The Presidents’ Black book and the rewards He received from Kagame and Kabila and compensated military support of Kiir

I know it is supposed to be celebration of 30 years of NRM rule in Uganda. I have discussed the economic situation and democratic deficit now and then. Today I write about something I have thought about for a long time and think is necessary to be told. Never enough as long as President Museveni is a leader and also President Kagame and the son-of Laurent, Joseph Kabila in Democratic Republic of Congo. There is a dark history in the way President Museveni took power in Uganda and right after. Here will not directly tell about the atrocities between the UNLA and NRA. There we’re massive breaches in the middle of the civil-war. This here will be snippets of histories from both former loyal men and documents that have been released recently that we’re not public before. They tell how Museveni ushered Kabila, used force to earn wealth for himself and Uganda, how he gave way to Kagame after he helped Museveni gain power in Uganda, And lastly a little story about the recent adventure of Museveni in South Sudan as loyalty to President Kiir. Some tricks doesn’t die easy, as long as he gain something with the use of arms and guns, President Museveni will take it. Take a look!

Gen David ‘Tinye’ Sejusa revealed this murders as ordered by Museveni:
“That after accusing Gen Kazini of sending money to elements of the SPLA, Museveni “ordered his execution by procuring the services of a 6ft 6in man to murder Kazini”. He went on to say: “Forget that trash of [Lydia] Draru. In case of Kazini, again some forex bureau, originally said to belong to Gen Kazini, but [which] actually belonged to a known relative of Museveni, was later to be used to pass the money for the payment of the executioners of Kazini, to the accounts of the assassins.” (…)”He said: “For those in the know, again Andrew Kayiira was said to possess money before he was gunned down by Museveni’s goons.” (Gombya 2013).

Human Rights Violations right after the Bush-War:
“NRA embarked on revenge against people from Acholi, Lango and Teso; and second, the collapse of discipline within the NRA coincided with insurgencies in the North and East. Both the NRA and thevarious armed groups in the areas continued to attack and kill civilians. As a matter of fact, the same strategies of gross violations of human rights the UNLA had used in the Luwero Triangle and West Nile are being used by the NRA in these areas. Hospitals, schools, churches, granaries and houses have been destroyed by the the NRA. The insurgents have likewise looted, raped and murdered people from their own home areas. (Otunnu, 1992).

Killings in 1993:
“There is no evidence that the Government sanctioned political killings in 1993. There were, however, reports of extrajudicial killings. For example, on June 21, police and internal security officials arrested four intelligence officers accused of murdering two prisoners in Iganga district on June 7. The case received considerable media attention. Two of the four accused officers were released without charge; the other two were being held in Makindye military prison without charge at year’s end” (U.S. Department of State, 1994).

Museveni support of Kagame:
“Despite Museveni consistence denials, Uganda has given the RPF military support since it began the civil war in 1990. Kagame, a Tutsi who headed Ugandan military intelligence before taking over the RPF, served closely with Museveni in Ugandan civil war” (EXDIS, 1994). Mr. Claver Kanyaryshoki reminiscing: “In September 1990, precociously on 11th September , a three party summer was organized between MOBUTU, HABAYARIMA and MUSEVENI to control the borders of his country and to avoid the invasion of other countries. On that occasion, they issued a declaration signed by the three heads of state that was meant to prevent the destabilization of a neighboring country from Uganda. As the threat became clearer despite all these efforts, president HABAYARIMA sent his foreign affairs minster to MUSEVENI on the 24th September to tell him that the attack was imminent. MUSVENI reiterated that these were rumors. He let HABAYARIMA know that: “he did not to lose single second of sleep thinking about an attack from Uganda, as this would never be the case as long as (MUSEVENI] would hold power”. Later on, MUSEVENI claimed later on the same day he met Fred RWEGEMA, after receiving the Rwandan Minister Casimir BIZIMUNGU. He said he calmed down the Rwandese. However, in fact his meeting with RWEGEMA was intended to put the finishing touches on the details of the invasion. MUSVENI was to attend A UN Summit on the rights of the child in New York. He knew he would not be around and wanted that he operations be carried out in his absence. By doing so, he would then pretend to be innocent or not aware of them. This is an old habit in Uganda. Even in October 1982 with Rwandese nationals were deported, President Milton OBOTE was by any chance away in Italy” (Unofficial OTP Translation, 2006).

Museveni fallout with Laurent Kabila because of business:
“At first, in 1997, Uganda seemed ready to tolerate many of Kabila’s shortcomings if the new president of the DRC would address bigger economic issues, such as US$2 billion road linking Uganda and Kisangani and the need to train police and anti-smuggling units. Both Rwanda and Uganda had hoped that by helping Kabila take power, they would ensure security on their borders and also benefit economically from North Kivu’s natural resources including minerals, gold and diamonds. By May 1997, Ugandan businessmen had jumped into the fray, selling everything from frozen chicken to plastic mugs to Congo. But Kabila had other plans. The Kisangani project also never materialized. This lack of interest on Kabila’s side to open up Congo to Uganda’s business interests was a critical blow to the relationship between Museveni and Kabila” (International Crisis Group, 1999). “Kabila was assassinated on 17 January 2001, the date set for commemorating the 40th anniversary of the death of Lumumba, whose successor he claimed to be. No light has ever been shed on this crime either” (Garreton, 2008).

The plundering under Museveni in 90s in the DRC:
“At the request of the panel, the Ugandan authorities provided extensive data, including production and export values for agricultural products such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. In terms of minerals, the data also cover gold and coltan production and export figures” (…)”The gap between production and export could originate from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo” (…)”Ugandan gold export does not reflect this country’s production, levels but rather that some exports might be “leaking over the boarders” from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The central bank reported that, by September 1997, Uganda had exported gold valued $105 Million, compared with $60 million in 1996 and $23 Million in 1995” (…)”Second, the data from the Ugandan authorities are silent with regard to diamond production and export” (…)”These diamond exports are suspicious for many reasons: (a) Uganda have no known diamond production; (b) Diamond exports from Uganda are observed only in the last few years, coinciding surprisingly with the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo” (…)” (c)” (…)”external observers on the need to control the rich diamond zone near Kisangani and Banalia” (UN, P: 19, 2001).

Museveni’s adventure in South Sudan:
“Observers question how deployment of Uganda’s army, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), in South Sudan is paid for and who profits from it. At the beginning of the war, when Juba’s fall to the insurgents was a possibility, some of South Sudan’s national reserves as well as senior politicians’ assets were sent to Uganda” (…)”8 A return to intense combat or a protracted war in Uganda’s areas of operation would raise the financial and operational costs of the deployment. In February 2015, the defence ministry requested a supplementary budget allocation, in part to cover South Sudan operations, thus suggesting that they are as much strategic as economically motivated” (…)”Ugandan officials say these early payments do not appear in the national budget and speculate they may have been used for personal, not official purposes”.“The Report of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs on the Ministerial Policy Statement and Budget Estimates for the Fiscal Year 2015/16”, Parliament of Uganda, May 2015 (hardcopy with Crisis Group); Crisis Group Report, South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, op. cit., p. 23” (ICG, 2015)

Afterthought:
I don’t think I just discuss this deep subject to much. The stories and history tells enough and also the sadness of what the Ugandan Army has done after NRA/NRM took power in Uganda. This here is tales and stories of the darkness and shadow of President Museveni. Not only economic destruction in Uganda to personal gain, or democratic deficit to keep himself in power, this here is how he lived by the guns to keep loyal leaders in the neighborhood and also gain riches while looting the DRC. Peace.

Reference:
EXDIS – Unclassified American Government official update: SC-12252-94 ‘Rwanda Update’ (12.04.1994).
Otunnu, Ogenga – ‘Socio-Economic and Political Crisisin Uganda: Reason for Human Rights Violations and Refugees‘– Refuge Periodical, Canada – (October 14-17,1992)

Gombya, Henry D – ‘EXCLUSIVE: Museveni “ordered murder of Kayiira, Kazini and many others” (25.08.2013) link: http://www.thelondoneveningpost.com/exclusive-museveni-ordered-murder-of-kayiira-kazini-and-many-others/

International Crisis Group – ‘ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report Nº 3’ (21.05.1999)

International Crisis Group – ‘South Sudan: Keeping Faith with the IGAD Peace Process’ Africa Report N°228′ (27.07.2015)

Unofficial OTP Translation – Witness KVB46 – RP 31398-31403 BIS – ‘Report on the Interview between Counsel Yaovi Degli and Mr. Kanyarushoki Claver’ (20.11.2006)

United Nation – S/2001/357: ‘Report of the Panel of Expert on the Illegal Exploration of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (12.04.2001)

United Nation – DOCUMENT ICC 01/04-01/06 – ‘REPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’ (03.12.2008) Written by Robert Garreton.

U.S. Department of State – ‘UGANDA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993’ (31.01.1994).