



Burundi: Sonnette d’alarme de l’OLUCOME sur la détérioration de l’économie (24.11.2016)












Its days after and just two weeks after leaked Memo that said how little plans the Conservative Party or Tories Government had. So this report is a answer to that. Like the certain quote of the memo:
“The divisions within the Cabinet are between the three Brexiteers on one side and Philip Hammond/Greg Clark on the other side. The Prime Minister is rapidly acquiring the reputation of drawing in decisions and details to settle matters herself – which is unlikely to be sustainable. Overall, it appears best to judge who is winning the debate by assuming that the noisiest individuals have lost the intra-Government debate and are stirring up external supporters” (Sky News, 2016).
When the matter comes into the light like this; it’s fruitful to see that the major Opposition Party have now showed alternative path or at-least thought things through where they have propositions to a counter-party that doesn’t care for fulfilling their mandate and exercising the vote of the people.
Theresa May, was voted into the Parliament to be MP and not a PM. Therefore she might forget how to get the popular vote and get consensus. Here is one set of ideas and suggestions to how to make amends of the Brexit. This is worth listening to and also reading to get ideas of how to fix the problems of the European Union and the United Kingdom. Take a look!
Infrastructure Policy:
“So what should be done? Brexit offers British policy-makers the opportunity to step back and examine the future direction of infrastructure and housing policy. The Autumn Statement should be used signal a change in direction towards an economic strategy which uses infrastructure and housing policy as a tool to boost growth and productivity in regions that have suffered a lack of investment” (Moving On, P: 12, 2016). “Ignore this problem and it is clear that unity in our divided country will be even further away. Accept the challenge, take steps to rebalance investment, and the United Kingdom has half a chance at sticking together“ (Moving On, P: 14, 2016).
Working Policy:
“First, he should do all that he can to stimulate investment in innovation. Coming up with new ideas, products and services which the rest of the world wants to buy is the best way we can remain internationally competitive post Brexit without seeking to pursue an alternative strategy, advocated by those on the Right, of making our labour markets ever more flexible and embarking on a race to the bottom on people’s terms and conditions of work. Innovation will also help improve UK productivity which is 18% below the G7 average, the largest gap since 1991 when the ONS started collecting such data” (Moving On, P: 19, 2016). “Limited digital connectivity is one of the biggest barriers to business and Ofcom estimates that 1 in 5 small business premises will still not be able to access superfast broadband without further action from government. The Universal Service Obligation – which sets a target of all homes having 10MB per second speeds by 2020 is nowhere near ambitious enough – a more ambitious target and timeframe for delivery should be set if Britain is to be at the forefront of the fourth industrial revolution” (Moving on, P: 22, 2016). “The biggest boost he could provide is by declaring that the Government’s goal during the Brexit negotiations is to continue with the UK’s membership – not just access to – the European Single Market, as I set out in my speech to the Centre for Progressive Capitalism last month” (Moving on, P: 24, 2016).
Skills/Education:
“The National Audit Office for instance has recommended that the Department of Education should set out the planned overall impact of its apprenticeships policy on productivity and growth, along with short-term key performance indicators to measure the programme’s success. The Government must also adequately fund welfare-to-work in the Autumn Statement, get a grip on inclusive regional growth and ensure that welfare-to-work helps those in areas with high unemployment and not just those who find it easiest to get back into work. As the Science and Technology Select Committee has said, the Government should now publish its Digital Strategy policy without further delay and include goals for developing better basic digital skills and increasing digital apprenticeships as well as providing a framework through which the private sector can more readily collaborate with communities and local authorities to raise digital skills in local SMEs” (Moving On, P: 30, 2016).
Welfare:
“The ‘digital skills gap’ meanwhile has been estimated as costing the economy £63 billion a year in lost additional GDP. Also holding us back from the high tech economy of the future is the lack of new engineering and technology recruits meeting employers’ expectations. We are also facing an engineering ‘retirement cliff’ with the average engineer currently in their fifties.18 According to the Engineering UK 2016 report, engineering employers have the potential to generate an additional £27 billion per year from 2022 but only if we can meet the forecasted demand for 257 000 new engineering vacancies.19 And these are exactly the type of professions we need to build our industries and export to the world after we leave the European Union” (Moving On, P: 28, 2016).
Welfare II:
“Firstly, he must reverse cuts to Universal Credit (UC) and restore confidence after the programme’s chaotic introduction so it genuinely provides an incentive to work. Secondly, the Chancellor has to do more to help parents join or re-join the workforce and give every child the best start in life. We should move towards a system of universal free childcare for all working parents of pre-school children, starting with free childcare for all two year olds” (…) “There is also a worrying picture on pay progression too. Universal Credit was intended to help workers move onto higher pay levels, as well as get a job in the first place. But as the Resolution Foundation has said “implementation realities scuppered the ambition of the design”. The likely result is that UC will leave an increasing number of workers stuck on the minimum wage when they should be looking to earn more” (Moving On, P: 32-34, 2016).
Championing Key Sector:
“Because Brexit austerity could last beyond a conventional economic cycle, it will require fundamental policy change and supply-side efforts to counteract. Take, for example, the risks now hanging over the financial services sector – which represents 12% of our economic output, nearly two million jobs in the UK and which generates £67billion of revenues for the public purse. It’s not simply a case of having an ‘industrial strategy’ to play to this core comparative advantage for the UK. We will need to negotiate long term access to EU markets where a whole series of product lines face the prospect of being banned and outlawed. Should this turn out to be the case, and the cluster of specialisms in UK financial centres erode with core competences like clearing relocating to Frankfurt or to New York, then we lose a vital skills infrastructure as well as year by year corporation and income tax revenues” (Moving On, P: 38, 2016).
“So we should test the Autumn Statement for whether it counteracts the looming Brexit austerity and whether it can deliver access and opportunities for sectors under threat, like financial services. Yes, there are reforms still needed to many of the tax regimes in which the financial services sector operate. Some lucrative practices need loopholes closing – for instance in the taxation of financial spread betting or old Osborne legacies such as the wasteful ‘shares for rights’ dodge that is rife for abuse” (Moving On, P: 2016).
This here shows the proofs that the Labour Party can have things that works for the nation, if they get people to believe it, but the simplistic dogma of the Tories is sold to the commoners like coke and cheddar cheese, while the Labour Party message is a rock to hit your head instead of being served feasible to the public. Therefore the Labour has to change their ways of sending their message and make sense to the ones blinded by the PM May and her deceptive tone of arrogance from White Hall. Peace.
Reference:
Alison McGovern MP, Chuka Umunna MP, Shabana Mahmood MP, Rachel Reeves MP & Chris Leslie MP – ‘Moving on – A Labour approach to the post-Brexit economy’ (November 2016)
Sky News – ‘Leaked memo shows Government’s lack of Brexit plans’ (15.11.2016) link: http://news.sky.com/story/leaked-memo-shows-governments-lack-of-brexit-plans-10658063/revision/1479197701

Today is another day and on this blessed Sunday, the battles between the SPLM/A and SPLM/A-IO are continuing and are in many states like: Yei River State, Blue Nile, Upper Nile, Western Bahr El Ghazal and Unity State. With this in mind, the reports of today tell who the fragile situation is and what this can all mean for the near future. Because the SPLM-N are even in trouble in Sudan and in South Sudan, which makes the borders even worse; with this reality the world should act and give extend the mandate of UNMISS, the Arms Embargo would not work if there is still sold weapons without ending certificate; than the meaning of the trade will not be in the loop until their fetched by the International Community like MONUSCO this year. So here is the lot of the day!
No pardon for Dr. Riek Machar:
President Salva Kiir said on Sunday: “My brother Riek Machar thinks the only way for him to become the president of this country is violence, killing innocent people. I told him several times [that] there is no reason to fight. If you [Machar] wants to be the president, wait for elections, but he did not listen” (…) “They come asking me to pardon him. I tell them I have no problem with him. He is a citizen of this country and he can return anytime, but must denounce violence” (Sudan Tribune, 2016).
Offensive from SPLA:
Big government offensive on rebel Fatuyo’s base in Li-Rangu following the attack on Yambio, in which rebels showed off new RPG supply.
This is happening as fuel shortages are hitting the country, the issues with lacking of food-supply and the NGOs are under attack from SPLM/A-IO and also SPLM/A; this is happening with the full knowledge and with support from the Troika. That have set in force the process, but not considered the wish of power for the President and FVP Machar, who both of them has their agenda. This is happening as the sore and weak Kenyan Government cannot handle criticism of their commander, therefore they are leaving the UNMISS to show integrity, but instead losing their power and helpful assistance in the war-torn country.
As this is happening the Yei River State Officials are resigning because of the “Human Right Violations” in the state. There been reports of fierce battles between the State and the SPLM/A-IO in the Unity State.
Gen. Malik Agaar speaks out:
“Does Taban know how many lives we sacrificed for the independent of South Sudan?” Asked Malik Agaar” (…) “Does Taban know how the people of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile fought for the liberation of South Sudan?” He ask again?” (…) “Where was he when our bones littered the land of South Sudan?” And asked again. Taban looked between his legs as if he was peeing but he was just sweating” (…) “Taban we aren’t going anywhere, as SPLA-N we are here to stay whether you like it or not.” Malik Agaar concluded boldly looking in the face of Salva Kiir. At this point Taban was done” (…) “Until you become the President of South Sudan then you can do whatever you want to do to SPLA-N.” Malik Agaar warns” (…) “From today onwards I don’t want to hear from you, neither call me nor ask me.” Malik Agaar declared and that was by no mean a point of contention. It was the END of the meeting” (Alfa, 2016).
So another group who are in the borderland and creating problems in South Kordofan, Blue Nile State and in Darfur, the SPLM-N are now threatening the SPLM/A and the FVP Taban Deng Gai, who took over when Dr. Riek Machar fled Juba in July 2016. This has since inflamed the situation and now the fragile state has more trouble.

But the SPLM-N is already trouble also inside Sudan:
“On Sunday, the Khartoum North court judge Osama Ahmed Abdalla convicted the defendant of spying for violating article “53” of the Criminal Code, saying the prosecution presented coherent and strong evidence against the defendant” (…) “He pointed the prosecution witnesses proved that the defendant has conveyed military information about the Sudanese army in El Meiram area, South Kordofan to the ruling SPLA party in South Sudan” (…) “The judge added the defendant also, in collaboration with two others, handed over a government source to the SPLA, saying the source was assassinated by the latter” (Sudan Tribune, 2016).
So when the Gen. Malik Agaar attacks Gen. Taban Deng Gai for his actions, they are themselves into trouble elsewhere… the fragile border and frictions between Sudan and South Sudan. This has become better and there been visits from Juba to Khartoum as even Dr. Riek Machar came there after being in the woods of Democratic Republic of Congo and banished by the MUNSCO, the President Kiir has pardoned the 750 soldiers that we’re part of Machar’s group there, but is not willing to pardon him before he acts peaceful. Certainly the bloodshed between the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-IO is not over, as the SPLM-N are taking stand now and are under fire in Sudan as well.
There rumours that the SPLM/A-IO Dr. Riek Machar after leaving the safe shores of South Africa he is now taken by Army Operatives of the Ethiopian State on Ethiopian soil, while the U.S. is currently on working on blacklisting him for not being able to get arms on legal basis; though I am sure the blood money can pay for guns and ammunitions.
These rumours and reports are coming as Dr. Riek Machar has leached out this statement:
“We have been driven back to the bush,” James Gadet, a spokesman for Machar, told the AP on Saturday in a call from Nairobi, Kenya” (…) “(We) call on the international community to declare the regime in Juba a rogue government,” the document says, adding that international agencies monitoring the peace deal should “suspend their activities” until the agreement is “resuscitated.” (News Wires, 2016).

They can declare as much as they like, can call the TGoNU who cooperates with the IGAD-Plus and the UNMISS, also with the Troika a “Rogue Regime”, that might help their cause and help their loyal commanders, but it doesn’t strengthen their cause after the skirmishes this year.
President Salva Kiir might be totally wrong about his actions and decrees, but the initial violence comes as a result, but also the power-hungry FVP Machar has created as much violence on his own and also tried to kill the president in vain. Therefore both men do what they can keep themselves in power. The people, the citizens of the South Sudan are the losers who torn between two Parties and too Big-Men. Peace.
Reference:
News Wires – ‘South Sudan rebel chief urges armed resistance against government’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.france24.com/en/20160924-south-sudan-rebel-chief-riek-machar-kiir-urges-armed-resistance-against-government?ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_source=twitter&ns_mchannel=social&ns_linkname=editorial&aef_campaign_ref=partage_user&aef_campaign_date=2016-09-24
Sudan Tribune – ‘No amnesty for South Sudan rebel leader, says President Kiir’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60893
Sudan Tribune – ‘Sudanese court convicts former SPLM-N officer of spying for South Sudan’ (20.11.2016) link: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60895
Alfa, John – ‘GEN. MALIK AGAAR OF SPLA-N IN is in JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN’ (20.11.2016) link: https://africanspress.org/2016/11/20/gen-malik-agaar-of-spla-n-in-is-in-juba-south-sudan/

















The United Nations Security Council have delivered a letter and also two statements on the situation and the level of crisis in the Republic of South Sudan. This is happening as the UNSC are discussing the mandate of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The problem is continuation of the flaring skirmishes in July 2016.
The UNSC are now looking into crisis and fixing the lax mandate or the issues with the peacekeepers in the nation. This has to happen as the UNMISS has already come under scrutiny for their acts around the UN House in and around Juba. The proven skirmishes and the evidence of what went down and also what has gone on since. Also the interesting who has exported the arms to the Republic; which has given the fighting armies the needed ammunition and weapons to continue to fighting each other.
Mr. Mohamad of Sudan said this:
“The Cooperation Agreement laid a solid foundation for normalizing relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, enhancing cooperation in all areas between the two and achieving sustained peace. It covered the areas of oil resources, trade, borders, security arrangements, the status of citizens and other themes. However, our brothers in South Sudan have so far been enthusiastic only about the implementation of the oil agreement. They have overlooked the implementation of other agreements, particularly the Agreement on Security Arrangements between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, which includes provisions on ending the support for, and the harbouring of, rebel movements, the establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and the establishment of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM)” (…) “On the deployment of the oil police in the Diffra oil complex, my delegation reaffirms the need for such a step, as the joint Abyei police has not yet been established. Another reason is that there are Sudanese rebel movement groups in South Sudan that can target those vital installations. That force is limited both in number and equipment” (UNSC 7810, 2016).
Mr. Malok of South Sudan said this:
“Cooperation between the two countries is crucial to any constructive and productive efforts in Abyei. Indeed, even the progress made by UNISFA could not have been possible without a degree of functional cooperation by the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan. However, much more cooperation is needed if the efforts of UNISFA are to continue to bear tangible fruits that will benefit the two communities and help to facilitate continued improvement in the relations between the two countries” (…) “It is noteworthy that, as the report of the Secretary-General observes, the restrictions imposed by the Government of the Sudan on non-governmental organizations have limited the implementation capacity of humanitarian and development actors, especially in the northern parts of Abyei. As the Secretary-General also notes, in addition to a lack of adequate funds, other challenges include high implementation costs owing to security and logistical constraints, delays in the issuance of travel permits and restrictions on the movement of personnel and supplies by the Government of the Sudan.” (UNSC 7810, 2016).
Context:
“The armed opposition to Kiir’s regime is an increasingly multifaceted amalgam of forces encompassing dissident groups with diverse grievances, aims and approaches to the war. Many of these groups are either not under the direct control of SPLM/A in Opposition led by Machar, which was a party to the Agreement, or are only loosely affiliated with it. Nevertheless, Machar’s resilience, notwithstanding the government attempts to assassinate him in greater Equatoria, has seemingly provided more motivation for Equatorian armed elements to associate formally with SPLM/A in Opposition. The perception that the belligerence of Kiir’s Dinka-dominated regime is leading the country inexorably towards a devastating tribal war, coupled with a sense that the international community is failing to take the steps necessary to avoid a further escalation of the conflict, are providing impetus among non-Dinka opposition political and military forces towards greater coordination, if not complete organizational unity” (UNSC letter, P: 3, 2016).
“The SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, remains a central figure in the perpetuation and expansion of the war, including the conflict in greater Equatoria, described in detail below. After the fighting in Juba in July, he oversaw the operation to hunt down Machar and the SPLM/A in Opposition forces in Central Equatoria” (…) “The extension of the war continues to pose an increasingly grave threat to the countries that neighbour South Sudan. For example, after a long series of skirmishes between SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition in Central and Western Equatoria after Machar fled from Juba in July, Machar and some 750 soldiers and civilians entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has confirmed that, on 13 August, SPLA then launched an incursion into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An estimated 800 to 900 SPLA troops from Division VI crossed the border and engaged in a battle with SPLM/A in Opposition. On 17 August, two MI-24 helicopters also crossed the border, travelling nearly 6 km into Congolese territory and again attacking SPLM/A in Opposition positions” (UNSC letter, P: 6-7, 2016).

Arms dealings:
“In a meeting with the Panel on 28 September, the First Vice-President, Taban Deng Gai, refuted the presence of L-39 jets in South Sudan, which the Panel had documented with supporting evidence, including photographs and eyewitness accounts, in its report to the Security Council that month” (…) “The Panel has been provided with preliminary information on the weapons that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo took from the combatants who accompanied Machar into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 2016. The sources of the weapons are consistent with those previously documented by the Panel as having been procured in South Sudan, both before and after independence, including weapons and ammunition manufactured in the Sudan, China, the United States of America, Israel and various Eastern European countries” (…) “One weapon of note among the arms documented is a Micro Galil rifle manufactured by Israel Weapon Industries, bearing serial number 36100549. This is the third weapon of its type identified by the Panel, with two others (serial numbers 36100566 and 36100588) having been documented in Upper Nile in 2015. Each of the weapons was, according to interviews with SPLM/A in Opposition members, taken from South Sudanese government stocks either through battlefield capture or by defectors. According to information provided to the Panel by the manufacturer, as noted in the Panel’s report of January 2016 (S/2016/70), the three weapons are from a batch sold to the Ministry of Defence of Uganda in 2007. There is no provision in the end user certificate for their transfer to South Sudan” (…) “In September, the Panel received information from Spain regarding weapon trafficking to South Sudan that the Spanish police had obtained as part of a continuing investigation into money-laundering and racketeering. The information details communications between an arms trafficking network based in Europe and the leadership of SPLM/A in Opposition in 2014, in which the latter had requested the delivery, through an intermediary in Senegal, of an extensive list of small arms, munitions and light weapons. Further investigations by the Panel suggest that this shipment was at least partially delivered” (…) “Also in September, the Panel received information and documentation from a confidential high-level South Sudanese source that, in July 2014, a shipment of small arms ammunition and 4,000 assault rifles had been delivered by Bulgarian Industrial Engineering and Management to the Ministry of Defence of Uganda. According to the documentation, Bosasy Logistics, a company registered in Kampala and described in previous reports by the Panel, including its report of January 2016 (S/2016/70), acted as an intermediary in the transaction. The weapons and munitions were subsequently transferred to South Sudan. While the Panel is further investigating this transaction, it notes that recent arms transfers from Uganda to South Sudan, as described in its report of September 2016 (S/2016/793), are likely to be using the same modality as the earlier transfers from 2014, with Bosasy Logistics and its Chairman, Valerii Copeichin, facilitating the sales” (…) “The Panel has received multiple reports from various sources of arms shipments entering South Sudan by road through Uganda and by airlift to Juba and Wau since May. The content, according to two high-level sources with knowledge of the operations, was small arms and light weapons, ammunition and armoured vehicles. The Panel is in possession of a contract signed by SPLA in May 2015 for the provision of Panthera armoured vehicles valued at $7,187,500.50 The company contracted to provide the vehicles, Egypt and Middle East for Development, was represented by an Egyptian national, Mohamed Atta Jad. The company is registeredin Cairo.51 The Panel is investigating the possible connection between this contract and the recent airlifts to South Sudan” (UNSC letter, P: 18-20, 2016)
Budget:
“The Panel obtained data indicating that projected State budget expenditure for the 2016/17 fiscal year would exceed revenue by 149 per cent.62 Consequently, the government has laid out a proposal for financial austerity and external borrowings, which incorporates recommendations made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after its mission of May. The Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, in his address to the Commission on 19 October, said the following: “We commend the TGNU for the work that has gone into creating an ambitious budget, which has been commended by many analysts. Strong constraints on expenditures are central to the budget and a condition for stabilization.” Progress towards the implementation of this strategy will indicate the government’s seriousness in addressing the macroeconomic crisis” (…) “The draft budget for the fiscal year 2016/17 is estimated to be 22.3 billion South Sudanese pounds, half of which is allocated to the security sector” (…) “Revenue for the 2016/17 budget was calculated on the basis of oil production of 120,000 barrels per day, which is the lowest rate of extraction since December 2013. There is no indication that Deng Gai’s efforts in August to renegotiate the pipeline and transfer fees with Khartoum were successful, meaning that South Sudan will continue to pay $24.1 per barrel in fees to the Sudan, undercutting the revenue of the budget owing to volatile oil prices. The oil industry also shows no signs of recovery to the pre-war levels; the Unity fields were disabled in the early months of the war, and the continuing conflict will make it difficult to launch the long and technologically complicated process of restarting oil production” (UNSC letter, P: 23, 2016).
This here is lots of interesting collected information that usually would be left behind and not for-told to the media and the press, as even the press is suppressed in the South Sudan. As the Eye Radio and others has gotten harassed by the TGoNU. They don’t want the news of conflict spread and the initial reports from the nation. Peace.
Reference:
United Nation Security Council 7810th Meeting (15.11.2016)
UNSC – ‘S/2016/963: Letter dated 15 November 2016 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (15.11.2016)