kyankwanzi (6,February 2014); Fully aware of our Country’s historical  past and the need to consolidate and sustain the Milestones registered over the years since 1986; Cognizant of the fact that there is still a lot more to be done in order to realize our ideological vision of uniting Uganda(Nationalism), Pan-africanism, transforming our country from a poor peasantry society to a modern economy and upholding democracy; Conscious of the fact that what has been so far achieved over the last 28 years needs to be guarded jealously and improved upon to realize our vision; Aware  that when individuals engage in personal scheming, party cohesion is undermined, development efforts aredistracted and the population is diverted from work to early politicking;

DO here by resolve;

1. To support H.E Yoweri Kaguta Museveni tocontinue leading and facilitating our country on its take off journey to transformation”

Afterthought –Run in to General Election 2016.

1986-1996: First and Second Term!

So I have now gone through the Elections since 1986 until today in 2016. That is thirty years in Power for the Executive Power and being President Museveni. 1986 to 1996, he didn’t really become elected as President as he did a coup d’état in 1986 to bring down regime at the current time. So the period from 1986 to 1996, there was an election in 1989 a Resistance Council elections which barred the Parliament with elected men and woman from the NRM/A, but was not an ordinary election to bring the people’s will in full effect and not even electing President Museveni, but securing polls to validate the rule of NRM at the time, also in my consideration to shut-up the donor-community; so they see the “democratic” vision of President Museveni. He even made a stunning Constitution in 1995. President Museveni had set the standard with two term limits and other regulatory tools to secure accountability that was new in Uganda, together with swallowing the Structural Adjustment Program to secure massive amount of funding to rebuild the country and secure Universal Preliminary Education. Something the citizens of Uganda got excited about and also gave him praise abroad.

Third Term 1996-2001:

After the 1996 Presidential Election was his third term elections, and the official first term (which I can’t take serious) as he had already ruled for a decade, and you can’t shuffle that off that easy. Even with the bodies and violence to get the power in 1986, it cost so much suffering to gain that power; so to eradicate that and call this his first term, is to neglect the first ten years of power. Something we should be to damn wise to not. There we’re still not a Multi-Party Democracy or Elections as President Museveni doesn’t really believe in that; as the nation had to after this go through two referendum polls before initiating the hassle of letting people be controlled by other party functions then the NRM.

Fourth Term 2001-2006:

So when the fourth term came in 2001, he had already been long enough in power to already using up the constitutional rights as the Executive Power and President of the land. He was still popular and gained a lot of support. Even if the election was rigged and had a massive malpractices; the initial issues is how he pleaded and mixed up with referendum terminating presidential term limits to fit himself and rewriting the constitution of 1995 in 2005, so he could run off a third time. The second score of joy for the people was the second vote of the polls for Multi-Party Democracy, meant that the public could vote for other parties then the NRM during the 2006, as much as they could still as ever; vote for the old man with the hat! After 20 years in power he still used sufficient tools to be able to get voted in. And also stifle the completion in his favor, as the man who took power himself in 1986.

Fifth Term 2006-2011:

Set for the fifth term in 2006. The NRM and President Museveni at the time was re-introducing of multi-party election and continuing to go as the candidate, to secure the total tally of 25 years; when the term would be done.  He fixed the 1995 constitution one year advanced so he could run again! This time the third official campaign and polls, though still, with the 10 year as ruler before an election means, initially fifth. This here was the start of the down-turn as he now showed more and more the authoritarian leader and totalitarian state, compared to donor-friendly character he was when he first was sworn in 1986 and steady ship he hold while elected in 1996.

Sixth Term 2011- 2016:

As his sixth term in 2011, there was already starting to crack with the NRM leadership and the people, as they we’re ready for new leaders and a new executive. As the Kampala Riots and ‘Walk to Work’ demonstrations; proves that the leadership is in a fatigue state where the public is tired of the NRM and their ring leader President Museveni. Even still with well rigged machinery the NRM “won” again the election. To finish of this one, he had to swallow a few scalps to secure his sole candidacy, he had to break of Gilbert Bukenya his loyal fellow, he had to push of cliff Amama Mbabazi who wished to take his seat in the NRM, which is not a possibility unless you are the clone of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni; something Amama Mbabazi is not! In early 2014 he had to set up his machinery ready and get his party in line so that he could get the spot again with the Kyankwanzi Resolution in February 2014 and set his goals on the 7^th Term as the Executive and President of Uganda, in the 10^th Parliament. That is another timeline I am not sure of, I am sure there are more then 10 elected or appointed Parliaments and sessions in the great republic of Uganda. It is just a a way of rewriting history as the NRM is famous for.

That rewriting history comes in the sense of saying NRM and President Museveni is contesting for the 5^th Term, I am saying his fifth term was between 2006-2011 his most turbulent ruling period after his first term in 1986-1989 when he still struggled to keep the whole country into peace, as there was still guerrillas and militias wanting to unsettle the new regime in Kampala. As we have seen, and we can see, there is a pattern and there is a reason why I am saying “we could really see his democratic wish” as the elections and malpractices seems like the same as when he took power. The rigging he claimed he wanted in the 1980s and why he lost as the UPM front-man, it seems to be same as it was under Dr. Milton Obote, the only difference is that he has been able to be stable and keep a strong army to spread the fear so that nobody has tried to really use a coup d’état against him. There been allegations in the past, and even persons been alleged in court for treason against the state, but they have been more political motivated then actual forces or militias in the sense they went to the bush to get rid of President Museveni. Though LRA and ADF has gone after his head, but failed.

President Museveni is now trying his best to get into his 7^th Term, and we should not be surprised by election rigging, malpractices to destroy level playing-grounds for political parties, paying for votes and using both government institutions and government funds to be re-elected; Even supress the court to secure the validation or dismiss the allegation of election fraud in the 2016 election. I fear for the public response this time and how the security agents of the state will address them. As the Gen. Katumba Wamala of the UPDF will surely do what he can to impress President Museveni and Police Boss IGP Gen. Kale Kayihura follows orders blindly made by the Executive, as if he wants to shut down demonstrations and revolts against the totalitarian regime that the NRM has evolved into. As they are used to stealing the elections and taking the people for ransom to gain riches while the average people toil in poverty. There is time for change with a government with transparency, accountability and good governance; as the government now is famous for not caring about this issues and becoming dependent on feeding the cronies and loyal men of Museveni instead of serving the people. Peace.

Reference:

African Elections Database – ‘Elections in Uganda’ link: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ug.html

Afrol.com – ‘”Uganda needs to re-affirm human rights commitment” (17.03.2001) link: http://www.afrol.com/News2001/uga006_hrights_reaffirm.htm

Bwana, Charles – ‘Voting Patterns in Uganda’s Elections: Could it be the end of the National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) domination in Uganda’s politics?’ (2009) – LES CAHIERS D’AFRIQUE DE L’ N° 41

Commonwealth Observer Group – ‘UGANDA PRESIDENTIAL AND

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS’ (24.02.2011)

Committee to Protect Jorunalist (CPJ) – ‘Critical website Radio Katwe blocked on eve of presidential election’ (23.02.2006) link: http://www.ifex.org/uganda/2006/02/23/critical_website_radio_katwe_blocked/

Democracy Monitoring Group (DMG) – ‘Report on Money in Politics – Pervasive vote buying in Ugandan Election’ (January 2011)

Fisher, Ian – ‘Final Count Has Uganda President Winning 69% of Vote’ (15.03.2001) link: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/15/world/final-count-has-uganda-president-winning-69-of-vote.html

Hauser, Ellen – ‘Ugandan Relations with Western Donors in the 1990s: What Impact on Democratisation?’ (Dec. 1999) link: http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Hauser%20Uganda%20donors.pdf

Human Right Watch – ‘Hostile to Democracy The Movement System and Political Repression in Uganda’ (01.10.1999) link: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45dad0c02.html

Manyanja, Vincent – ‘Ugandans face paradox in referendum’ (25.07.2005) link: http://mg.co.za/article/2005-07-25-ugandans-face-paradox-in-referendum

Muhumaza, William – ‘Money and Power in Uganda’s 1996 Elections’ (1997) – African. Journal. Political Science (1997), Vol. 2 No. 1, 168-179

Rule, Sheila – ‘REBEL SWORN IN AS UGANDA PRESIDENT’ (30.01.1986) link:  http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/30/world/rebel-sworn-in-as-uganda-president.html

Rulekere, Gerald – ‘Uganda Elections 2011: The Presidential Candidates – Early Predictions’ (17.02.2011) link: http://www.ugpulse.com/government/uganda-elections-2011-the-presidential-candidates-early-predictions/1207/ug.aspx

Sekaggya, Margaret – ‘Uganda: Management of Elections’ (01.01.2010) link: https://www.eisf.eu/library/uganda-management-of-elections/

Tidemand, Per – ‘The Resistance Councils in Uganda A Study of Rural Politics and Popular Democracy in Africa’ (1994) –PHD Dissertation at Roskilde University, Denmark.