Ugandan and DRC CSOs’ Communique Rejecting Secret Agreements Signed for the Lake Albert Oil Project in Uganda (13.04.2021)

Joint Communique between the President of the Republic of Uganda and the President of the United Republic of Tanzania on the Implementation of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) Project on the 11th April, 2021 at the State House Entebbe, Uganda (11.04.2021)

Opinion: Now that the World Bank has new priorities, they will most likely not loan to the pipelines in East Africa!

 

There is certain movements that will strike as more expensive for the East African Community (EAC). This being for the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Government of Kenya (GoK), who has big plans of petroleum pipelines from their oil-fields and to the coast. That being from Turkana to Lamu Port. While the Ugandan oil goes from Hoima to Tanga Port in Tanzania. Both development and industrial projects will have issues with the funding. The World Bank has supported massive infrastructure projects in both countries.

Therefore, for the two counties big development and oil industry, this is giant set-back, since they have to find funding and loans for the pipelines on the open market. Even with higher interests and making the profits of it lesser, than it would have been with a World Bank loan. It would not hurt the pocket as much as it does on the open market. The banks wants more profits themselves and also make sure they are paid-in-full.

With all this in mind. There are speculations, but first. Parts of the self-answering service. Before we look at the reactions in Kenya and Uganda. All of are important, as the state is involved in the licensing and building the pipelines. They are directly into the development and procurement of the pipelines. That is why this is big blow for the administrations and their possible tax-profits on it.

Word Bank Q&A:

“Q. How is “upstream” oil and gas defined?

Upstream is an industry term that refers to exploration of oil and natural gas fields, as well as drilling and operating wells to produce oil and natural gas” (World Bank, 2017).

“Current projects in our portfolio would continue as planned. However, no new investments in upstream oil and gas would be undertaken after 2019, unless under exceptional circumstances as noted in the decision” (World Bank, 2017).

Kenya Pipeline:

“The announcement by the bank, which has significant interests in Kenya’s oil prospecting sector, does not bode well for the country’s anticipated entry into the club of oil producing nations beginning next year. Analysts said they do not expect an immediate reaction to the announcement even as they acknowledged that it takes the shine from oil in the long term” (…) “Locally, the World Bank is offering technical support to the Kenyan government, through the Kenya Petroleum Technical Assistance Project, to prime all stakeholders for commercial oil production and sale. The six-year programme is scheduled to run until February 2021 and involves the World Bank managing a Sh5.2 billion fund set up by investors from Germany, Norway and Britain. The World Bank’s private lending arm, International Finance Corporation, is however directly involved in Kenya’s oil fields, having a 6.83 per cent stake in Africa Oil, the Canadian exploration firm with interests in northern Kenya oil blocks” (Mutegi, 2017)

Uganda Pipeline:

“The pipeline, is expected to be completed by the year 2020, when the country is scheduled to start oil production. In fact, Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni and his Tanzanian counterpart recently commissioned the construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline. The two leaders laid mark stones for the crude oil pipeline in Mutukula, Kyotera district and Kabaale in Hoima district. Total E&P Uganda, a subsidiary of French oil giant, Total S.A, is spearheading the construction of the crude oil pipeline on behalf of the joint venture partners. Adewale Fayemi, the general manager, Total E&P Uganda says discussions are ongoing to discuss on the formalities of how the pipeline will be run. Already, an agreement has been reached that the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) will be run and managed by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) – private pipeline company. This means that a private company will be incorporated with joint venture partners – Tullow Uganda, Cnooc Uganda Ltd and Total E&P Uganda, and the governments of Uganda and Tanzania as shareholders in the company” (Ssekika, 2017)

Certainly, this will put a strain on the projects. They have to deliver another type of arrangement to make sure they get funding and have the funds to pay the added interests the banks wants. The added points on the dollar and the interest-rates will hit state-owned firms and the state itself. Since the pipelines most likely becomes more expensive and will be less profitable.

That the World Bank is pulling out of these projects is all within line of the Paris Accord, as they have professed is the reason. Still, this will make these projects more expensive and make sure they are earning less on it. Unless, the crude-oil prices are going up to a level that makes these investments even more profitable. That is only for time to tell. Since it is costly projects and also sophisticated to build. There is needed lots of expertise combined state planning to achieve the development plans.

This is just the beginning, but the pipelines and these investments are vital for both Kenya and Uganda. As the governments are already borrowing state funds on the possible earnings from the oil reserves in their basins. Therefore, they need to drill and need the petrodollar as quickly as possible. Peace.

Reference:

Mutegi, Mugambi – ‘World Bank dims Turkana oil hopes’ (14.12.2017) link: http://www.nation.co.ke/business/World-Bank-dims-Turkana-oil-hopes/996-4227848-u02v8n/index.html

Ssekika, Edward – ‘East African Crude Oil Pipeline: The Inside Story’ (11.12.2017) link: http://www.oilinuganda.org/features/economy/east-african-crude-oil-pipeline-the-inside-story-details-emerge-of-how-the-crude-oil-pipeline-will-be-financed-managed.html

World Bank – ‘Q&A: The World Bank Group and Upstream Oil and Gas’ (12.12.2017) link: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/qa-the-world-bank-group-and-upstream-oil-and-gas

EAC: Signing of the Inter-Governmental Agreement between the Republic of Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) Project (26.05.2017)

Communique between the President of Tanzania and President of Uganda on Bilateral Talks between the Two Countries on the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) Project on the 21st May 2017 at the State House Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (21.05.2017)

The Battle for the Oil the Coast; the Continuation of the diplomatic squabble between Kenya and Tanzania!

The tides are turning and the continuation of the matter on who gets the crude-oil pipeline through their countries from Hoima down the coast. The Ugandan delegates to Tanzania were treated as royalties as the delegation could bring tax-money and development for the Tanzanian government. While the Kenyan could take that away and they could see either their advantage or disadvantage towards the Port system of Tanga. That might be why CS Keter lost his passport and travel papers on Wednesday in Port of Tanga.

The only ones earning on this diplomatic matter is Ugandan, but the East African Community is creating a hostile environment between countries over a pipeline and the gaining the monies involved in the deal, the rates and construction of the pipeline.

What was said the day after the Passport and Travel Papers of CS Keter taken at Tanga Port:

“According to a source in the Presidency, Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed has tasked Kenya’s envoy to Tanzania Ali Chirau Mwakwere with getting to the bottom of the matter. “We want them to tell us what wrong they did as per the East African Protocol.” (…)“The two leaders agreed to meet after two weeks in Kampala to allow their technical officials to harmonise their presentations, focusing on: ensuring a least-cost option for a regional integrated pipeline, address constructability issues along all routes – existing and planned infrastructure, terrain and elevations. Assessing and confirming the current proven reserves which will have an impact on the size of the pipeline,” Keter and his Ugandan counterpart Irene Muloni jointly stated on March 21 following the State House meeting” (…)”It is in the process of assessing the, “viability of the Lamu, Mombasa and Tanga ports,” that Keter and the rest of his delegation encountered hostility”.

What is said today on the matter:

“State House Spokesman Manoah Esipisu told reporters in Nairobi that Tanzania was isolated deliberately because it had nothing to do with the issues on the agenda. “Monday meeting was bilateral. As you know we had also invited oil companies but they did not participate in the bilateral meeting,” he told journalists” (…)”Diplomatic sources said Kenya was planning to protest the apparent violation of the East African Community laws on free movement of people, even though Tanzania has argued it had no prior information the officials would be travelling to Tanga” (…)”As Mr Keter and his group were being barred from the Port, the Ugandan delegation led by Irene Muloni, the Energy Minister, were being shown a presentation on the advantages of routing the pipeline through Tanzania” (Mutambo, 2016).

More on the matter today:

“A senior State House official who did not want to be named because the matter was being handled at the Foreign Affairs ministry said the incident was “unfortunate” and that Kenya would protest to the Tanzanian government through its high commissioner in Dar es salaam. “I can confirm to you that the matter will be handled through our Foreign Affairs ministry. The incident was embarrassing,” the official said. He said the Tanzanian government was aware of the planned trip, which was part of an assessment of the three ports of Lamu, Mombasa and Tanga to check the suitability of the ports for Ugandan petroleum” (Kajilwa & Ng’etich, 2016),

It is hard to know what this can lead to, at least the Tanzanian diplomatic sources saying it was embarrassing to them, and to get knowledge of the Port Police actions in the Port of Tanga. When the Tanzanian Government person inside their State House says so, then their suddenly was not maliciously intent towards the Kenyan officials and diplomatic team on their soil. Though it will put a strain to the matter, as the actions speaks louder than words and to what extent certain people goes towards the advisories.

The Kenyan are right to ask for a sincere apology and reasoning for the hold-up, the passport and travel documents from the CS Keter and his team, while letting Ugandan Energy Minister Muloni walk around like proud-cock at the Port of Tanga.

This here is proof of the matter and how the governments are handling the matter and approaching each other. The Tanzanian Government should issue an sincere apology and the Kenyan should comply in a peaceful manner, as that is what they have asked for. Since this a big deal for both countries, as I have described again, and would be a long-term economic development project that would benefit more sectors than just the oil. Therefore we can see the growing rift for getting through their country and down to their port. I hope that Tanzanian government have sense and the same from the CS Keter as he was the victim, and have already gotten leverage, but that does not mean it gives a free-pass to the minister of Kenya. This will be something that will continue, into the final agreement between Uganda and the picked destination and the contracts between the Oil-Companies who will be drilling the oil in Lake Albert and the Albertine Region. Peace.

Reference:

Burrows, Olive – ‘Kenya: Govt Protests to Tanzania Over Keter Passport Fiasco’ (24.03.2016) link: http://allafrica.com/stories/201603250043.html

Kajilwa, Graham & Ng’etich, Jacob – ‘Kenya protests to Tanzania over confiscation of Charles Keter’s passport’ (25.03.2016) link:http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000196026/kenya-protests-mistreatment-by-tanzania

Mutambo, Aggrey – ‘State explains why Tanzania was excluded from oil pipeline talks’ (25.03.2016) link: http://www.nation.co.ke/news/State-explains-why-Tanzania-was-excluded-from-oil-pipeline-talks/-/1056/3132806/-/52cqfg/-/index.html

Ugandan National Development Plan II – Outtakes and Quotes from the Plan

SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2015/16 – 2019/20 (NDPII):

“A Transformed Ugandan Society from a Peasant to a Modern and Prosperous Country within 30 years”.

This here piece will be the important and special words and numbers from this report that has had a release date the same as budget for financial year 2015/2016. This is important to address to show what the draft of 3^rd March 2015 is saying. If the numbers has changed then the government should drop and show the world the updated NDPII. But that hasn’t surfaced anywhere. Therefore I will drop the numbers and quotes I do have. It will be a long piece. But this is a big plan with enormous sums of monies in play. So with that play you got show what the government really want to do. I have already showed the dream-piece or press release earlier this week. So this here will see if that has changed or not. The pages where the quotes are from are not direct pages because the page number is different in an pdf so the empty pages also get counted. Just to explain that.

Basic of the Plan:

“This National Development Plan (NDPII) is the second in a series of six 5-year Plans aimed at achieving Uganda Vision 2040” (…) “The Plan also seeks to leverage opportunities and honour obligations presented by emerging developments at the national, regional (East African Community (EAC), and the Africa Agenda 2063), and global levels (the Post 2015 Development Agenda)” (P: 12). “This Plan prioritizes investment in three key growth opportunities including Agriculture; Tourism; Minerals, Oil and Gas as well as two fundamentals: Infrastructure and Human Capital Development” (P: 13).

Certain information:

“The overall government budget deficit level was unstable over the three years, increasing from an overall balance including grants of 2.5 percent of GDP in 2011/12 to 3.4 percent in 2012/13 and to 5.0 percent in 2013/14” (…) “ (…) “Fiscal Deficit: The overall government budget deficit level was unstable over the three years, increasing from an overall balance including grants of 2.5 percent of GDP in 2011/12 to 3.4 percent in 2012/13 and to 5.0 percent in 2013/14.” (…) “Uganda‘s total debt stock rose from UGX11,234.9 billion in 2010/11 to UGX15,939.1 billion in 2012/13 (close to 30 percent of GDP). External debt in 2012/13 was UGX9,893.3 billion (USD3.761 billion). In 2012/13, the total stock of domestic debt stood at 10.4 percent of GDP and 15.8 percent of GDP for the total stock of External debt” (P. 30)

“The Public Debt-to-GDP ratio is currently (2013/14) at 26.14 percent and is projected to peak at about 42 percent in 2019/20, but will remain below the 2013/14 debt strategy threshold of 50 percent throughout the projection period. The debt is however still highly sensitive to non-concessional borrowing, given the current structure of external debt” (P: 32).

“Commercial Banking and Microfinance: As of April 2014, Uganda had 26 licensed commercial banks, with about 544 branches and 5.5 million accounts. The commercial banks hold about 80 percent of the total assets of the financial system and the NSSF holds almost the remaining 20 percent. Savings are still low despite measures to increase savings in the past which included: NSSF improving its return on savings; starting the financial literacy project; URBRA putting in place a framework to enable the informal sector to participate in formal saving schemes; and having SACCO‘s empowered to mobilize savings. SACCOs and MFIs are still experiencing weaknesses in regard to their sustainability, due to the low mobilization of savings from the public, partly due to the over dependence on Government through the Uganda Micro Finance Support Centre and also the fraudulent activities that are a vice to the people‘s savings” (P: 36). “Uganda‘s capital markets are characterized by under capitalization and limited investment opportunities. The Stock Market remains thin, with only 16 companies listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange (USE). Equity markets are poorly developed and only large and well established firms can realistically raise finance on equity markets” (P: 37).

Infrastructure:

“Generally, during the NDPI period the paved road stock increased at an average rate of 123km, lower than the targeted increase of 220km per year” (P: 42). “The rail infrastructure has not changed over the last 5 years. The current rail network comprises of long meter-gauge rail lines, running from the east to the west of the country. Its operations are limited to 640 km between Kampala-Malaba, Kampala–Port Bell, Kampala-Nalukolongo and Tororo-Gulu, while the rest of the network is defunct” (P: 42).

Water:

“Currently, only 2 percent of water is used for production, with only 1 percent of potential irrigable area, where 15,000Ha out of 3,030,000Ha is under formal irrigation. Access to water for livestock at present is estimated at 48.8 percent. The country is increasingly facing a major challenge of prolonged droughts and unexpected floods due to climatic change and variability and is predicted to be water stressed by 2025” (P: 44).

“Financing Health Services: The trend in allocation of funds to the health sector shows an average increase of 20 percent per annum in absolute terms over the past four years of HSSIP. However, the allocation to health as percentage of the total Government budget has reduced from 9.6 percent in 2003/2004 (AHSPR, 2013/14) to 8.6 percent in 2014/15 of the total Government budget much lower than the Abuja Declaration target of 15 percent. This decline has taken place in the midst of rising health care demand and costs due to high population growth” (P: 48-49).

Education:

“Pre-Primary Education: The net enrollment at pre-primary level stands at 10.1percent (EMIS 2013). The provision of pre-primary education continues to be dependent on NGOs, multilateral organizations, and the private sector. This limits access with high disparities between urban and rural areas and among different socio-economical levels” (P: 50).

“Primary Education: The implementation of UPE program since 1997 resulted to increased access from 2.5 million to 8.5 million in 2013. The Pupil/Book ratio has stagnated at an average of 4:1 from 2009 to 2013. The repetition rate reduced from 11.7percent in 2009 to 10.3percent in 2013” (P: 50).

“Secondary Education Sub-sector: The Student/Classroom Ratio (SCR) improved from 68:1 in 2009 to 57:1 in 2013 (EMIS 2013). In 2013, Government owned secondary schools were 1,019 (36 percent), private schools were 1,819 (64 percent). Enrolment in Government secondary schools is 669,225 (49 percent) and it is 693,514 (51 percent) in private schools” (P: 51).

“Higher Education: Total student enrolment in higher education increased by 26percent from 183,985 in 2010 to 232,612 in 2013. Universities continue to enrol the majority (67.3 percent) of post-secondary students (156,747) as of 2013. 60 percent of these are in Public Universities. The private providers cater for the remaining 40 percent” (P: 51).

Governance:

“Economic development and transformation cannot thrive if citizens and investors have no confidence in the rule of law and the justice system” (…) “Good governance provides a setting for the equitable distribution of benefits from economic growth. The Constitution requires that the State promotes balanced development for all regions of the country, between rural and urban areas. It also requires the State to take special measures to develop Uganda‘s least developed areas and to pay special attention to the problems of the marginalized” (P: 57). “The Government of Uganda has adopted the Zero Tolerance‖ to Corruption Policy (2009). The policy correctly recognizes that fighting corruption requires measures beyond legislation and sanctions against corruption. It also requires restoring public sector ethics and creating behavioural change” (P: 60). “However, international surveys, as well as nationally representative data indicate that corruption in Uganda remains a major problem. The East African Bribery Index (EABI, 2013) found that 82 percent of respondents in Uganda described the current level of corruption as high, while 10 percent perceived it to be medium (Transparency International, 2013)” (P: 61).

Oil and Minerals:

“Uganda is destined to benefit from the opportunities explored along the minerals, oil and gas development value chain by addressing a number of challenges and emerging issues involved in minerals and petroleum development” (…) “The petroleum sub-sector is challenged by: inadequate industry infrastructure to support upstream petroleum activities; excitement and high expectations from the general public; lack of skilled manpower, both in the public and the private sectors; inadequate financing; land acquisition for infrastructure development for oil prospecting; and low institutional preparedness; huge capital requirements and technical expertise needed for projects; inconsistent fuel supply leading to scarcity of petroleum products; and absence of a legal framework and associated technical capacity to regulate and minimize the attendant environmental risks” (P: 71).

Cooperatives:

“There are over 6,351 registered SACCOS with savings of over UGX 120 billion, total shareholding of over UGX 25 billion and loans of UGX 80 billion. Cooperatives have also been formed in other sectors of the economy. For example, 2 energy cooperatives are managing the distribution of energy, 10 housing cooperatives are at various stages of development” (P: 76).

Illiteracy:

“The country still faces high levels of illiteracy. According to UNHS 2009/10, 6.9 million Ugandans (5.5 million women & 1 .4 million men) aged 15 years and above are non-literate – unable to read, write and numerate with understanding” (P: 83).

Local Government:

“The financing for local governments has increased from UShs974 billion to over UShs2 trillion today” (…) “In general, LG staffing level is at 56 percent for the districts and 57 percent for the municipal councils – a state that has further constrained service delivery. Rapid urbanization characterized by an increase in urban centers from 28 in 1969 to more than 400 in 2013 (1 City, 22 Municipalities, 174 Town Councils and 207 Town Boards) has been without proper planning and facing declining resources. In addition, governance at LGs characterized by poor coordination between the technical and political leadership especially in newly created districts is hindering service delivery” (…) “This is mainly due to breakdown of social values, peoples‘ expectations of hand-outs from government and CSOs, mistrust of communities towards leaders due to persistent unfulfilled promises” (P: 84-85).

Development:

“Regional Commitments: Protocol on the establishment of the East African Community Monetary Union. Particularly; Article 2 (b) attain the macroeconomic convergence criteria in article 6 (2) and maintain the criteria for at least 3 consecutive years. The criteria include:

1. a) ceiling on headline inflation of 8 percent
2. b) a ceiling on fiscal deficit, including grants, of 3 percent of GDP
3. c) a ceiling on Gross Public Debt of 50 percent of GDP in Net Present Value terms; and
4. d) a reserve cover of 4.5 months of imports

The indicative convergence criteria are;

1. a) a ceiling on core inflation of percent
2. b) a ceiling on fiscal deficit, excluding grants, of 6 percent of GDP
3. c) A tax to GDP ratio of 25 percent” (P: 103).

Part III: Strategic Direction:

“The strategy highlights the key development outcomes expected under the NDPII, the interventions and resources required to achieve these outcomes. The strategy also provides a motivation for the sources of growth and the expected socio-economic outcomes” (P: 111). “The goal of this Plan is to attain middle income status by 2020” (P: 112). “Fiscal Expansion for Frontloading Infrastructure Investment: In order to realize the necessary public investment, government will harness concessional and semi-concessional financing and other development support facilities that are targeted to accelerate investment in infrastructure and human development, among others. Industrialization: To stimulate growth and employment, the country will promote value addition through agro-processing and mineral beneficiation as well as light manufacturing which have a higher multiplier effect on wealth creation. Fast Tracking Skills Development: In order to plug the current skills gap, government will establish five centers of excellence to rapidly build the necessary skills required in the key priority areas. Export Oriented Growth: Uganda‘s strategic location at the heart of East Africa makes it well placed to exploit the regional market. The region is increasingly becoming a fertile ground for small scale exporters, diversifying the export market and adding value to traditional export commodities. A Quasi-Market Approach: A Quasi-Market approach will be pursued in order to increase efficiency of the public sector and competitiveness of the private sector. With this approach Government will invest in key strategic infrastructure in order to remove the barriers of entry and increase private sector participation in the key growth areas” (P: 114).

“Harnessing the Demographic Dividend: Uganda will implement policies aimed at accelerating a rapid decline in fertility and ensure the resulting surplus labour force is well educated, skilled, healthy and economically engaged in order to reap the demographic dividend. Urbanization: Uganda will implement a tripartite strategic policy aimed at accelerating planned and controlled urbanization, while ensuring the critical link between urbanization and modernization of agriculture where the urbanizing community frees land for commercial agriculture as well as create a market for the increased output and quality of agro products. Strengthening Governance: The key development results cannot be achieved without the necessary enabling environment. Meeting good governance principles which include: constitutional democracy; protection of human rights; rule of law; free and fair political and electoral processes; transparency and accountability. Integrating Key Cross-Cutting Issues into Programmes and Projects: The key cross-cutting issues of; Gender, HIV/AIDS, environment, nutrition, climate change, human rights, social protection, child welfare among others will be mainstreamed in the relevant programmes and projects during the implementation of the Plan” (P: 115).

Agriculture NDPII:

“For this Plan period, focus is placed on investing in the following agricultural enterprises along the value chain: Cotton, Coffee, Tea, Maize, Rice, Cassava, Beans, Fish, Beef, Milk, Citrus and Bananas. These enterprises were selected for a number of reasons including, high potential for food security (maize, beans, Cassava, Bananas); high contribution to export earnings (e.g. Maize – USD 21 million in 2005; coffee -USD 388 million in FY 2007/08; fish – USD 143 million at its peak; tea – USD 56 million in 2007)” (P: 120). “During NDPII the necessary institutional changes should be made so that a clear strategy for agro-processing can be developed and implemented. This should enable proposals for locating value addition facilities in the proposed zones” (P: 121).

Tourism NDPII:

“The NDPII has prioritized investment in strategic tourism supportive infrastructure (expansion of Entebbe International Airport, construction of Kabale Airport in Hoima, upgrading of strategic airfields, construction and maintenance of strategic tourism roads, as well as, investing in water transport to support tourism activities” (P: 122).

Minerals, Oils and Gas NDPII:

“The pumping of an estimated reserve of 3.5 billion barrels of oil, expected to start by 2017/18, portends great benefits for transport, energy, road infrastructure and public revenue” (…) “In the first year of implementation of the NDPII, a mineral development master plan containing the Country Mining Vision will be developed to implement the African Mining Vision. The Vision will clearly provide the detailed strategic direction and guidance for the mining, oil and gas during the NDP period and beyond” (P: 124-125).

Transport:

“Standard Gauge Railway System” (…) “A good railway system would effectively link Uganda to other countries within the East African region and to overseas. This is key to exporting, and importing for manufacturing and services at affordable/competitive rates via connections to Djibouti and Mombasa if we are to achieve the Plan targets” (P: 126). “Strategic Roads” (…)“For this Plan period, 1,500KM of gravel roads will be upgraded to tarmac, 700KM of old paved roads will be rehabilitated and 2,500KM of paved roads and 10,000KMs of unpaved roads will be maintenance” (P: 128) (…) “Energy Infrastructure: Government will invest in the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the exploitation of the abundant renewable energy sources including hydropower, geothermal, and nuclear, so as to increase power generation capacity from 825MW in 2012 to 2,500MW in 2020 and prepare for achievement of the required 41,738 Mega Watts by year 2040” (P: 130).  “Oil and Gas: The pumping of this oil and gas is expected to start by 2017/18” (…) “The Government will commence construction of a 22-inch diameter, 1,300Km long oil pipeline from Hoima via Lokichar to Lamu in Kenya. This is in addition to the oil refinery that is to be constructed at Kabaale in Hoima to process petroleum and other products for the domestic and international market” (P: 131). ICT: “Over the Plan period, government will prioritize investment in the following ICT infrastructure: extension of the National Backbone Infrastructure (NBI) to cover most of the country so as to increase penetration of communication services; finalise the migration from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting” (P: 132). Human Capital Development: “the Plan will focus on providing early childhood survival and full cognitive development. Efforts will be geared at: reducing incidences of morbidity and mortality; scaling up critical nutrition interventions outcomes especially for children below 5-years; and implementation of Early Childhood Development (ECD)” (P: 134). “A skills development programme will be designed and tailored to the Industrial strategy, production zones and urban corridor locations that will be planned during NDPII. Provisions will be made for skills training on location at infrastructure construction sites to give unemployed young Ugandans rather than imported labour the maximum chance of personal development”(P: 135).

Overall Growth:

“The NDPII assumes that all the interventions outlined in the strategic direction will be implemented during the period 2015/16-2019/20. In particular, it is assumed that the following will be realized during the NDPII period: (i) increasing productivity of all sectors, (ii) pursuing value addition especially for the agro-processing and mineral products, (iii) creating an environment where industrialization can flourish, and; (iv) improving social delivery of services” (P: 139).

Fiscal Strategy:

“The fiscal strategy of the NDPII is underpinned by the need to maintain macroeconomic stability and a quest to competitively position Uganda to fully benefit from the East African Common Market” (P: 141). ”The focus of addressing the infrastructure deficit while consolidating the gains in human capital development remains a key priority for the NDPII. In summary, being that infrastructure has been prioritized; the fiscal deficit will mainly be driven by the additional resources required for infrastructure and human capital development” (P: 142).

Expenditure Strategy:

“The overall average spending is expected to be 21.1 percent of GDP with the peak of 22 percent of GDP expected in 2016/17, and consolidation of spending by the end of the Plan period” (P: 142).

Revenue Development:

“On the revenue outlook, the NDPII envisages that there will be some improvement in domestic revenue mobilization (excluding oil revenues). These gains will arise from minimizing the use of non-standard VAT tax exemptions which have compromised the effectiveness of tax collection. These exemptions are estimated to reduce government revenue by 1 percent of GDP” (P: 144). “Grants under the NDPII period are expected to decline due to a combination of factors including: (i) austerity measures pursued in donor countries (ii) continued positive growth perception of donors about Uganda‘s recent developments and therefore not being eligible for certain grants. As a result grants are expected to decline further to 0.5 percent by the end of 2020” (P: 145).

Monetary Policy Stance and inflation:

“The Bank of Uganda (BOU) has been implementing monetary policy under an Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL) monetary policy framework since July 2011” (…) “BOU will continue to implement a monetary policy framework that will ensure price stability and at the same time conducive in attaining economic growth over the NDPII period. The inflation outlook will be largely dependent on changes in domestic food prices, exchange rate and international commodity prices. Over the NDPII period, the objective is to keep annual inflation low and stable assuming no major shocks to the economy” (…) “The foreign exchange market: The import content of infrastructure investment in Uganda is estimated to be between 67 percent and 80 percent, but over 80 percent of the key infrastructure projects will be financed from external sources” (…) “Domestic liquidity and private sector credit: The impact of public investment on domestic liquidity will be limited due to the high import content of the infrastructure projects. Nonetheless, a higher fiscal deficit and foreign exchange purchases by BOU will create a liquidity injection that must be managed appropriately to maintain low and stable inflation and healthy levels of private sector credit” (…) “Credit rating: There is a risk that higher fiscal deficits over the medium term will reduce confidence in Uganda‘s public finances. This could lead to a downgrading of the country‘s credit rating and raise interest costs” (P: 149-150).

Concessional External loans:  

“Concessional loans are defined as external loans contracted with a grant element of more than 35 percent mainly sourced from the bilateral and multilateral donors. Over the years these loans have cushioned Uganda to finance a moderate deficit. In 2014/15, concessional loans were projected to contribute up to 2.3 percent of GDP” (…) “Less than 50 percent of the financing needs will be met through concessional borrowing in 2013/14. Given this background, the NDPII relies on conservative estimates for concessional borrowing. It is expected that over the NDPII period concessional loans will remain a key source of financing in 2015/16 and 2016/17 and decline to 1 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2019/20 as the financing needs also decline” (P: 151-152).

Semi-Concessional External Loans:

“Financing from semi-concessional loans especially for large infrastructure projects including Karuma and Isimba dams and the SGR are expected to total USD 5.3 billion during the period 2015-20” (…) “Under the NDPII Government will continue to source these types of loans given their favorable terms compared to commercial loans” (P: 152).

Non-Concessional External Borrowing

“It is imperative that Government also starts exploring other options especially to finance large infrastructure projects whose economic returns may not be viable in the short run but with enormous social benefits. Uganda is currently rated at B by Fitch and Standard and Poors rating agencies” (P: 152).

Domestic Borrowing:

“Government started issuing securities for fiscal purposes in the year 2012/13 raising about UGX650bn (1.2 percent of GDP)” (…) “Given these challenges, the NDPII would attempt to limit domestic borrowing to current levels especially as the infrastructure projects get completed. The level of domestic debt would be limited to the range of 1.5-3 percent if domestic debt is to be contained within sustainable levels” (P: 153).

Public Private Partnership:

“Given the scale of investments required under NDPII, there is need to have close cooperation between the public and private sectors in form of public-private sector partnerships (PPP)” (…) “Government has already embarked on promoting and encouraging PPP in various forms for the smooth implementation of NDPII. Legislation towards formulating laws for PPPs is also in advanced stages. The forms that PPPs usually take include joint ventures between the Government and private sector entity/ies where both may contribute financial resources, Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT), Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT), Build, Own and Operate (BOO) and Concessions” (P: 153).

Financing debt:

“Under this financing strategy, all the solvency and liquidity external debt-burden indicators remained well below their policy-dependent thresholds throughout the projection period. The public gross national debt would peak at 42 percent of GDP in 2019/20 while the NPV is expected to peak at about 40 percent of GDP” (P: 154-155).

Afterthought:

This must be an eye-opener. It has already been a long article. I could have written my opinion on the matters and the whole NDPII. But I think the quotes speak for themselves. That if these don’t give you any indication on how the Government of Uganda hopes it turns out. They also told in this draft that certain aspects of the NDPI they didn’t succeed so if they don’t do it here. It shouldn’t be like a lightning strike from a clear sky. More like expected, this should be hard to achieve it’s a broad and general plan that has visions of all aspects of society from narrow industrial projects to infrastructure. That gives a lot of power and also a framework which is big. Therefore they need massive funding for this and already seen in other documents and in this that the scale of debt and loans is getting higher while the donor countries are offering less to the state coffers. Meanwhile the economy isn’t sustainably growing. While the Oil and Gas might cover for this that will still to be seen in 2017/2018 when the monies are expecting to recover. In the meanwhile the economy will drive itself on loans and hope for other funding. It’s already up to 40% of all budget concerns which is alarming. It should be, even if progression and analyzes say it can go up to 50% before the debt rate is too high. Even though that makes sense from an economic standpoint it’s still frightening to see the figures on how it has risen. And I wonder does the government have a constructive plan to pay this back to its creditors? Because that doesn’t comply here or anywhere else I have seen which is a little bit frightening. Peace.

Uganda – The Annual Report Audit General for FY ended 2014 – Value for Money Audit Volum 5: Quotes and Outtakes from this.

This blog here will be focused on the ‘Office of the Auditor General’ who released ‘Annual report of the Auditor General for the Financial Year ended 30^th June 2014 – Volume 5 Value for Money Audit’. What you will read is actual quotes from the paper or report. Here you get a vivid picture of how the financial year (FY 2013-2014) was in reality.

I haven’t taken everything from the piece. It would be too long and you might end up bored. Here is what should get your mind boggling and wonder. How could this be this way? Why is it like this? How did it end up like this? What does this tell me about the economic practices in Uganda? And so on. If you start to think like that, then it was worth using my time. Enjoy the quotes from the report. Hope you catch some wisdom.

When it comes to managing Public Debt:

“Public debt is incurred primarily for financing budget deficits, development of domestic financial markets, supporting the country’s Balance of Payment (BOP) position/foreign reserves and monetary policy objectives. In Uganda, public debt is managed by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) in liaison with Bank of Uganda (BoU). Government borrows internally from domestic markets through issuance of Treasury bills and Bonds by the BoU and externally through Bilateral and multilateral borrowings. Currently, over 60% of the public debt is external debt and 40% is domestic debt. GoU borrowing has been rising over the years from USD 5.7 billion in Financial Year (FY) 2011/12 to USD 7 billion in FY 2013/14. The growing National debt, if not properly managed, could revert to unsustainable levels as was the case in the past”.

“Interest rates on domestic debt have overall stabilised in recent years relative to their peak in 2011/12. However, they remain a cause for concern due to their high contribution to overall debt service costs and the relatively high yields which they attract stand in stark contrast to those achieved by comparator nations with similar credit ratings”.

When it comes to roads:

“The Uganda Road Fund invested a total of UGX 914 billion in road maintenance activities during the three years under review (2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014),4 with a total of 4,565km of roads maintained. Despite the increasing investment, there are reports and persistent public outcry about the poor state of roads and the deteriorating quality of works being executed. The physical and financial performance reports of designated agencies in FY 2011/12 revealed the following issues: budget indiscipline, poor absorption of road maintenance funds, inaccuracies in reporting, lethargy of Designated Agencies (DAs) in complying with reporting requirements, widely varying unit costs, risk of loss of funds through end of year procedures, and grave underperformance of periodic maintenance works” (…) ”The road maintenance needs in Uganda cannot be met due to limited resources, for example for FY 2011/2012, the total maintenance needs from the agencies was UGX 413.95bn, and the budget provided by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) was UGX 280.95bn, indicating a 32% deficit” (…) “The road maintenance equipment inventory maintained by the URF is incomplete; the inventory is only for 12 (55%) of the municipalities and it is outdated as it was submitted in January 2011”.

When it comes to Gas and Oil:

“Through a review of reports on procurement submitted by the oil companies to PEPD, it was noted that from 2010-2013, the oil companies spent a total of USD 1,171.8 million on purchase of goods and services. Of this, USD 329.9 million was paid to Ugandan service providers, representing 28% of the total spend for all the companies in the period under review” (…) “The Ugandan service providers comprised about 73% of the approved suppliers which implies that the total value of the procurements from them was less than their relative number” (…) “Ugandans employed in the oil and gas sector by the oil companies overall rose from 69% in 2012 to 80% in 2014, absolute numbers of employees decreased from 546 to 432 between 2013 and 2014; in particular, the nationals dropped from 370 to 347 over the same period” (…) “For all the 27 jobs advertised in the newspapers, attracting over 700 local applicants, none was appointed, citing lack of experience in the oil and gas sector. Instead, the recruitment report submitted by the CNOOC to PEPD recommended recruitment of expatriates” (…) “According to the Industrial baseline survey done by the Joint Venture partners (CNOOC, TEP and TUOP), 60% of the workforce required for the next phases will be technicians and craftsmen, which translates to a demand of 7,800 and 1,800 technicians and craftsmen at the peak and plateau phases, respectively, of development and production. With the current total of only 86 UPIK graduates, there is doubt that the projected demand will be met by the time production starts (2018)” (…) “There are still several areas with clear potential for enhancing national content, such as: establishment of a clear regulatory framework, performance targets and indicators for national content; determining the level of state participation; local supplier development; employment and training of Nationals by the oil companies and government; ensuring gender parity and involving host communities”.

When it comes to the Healthcare:

“The Uganda Health Systems Strengthening Project (UHSSP) is a project administered under the Ministry of Health (MoH)” (…) “UHSSP, is a five year project, which was established in 2010, commenced operations in February 2011 and is due to end on 31st July 2015. The UHSSP project is jointly funded by the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the World Bank to a tune of USD 14.31 million and USD 130 million, respectively” (…) “UHSSP was set up to bridge the existing gap of supply and maintenance of medical equipment in 46 selected health facilities in order to improve the quality of health care delivered to patients. The project has spent USD 24 million (UGX 60.480 billion) on procurement and supply of these medical equipment, yet some of the equipment remains unused in the facilities where it was supplied” (…) “For instance, at the time of audit field visit in September 2014, the project had supplied anesthetics machines to 165 HCIVs at a cost of USD 2,063,085.75, however, all the HCIVs visited were not utilising this equipment because they lacked the technical expertise to effectively utilise the equipment. In a related instance, 2 auto strainers valued at USD 25,345.68, which were issued to Mubende and Moroto Regional Referral Hospitals, are not operational because of lack of qualified staff” (…) “observations conducted during field visits to the seventeen selected beneficiary health facilities, it was noted that some of the equipment supplied, worth Euros 3,954.67 and USD 1,209,879.09, was not being used at all while other equipment was not optimally utilized” (…) “Through field inspections, it was observed that health facilities namely Mwizi had no power supply while others such as: Moyo, Aduku, Aboke Pakwach had unreliable solar power supply, and therefore, were not providing emergency obstetric care services when needed” (…) “that various equipment supplied by the project, worth USD 319,676.35 and Euros 347.24, required additional logistical supplies to be effectively put to use. Such equipment included anesthesia units which required regulators, oxygen cylinders and other reagents while incubator cultures, incubator baby, defribrators, counting chamber, colorimeter required Medias, distilled water, thermometers, tubes and batteries”.

When it comes to handling Public Debt Part 2:

“Uganda benefited from the various Debt relief initiatives like the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative in 1998, the Enhanced HIPC in 2000 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2006. Despite these initiatives, GoU borrowing has been rising over the years from USD 5.7 billion in Financial Year (FY) 2011/12 to USD 7 billion in FY 2013/14. The growing National debt, if not properly managed, could revert to unsustainable levels as was the case in the past” (…) “In the FY 2013/14 Public debt increased to USD 7 billion up from USD 6.4 billion in F/Y 2012/13, reflecting a 9.38% increment in one year alone, the increment was way above the GDP growth of 6.2% in the FY 2013/14. Domestic debt accounted for 9.55% (UGX 1,437 billion) of the National budget, 2014/15 an increase of 1.65% (UGX 397 billion) from 7.9% (UGX 1,040 billion) in financialyear 2013/14. External financing on the other hand increased from UGX 2,660 billion in F/Y 2013/14 to UGX 2,733 billion of the National budget, 2014/15 an increase of UGX 73 billion. As non-concessional borrowing increases, the need for proper debt management becomes even much greater” (…) “On average, 60% of public debt is external loans of which Multilateral loans constitute over 80%. The domestic debt is largely derived from the sale of bonds which constituted an average of about 60% over the period FY2011/12 – 2013/14 “ (…) “In evaluating whether the debt, acquisition process facilitates debt sustainability, the audit mainly focussed on the acquisition of external debt since it constitutes over 60% of the National debt portfolio” (…) “The 2012 corruption scandal involving the Prime Minister’s office resulted in a changed relationship between multilateral lenders to the Ugandan government and a consequent reduction in the amount of aid in the form of direct budget support. Budget support in 2011/12 amounted to 168m USD, but reduced to 24.1m USD in 2013/14. The shortfall has in part been filled through domestic financing” (…) “The lack of coordination between debt and cash management functions contributed to inaccurate forecasting of cash needs. This exacerbated the problem of unplanned cuts to government programmes and led to the needless issuance of short-term debt, with the associated debt service costs” (…) “it was noted that local government authorities still held significant cash balances accrued from non-tax revenues and unutilised balances which were not remitted to the Consolidated Fund regularly, and that some accounts containing cash lay dormant, risking embezzlement” (…) “the current economic conditions characterised by reduced exports and a depreciating Ugandan Shilling against the dollar (30% for the last 4 months) there is a risk of stress which can affect future sustainability. Interest rates on domestic debt remain a cause for concern due to their high contribution to overall debt service costs (78%)”

When it comes to Health Care Part 2:

“Over the past three financial years 2011/12, 2012/13 and 2013/14, there has been an 18% increment in the funding of RRHs from UGX 53.86 billion to UGX 63.56 billion” (…) “Jinja nd Lira RRHs revealed that Jinja RRH which ran a 13-bed Intensive Care unit only used 6 of the beds, leaving 7 beds idle in the unit while Lira RRH had not utilized its 16-bed ICU since FY 2012/13. The Hospital Directors of Jinja and Lira RRHs explained that more nurses wouldhave to be deployed as each bed required at least 2 full time nurses to the unit to ensure full utilisation of the unit without compromising the quality of care. The unit would also require full time doctors and an anaesthesiologist. In Lira RRH, management explained that the ICU had not been commissioned and that its underutilisation was also due to the absence of an oxygen plant” (…) “With the current ICU bed capacity in Uganda of 61 in all public and private hospitals, 23 unutilized ICU beds in Jinja and Lira represents a wasted resource. It is estimated that about 10 critically ill patients were deprived of ICU admission daily and as a result succumbed to their illnesses” (…) “Hospital managers in response attributed this to the lack of bio medical engineers and high costs of repairing the equipment, for instance, according to Jinja RRH, the maintenance of the En-Visor ultra sound machine and the repairs of the Duo-Diagnostic big x-ray machine requires not less than UGX 15 million, and without a medical equipment maintenance fund, it is a challenge to maintain and repair the radiology and imaging machines. Management of Fort Portal RRH attributed the low usage of the x-ray and ultrasound machines to stock-outs of the supplies, such as reagents and films required for the operation of this diagnostic equipment” (…) “The average doctor-patient ratio per year in RRHs was 12440:1 implying one doctor for 34 patients per day while clinician- patient ratio was 10652:1 annually implying one clinician for 29 patients” (…) “For example; Kabale, Fort Portal, Masaka and Mbale Regional Hospitals referred some special cases to Mbarara RRH for services like CT scan, renal dialysis, neurosurgeon, paediatric surgery. In addition, lack of adequate staff has led to referrals to the National Referral Hospital and this has further resulted in the congestion and handling of cases at National Referral Hospital which cases could be handled by the RRHs. The process of referrals is costly and in some cases patients lose their lives in the process of reaching the health facility to which they have been referred”.

 When it comes to Management of Sewage in Urban areas:

“Poor sanitation costs Uganda 389 billion shillings annually, equivalent to 1.1% of the national GDP” (…) “Fifty six percent (56%) of the pipes in Kampala were built in the 1940s and 86% of these have been operational for 35 years or more” (…) “National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC)” (…) “NWSC had spent UGX 10.9billion towards sewage management activities in the areas under its jurisdiction over the last three years” (…) “the volume of sewage generated in the different towns and the volume of sewage collected and treated by NWSC, a study conducted by Mott Macdonald on behalf of NWSC in December 2012 estimated that by 2014, a total of 238.9 ML of wastewater would be generated of which, only 8.38ML would be collected and treated. This leaves approximately 230.52 ML of generated sewage uncollected and therefore not treated”.

Short ending:

I hope this was worth your time and also giving you an indication on the matters on the ground. This is just a fragment on the matters and what got told in the report. This just comes as gift to you. Especially to all of you who don’t use time reading the report on your free will or are lucky enough to get the report in your mailbox. Never the less, hope you got enlighten and also got a picture on how the monies is spent in last FY. Peace.