Key aspects of the UNMISS Independent Special Investigation report of First November 2016
This report has been targeted by the Kenyan Government becomes of the sections that we’re about the leadership of UNMISS Peacekeeping Operations in South Sudan. The UN House and other activity in Juba as the crisis sparked in July 2016. These words we’re too much for the Jubilee Government, President Uhuru Kenyatta and the overzealous Vice-President William Ruto. Therefore I had to go through it; it’s a short one and quick fix to read. This here is the key and they give you the ability see what the Independent Special Investigation coming in after serious reports happening in Juba in July. This is important to look at.
As the UN said: “Commenting on the report at the daily press briefing at UN Headquarters, Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric announced that in line with the report’s recommendations, the Secretary-General has asked for the “immediate replacement” of UNMISS Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki” (UN, 2016).
Here is the aspect of the report that people should look at:
“In the weeks prior to the violence, UNMISS and the humanitarian community saw timely and accurate warning signs of the resumption of hostilities in Juba between the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) and Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO). Despite the early warning that fighting would take place near UN House, the Mission did not properly prepare for three critical and foreseeable scenarios” (Independent Special Investigation, 2016).
“The Special Investigation found that a lack of leadership on the part of key senior Mission personnel culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response to the violence” (…) “The JOC and the Security Information Operations Centre (SIOC) were not co-located, as required by UN policy, contributing to a fragmented security response” (…) “The Force Commander appointed the Chinese Battalion Commander as the Incident Commander, commanding all the forces at the UN House in addition to his own battalion. Furthermore, the Force Commander ordered the Incident Commander to retain an explicit and ultimately confusing command link to Sector South headquarters in Tomping, which was physically cut off from the UN House for the duration of the fighting. This confused arrangement, in combination with the lack of leadership on the ground, contributed to incidents of poor performance among the military and police contingents at UN House. This included at least two instances in which the Chinese battalion abandoned some of its defensive positions at POC 1 on 10 and 11 July. The Nepalese Formed Police Unit’s performance to stop looting by some IDPs inside UN House and control the crowd was inadequate” (Independent Special Investigation, 2016).
“At approximately 15:30, when the soldiers began looting and forcing their way into the accommodations, the residents immediately notified UN Security and UNMISS. During the attack, civilians were subjected to and witnessed gross human rights violations, including murder, intimidation, sexual violence and acts amounting to torture perpetrated by armed Government soldiers” (…) “The JOC made multiple requests to stand up a quick reaction force to respond but each UNMISS contingent turned down the request, indicating their troops were fully committed. The situation at UN House remained chaotic at this time, with thousands of IDPs in the staff accommodation area, armed men still threatening the perimeter of POC site 3, and large numbers of armed Government soldiers still on Yei road in front of UN House’s main gate” (Independent Special Investigation, 2016).
“The Special Investigation found that the lack of preparedness, ineffective command and control and a risk-averse or “inward-looking” posture resulted in a loss of trust and confidence—particularly by the local population and humanitarian agencies—in the will and skill of UNMISS military, police to be proactive and show a determined posture to protect civilians under threat, including from sexual violence and human rights violations” (Independent Special Investigation, 2016).
If this wasn’t damning for the UNMISS leadership and the peacekeepers where the investigation team clearly saw that the leadership we’re inward looking and not prepared. That shows that in country that is war-torn the leadership of UNMISS wasn’t prepared to secure their facilities or keeping the peace. The communication between the different battalions we’re chaotic with double roles and that was between the Chines Battalion and the Tomping PoC camp.
So with this there must be better than what they found and that the Kenyan Government feels sorrow for volunteering is understandable. It’s a slap on their face, but it is one Military Leader not prepared for the operation and facilitates the other battalions. Therefore when the violence came, they wasn’t on the alert, instead they we’re scattered. Something that the Protection of Civilians camp, Civilians, NGOs or the people around UNMISS sites.
Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response (01.11.2016)
UN – ‘South Sudan: Ban to put in place measures to improve UN Mission’s ability to protect civilians’ (01.11.2016) link: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55448#.WB-jP_nhDIU